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INTRODUCTION
The present report builds upon various studies published by the Center for the 
Study of Democracy throughout the last decade which have focused on specific 
aspects of organized crime in Bulgaria (contraband, the drug market, tax fraud, 
human trafficking, arms proliferation, etc.), the systemic spread of corruption, 
and the linkages between the two. The report presents the latest trends and 
manifestations (or ”market niches”) of syndicate crime and its particularly damag-
ing effects. It goes further to offer a historical review of the facts and available 
expertise in the area, and to draw conclusions about the origin, characteristics 
and developmental features of organized criminality in Bulgaria in the context of 
the transition to democracy.
Organized crime is approached as a complex phenomenon through one basic 
assumption: rather than being deviant behavior, as it generally is in other societ-
ies, crime in post-communist states such as Bulgaria was an essential attribute 
of a society in transition from state to private property, as the post-1989 state’s 
monopoly over the economy began to dissolve, institutional control declined and 
private businesses proliferated in a largely unregulated environment. The collapse 
of the totalitarian state, whose immediate result was a burgeoning gray and black 
economy followed by a precarious combination of legal and shady businesses 
run by the post-communist elites, rather seamlessly propagated the emergence 
of organized crime.
Public bodies, particularly the judiciary and law enforcement, in transition states 
are under-equipped for identifying and tackling complex organized crime enter-
prises which run legitimate businesses on a par with criminal deals and com-
monly resort to corrupt practices. Thus, law enforcement agencies would rather 
focus on the unequivocally criminal and direct their efforts against black markets. 
The lack of capacity of both Bulgarian and EU institutions to tackle organized 
crime is nowhere more visible than when public figures and politicians speak 
publicly about contracts killings. These notorious mafia-type murders, however, 
are a clear marker of the existence of complex criminal structures where even 
the gravest crime has a rational justification and a sound economic motive.
As the EU cannot but seek to apply uniform approaches and regulations across 
member states, its attempts to offer and require solutions regarding Bulgaria’s jus-
tice and home affairs failures could only be cursory. Countering organized crime 
and high-level corruption are legitimately defined by the European Commission 
as the areas where progress to integration is most lacking. The benchmarks set, 
however, are too quantitative and formal to be able to capture the changes or 
lack thereof of such deep-set issues.
By outlining the types and trends in Bulgarian organized crime as it evolved in 
the transition years, this report provides a new perspective to these issues in 
general and in particular – on the implications and the price to be paid for the 
penetration of local criminal enterprises (bearing the characteristics of oligar-
chic cliques) into the economic and political elites of Bulgaria. This approach 
helps examine some fundamental questions, such as whether there is any legal 
national capital in Bulgaria and what is the preferred way of its legalization and 
transfer in the legitimate economy (amnesty, money laundering, etc.), what could 
be done against an increasingly brazen high-level symbiosis of policy makers and 
civil servants with gray businesses, and if this symbiosis could be further tolerated 
now that Bulgaria is a full-fledged EU member. 
* * *
This report attempts to present an authentic picture of organized crime in Bul-
garia, by identifying its constituent features and major trends. The authors of the 
report, however, are not claiming to offer the most comprehensive representation, 
as the topic is constantly and dynamically changing. The research team has used 
information from all available sources, analyzing it through several, complemen-
tary methods. This multifaceted approach has sometimes led to contradictory 
conclusions about the surveyed gray and black markets. Any such contradictions 
were intentionally left intact in order to demonstrate the need for a continu-
ing information gathering effort. Collecting empirical data about clandestine and 
hidden markets is a hard task, which can sometimes put the researchers at risk. 
However, it cannot be dispensed with, particularly as the so called ”objective 
data” (police and judicial crime statistics) provided by public bodies is often 
incomplete and sometimes manipulated. The publication enhances expertise ex-
change through public-private partnership as a main research approach favored 
by the Center for the Study of Democracy. 
The sources of information drawn upon are primary and secondary.  
Primary sources comprise a series of quantitative and qualitative surveys that can 
be placed in two groups: 
• National Crime Surveys conducted annually by the Center for the Study of 
Democracy and Vitosha Research since 2002. These are based on a nation-
ally representative sample of the population over 15 years of age. They 
follow the UNICRI methodology, which makes their findings internationally 
comparable. 
• Population surveys on drug use and prostitution. These are conducted by 
either Bulgarian and foreign public bodies, or non-governmental organiza-
tions and concern the use of psychoactive substances by various groups of 
the population (secondary school and university students, intravenous users, 
the populations of different localities, etc.) or cover prostitutes and human 
trafficking victims. 
Qualitative research comprises over 200 in-depth interviews with law-enforcement 
and judiciary officials, organized crime participants and consumers of criminal 
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goods and services, conducted in the course of two years (2005–2007). Informa-
tion from similar interviews carried out by the Center for the Study of Democracy 
experts throughout the period 2001–2007 in areas such as drug distribution and 
drug trafficking, arms transfer, contraband and customs frauds, have also been 
used. In-depth interviewees were selected from among three target groups:
1. Law-enforcement and judiciary officials. High-ranking and first-line police 
officers from units dedicated to countering the markets under research, 
customs officers, prosecutors and judges involved in key investigations and 
lawsuits against organized crime. Most interviewees have preferred to keep 
their anonymity. Others expressly required from the team not to disclose 
their rank or position. For this reason, a list was compiled, where each 
anonymous source was designated with a particular letter from the Latin 
alphabet.
2. Organized crime players. Most of them are from the grassroots level – cur-
rent and former street dealers, petty pimps and car thieves, etc. In addi-
tion, some middle-level participants were interviewed, as well as several 
emblematic underworld figures. 
3. Privileged clients of drug distributors, sex workers and car theft networks. 
As a rule, these people have had long relations with organized criminal 
groups and have an almost insider view of the situation. They are part of 
the criminal infrastructure–bartenders, security guards, nigh club owners, 
DJs, lawyers, car mechanics, etc.
Secondary sources include official crime statistics, such as police and customs 
service operational records, judicial statistics, statistical data from foreign police 
and judicial systems.
* * *
The five parts of the report focus on: first, an overview of organized crime, fol-
lowed by sections devoted to four of the main criminal markets–car theft, women 
trafficking and prostitution rings, drug smuggling and the local drug market, and 
the market of antiquities.
The analysis draws on key international and foreign crime surveys and research 
papers, as well as police records and statistics from Bulgaria and Western Europe. 
The key research approaches used are in-depth personalized interviews with 
experts/officials at relevant public institutions and agencies of the Ministry of 
Interior, and interviews with people victimized by or involved in organized crimi-
nal activities. The publication enhances expertise exchange through public-private 
partnership as a main research approach. 
The study was developed by Tihomir Bezlov and Dr. Emil Tzenkov, Senior Fel-
lows at the Center for the Study of Democracy, with essential contributions from 
Marina Tzvetkova, PhD scholar at Oxford University, Philip Gounev, London 
School of Economics and Georgi Petrunov, research fellow at the Institute of 
Sociology, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. 

1. ORGANIZED CRIME IN BULGARIA: 
TYPOLOGY AND TRENDS
The spread of organized crime as an extremely dangerous social phenomenon 
has marked the transition in nearly all of the post-communist countries. Bul-
garia was among the most hard-hit by the crime wave accompanying the 
transformation of the totalitarian state1 in the early 1990s. In fact, the term 
„transformation” hardly provides an adequate idea of the abrupt shift from total 
state control over the individual to the kind of freedom that combined a semi-
criminal economy, legal and institutional chaos and insecurity for the citizens. As 
a result of the nihilism and incompetence, as well as the corruption of the new 
political elites, chaotic measures were undertaken in the guise of „liberal reform” 
which actually led to the practical dissolution of statehood and the expansion of 
organized crime.2
The problems related to the rise in crime in the early stages of the transition, 
however, were overshadowed by the ostensibly successful democratic reforms 
and, on account of various political considerations, were downplayed both by 
the local expert community and party elites and by the foreign partners of post-
communist Bulgaria. It was not until the end of the past and start of the current 
decade when the ideas predominant up to then began to lose in influence and 
there appeared signs of deepening public mistrust in democratic institutions and 
the political class of the early transition, that the problems of organized crime 
and corruption acquired primary social and political salience and subsequently 
their monitoring and assessment came to be essential in shaping the attitude to 
Bulgaria of allies such as the European Union and the US. 
The initial temptation to handle these issues exclusively with the political tools 
of traditional anticommunism is gradually being overcome. More and more poli-
ticians and analysts realize that organized crime is rather a beneficiary of the 
downfall of totalitarian statehood and cannot be interpreted and accounted for 
solely in terms of the „communist heritage”. It successfully legitimizes itself by 
identifying with the key categories of the democratic transition and has taken 
up the vacant niche of the „national capital” within the frames of the transition, 
which has had a great many adverse implications for the country (it is hardly 
1 In the late 1980s, the so called militia (the then police service) and the special services had an 
agent network of about 250 thousand people and kept files on 450 thousand people out of 
a population of 9 million. By number of agents per capita (roughly 3 agents per 100 persons) 
Bulgaria was only surpassed by East Germany and Romania.
2 In the literature, such liberalization is commonly referred to as „reform by catastrophe”.
by chance that in the 1990s, terms such as „businessman” and „smartly-dressed 
businessmen” came to be popularly perceived as synonymous with banditism).3
From here, there is just one step to raising the issue of the legitimization of orga-
nized crime as an expected phenomenon in a transition that is marked by high 
crime rates.4 In the context of stagnant reform, with the corrupt exploitation of 
state property by the elites of the transition and with the dismantled or corrupt 
law-enforcement and justice administration institutions, the breaking of the law 
and economic crimes are becoming a political and economic necessity. In other 
words, in countries like Bulgaria, organized crime is not so much a deviant 
phenomenon but actually has functional preconditions stemming from the 
specific characteristics of the transition.5
What is certain is that the evolution of organized crime is a complex socio-politi-
cal process related to the radical changes in society and the far-reaching re-
distribution of the national wealth, as well as with the emergence of grey and 
black markets operating in parallel to the legal economy. It is a transition from 
total control over society and one-hundred percent state ownership to a situation 
of an oligarchic type which suggests parallels with Latin American countries.
What is characteristic of the Bulgarian transition is that several thousand „busi-
nessmen” found themselves in the position of owners of the country and its 
economy, with a great many of the businesspersons in question fully meet-
ing the criteria established by academic research and the basic textbook 
definitions of organized crime.6 For the most part, control over the property is 
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The ”grey economy” comprises activities that in essence are not prohibited by national law but do not take place 
in compliance with the respective rules and/or institutional requirements (declaration, registration, licensing, etc.) 
and typically constitute administrative violations of some of these regulations.
The ”black economy” covers activities prohibited and punishable by law.
Example: The trade in spirits is a legal activity. In the absence of excise bands, it turns grey yet only as long as 
the due excise is not paid. I.e., there exists a channel through which this activity can be ”brought out into the 
light”. The drug trade, on the other hand, is a black market activity with no available options for legitimization 
within the existing legal framework.
Box 1. Grey and black economy: a tentative definition
3 Insofar as, up to the downfall of the communist system, there did not exist any know-how about 
a relatively painless transition from state socialism to market capitalism and pluralist political 
system, there may be endless speculations on this subject. In any case, they should be the object 
of a special study.
4 The well-known Russian sociologist and political scientist Vadim Volkov also considers this issue 
in the context of his study of organized crime in Russia; see Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: 
The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism, 2002.
5 In the political history of Eastern Europe, no country has been able to withstand this tendency. 
Even in East Germany, where the transition was carried out with the help of the most powerful 
economy in Europe and the political class of the Federal Republic of Germany, economic crime 
and political corruption proved inevitable.
6 There exist numerous definitions of organized crime. In the European literature there prevails the 
view that organized crime is an activity having at least six basic characteristics, of which the first 
four are indispensable: 1. collaboration between more than two persons; 2. occurs over a long 
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exercised through stable structures involving hundreds and even thousands of em-
ployees and companies in complex hierarchical relationships. Such mechanisms 
are used to secure monopolistic profits part of which are redistributed through 
corrupt networks among local bureaucrats, magistrates, MPs, and ministers. These 
mechanisms or models are universally applicable, regardless of whether in crimi-
nal privatization, bank crediting, illegal trafficking in goods, pilfering of natural 
resources, etc.
Three different forms of organized crime in this country can be distinguished:7
• The first type are the so-called „violent entrepreneurs” whose activity was 
initially largely based on violence.
• The second type is represented by the group of the extreme-risk entre-
preneurs. They are more likely to be permanently involved in systematic 
criminal activity in view of the great competitive advantages of this type 
of entrepreneurship. So far their activity has tended to remain outside the 
focus of public attention. 
• The third type constitute huge structures headed by so-called oligarchs 
(akin to the notorious Russian model) whose ambitions are aimed at mo-
nopolizing the most profitable activities and sectors in the state with the 
help of the methods of corruption and clientelism. 
The common principle for all three groups is the aspiration to capture the mar-
kets regardless of the different structures and methods of operation. Moreover, 
entry into the various legal, grey, and black markets takes place within the con-
text of the restructuring of the planned economy into a market economy and 
its liberalization accompanied by the arrival in the market of big international 
companies (Table 1).
or indefinite period of time; 3. the respective group is suspected of committing serious crimes 
punishable by at least 4 years” imprisonment; 4. the group in question is acting in the pursuit 
of material gain and/or power. To these four criteria should be added any two of the following 
characteristics: 5. there is division of labor among the members of the group; 6. measures are 
taken to reinforce discipline and control; 7. use of violence or other means of intimidation; 
8. use of commercial and business structures; 9. involvement in money laundering; 10. the 
activity of the group is in part of transnational character; 11. exerts influence over legitimate 
social institutions (the political class, government, justice administration, the economy). See 
Michael Levi, The Organization of Serious Crimes, in: The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, ed. by 
Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner, 2002, p.882. It is worth noting the following 
definition of this phenomenon: ”any organized group that has its leadership insulated from 
direct involvement in criminal acts and ensures organizational integrity in the event of a loss of 
leadership”. See www.iir.com/28cfr/sample_operating_Policies_definitions.htm
7 These general categories have been identified based on available studies, „grey literature”, 
investigative reports by journalists, analyses by special services in Bulgaria, as well as data about 
the related situation in other countries – in the Balkans, in Eastern Europe, and particularly in 
Russia.
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Table 1. Sources, methods, and stages in the development 
of organized crime in the context of the Bulgarian 
transition
Violent Entrepreneurs
Extreme-risk
Entrepreneurs
Oligarchs
Sources
1. Former sportsmen in 
heavy athletics and high-
ly physical sports such as 
weight-lifting, wrestling, 
etc. 
2. Former officers from the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs 
3. Former criminal convicts 
1. Representatives of occu-
pations requiring no edu-
cation degree but with a 
degree of entrepreneur-
ship under socialism: taxi 
drivers, bartenders, ware-
house managers, waiters, 
etc.
2. Representatives of pro-
fessional groups such 
as foreign trade special-
ists, accountants, jurists 
(mainly lawyers), as well 
as students in these sub-
jects.
3. Former criminal convicts
1. Former high-ranking busi-
ness executives 
2. Former communist-party 
functionaries 
3. Former officers from the 
special services
Method
Use and selling of violence 
through large groups 
Using networks to execute 
criminal and semi-criminal 
operations, mostly involv-
ing import and trafficking of 
goods, as well as lease and 
purchase of state and mu-
nicipal property; obtaining 
bank credits (the group of 
the so-called credit million-
aires), and others.
National wealth redistribu-
tion through the use of 
the new political elites and 
establishment of holdings 
comprising dozens of com-
panies. Gaining domination 
over financial institutions 
and taking control of state 
financial institutions (includ-
ing the Central Bank) and 
the media.
Markets – 
initial emergence
1. Providing security for re-
tail companies and out-
lets, and entertainment 
establishments.
2. Debt collection, puni-
tive actions, mediation in 
conflicts between busi-
nesses.
3. Trafficking from and to 
the former Yugoslavia.
4. Trafficking in excise 
goods – spirits, cigarettes, 
crude oil.
5. Thefts, smuggling and 
trade in automobiles.
Gaining advantages from the 
unlawful entry into all possible 
markets:
1. Trade in scarce goods – 
starting with mass con-
sumer goods such as 
cooking oil and sugar in 
the first months of the 
1990 spring crisis.
2. Ranging from the import 
of used cars and spare 
parts to car and registra-
tion fraud schemes.
3. Ranging from trade in 
real estate to speculative 
operations such as buying 
up municipal and state-
owned housing, including 
by eviction of tenants.
Conquering key markets by:
1. Setting up financial com-
panies – financial houses, 
banks, etc.
2. Controlling the input and 
output of state enter-
prises.
3. Creating, gaining domi-
nation and control over 
mass-media.
4. Controlling large shares 
of mass markets (cartels).
5. Partnering with risk en-
trepreneurs and setting 
up holdings present in 
as many markets as pos-
sible.
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Table 1. Sources, methods, and stages in the development 
of organized crime in the context of the Bulgarian 
transition (continued)
Violent Entrepreneurs
Extreme-risk
Entrepreneurs
Oligarchs
Markets – 
initial emergence
4. Trade in foreign cur-
rency, including currency 
speculations.
5. Participation in the black 
markets, including prosti-
tution and drugs.
6. Establishing strategic alli-
ances with big multina-
tional corporations. 
Markets –
second stage
1. Insurance transforming 
the security and entering 
the mass insurance 
market – symbiosis with 
the stolen car market.
2. Pirated CD 
manufacturing, 
considerable investments 
in advanced technology.
3. After the end of the 
Yugoslav embargo, 
attempts to make up for 
the losses in income by 
taking control over the 
most profitable smuggling 
markets (including drugs).
Cooperation 
between the three 
groups
The oligarchs’ role is to 
solve problems with law-
enforcement and judiciary. 
Extreme risk entrepreneurs 
serve as advisors, trustees, 
and income and investment 
channels.
Using the structures of these 
groups to conquer market 
shares and to deal with 
problems with competitors 
or partners; joining up 
with the oligarchs to 
ensure access to markets, 
protection, and assistance 
against the state.
Intimidation and control 
over small businesses 
through extreme punitive 
action (including destruction 
of property and murder); 
using extreme-risk 
entrepreneurs (including 
through financing) in 
problematic operations.
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1.1. EVOLUTION OF VIOLENT ENTREPRENEUR GROUPS
The violent entrepreneur groups are emblematic of Bulgarian organized crime and 
ever since the beginning of their activity have been synonymous with criminal 
business in this country. The different stages in their development over the two 
decades of the transition quite eloquently illustrate the ambivalent relationships 
between the criminal and the political elites, vacillating between antagonism and 
corrupt partnership.
The beginning (1990-1992)
The model of entrepreneurship of violence (also dubbed „selling protection”) 
has been well-documented in the criminological literature. In its Bulgarian ver-
sion, group members were initially recruited from among athletes, whence the 
popular name „wrestler groups” or „wrestlers”. Similarly to the former Soviet 
Union and the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria had a very well developed 
system for training professional athletes in the Olympic sports. A network of sports 
schools was in place where huge numbers of children were trained to become 
professional athletes. At the time, the state ensured lifelong support for the elite 
athletes. With the end of communist rule, the system was deprived of financial 
support practically leaving tens of thousands of athletes out in the street. Some 
of them, and particularly the heavy sports athletes, joined the violent entrepre-
neur groups that guaranteed a new identity, good incomes, and prospects for 
quick prosperity in the chaos of the transition. The thus recruited members of 
these structures had the unique psychological and physical experience in using 
violence, winning combats, enduring pain, etc. Structurally, the sports schools 
themselves formed the backbone of the future structures of organized crime.
The second pool of recruits for the violent entrepreneur groups were former 
officers from the police and special services. In the period 1990-1992,8 12-17 
thousand employees were discharged from this system for ideological reasons. It 
is generally believed that the representatives of this group, whose names rarely 
become public, have played a key role in the choice of the activity of the violent 
entrepreneur structures. They further take on the critical function of mediators in 
the event of problems with the law enforcement authorities.
The third pool was made up of criminals, a great many of whom were given 
amnesty in the early 1990s. Their role, however, cannot be compared to countries 
with a long history of organized crime, such as Russia (the Soviet Union).
The successful establishment of the violent entrepreneur groups in the first half of 
the 1990s was related to the far-reaching political, economic, and institutional cri-
sis that paralyzed the state and facilitated its usurpation by new elites involved in 
8 The period January-May 1990 was marked by mass lay-offs of State Security – the former secret 
police of the communist regime - officers; it was followed by a second round of lay-offs in 
January-June 1991, and a third one in 1992.
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semi-criminal networks. The grave economic crisis9 and the economic isolation10
produced a huge deficit of resources. As a result, it proved practically impossible 
to conduct a controlled policy of transition from planned centralized governance 
to market economy.
At the same time, the political processes led to instability of government. Over 
a period of seven years (November 1989 – June 1997) there was a succession of 
2 interim and 8 elected governments. Upon each political change, one of the 
most affected systems was that of the Ministry of Interior (MoI). These changes 
also had extremely adverse implications for the judicial system. In the first period 
of the transition, the law-enforcement agencies were practically paralyzed, in-
cluding with respect to organized crime. In the security sector, the processes of 
dismantling the old communist services placed a number of law-enforcement and 
control functions in a state of institutional vacuum. In fact, by the early 1990s 
the state had effectively lost its monopoly on violence which freed the hands 
of the violent entrepreneur groups. Law-enforcement authorities appeared par-
ticularly powerless to protect the proliferating, mostly small, businesses the very 
emergence of which actually gave the start to the transition from state-controlled 
to market economy. These new shops, restaurants, hotels, and other businesses, 
largely in the area of services, found themselves almost completely helpless in 
the face of the explosion of criminal activity. By official data, in three years alone 
(1990-1992), overall street crime increased four times with the rate of some 
types increasing 10 to 20 times. 
The violent entrepreneur structures quickly filled the emerging vacuum and the 
market for the sale of violence and protection became critical to the survival of 
any business in the following 7-8 years. Similarly to the situation in the other East-
European countries, in Bulgaria there evolved a market for „protection against 
violence”, in addition to racketeering.11 The actual start of this process was set in 
1991 when a group of well-known Bulgarian athletes (Olympic and world med-
alists) demanded that private security activity be licensed by the state. This was 
seen as a means of survival after the „drastic cuts in public spending on sports”. 
The Ministry of Interior rapidly regulated private security activity arguing that it 
would give the laid-off officers a chance to earn a living legitimately. As a result, 
tens of thousands of former MoI and Ministry of Defense employees, a large 
9 During socialism, Bulgaria was a country with a remarkably open economy – foreign trade 
accounted for close to 60-70% of its domestic product. About 60% was with the Soviet Union, 
and another 15% with the remaining countries of the Eastern Bloc. The end of CMEA – the 
trade organizations of the communist countries - led to a dramatic drop in foreign trade and 
by 1990-91, Bulgaria had lost 2/3 of its markets. The onset of the war in Yugoslavia practically 
confined Western Europe’s interest to the Central-European countries. In addition, Bulgaria lost 
its second most important market – the Arab countries – with the war in Iraq in 1990-1991. The 
biggest problem of the country’s population is the drastic fall in the standard of living which used 
to be equivalent to (German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia) or higher than (Poland, 
Hungary and the Baltic republics) that in Central Europe.
10 Bulgaria had the largest foreign debt in Eastern Europe. Unlike countries such as Poland, 
indebted to other states, the bulk of the Bulgarian debt was owed to private institutions (the 
London Club). In early 1990, the creditors refused to extend payment deadlines and the country 
found itself incapable of servicing its debt. As a result, Andrey Lukanov’s government declared a 
debt moratorium and Bulgaria was plunged into almost total financial isolation.
11 See Philip Gounev. Bulgaria’s Private Security Industry in: Private Actors and Security Governance, 2007, 
p.110
number of former athletes and even criminals who had been given amnesty not 
only obtained legal jobs but also the right to carry arms and demonstrate force 
in a situation of general insecurity. This was basically the start of the raising of 
an army of experienced armed people who actually served as a legal cover for 
the emerging organized crime.
From the very beginning, private security providers began offering protection not 
only to private, but also to state-owned enterprises. Subsequently, these essen-
tially racket groups registered as security companies. The typical scheme involved 
taking over a specific territorial zone and defending it against rival racketeering 
groups. The gang’s territory covered all newly opened offices, shops, warehouses, 
restaurants, and other commercial outlets. The owners were coerced to resort to 
the services of the security company, with physical violence and/or damaging or 
destruction of property ensuing from any refusal to do so.
Gradually, in addition to the simple protection racket paid by the companies, the 
owners were offered extra services. In the context of an ineffective judicial system 
and with annual inflation in the range of 30-40% - which benefited debtors – 
debt collection became the most commonly offered service. It is in this context 
that the first territorial clashes between competing security structures arose. How-
ever, they subsequently quickly merged together. By mid-1993, in Bulgaria there 
were security companies of the violent entrepreneur type that covered nearly half 
of the biggest cities in the country.
The Yugoslav embargo and the flourish of smuggling (1992-1995)
The Yugoslav embargo catalyzed the formation of the structures of organized 
crime. It was imposed in the summer of 1992, when the Bulgarian government 
adopted the UN restrictions on export to the countries of former Yugoslavia. 
This measure put in place favorable conditions for organized transborder crime. 
With its already established structures for executing various forms of coercion, 
including violence, organized crime had an exceptional advantage over all other 
participants in the smuggling business (residents of border regions and private 
companies). Over the next period there occurred a specialization of various orga-
nized crime structures depending on the schemes they employed to earn profits 
from illegal export to the former Yugoslavia. It was towards the end of the 1990s 
that the actual scope was revealed of this criminal activity, covering the export of 
crude oil by tankers and trains, as well as petty smuggling by individual persons 
crossing the border by car. The documents disclosed in this period also shed 
light on the particular system of contraband franchising where all participants in 
transborder trafficking paid special fees to the organized crime representatives 
in charge of the area and the border checkpoints. The impact of the embargo 
against Yugoslavia on Bulgarian organized crime is comparable to that of the US 
Prohibition on American organized crime in 1920-1933.
Immediately following the emergence of the violent entrepreneur groups, contra-
band had an important place in their activity and over the years they managed 
to organize more or less lasting trafficking channels for drugs, as well as for legal 
goods. One of the reasons for the involvement of the violent entrepreneur groups 
in transborder operations was the shortage of goods. The Soviet model of planned 
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economy provided for full state monopoly on the consumer market – the type 
of imported goods as well as their quantity and price were determined by state 
planning authorities. As a result of this policy, in Bulgaria, as well as in the rest of 
Eastern Europe, there was a constant and general shortage of goods that intensi-
fied in the first year of the transition. With the elimination of state monopoly of 
the consumer goods market, there was a staggering surge in imports – ranging 
from cheap Turkish goods to expensive electronics and luxury cars. The newly 
formed organized crime structures immediately captured the new trend. Unlike 
Russian organized crime, which specialized in obtaining a cut from the sales and 
profits of importing companies, the Bulgarian violent entrepreneur groups actually 
got involved in the import business themselves. Several types of involvement in 
this process could be outlined.
The first type is primarily associated with the riskiest type of import – contra-
band. The use of violence and the involvement of former security-service officials 
(maintaining contacts with officials in customs, the tax authorities, and most no-
tably the MoI), allowed the structures of organized crime to take over the illegal 
trafficking in excise goods – imported cigarettes and spirits. Particularly profitable 
in this respect were some of the most basic consumer goods that became scarce 
in the country at different times (petrol products, sugar, cooking oil). The other 
group of products of interest to the import companies controlled by violent en-
trepreneur groups included consumer electronics, used cars, car spare parts, and 
others. 
The second type of involvement is associated with payment for the various 
services provided by organized crime to business, starting with the clearance of 
the goods and processing of import documentation at customs; through securing 
police protection, to collecting from non-payers and dealing with the competition 
by violent means.
The third type is related to the small-scale importer market. In the early days 
of the transition, the so called „suitcase trade” with Turkey (which began in the 
autumn of 1989) was completely free, chaotic, and uncontrolled. This type of im-
port and trade took place with the help of „import organizers” and go-betweens 
(dubbed „guides”).12 The scheme typically used the former state-owned facilities 
which in addition to warehouse storage served as retail and wholesale outlets.13
The violent entrepreneur groups managed to place under their control a great 
many of the participants in the Turkish trade chain. Thus, at the entry point the 
guides charged an additional security fee while the distribution network was di-
vided among the most powerful security providers. The regular clashes between 
the latter repeatedly led to turmoil and conflicts over control of the warehouses 
and the guides. In the periods of wars between the various national and regional 
structures of the groups involved, there were frequent burnings and destruction 
of goods, and the participants were fined, kidnapped, physically abused and even 
killed for their affiliation with a given group.
12 See Transport, Contraband, and Organized Crime, Center for the Study of Democracy, 2004, Sofia, 
p.50.
13 Ibid., p.51.
The golden era of violent entrepreneur groups: capturing the insurance market
By mid-1993, the chaotic occupation of free territories allowing the sale of violent 
services, the participation in illegal trafficking of goods, and control over the black 
markets such as car theft, drug trafficking, prostitution, illegal gambling, etc, had al-
ready come to an end. In the process of redistribution and amalgamation of these 
markets, one violent entrepreneur structure of nationwide coverage came out with 
monopoly positions – VIS-1.14 Its principal activity was the provision of „violence-
related services”. The model created and successfully developed by VIS-1 functioned 
through affiliation of local „security companies” with the main organization in Sofia. 
The goal was for VIS-1 to be represented in all of the big towns of the country 
and the local companies started presenting themselves as its subsidiaries. Any newly 
joining structure preserved its territory (town, region, clients, etc) and could count 
on assistance against the competition, and respectively, was obliged to assist the 
members of VIS-1.15
At that time, the state made no attempt whatsoever to restrain the activity of the 
company. According to some analyses, the MoI even intervened and took sides in 
some of the most fiercely competitive markets such as Sofia. Thus, for instance, in 
the clashes with competitors such as „the Karate Fighters” - the structure associated 
with Ivo Karamanski - and „the Sevens” [the 777 security company], the MoI rep-
resentatives often intervened in favor of VIS-1. By mid-2004, VIS-1 employed about 
2,000 people assigned to „brigades” of varying size. The analysis of the structure of 
VIS-1 and of other similar groups suggests that in many respects they borrowed from 
and copied their counterparts in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The larger 
structures as a rule had at least a three-tier hierarchy and many of the designations 
literally reproduced the Russian ones (see Figure 1).16
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14 The name derives from the Bulgarian abbreviation for Loyalty, Investments, Security.
15 For instance, if a problem should arise for a representative of VIS-1 in a given town (region) 
he may request and would receive assistance from the headquarters and from structures of the 
organization in neighboring towns. Within one year the organization had grown immensely and 
the firms under its umbrella managed to assimilate, drive out, or destroy the local competition. 
This applied in equal measure to ordinary security companies and to rival criminal groups 
operating in their area. VIS-1 thus managed to achieve nationwide coverage. Nevertheless, they 
failed to establish a monopoly on the „security business” in the bigger towns. In the largest ones 
such as Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, and Bourgas, and some smaller towns, various local racketeering 
structures such as TIM, 777, and others preserved their influence and even held the largest share 
of the market. It should be noted that legally VIS-1 was a registered as a legitimate company 
offering security services.
16 The reasons for this similarity are uncertain. The most popular explanation accounts for it with 
the clash between the Bulgarian violent entrepreneur structures and their counterparts from the 
former Soviet Union (mainly Russian, Ukrainian, and Caucasian) upon their attempt to establish 
themselves in Bulgaria. Another hypothesis is related mainly to the involvement of Bulgarian 
violent entrepreneur structures in the activity of trade companies exporting and importing to 
and from the countries of the former Soviet Union and Russia in particular. It is well-known 
that after 1991-92, the Russian criminal structures became the guarantors of trade deals with 
Bulgarian counterparts. At the time, in order to conduct a deal with a Russian cigarette importer, 
for instance, the exporter had to approach a similar violent entrepreneur structure in Bulgaria 
to guarantee the payment.
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By the mid-1990s, however, the widespread practice of racketeering and the 
many incidents involving the use of physical violence had created extremely 
negative public attitudes against the racketeers. The political change that took 
place at the time17 led to undertaking a series of government measures to put a 
check on the activities of private security providers. In the summer of 1994 the 
MoI had its the first tentative plans to rein in private security activity, in some 
cases even proposing to ban it altogether. The requirement was introduced for 
licensing of security companies by MoI and they were banned from having na-
tionwide coverage.18 As a result, many of the racketeers lost their authorizations 
and had to leave the market. 
In order to get around the new restrictions, in 1995 VIS-1 re-registered under a 
new name and area of activity. The new VIS-2 identified insurance as its prin-
cipal activity. In practice, however, clients were offered a whole package, as it 
were: should the clients decline the proposed insurance plan, they not only lost 
their protection but were subjected to physical coercion until they capitulated. 
Officially, however, the contract proposed by VIS-2 concerned insurance of the 
site rather than security provision. This insurance racket in fact followed logic 
contrary to that of the normal insurance business: instead of the client paying 
17 In the summer of 1994, after the withdrawal of BSP support for Lyuben Berov’s government, 
snap parliamentary elections were held and a new government was formed as a result.
18 See Ordinance No 14/25.03.1994 on the Issuing of Permits for Provision of Security of Sites 
and Individuals by Legal Entities and Natural Persons (Issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs, 
prom. SG No 28/01.04.1994, amend. No 99/02.12.1994, No 18/28.02.1997, abolished No 
19/02.03.1999.)
Figure 1. Structure of a violent entrepreneur group 
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Sorce: Vadim Volkov, Violent Enterpreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism, 2002
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for compensation in the event of an insurance incident, in this case they were 
paying protection racket to prevent damages by the racketeer. 
Car insurance became the main sector of insurance-related activity of VIS-2. In 
the mid-1990s, about 70-100,000 automobiles were brought into this country, 
mainly from Western Europe, each year (90% of which were second hand). 
Owing to the huge demand in Eastern Europe and the Near East there grew an 
enormous market for stolen cars. As a result, in Bulgaria car theft reached several 
hundred vehicles a month. In terms of the scale of the country, this meant one 
in three-four households or companies with a newly purchased car was likely 
to have it stolen. Traditional insurers were unable to cope with this surge in car 
theft, delayed or were incapable of paying claims.
It was this very market that became the target of insurance racketers. In the new 
situation, the vehicles insured with VIS-2 received protection against theft by the 
organization’s own structures, but also the guarantee that independent criminal 
perpetrators would be pursued if they should steal a car insured by VIS-2. Thus, 
a new service was added to the provision for commercial sites (shops, restaurants, 
warehouses, etc) – recovering stolen property and even paying compensation in 
the event of a criminal incident. In the course of time, clients realized that the 
services of this new type of insurer and the acquisition of the VIS-2 sticker mini-
mized the risk of theft or damage to their vehicles. The rapid development of 
VIS-2, however, gave rise to internal organizational problems. Its local competi-
tors began to join up against the company’s national headquarters. Similarly to 
legitimate corporations, any attempt to reinforce centralized management created 
tension inside the organization. As a result, the first two leaders who refused to 
acknowledge the authority of Vassil Iliev left the VIS-2 system. They formed the 
core of the new violent entrepreneur structure, SIK [Sofia Insurance Company]. 
Unlike VIS, the new company did not have a single dominating leader. Through-
out its existence, the company and, subsequently, its various spin-offs were man-
aged by eight publicly known figures. The newly established organization was 
soon joined by local rival to VIS across the country, as well as by discontented 
former VIS members. Similarly to VIS-2, the newly-established SIK went into the 
violent insurance business.
Thus, in 1995, there emerged the basic structures of organized crime in this 
country. Over the next period, all criminal and semi-criminal economic groups 
identified with either one of the two leading structures. Although there soon 
emerged other violent insurance companies, such as Apollo Balkan, Korona Ins, 
Levski Spartak, Zora Ins, and others, which successfully imitated the scheme of 
the dominating insurers and managed to gain some market share, to this day the 
division among criminal and economic groups is still consistent with their initial 
allegiance to either VIS-2 or SIK.
The insurance period (1994-1997) can be defined as the golden age of Bulga-
rian organized crime. Although the embargo against Yugoslavia was lifted in 1995 
and the revenues from illegal trafficking to and from the countries of former 
Yugoslavia declined, this was the period when the violent entrepreneur groups 
secured a sphere of influence including over the government, legislature, and the 
judiciary. Indicative of the scope of this phenomenon is the fact that the SIK and 
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VIS-2 insurance stickers at one point became mandatory attributes of any de-
cent-looking car, shop, office, restaurant, etc. The cars or commercial outlets that 
did not display such stickers were likely to become the object of a crime within 
24 hours. At that time, the violent insurers claimed they, rather than the police, 
were the ones helping to eliminate crime.19
Restructuring of violent entrepreneur groups
After the change of government in 1997, it was evident that the large structures of 
organized crime would have to seek new areas of activity. The process of driv-
ing violent entrepreneur groups out of the insurance market first started with 
the introduction of licensing the following year20 when all insurance companies 
had to be licensed by the National Insurance Council and the Insurance Supervi-
sion Directorate was authorized to supervise the activity of insurers. After the first 
round of licensing in 1998, there remained 27 out of the roughly 100 insurance 
companies operating in the market up to then. Licenses were denied to Union 
Ins (the then name of SIK), Planeta Ins (allegedly the successor of VIS-2), Zora Ins, 
Korona Ins, the companies associated with Multigroup – Sofia Ins and Sofia-Life, 
as well as Apollo&Balkan and others created by former security officials.
In the late 1990s, the decisive factor for the restructuring of organized crime was 
the readiness of the government to arrive at a compromise with both the 
oligarchic and the violent entrepreneur groups. An agreement was reached with 
the leaders of the various groups – the government would legalize their grey busi-
ness on the condition that they gave up their criminal activity. In fact, similarly to 
the oligarchic structures,21 violent entrepreneur groups were given the opportunity 
to largely continue their activities undisturbed by the tax and police authorities 
or the prosecution. This process of distancing of the violent entrepreneur groups 
from outright criminal activities found metaphoric expression in Ilia Pavlov’s22 call 
for ”the lizard to shed its tail”.
With the beginning of political stabilization (February 1997) and the adoption of 
the currency board (in the summer of 1997) there began a process of gradual 
legalization of the domestic retail market and foreign trade alike. There was 
a gradual shift from the „lifted-barrier” type of contraband of goods (i.e. without 
any customs clearance of the goods) towards more refined forms of customs 
violations, such as taxing the imports based on a lower value, declaring smaller 
quantities or declaring them under a different product category. With some 
consumer goods, import became almost completely legal – e.g. spirits and wash-
ing powder. With others, e.g. foods and apparel, notwithstanding the practice 
of under-invoicing, outright contraband almost disappeared. The transition from 
19 At the time, violent insurance companies were making much of their stand against crime, 
including by PR in the media about how they exposed under-aged thieves and pursued drug-
dealers.
20 The Law on Insurance was adopted in 1996 and introduced state supervision through the 
Insurance Supervisory Directorate with the Ministry of Finance. In fact, the Directorate did not 
start operating until the end of 1997.
21 Mostly those associated with the so called credit millionaires, bankrupt banks, and liquidated 
state-owned enterprises.
22 Ilia Pavlov was the founder and president of Multigroup, declared the richest Bulgarian in a 
ranking of the Polish Vpost magazine in 2002; murdered in 2003.
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black-and-criminal to grey activities was related to the import and trade largely 
in spirits and fuels.23
Along with that, however, particular groups continued to be active players in 
the black markets. The trafficking and distribution of drugs remained a major 
criminal market in the period under consideration. A new niche of criminal 
activity was the forgery of money and documents, where Bulgarian organized 
crime managed to gain a competitive edge over the other Balkan mafias. Prob-
ably the largest black market in that period was the export of prostitution. In 
many respects this was a matter of expanding into Western Europe the existing 
domestic market controlled by violent entrepreneurs and bringing in larger profits 
to the procurer networks than drug trafficking.
The incentives to get into the black and grey markets were easily understandable. 
In view of the grey market in the late 1990s amounting to 30-35% of GDP, it 
was hard even for legitimate businesses to remain entirely within the bounds of 
the law without losing their competitive edge. This was only feasible for the big 
multinational companies. With Bulgarian companies, any attempt to reduce grey 
business activities below a certain proportion led to loss in competitiveness since 
profits in the legal business were 30-50% lower than in grey markets and several 
hundred percent lower than in black markets.
Structurally, the elimination of the main sources of income of the violent en-
trepreneur groups (insurance and contraband) led to the dismantling of the old 
structures. At the same time, on the local level in particular, fragmenting their 
structures and creating networks, the groups managed to preserve the provision 
of security of the warehouses and the routes. The respective local authoritative 
figures from the former violent entrepreneur groups managed to retain control 
over the key contraband zones along the Turkish and Greek borders, as well as 
23 In 1991-96, imported cigarettes, which accounted for close to 50% of the domestic market, were 
almost entirely of contraband origin. A similar situation was in place regarding imported spirits 
(Scotch whisky and popular vodka brands). Due to the economic crisis of 1996-97, the national 
cigarette monopolist Bulgartabak managed to recover about 80% of the market since imported 
cigarettes were too expensive to Bulgarian consumers. After the political stabilization and with 
the improved customs control, the basic channels of import of cigarettes remained the duty-free 
shops at the borders while outright contraband declined drastically. According to estimates by 
the Center for the Study of Democracy, in 1998-2001, the volumes of this semi-legal, i.e. grey, 
import amounted to about $45 million a year. The scheme consisted in reselling about 70-80% 
of the cigarette turnover of the duty-free outlets in the domestic retail sector. Such trends were 
observable with regard to alcohol imports as well. In 1998-99, all major multinational companies 
chose to sell legally in Bulgaria, renouncing their former partners who used to import largely 
illegally. Customs statistics from the period are quite revealing. Whereas in 1998, imported spirits 
amounted to 4.1 million levs, in 2000 the figure was 20 million. The problem was that by the 
year 2000 the same contraband dealers started buying from duty-free outlets across the world 
the alcohol brands popular in Bulgaria and sold them at prices undercutting those offered by 
the multinational companies. Although they did pay excise duties and taxes, their prices were 
still lower since they had no expenditures for advertising, offices, distribution, etc. The so-
called „parallel import” is defined as grey by brand owners since it causes losses to the official 
distributors as well as to the budget. In this particular case, the former contraband dealers 
who took up this type of import managed to take advantage of an existing legal loophole. The 
situation is similar with respect to alcohol from the duty-free shops. It became common practice 
for restaurants, nightclubs and other establishments in the big cities to buy their spirits from the 
duty-free outlets, thus saving on the unpaid excise duties and VAT.
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over some of the big cities, although the old hierarchy and subordination were 
gone. The fragmented structures gradually started entering into new relationships – 
former competitors took part in common channels securing various components 
of the system, while old partners turned into rivals and even enemies because of 
the redistribution of former clients.
At that time there began to emerge a new type of organization of organized 
crime – network structures whose members provided a variety of services: bank 
credits, transport and shipping services, customs, fiscal, and police protection. 
Various forms of influence were used – from reactivation of yearlong stable rela-
tionships among companies to ad hoc criminal projects where the criminal group 
fell apart immediately after the execution of the operation. Unlike the old struc-
tures of VIS and SIK, whose more prominent members were familiar not only to 
the special services and the police but also to the general public, with the new 
network organization, public exposure only occurred in the event of accidents.
The period after 1998 was successful for the new, smaller and more flexible 
structures of organized crime despite the end of many of the most profit-
able activities related to the provision of violence and the contraband in goods. 
These losses were made up by the broad opportunities for investment of illegal 
capital in the privatization of state-owned enterprises and sites that boomed in 
that period. The assets of the banks and the mass privatization funds also pro-
vided extremely favorable opportunities for dirty money laundering. Various trade 
companies and production enterprises became the priority. Within a period of 
2-3 years, investments were made in markets associated with a relatively simple 
technological cycle and maintenance of the price of the assets. The reorientation 
towards legal businesses in many respects copied the investment policy of the 
Italian-American organized crime, largely focused on fast-moving and high-profit 
sectors (tourism, food establishments, the entertainment industry, fashion stores, 
auto garages, wholesale warehouses, transport, etc.).
1.2. OLIGARCHIC STRUCTURES
Emergence and structuring of the oligarchic corporations
Along with the development of violent entrepreneur groups, already at the out-
set of the transition there emerged an essentially different kind of economic 
structures that obtained access to resources not by means of violence but 
through their access to the political elites.24 With the assistance of politicians 
24 There has been significant research and analysis of the oligarchic structures in Eastern Europe: 
Ganev, V. Preying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria after 1989. Lengyel, G. (ed.). Cohesion 
and division of economic elites in central and eastern Europe: contains chapters on the economic elite in 
most East European countries; Barnes, A. ”Comparative theft: context and choice in the Hungarian, 
Czech, and Russian transformations, 1989–2000”, East European Politics & Societies, Summer 
2003, v 17 i3, p. 533 (565); Miklos, I. Economic Transition and the Emergence of Clientelist Structures in 
Slovakia; Schwartz, A. The politics of greed: how privatization structured politics in Central and Eastern Europe; 
Gould, J. Beyond Creating Owners: Privatization and Democratization in the Slovak and Czech Republics, 
1990–1998; Darden. ”Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine under Kuchma.” – 
East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 10, Nos. 2/3 (Spring/Summer 2001), pp. 67–71. 
Albats, Y. Bureaucrats and the Russian transition: the politics of accommodation, 1991–2003, etc., 2004.
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from various formations, several dozen economic groups managed to establish 
themselves and to benefit from the process of property redistribution. In many 
respects, their leaders resemble the Russian oligarchs. There is a „genetic” differ-
ence between them and the violent entrepreneurs. The latter emerged progressed 
from the bottom up: they resorted to violence to take over the respective assets 
and to obtain financial resources from small and medium business owners; then 
they established partnerships with the local government structures and mid-level 
representatives of law-enforcement; ultimately, they entered into corruption-based 
relationships with the politicians on the national level. With the oligarchs, de-
velopment took place from the top down: they gained control of the country’s 
government by „enrolling” key politicians and by capturing the leaderships of 
political parties. This type of symbiosis subsequently allowed them to replace 
unaccommodating managers of enterprises; to obtain unlimited bank financing; to 
import or export goods without customs control; to avoid tax inspections, etc.
The leaders of these proto-oligarchic organizations were largely ex-officers from 
State Security and former officials with the country’s foreign-trade missions 
(a great many of whom connected to State Security). They typically established 
information departments which is indicative of their more serious business ambi-
tions. Their arsenal equally comprised the more active use of offshore companies 
as part of their structurally supranational corporations. This niche of relatively 
legitimate business also presupposed subcontracting violent operations. A case in 
point was the use of the violent entrepreneur group VIS-1 as subcontractor to the 
oligarchic structure Multigroup.25
Along with the control over political levers, of no less importance for the oli-
garchic model is to secure influence in public administration. A fundamental 
characteristic of this approach was to employ competent senior public officials 
in the oligarchs’ private companies– from heads of ministry departments to man-
agers of state-owned enterprises many of whom found themselves unemployed 
due to the constant political upheavals in the 1990s. The process is bilateral with 
the oligarchs often turning into a kind of placement officers for the high-ranking 
administration. Gaining control over key positions in state institutions and enter-
prises is of strategic importance. Unlike politicians, who typically have a limited 
time-span of influence, it is not uncommon for public officials or managers to 
stay in their job for years. As a consequence, there emerges a unique symbiotic 
model in which it is essentially impossible to tell where private property begins 
and public property ends. 
Since, in the early 1990s, state-owned property in industry and finances still made 
up close to 90% and privatization proceeded, for various reasons, at an ex-
tremely slow pace, the aspiring oligarchs employed special techniques to siphon 
off public assets and resources. Unlike the other countries of Eastern Europe 
where their counterparts concentrated on acquiring property (establishing mass 
privatization funds, buying up vouchers, participation in management privatiza-
tion schemes, etc), in Bulgaria up to 1996, the chief opportunity concerned the 
25 The various oligarchic structures went through different stages in their development and mutual 
relations. For instance, by 1994, relations between VIS and Multigroup had deteriorated into an 
open conflict, leading Ilia Pavlov to create his own internal security structures.
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exploitation of state-owned assets. Particularly popular was the practice of estab-
lishing control over the „entry and exit points” of big state-owned enterprises. 
For the purpose, all deliveries to the enterprises (raw materials, supplies, spare 
parts, equipment, etc) were monopolized while the output was marketed (sales, 
export) through private companies. Thus, without taking on any payroll, tax, and 
other expenses, the large private groups privatized the profit-making activities of 
state-owned enterprises. As a result, vast industrial structures, such as metallurgical 
plants, chemical plants, machine-engineering holdings, military plants, etc, ended 
up operating at a loss; there would ensue protest actions and the state covered 
their losses and granted the credits needed (mainly for payroll purposes) through 
the state-owned banks, which only put off the consecutive crisis.
Another popular scheme among aspiring oligarchs in the 1990s involved siphon-
ing off state-owned bank funds and even financing through the Bulgarian Na-
tional Bank (BNB). Their financial structures (banks and financial houses) obtained 
credits from state-owned banks on which they paid extremely low interest rates, 
delayed paying them off, or simply did not pay them back by bankrupting the 
companies that had taken out the credits. As a result, the largest state-owned 
banks turned into hollow structures which was the underlying cause of the crisis 
of 1996-97. A similar situation was in place with regard to private banks. With few 
exceptions, they were not functioning as financial institutions but instead became 
organizations that accumulated property at the expense of increasing outstanding 
liabilities. The bank crisis led to the closure of nearly 90% of the private banks 
and the losses (direct and indirect) in national wealth as a result of this crisis are 
estimated at approximately $10 billion.
In addition to the various forms of national wealth redistribution and destruction 
through the transformation of state-owned into private property, these operators 
also established themselves in contraband schemes of export and import of 
goods. The markets where the violent entrepreneur groups were involved were 
equally used by the oligarchic structures though they developed far more com-
plex and wide-ranging systems. However, unlike the violent entrepreneurs, they 
were reluctant to use mass violence and preferred to operate by corrupting public 
officials and with state institutions as their basic tool. The outcomes of such part-
nership are evident from an analysis of the contraband export of oil products to 
Serbia. Whereas violent entrepreneurs would content themselves with trafficking 
a few auto-cisterns through companies of theirs or with small business protec-
tion racket, the oligarchic corporations exported whole tankers and trainloads. 
The oligarchs were the only ones in position to run and sustain operations on a 
national scale – from the import of tankers of crude oil, through its processing at 
Bulgarian oil refineries and transportation across the country by state railways to 
its controlled export to former Yugoslavia during the embargo. The same scheme 
was employed with the contraband import of other quick-selling consumer goods 
such as spirits, cigarettes, and sugar.
In the late 1990s, the most typical form of involvement of oligarchs in the re-
distribution of national wealth was by participation in the privatization of state-
owned property. This was most commonly done through the so-called manager-
and-worker buyouts, as well as by using the bankruptcy trustees to take over 
the bankrupt enterprises and financial institutions. Other common forms were 
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participation in privatization funds in mass privatization, and participation in cash 
privatization through offshore companies. All of these gave the oligarchs and their 
counterparts in the field of violent insurance the opportunity to launder the dirty 
money accumulated from criminal activities in the 1990s. stealth
It is worth noting that with oligarchic structures in Bulgaria it is possible to distin-
guish between two types of communication strategies. The first one is secrecy – 
the ownership of companies and assets is covered up by a variety of techniques 
through Bulgarian and foreign legal entities and natural persons. This involves the 
use of offshore registrations, companies, and funds with anonymous owners, and 
even paying royalty and franchise fees to big multinational corporations. New 
companies and holdings were created, assets were purchased, and privatization 
transactions were carried out through trustees hired by close intermediaries.
The second strategy was the aggressive PR. In this case various techniques of 
self-promotion and lobbying were used – from media campaigns to outright buy-
ing of politicians and parties. The adherents of this type of strategy create or 
buy means of mass communication (and individual representatives), thus buying 
freedom from media. This is in fact the well-known Russian scheme of turning 
media power into political one and in turn transforming it into economic power. 
In order to follow the Russian model, the Bulgarian oligarchs needed to reach 
a certain scale of their business activities. Although this group of entrepreneurs 
received initial financial impetus from political sponsors, their resources remained 
significantly more modest than those of their Russian counterparts. In order to 
achieve greater public influence, the Bulgarian oligarchs were inclined to set up 
associations to provide them with additional legitimacy. It was the members of 
this group that tended to be perceived by the public and the political elite as 
the legitimate representatives of national capital.
The Citizens’ Business Enterprise Union was the first attempt at such an as-
sociation. It was followed by the Patronat Club that paved the way for the best 
known organization – G-13. Founded in 1993, the latter brought together dis-
parate members, including the largest economic groups at the time (Multigroup, 
Tourist Bank, Nove Holding, Tron, Agrobiznesbank, Kapitalbank, Orel, Bulvaren-
terprises, Lex-Georgi Avramov, Slavyani Bank, Citizens’ Business Enterprise Union, 
168 Chassa Press Group, the state-owned arms company Teraton26). Safeguarding 
26 Because of the varying fate of the G-13 members referred to later in the text, some background 
information will be provided already at this point:
Up to 2003, Multigroup was considered the largest Bulgarian economic group with vast assets 
ranging from tourism to machine-engineering and the energy sector. After the death of its 
president, Ilia Pavlov, on March 7 2003 (see below), the group restructured and sold much of 
its assets.
The Tron group managed to turn into a major rival to Multigroup through triangular debt 
operations between Bulgaria, Russia, and Poland. It created the Standart daily newspaper and 
obtained the first GSM license without tender allowing it to subsequently establish the first 
GSM operator, Mobiltel. The owner of Tron, Krassimir Stoychev, later sold the GSM operator to 
Russian billionaire Michael Chorny.
The Plovdiv-based group Agrobiznesbank owned various trade companies, financial houses, the 
Maritsa newspaper, KOM radio broadcast network, Trakia cable television, and others. The Bank 
was closed down by BNB in 1996 and later declared insolvent. A number of charges of financial 
crimes were brought against the Chairman, Hristo Alexandrov, who was convicted in November 
2005 of dereliction of duty. 
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Bulgarian national wealth against the „invasion” of foreign capital was laid down 
as the principal task of this structure. The „patriotism” of G-13, however, did not 
exclude the provision of intermediary services to these foreign corporations.
The conflicts among the members of G-13 were so deep-seated that the Club can 
hardly be said to have functioned at all and was dissolved in about two years. 
It should be noted that a number of large business groups of national influence, 
which preferred to avoid unnecessary media attention though without resorting 
to conspiratorial techniques, had remained outside G-13. So had several smaller 
structures of regional scope. 
1.3. EXTREME-RISK ENTREPRENEURS
The analysis of Bulgarian organized crime would identify another relatively well 
differentiated intermediate group of criminal entrepreneurs who meet all of 
the criteria of organized crime. It can provisionally be called the group of „black 
entrepreneurs” and be situated between violent entrepreneurs and the „oligarchs”. 
To black or extreme-risk entrepreneurs the primary source of income was the 
grey and the black-and-criminal market. The difference between them and vio-
lent entrepreneurs and oligarchs was that the latter initially began their activity 
by non-market means – by sale of violence and protection and corruption-based 
partnerships with the political elites.
In terms of their occupational background, extreme-risk entrepreneurs were 
people who under socialism had had well-earning service sector jobs as bartend-
Kapitalbank, with president Angel Purvanov, financed the Tron group and went into insolvency on 
account of that. The license of the Bank was withdrawn in 1997. 
Orel Insurance Company is still among the top ten insurance companies in this country. The 
company’s president, Dobromir Gushterov, is currently an MP from BSP.
Tourist Bank was the second largest private bank in that period and was represented by Emil 
Kyulev (killed on October 26, 2005). The Bank was closed down in 1996. Emil Kyulev had left 
earlier to found Roseximbank, which largely worked with Russia. Emil Kyulev subsequently took 
part in the privatization of the State Insurance Institute (DZI) and created DZI Group (the largest 
insurance company and one of the ten largest Bulgarian banks).
168 Chassa Press Group owned the then largest daily, 24 Chassa, and largest weekly, 168 Chassa. 
In G-13 the Group was represented by Petyo Bluskov. During the crisis of 1996-97 the press 
group was bought by the German media company WAZ. Petyo Bluskov later created another 
daily – Monitor.
Nove Holding, chaired by Vassil Bozhkov, was one of the most inconspicuous economic entities 
at the time when G-13 was established. Nowadays most analysts consider it the most successful 
economic structure, comprising more than 350 companies operating in various markets in this 
country.
Teraton is a state-owned company specializing in the arms trade and its Chairman, Mladen 
Mutafchiyski, is a public official. Since the change of the management, Mladen Mutafchiyski has 
been involved in various private structures investing in sectors ranging from tourism to home 
electronics.
Bulvarenterprises, headed by Borislav Dionisiev, specializes in trade and is popularly known 
as the official dealer of Opel. It has not been as successful as Multigroup, Nove, or DZI. 
Borislav Dionisiev has managed to expand his personal wealth through companies such as 
Bulvaria Holding and Elektromachinari Holding. He became well-known in connection with the 
privatization of Elektroimpex.
Lex, with Georgi Avramov as its President, proved one of the financial pyramids that crashed in 
1995, leaving the stage permanently.
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ers, waiters, and taxi drivers (some of them had worked for the secret police 
at the same time) and who even before 1990 had been active in the Bulgarian 
grey markets, supplying scarce goods to the local elites. A number of foreign 
nationals from the Middle East (some of whom also connected to the former 
secret services) can also be referred to this group. It is only possible to estimate 
the number of these black entrepreneurs based on the various lists that MoI at-
tempted to draw up after 1995, as well as the list published by BNB in 1997 
with the names of 5,000 credit millionaires.
This type of organized crime followed the entrepreneurship model of classic supply 
and demand. They largely focused on addressing the most severe shortages and mar-
ket deformations which in the beginning of the transition reflected the inherited de-
ficiencies of the socialist economy. The black entrepreneurs created and controlled 
black and grey channels of import, export, and distribution. Unlike the majority 
of private entrepreneurs in the first stage of the transition, they not only evaded pay-
ing some of the due customs duties, taxes, and fees, but actually preferred entirely 
criminal transactions. Black entrepreneurs largely specialized in the trade in scarce 
staple goods such as sugar, cooking oil, meat, milk, auto spare parts, textile, foot-
wear, consumer electronics. They were also the first to engage in cash corruption of 
public officials (customs officers, police officers, tax and other officials). The extreme-
risk entrepreneurs set up companies, student cooperatives and foundations as sham 
structures in order to evade financial control. A common practice was to take out 
unsecured loans in the full realization that they would not repay them. Their victims 
included both state entities and private business partners.
Unlike the oligarchs and the violent entrepreneurs, their criminal organizations 
were far smaller and operated in networks already at the outset of the transition. 
At the same time, black entrepreneurs sought the support of the violent entre-
preneurs and the oligarchs. They often joined the oligarchic holdings, worked for, 
and did favors to them. At certain times they even identified themselves as part 
of the big violent entrepreneur or oligarchic structures. Towards the end of the 
1990s they increasingly operated independently.
In the first few years following the democratic transition, the black entrepre-
neurs were usually the first to identify the most profitable markets – regardless 
of whether import of contraband cigarettes, fictitious or real export of Bulgarian 
cigarettes, smuggling of premium spirits or production and sale of cheap alcohol. 
Once they had developed the market, they often lost their market share or were 
pushed into partnerships dominated by the more powerful violent entrepreneur 
or oligarchic structures, or at the very least had to pay a cut to them. The same 
happened with the contraband across the Yugoslav border although far larger 
revenues were at stake in this case.
In addition to their pioneering role in developing the domestic grey and black 
markets, the extreme-risk entrepreneurs were also the first business structures to 
start dealing with the big Western companies. They tried to make some room 
for themselves in the legal business, paying for rights to represent international 
brands and franchises in the awareness that this would initially be a loss-making 
business yet a worthwhile investment for the future when the domestic market 
would grow big enough and legal enough.
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1.4. THE NEW SYMBIOSIS: ORGANIZED CRIME ON THE DOORSTEP 
OF EUROPE
With the completion of the basic processes of initial capital accumulation and 
national wealth redistribution, at the dawn of the current decade there began 
to emerge the present-day configuration of organized crime in this country. It is 
characterized by a symbiotic structure comprising all three types of organized 
crime from the early days of the transition – violent entrepreneurs, the oli-
garchs, and black entrepreneurs. As a result, a new type of universal structure 
of organized crime gradually began to be established, which is active not only in 
the black and grey markets, but also in legitimate business.
Figure 2 constitutes an attempt to visualize the share of criminal capital in the 
retail networks and their positioning in the various markets – white, grey, and 
black.27
Combining legal and illegal business activities requires a successful strategy of 
survival and expansion. It essentially boils down to the mechanism of transferring 
„dirty operations” over to subordinate structures and subcontractors dependent on 
the bosses. At the same time, the leaders of the criminal groups own perfectly 
legal companies and avoid an involvement in practices associated with even 
minimal risk. The bulk of the revenues of a given criminal group are secured by 
companies whose operations include grey business activities. These white-and-grey 
companies are the largest and most typical ones of the oligarchic holdings and 
the former violent entrepreneur groups.
Another important characteristic of the activity of the companies of criminal 
groups is their tendency to mushroom in number – i.e. they grow in number 
but not in terms of staff, capital, assets, or sales. It is common practice for the 
27 A cut across this three-layer model of markets, regions and structures of organized crime reveals 
several more notable characteristics. Above all, it is the size of each market. Secondly, it is 
possible to determine the structure of the particular market by the correlation of the layers – 
legal, grey, and black. For instance, in the largest market in this country – that of real estate – 
the important question is what proportion of the turnover is legal, i.e. all due taxes and fees 
have been paid, registrations have been done in full compliance with the law, etc; also, what 
part of the volumes are in the grey zone, i.e. the actual price of the property was not reported 
and consequently, the due taxes and fees have not been paid in full; some of the required 
authorizations (concerning construction, zoning, etc) may not have been properly issued; finally, 
in the black market, there are outright criminal fraud schemes, including document forgery, 
appropriation of property by violence, etc. A vertical analysis can also be made regarding oil 
products where, unlike the 1990s, there is hardly any black segment at all. In the third largest 
market – of new and used cars – the grey market has shrunk significantly since the lifting of 
the various restrictions in the process of the country’s accession to the EU, while the black 
market is in the process of serious restructuring. A similar structure is discernible in each market, 
bearing in mind that in some cases (e.g. illegal drugs) there are no legal or grey markets and 
in the market for sexual services there is no legal segment in this country but there are many 
opportunities in the countries of the European Union. In Bulgaria, there have already emerged 
fully legal consumer markets such as those of beer, washing powder, banking services, etc. There 
may be organized crime structures in any one of the three layers – legal, grey, and black. The 
markets can also be analyzed horizontally, exploring their size and structure in the respective 
regions. Sometimes two or three regional structures are in position to control the economy of 
an average-sized town and the surrounding municipalities.
bosses of large legal companies to make their long-time employees register firms 
in their names. If any problems should arise with state institutions, these volatile 
companies terminate their activity and the responsibility for their activity is ob-
scured. In illustration, one of the largest grey networks in this country comprises 
more than 350 legal companies operating in all kinds of areas – from the import 
of cars to a nationwide sports betting network.
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Figure 2a. Share of criminal capital in various markets
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Figure 2b. Share of criminal capital in various markets
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Cooperation with the violent players is resorted to when necessary, with the latter 
selling their services in order to close the chain and not allow access to any outsiders.
The riskiest activities related to the black markets, such as siphoning off VAT, 
concealing gambling turnover, crimes involving objects of cultural value, con-
traband of cigarettes, etc., pass through 5-6 companies, at the least. As a rule, 
these structures are very small, with a core of 2-3 people. Their existence only 
continues until the execution of the respective criminal operation; they resemble 
legitimate projects whose teams fall apart once their work is done. Such tactics 
make it easier to cover up the traces of criminal business. For instance, upon 
apprehension of mid-level participants in the drug market, trade is relayed to the 
remaining unaffected units so that within no more than 24 hours any disruptions 
in supply are overcome. Another example is the restoration of contraband chan-
nels mere days after their exposure by the law-enforcement authorities.
The legal/illegal differentiation takes place even inside the groups themselves 
along the lines of young/old. In recent years, there has been a tendency for 
the older and more powerful members of organized crime to take up fully 
legal businesses28 while the young and unknown members take the control 
of the grey and black structures. As an additional safeguard, the leaders of the 
respective structure buy assets abroad (in a Western European, Asian, or American 
country). This allows the respective boss to demonstrate he is a recognized busi-
nessman in an advanced country, as well as to spend extended period of time 
in that country in the event of a threat to him personally or to his business in 
Bulgaria (whether coming from rivals or from law-enforcement).
The three types of markets (white/grey/black) the networks use the strategy of mar-
ket mobility to adjust to the changing environment. Thus, for instance, in the event 
of a government crack-down on a particular group, its activity in the black market 
is greatly reduced or suspended altogether for a time (a case in point was the tem-
porary suspension of the sale of spirits without excise bands). Respectively, once the 
inquiries and inspections by the authorities are over, the old schemes resume.
The ultimate goal of a criminal group having at its disposal advanced networks 
of companies and individuals is the establishment of a monopoly or cartel over 
certain markets. This is done by using clientelist contacts with the political elites, 
employing corruption techniques to secure public procurement contracts, profit-
ing from non-market competitive advantages (evading taxes, excise and customs 
duties, social security contributions), and others. The various structures tend to 
act differently depending on their level. Sometimes, 2-3 extended families may 
control a town or region. On the city level, one or even all of them may be 
engaged in grey and black operations. This model is reproduced on the national 
level, with a few dozen large structures/networks covering the whole country.
This universal symbiotic structure constitutes an independent network of indi-
viduals owning dozens of legal companies that tend to mushroom in number 
or are closed down upon exhaustion of the corruption resources in a particular 
28 In 2003, the top 50 best-known persons associated with organized crime (according to the 
media) for the first time paid record-high taxes for Bulgaria.
sector. The successful balancing between the three types of markets is measured 
by the actual immunity of the „smartly dressed businessmen” with regard to the 
law, the lasting corrupt partnerships with the political class, and the creation 
of business branches abroad that confer additional legitimacy on their owners. 
Achieving this task is a process that may metaphorically be referred to as „invest-
ing in risk”.29
One of the more notable questions is how Bulgarian organized crime is adapt-
ing to the opening up of the Schengen space and Bulgaria’s subsequent ac-
cession to the EU. Initially the access to West-European countries created excep-
tional expansion opportunities for the Bulgarian criminal networks. In some cases, 
more than half of the staff of violent entrepreneur structures moved to Western 
Europe and more specifically, to the South-European EU member states. This ac-
counted for the active involvement of Bulgarian criminal groups in the European 
grey and black markets and above all, the market for sexual services, car theft, 
and drug distribution, particularly in 2001-2003.
On the whole, however, Western Europe’s apprehensions about an invasion of 
Bulgarian organized crime proved exaggerated and there is presently a noticeable 
trend towards stabilization of such transborder export of crime. On the other 
hand, Bulgaria’s EU accession led to the gradual curbing of the most drastic 
forms of organized criminal activity in the country itself. This is largely due 
to the increasing pressure on Bulgarian institutions from Brussels which in turn 
has resulted in the taking of more resolute action against organized crime in 
this country. In the course of time, progress has also been made as regards the 
interaction between law-enforcement authorities within the EU which increasingly 
crack down on Bulgarian criminal groups, as well.
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The duty-free shops constitute an important, moreover formally legal, infrastructure of the contraband largely of 
cigarettes and spirits, as well as of oil products from the duty-free filling stations (consisting in fictitious export 
of these goods which are then resold in the domestic market). Unlike some other corruption-related schemes 
under the control of organized crime, this has been a rare instance of concerted lobbying efforts by members 
of nearly all of the parties represented in parliament, blocking any attempt to close them down. Even when, on 
the eve of the country’s accession to the EU, the duty-free outlets on the Greek and Romanian borders (which 
became internal EU borders) had to be closed, the authorities agreed to have new ones open at the remaining 
external EU borders. Bulgaria is one of the few countries that have duty-free filling stations, with turnover that is 
an object of envy even to the big oil distribution networks. Faced with the joint interests of politicians, criminals, 
and corrupt officials, it would seem that even the European Union is powerless - despite insistence by Brussels, 
Bulgaria continues to claim its right to ”extraterritorial trade”, from which the only ones who stand to gain are 
the anonymous beneficiaries of this officialized contraband.
Box 2. The duty-free shops as a case apart
29 Along with this universal symbiotic structure, since 2003 there has been a new trend towards 
emergence and coexistence of purely criminal networks with small structures active largely in 
the black markets of drugs, procuring, money forgery, car thefts, etc. Typically, these criminal 
formations are loosely connected to the established old structures, mainly on market terms, and 
are more likely to be apprehended by law-enforcement authorities.
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In addition to these external factors we should note the latest marked trend of 
sustained growth of the Bulgarian economy,30 further characterized by improved 
business environment, reinforced market institutions in the process of EU acces-
sion, and the presence of foreign investors, which together have helped reduce 
the share of the grey economy in this country.31 The latter constitutes an addi-
tional incentive for the structures of organized crime to speed up the legalization 
of their activities and to seek monopoly positions in the official economy through 
legislative capture – amending laws and regulations in their favor.32
Since 2001, an essential factor for improving the economic environment, along 
with political stabilization, has been the modernization of public administration. 
This has no doubt been facilitated by the drastic drop in the cost of key tech-
nologies in the information industry. With the gradual adoption of the customs 
30 In the last 9 years, GDP has been growing at a rate of nearly 5%, and by more than 6% since 
2003.
31 In 2002-2007, the share of the grey economy in Bulgaria declined from 29% to 17.1% of the 
total turnover of the enterprises operating in the economy. The decline is observable with regard 
to all of the components of the hidden economy measured by the business index of hidden 
economy in Bulgaria – unreported employment, turnover, covert redistribution. Further see 
The Grey Economy in Bulgaria, Center for the Study of Democracy, 2004 (in Bulgarian only); The 
Informal Economy in the EU Accession Countries: Size, Scope, Trends and Challenges in the Process of EU 
Enlargement, Center for the Study of Democracy, 2003. 
32 Nevertheless, in absolute terms, the grey economy in this country has remained relatively large 
and stable over time and may actually increase in volume in some years, depending on how 
effectively the institutional environment is functioning. Yet, its growth rate lags behind that of the 
official economy, resulting in its declining share in the business turnover.
Figure 3. Index of the hidden economy in Bulgaria*
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* The Index is a synthetic indicator of the various forms of hidden economy activity. Its value ranges from 0 (absence of hidden 
economy) to 10 (total domination of the hidden economy). For more see Valentin Goev, Valentin Boshnakov, ”Assessment of 
the Hidden Economy in Bulgaria”, in: The Informal Economy in the EU Accession Countries, Center for the Study of Democracy, 2003, 
pp. 57-93.
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS (Corruption Surveys of Bulgarian Business), 2007
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information system (Bulgarian Integrated Customs Information System), the border 
police information system and those of the tax administration, as well as some 
other systems of financial information and internal security, there has also been 
a stepping up of the processes of shrinking of the grey and black markets in this 
country.33
The analysis of the activity of organized crime in the period 2001-2007 finds 
several more notable new tendencies:
• There has been a noticeable shrinking of volumes and profits in the three 
major black markets in this country (drugs, stolen cars, prostitution); 
• There has been a similar trend towards declining share of the grey 
markets controlled by organized crime. This is due both to the improved 
performance of the customs and tax administrations, and the growing pres-
ence of multinational companies in the field of retail.
• The shrinking of black and grey markets is symptomatic of the more active 
involvement of organized crime in the legal markets. With the real estate 
boom since 2001, investments in construction, construction sites and land 
have become the number one market for organized criminal groups.
Under the changed conditions, even when resorting to violent means in dealing 
with their legal competition, the representatives of the groups strive to keep up 
appearances of law-abiding conduct. There has been tendency towards decline 
in violence by organized crime. It has been equally observable with regard to 
bomb attacks as the chief instrument of racketeering, and in conflicts between 
different groups. The following figure provides an idea of the proportions and 
tendencies in the use of bomb-planting by the criminal world:
More refined means of paralyzing the business of a rival began to be em-
ployed over the period under consideration. It has become common practice 
to file a claim against a competitor and possibly win the case with the help of 
corrupt magistrates. Considering the slow pace of Bulgarian justice administra-
tion, even if the claim is rejected, the freezing of the activities of the respective 
firms by court order is likely to lead to enormous losses and even the financial 
ruin of the competitor. On the other hand, the use of market instruments has 
been on the rise even in entirely criminal activities (drug trafficking, contraband 
of cigarettes, etc).
Violent methods in their pure classical form are demonstrated by the so-called 
contract murders, oftentimes deliberately committed in public places in order to 
33 There are several notable examples of the positive impact of modernization. Regarding customs 
fraud in 1997-2000, mirror statistics have shown that the disparities in the case of import and 
export to the European Union alone, in 1998 for example, amounted to $850 million with a 
trade turnover of $5,240 million. This means that 16.37% of this amount were not reported 
or involved siphoning off of VAT. The disparities are of even larger proportions concerning 
imports from Turkey, China, and other Asian countries. With the introduction of customs data 
exchange, the grey import (underreporting the value of the goods) and in part, VAT siphoning 
off, particularly with the EU countries has visibly begun to shrink.
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intimidate all potential competitors in addition to eliminating the particular rival. 
Even though - after escalating in the 1990s - they have been on the decline since 
the start of the current decade, contract murders still make up a significant pro-
portion of all homicides in this country – 13%. In the period from 2000 to 2005, 
there were 156 such murders (including attempted murders and those not specifi-
cally identified as contract killings). The low clear up rate34 makes contract killing 
relatively low risk. Furthermore, to the criminal groups, they are probably the 
most efficient and inexpensive instrument to solve serious economic problems. 
They allow them to eliminate major rivals in the pursuit of monopoly control 
and the conquest of high-profit activities/sectors. The experience of the past years 
indicates that killing the leader of a large group (whether an oligarchic or violent 
entrepreneur structure) usually leads to the disintegration of his empire and the 
redistribution of the black and grey markets previously under his control.
34 To this day, only 17 contract murders have been reported solved. It should be noted that the main 
problem in intercepting and investigating contract killings is the lack of competent professionals at 
the MoI. There is no specialized unit with the necessary expertise and experience. Notwithstanding 
their relatively good motivation, most of the officers currently working on these cases are young 
people lacking the necessary experience. At the same time, the prosecution and MoI are 
forced to provide evidence of activity and to report definite volumes of work done (formally). 
This leads to conducting hundreds of interrogations in connection with each killing which are 
ultimately of little use. Thus, for instance, in the case of the murder of the VIS boss Georgi Iliev, 
the police in Bourgas held more than 2000 interrogations, yet the killer was never identified.
Figure 4. Bombings by year
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An essential condition for the existence of organized crime is the presence of 
enduring corrupt links between the criminal groups and the state (politicians, 
MPs, magistrates, and representatives of the administration on the local and cen-
tral levels). All of the branches of power in this country are the object of most 
attention by organized crime. Thus, for instance, the formation of lobbies in 
the legislature is typical of the influence of the groups. By an expert estimate, 
within the past two parliaments (39th and 40th National Assemblies) it is possible 
to identify about 20 MPs on average who have actively advocated legislation in 
the interest of economic structures related to organized crime. Such legislative 
acts include a number of draft laws and amendments to the laws on gambling, 
insurance, electronic media, spirits production, etc.
The corruption-based collaboration between criminal groups and the judiciary
assumes even greater proportions. This is hardly surprising given that whereas until 
the end of the 1990s the national wealth used to be redistributed by the govern-
ment, in recent years this has largely been a prerogative of the judiciary. There 
have been particularly flagrant cases of corruption links between prosecutors and 
bosses of criminal groups. The most common method is by direct payment of 
bribes to corrupt prosecutors so as to refrain from pressing charges against or-
ganized crime representatives. The corruption methods of violent entrepreneurs 
used in the court stage of the proceedings usually involve the intermediation of 
lawyers.
One of the most widespread and destructive corruption networks link the 
criminal groups with local government representatives – mayors, municipal 
council members, as well as the local divisions of central government. The in-
tertwinement of public authority and criminal private agendas poses a particularly 
serious problem along the Black Sea coast and in the large resorts where real 
Figure 5. Contract murders by year*
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estate prices reach European levels. A case in point was the murder of the Chair 
of the Municipal Council of the town of Nessebar, widely reported by the media 
to be running a shady business with tourist sites and facilities. The corruption 
networks linking municipal officials and mayors and the bosses of criminal 
groups are most extensive in the capital. Sofia could in fact serve as a model 
in the analysis of the criminal plot concerning the exploitation for private gain of 
some of the most profitable sectors in the city economy: waste collection, water 
supply, central heating, etc.

2. THE DRUG MARKET IN BULGARIA
2.1. FORMATION OF THE DRUG MARKETS IN THE 1980s AND THE 1990s
Although Bulgaria lies on the heroin trail to Western Europe, up until the mid-1990s 
heroin was available only to a limited number of users.35 The number of registered 
drug addicts in 1989 was 1,300–1,400,36 but those were dependent on medical opi-
ates, such as lidocaine and morphine. Thеse substances were extremely hard to ac-
cess–users stole them from pharmacies, smuggled them out of hospitals with the help 
of medical personnel or bought them with counterfeit prescriptions. Marijuana was 
hardly popular, and despite the favorable local climate it was rarely grown. So were 
synthetic drugs–since the early 1980s state-owned pharmaceutical companies pro-
duced huge amounts of amphetamine under the trade name Captagon,37 which was 
not familiar to the wider population. Nearly 100 % of the produce was exported to 
the Middle East, though amphetamines were sometimes taken by university students 
during the exam season to enhance concentration and brain effectiveness, supplied 
by workers who stole the pills from the factory. Among the explanations of why Bul-
garia did not develop a domestic drug market up until 1990 is that this possibility 
was warded off by the totalitarian police apparatus. Alternatively, secret services may 
have held the drug channels through the country under their control, etc. 
An outbreak of drug use in Bulgaria was observed immediately after the demo-
cratic changes in 1989 and the dissolution of total state control. As the coun-
try became politically and economically open, and foreign crime groups were 
able to enter and integrate the newly sprung domestic criminal enterprises into 
trans-border drug networks, drug markets could freely develop and thrive in the 
1990s. The increased traffic along the drug routes crossing the country fostered 
the formation of territorially and hierarchically structured local drug distribution 
networks. Drugs rapidly penetrated most Bulgarian towns and street dealing 
proliferated, particularly around schools. The drug market in the post-communist 
transition period displayed the following distinctive traits:
35 In the three consecutive surveys of drug addicts (in 2003, 2004, and 2005), none of the respon-
dents interviewed who had used drugs prior to 1990 had used heroin.
36 Some experts claim that their actual number prior to 1990 could not have exceeded 600-800 
people. The numbers 1,300–1,400 refer to all people registered since the early 1980s. A sizeable 
share of those have either quitted using drugs, are undergoing compulsory treatment or are 
serving a sentence in prison with no access to drugs.
37 Amphetamines started to be produced in Bulgaria in 1981 when the Commission for Permission 
of Medical Drugs licensed the production of Captagon. In October 1981, the state-owned 
pharmaceutical company Pharmachim placed an order with the R&D Office of the Chemical 
and Pharmaceutical Plants in Sofia to develop a production technology for Captagon tablets. 
Later on, three separate production lines were engaged–the pharmaceutical plant in the town 
of Dupnitsa (formerly Stanke Dimitrov), the plant in Sofia’s Iliyantsi district, and the Scientific 
Institute for Chemical and Pharmaceutical Research–NIHFI JSC located in Darvenitsa district.
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• Steady growth throughout the period of the four basic markets (of heroin, 
marijuana, synthetic drugs, cocaine) with recurrent drug outbreaks; chang-
ing proportions of each submarket on the overall market due to the con-
stant transfer of addicts and new recruits between them.
• Strong linkages between the drug market and the rest of the black mar-
kets operated by organized crime, but with a degree of autonomy, as 
it is characterized by the highest level of risk (together with prostitution, 
contract murders, trafficking of people, etc.).
• Strong presence of money laundering schemes for drug trafficking and 
distribution incomes through the creation of corrupt networks involving 
law-enforcement, judiciary, and government officials.
• Pronounced impact of the heroin market on the structure of the overall 
drug market due to its strong addictive effect on users. The trends on the 
domestic heroin market are closely linked to trans-border heroin trafficking 
processes, the overall drug consumption in the country, the development of 
local crime organizations and their penetration into corruption schemes.
Thus, in the 1990s the heroin market was the most tightly structured segment. 
After a short initial period when heroin was imported and distributed by foreign 
nationals, mostly of Middle Eastern origin, domestic organized crime overtook 
both the heroin transit channels and in-country sales. Geographically, the heroin 
market grew from the capital, toward larger cities, down to the smaller and re-
moter places.
Structural developments were related to the major criminal players and the ways 
the market was (re)distributed between them. Alongside the widespread monopo-
lies by single drug network owners over a whole area (town or neighborhood 
served by a single police force) joint ownership was also practiced–either by two 
independent distributors or through partnership with a more powerful criminal 
group. The latter had several varieties – protection of the area for a fixed fee or 
exclusive supplies from a particular crime structure. Redistribution was achieved 
through any of the typical approaches of the business–demonstration of force, 
threatening, talks and negotiations often accompanied by brutality and violence.
The expansion of heroin and other drug markets was essentially dependent on 
distribution networks’ safety from investigation and penal measures. This was 
achieved through a tight scheme of ”reporting” by upper-level drug distributors to 
a number of corrupt law-enforcement officers, criminal investigators and prosecu-
tors and even judges, bonded with the drug distribution structures. Thus, drug 
market profits were distributed in a strictly stratified manner, often through the 
intermediary of the so called ”black lawyers”, specifically involved in counseling 
the drug structures.
A series of decisive government measures in the late 1990s targeting organized 
crime, in a well-intentioned attempt to ”cut off the lizard’s tail”,38 as it was then 
38 The origin of this expression is discussed in Chapter 1.
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popularly illustrated, managed to oust criminal players from a number of gray 
markets. Many of them, however, continued on the black market, and some 
took up drug distribution in particular. During this period there was a boom in 
synthetic drug use as a more social type of drug contrasting to the social with-
drawal typical of heroin use. Because of this characteristic of amphetamines and 
ecstasy their sales proliferated in discos and night clubs. In addition, addiction 
was milder and easier to handle. Thus, synthetic drugs became inseparable from 
youth entertainment styles. Because of this, the former racketeer groups managed 
to penetrate the market through buying out a number of nightlife venues in the 
big cities. 
Due to the fast growth of the market of marijuana in schools (which peaked in 
the late 1990s as well) soft drugs became most widespread in the country. The 
increasingly lax school discipline and parental control also contributed to its fast-
growing popularity among friends as an easily accessible substitute for tobacco 
and alcohol. Moreover, in contrast to a number of European countries that have 
long decriminalized marijuana on the basis of strong rational arguments, public 
tolerance in Bulgaria is rather low, and in a way stimulates consumption. Thus, 
a well-ordered distribution system grew around schools with criminal enterprises 
controlling numerous pushers selling to students, and suppliers/distributors work-
ing for that particular segment.
One major trait concerning the formative stage of the Bulgarian drug market in 
the last decade is its dire legacy of impunity. Drug dealers, and especially high-
level bosses remain untouchable by law-enforcement and they would much more 
often become victim to turf struggle than get hunted down and convicted.
2.2. THE DRUG MARKET – STATE OF PLAY, TRENDS AND RISKS. 
TYPES OF DRUG MARKETS
The late 1990’s saw the establishment of the four major markets of illegal psy-
choactive substances – heroin, marijuana, amphetamines, and cocaine. The main 
features of the Bulgarian drug market have persisted ever since, notwithstanding 
the clashes in the supply chains, the drug wars, and the dramatic changes in the 
demand patterns.
2.2.1. The Heroin Market: Types of Consumption, Structure and Organization of Heroin Dealing after 2001
The heroin dealing has been formative of the structure of the entire drug market 
in this country since the mid 1990’s. Due to the strong physiological and psychic 
dependence it generates, its daily use is stable and, for all practical purposes, it 
does not depend on any weekly or seasonal fluctuations. Thus the contingent of 
users has become quite substantial for the size of the country and the geographi-
cal proximity of Bulgaria and Turkey39 makes its importation almost free of any 
problems. The opportunity to have a great number of young people (many heroin 
39 The huge flows of goods and passengers across the Bulgarian-Turkish border make the routine 
transfer of heroin practically undetectable.
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addicts among them) who tend to apply extreme forms of violence plays a major 
role in maintaining the influence of the old extortionist entrepreneurs. The elimi-
nation of the extortionist protection money payment makes it difficult to maintain 
the old punitive brigades resorting to massive violence and consisting of former 
athletes. The opportunities provided by heroin dealing structures enable organized 
criminal networks to control (in some regions of the country) the market in the 
other drugs (marijuana, amphetamines and cocaine) and to rule the local black 
and gray markets, such as prostitution, real estate fraud, gray imports and sales 
of fuel, Chinese and Turkish consumer goods, purchase of farm produce, etc.
A possible point of departure to analyze the heroin market structure in Bulgaria 
is the use of the division of organized crime40 into two types – the predatory 
model and the market type. Interviews with police officers41 specialized in drug 
enforcement, street dealers and well-known names in the underground world 
make it clear that the heroin market builds on two principles. The hierarchical 
principle is similar to the classical model of organization and discharge described 
for New York in 1969 by Preble and Casey.42 The other principle of organization 
is zoning: in the beginning of the decade, most of the country was divided into 
territories each being dominated by a criminal structure.
The Hierarchical Principle
When describing the two principles of organization of drug markets, one should 
note that the situation has been changing dynamically for the last six or seven 
years. Criminal leaders holding the control over the respective markets change 
from time to time, territories and hierarchical levels change, too.
There are two main ways to supply heroin. The first one implies use of the con-
tacts of criminal leaders–or black market entrepreneurs43–with heroin wholesalers 
in Turkey. The cases of carriers (mules) caught make it clear that purchases vary 
from two to 15 kg and these shipments are intended for smaller regional markets. 
The organizers of this scheme are typically criminal leaders dominating a specific 
regional market (more precisely, people from their close entourage in charge of 
drug dealing). There are also cases when independent criminal persons manage 
to import heroin and turn into a local market factor. 
The second way is connected to the typical schemes of export to Central and 
Western Europe. It deserves greater attention since, for all practical purposes, it 
covers all other varieties. The scheme starts with the figure of the importer who 
buys heroin with 60 % to 80 % content of diamorphine (the active ingredient 
40 See more details in Chapter One on the evolution of Bulgarian organized crime. The team 
which has prepared the analysis of the drug market assumes that the typology of the predatory 
type and the market type of organized crime explains well the Bulgarian situation. See: Wages 
of Crime: Black Market, Illegal Finance and Underworld Economy, New York, Cornel University Press, 
2002; the interpretation of this theory by Levi, M. – In: The Oxford Handbook of Criminology 
(third edition), Oxford University Press, 2005.
41 See: The Drug Market in Bulgaria, Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, 2003.
42 Preble, E., J. Casey, Jr., ”Taking Care of Business – The Heroin User’s Life on the Street,” Inter-
national Journal of the Addictions, March, 1969.
43 See Chapter 1 and the provisional definition of the specific group of black market entrepre-
neurs.
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of heroin) from Turkish laboratories at the approximate price of $5,000 to $6,000 
per kilo44 and supplies it to a specific European country. According to security 
service sources, the importers are persons whom Turkish producers fully trust in 
their long-term relationship. The networks trafficking in heroin to Western Europe, 
which have been detected over the recent years, reveal that these are people of 
Albanian, Kurdish, Serbian or Turkish origin. 
The quantities and level of negotiation depend on the domestic market destina-
tion (Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, Bourgas or a smaller city). Quantities most often vary 
from 20 kg to 50 kg, which seems quite a lot in comparison to the small size of 
the Bulgarian market but typically the purity is below the average European level 
and heroin sells at lower prices respectively. On larger markets like Sofia or Varna 
the trusted buyer with whom the importer negotiates is somebody among the so 
called ”kilo connections” (from the close entourage of the area boss in charge of 
the drug market). The importer and the trusted customer/kilo connection usually 
never see the drug when they negotiate the sale and purchase. Some fragmentary 
data referring to this level of negotiation point to the involvement of interme-
diaries, as well. This increases the price of the stuff but enhances the sense of 
security of the participants. The heroin itself is carried by people who have no 
idea of either the importers or their trusted customers.45 These mules collect the 
stuff from a parking lot (or another public area) in Turkey and deliver it to a 
similar place in Bulgaria. This model suggests various schemes for the payment 
by the Bulgarian trusted person. It is possible to either pay $10,000 to $12,000 
per kg or apply barter arrangements. In the late 1990’s, the heroin remaining 
in Bulgaria (some 10 % of the shipment) was used to pay for the trafficking to 
Central and Western Europe (the so-called „spillage”) but those practices have not 
been observed since 2003 – 2005. A more advanced version, especially among 
smaller dealers over the recent years, is the arrangement to swap amphetamines 
or cocaine for heroin. 
In the case involving a foreign importer the routes may be very different after the 
shipment is delivered. Differences depend on the specific features of the domes-
tic regional markets and on the multiple disruptions on the highest levels of drug 
dealing. The heroin may well undergo three or four levels of adulteration and 
then it may be earmarked for a specific area (city) or shared among several cities. 
Generally speaking, the supply of heroin to the markets of most Bulgarian cities is 
always under the control of the capital city. However, the main principle is that 
the black entrepreneur or the kilo connection sells the drug to the lower level 
at approximately $14,000 to $16,000 per kg. The heroin is adulterated at each 
lower level. One kilogram is used to make two kilograms. Hence the diamor-
phine content is reduced to 30–35 percent. An example of the Bulgarian heroin 
dealing is the market in Sofia in 2001–2002, when one of the most notorious 
kilo connections nicknamed Klyuna (the Beak) who controlled almost the whole 
44 The quantities and prices of Turkish heroin vary from one period to another. According to 
UNODC data, over the period 2000 – 2005 its purity ranged from 30 % to 80 % and the price 
was between $5,000 and $10,000.
45 The description uses the labels which Preble and Casey used to analyze the market in New York 
in the late 1960’s because they generally coincide with the situation observed in Bulgaria. The 
jargon of the Bulgarian underground world is avoided because it is too volatile and ambiguous 
and it might generate problems in understanding the situation.
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capital city for some time demonstrated that the product was original by using a 
pressing machine to re-pack the heroin in packages that were full imitations of 
the layout and weight of those from Turkish laboratories. But the Turkish packages 
had been opened before and the stuff had been adulterated twice. 
The next level is the delivery to the ”head” (the boss) of the regional market. 
Sofia is divided conditionally into nine areas. In smaller areas a single connection 
might control several cities because of the much lower levels of consumption. 
The one or two kilograms from the shipment are adulterated to a half. Hence 
the active substance in the heroin is brought down to 15–17 %. The next adul-
teration takes place at the level of weight dealers (called also ”mothers”, ”depots” 
or ”gram dealers”). The principle of doubling of the ”cut” (the adding of various 
other substances) is applied again and the active substance content falls down 
to 7–9 %. The last but one level is that of street dealers who buy two to three 
grams and continue to adulterate the heroin (by 20 to 30 %). Typically, street 
dealers add an extra dose by dividing one gram into six rather than the five 
standard doses. Thus the diamorphine content falls down to 4–7 % in the street 
dose. The last level is that of jugglers (pushers) who have no opportunity to adul-
terate the drug any further because it is packed by street dealer.
In the middle of the decade, the classical scheme from the foreign importer to 
the street dealer was gradually replaced by direct imports from Turkey and the 
hierarchy became ever more chaotic.
When describing the heroin distribution, one should keep in mind that each 
large regional market follows its own logic of development, adulteration patterns, 
price levels, and specific mix with other groups of drugs. For example, in the 
case of Stolipinovo neighbourhood in Plovdiv there is a shorter scheme of three 
Table 2. Structure of heroin distribution networks
Preble, E., J. Casey (1969) Bulgarian Classical Model (2003–2007)
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steps of adulteration after the importation46 from 70 % of active substance at 
the consignee, 50 % at the weight dealers, and 30 % at the street dealer level. 
There exist other short schemes of personal imports when the connections (the 
area bosses in Sofia and dealer networks in the countryside) sell the stuff of their 
boss or their own stuff.
46 The information about the way the importation is organized is far too fragmented to give the 
overall picture.
Figure 6. The way of heroin from top to bottom
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As well as the top down cross-section, the review from the bottom up (Figure 6) 
is relevant to the assessment of the heroin market. The issue of paramount im-
portance in this approach is the width of the pyramid base or the first level. The 
identification of the number of users makes it possible to delineate the framework 
of the vertical structure of the drug distribution. Unfortunately, like everywhere else 
in the world, the estimates for the heroin-addicted population in Bulgaria are highly 
speculative. Few are the systematic surveys providing reliable quantitative informa-
tion. According to the National Drugs Centre, the number of problem heroin ad-
dicts in Bulgaria was 20,000 to 30,00047 in 2004 – 2005. The survey of the Center 
for the Study of Democracy (2002 – 2003)48 points to numbers ranging from 15,000 
to 25,000.49 Without entering into a discussion on the research methods used, one 
could assume that a contingent of 15,000 to 30,000 heroin users determines the 
parameters of the heroin distribution organization. This number of people depen-
dent on or using heroin is higher than the number of actual users. For various 
reasons (ongoing medical treatment, migration from the country, disease, prison, 
etc.), part of the users do not participate in the domestic market.
The number of heroin users is a major factor for the size of the market. This is also 
the contingent of people among whom many street dealers and jugglers are recruit-
ed. The conversion of heroin users into sellers is a process which was analyzed long 
ago.50 The surveys of injection users51 conducted in 2003 and 2005 established that 
5 to 7 percent worked also as dealers for their own account.52 In-depth interviews 
with old heroin dependent users held at the same time revealed that over 50 % 
had previous or current experience in selling heroin or assisting street dealers. 
Practices show that when the police catch dealers it takes only a couple of hours 
to recruit the required number of dealers from among heroin users. The people at 
the lowest level of distribution are those who are most frequently caught by the 
police and also most frequently eliminated from the distribution network.
The second level consists of a group which was referred to as jugglers (pushers) 
in New York in the 1960’s.53 The word ”dealer” is also used in Bulgarian, although 
47 See: Annual Report on the Problems of Drugs and Drug Addictions in Bulgaria, Sofia, 2006.
48 http://www.csd.bg/en/euro/antidrug.php
49 The first representative survey of the population in the country conducted at that time, which 
underpinned those estimates, made it possible to use indirect questioning in order to conclude 
that the number of heron users reached even 32,000 to 34,000. Subsequent nationally repre-
sentative surveys (2003 – 2006) did not confirm those observations. They partially confirmed the 
hypothesis that the large number of heroin users was due to mixing of that group with other 
groups using psychoactive substances. The collation of those observations to data from health 
establishments, damage reduction programs, police authorities and surveys among street dealers 
makes it clear that the estimate of 15,000 to 25,000 problem heroin users is realistic.
50 See Preble, E., J. Casey, Jr., ”Taking Care of Business – The Heroin User’s Life on the Street,” 
International Journal of the Addictions, March, 1969
51 In 2003, a survey was held in four cities (Sofia, Plovdiv, Bourgas and Pleven). The number of 
respondents was 501. In 2005, it was repeated with the same methodology in Sofia, Plovdiv, 
Bourgas and Veliko Turnovo, interviewing 498 respondents.
52 Bezlov, T., Barendrech, K., Injection Drug Users in Bulgaria – Profiles and Risks. Initiative for Health 
Foundation, Sofia, 2004; Bezlov, T., Heroin Users in Bulgaria One Year after the Outlawing of the Dose 
for ”Personal Use”, Open Society Institute & Initiative for Health Foundation, Sofia, 2005.
53 Preble, E., J. Casey, Jr., ”Taking Care of Business – The Heroin User’s Life on the Street”, Inter-
national Journal of the Addictions, March 1969; Silverman, L., Brown, G., The Retail Price of 
Heroin: Estimation and Application, 1973 Drug Abuse Council; Nordegren, T. The A-Z Encyclo-
pedia of Alcohol and Drug Abuse, Universal Publishers, 2002.
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the higher level is called /street/ dealers, too. The specific features of heroin 
consumption make this lowest level of drug distribution extremely vulnerable. 
The easy recognition of heroin dependents (the police recognize almost 90 % of 
problem users in smaller cities), their easy traceability and the interrogations of 
drug addicts who have no scruples to name the juggler lead to frequent arrests 
by the police. To make the distribution network less vulnerable in the wake of 
the amendments of the Penal Code in April 2004 and the elimination of the so 
called personal dose,54 a new layer of go-betweens has been introduced between 
street dealers and users. These are heroin addicts subject to arrests by the police. 
They usually deal in heroin to provide for their daily intake. These semi-pushers 
find customers among their friends who often have not used heroin previously. 
The model implies continuous renewal of those who sell at the lowest level. The 
average street life of such dealers is between three months and one year. Then 
they are out naturally as they are caught by the police, go to prison, stop the 
use at their own choice or are eliminated by the bosses.55 It is quite possible for 
54 For more details see Drugs, Crime and Punishment, Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, 2007; Heroin 
Users One Year after the Elimination of the ”Personal Dose,” Initiative for Health Foundation, 2005.
55 Most often because of indebtedness, economic inefficiency, aggravated heroin dependency, too 
close connections with the police, etc.
Figure 7. Five-tier hierarchy in the capital city as compared to 
three-tier hierarchy of a small town
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these jugglers to resume the dealing in several months and the cycle is repeated 
continuously. The model suggests that the most vulnerable layer is exposed to 
customers. These are the people who carry the drugs and the money and prevent 
the law enforcement authorities from reaching the higher levels. The participants 
at that level expect that it will be considered a venial crime and they will not 
be convicted or the conviction will be minimal. These people are sacrificed and 
this is imputed in the price of the final product.
Given that 5 to 7 percent of heroin users operate as pushers at their own ex-
pense and that users range from 15,000 to 25,000, the second-level dealers (street 
dealers) should range between 750 and 1,400 in number. This explains the num-
ber of people detained which the Ministry of the Interior announced to be 350 
to 700 per annum over the period 2003 – 2006.56
Street dealers perform different functions, depending on the heroin dealing 
model. In the case of sales by phone, they might take the courier role but their 
main function is to transfer the risk of exposure to the end customer. The effort 
to use such a protective layer further complicates the organization and reduces 
the profit margin. The comparison to 2002 – 2003 comes to show that the aver-
age daily income of street dealers was reduced from 150 levs in 2001 – 2003 to 
120 levs three years later. 
The third level of the distribution network consists of weight dealers who, unlike 
street dealers, are not sacrificed and belong to the organization. They have access 
to the higher levels, get protection from other criminal structures, rely on lawyer’s 
defense when problems occur, enjoy the trust of the area boss, etc. More often 
than not they are drug dependent people57 and have criminal records. These 
dealers have the right to buy the drug from the connection (the depot) by the 
gram and to prepare doses. This enables them to adulterate the stuff. In many 
respects, they operate as small entrepreneurs for their own account. At the same 
time, they must hire a certain number of street dealers to prevent the risk for 
the organization. In Bourgas, for instance, each of them has the right to hire only 
one street dealer. Two street dealers and, very rarely, three or four are allowed 
in Sofia. One could presume that the intention is to keep weight dealers small 
and to limit their economic capacity. It should be noted that until the late 1990’s 
weight dealers sold the drugs directly to heroin users. Practices are still the same 
in smaller cities. The direct sales of heroin to users by weight dealers are indica-
tive either of problems in the distribution pattern or special relationships with the 
customer. In the former case, street dealers are taken out of the scheme for one 
or another reason. Weight dealers often resort to direct sales after police raids 
in order to meet their financial obligations. It is at this point of time that the 
organization becomes most vulnerable. The latter case is observed with big users 
(high-volume consumption) and old (loyal) acquaintances.
56 See Annual Report on the Problems of Drugs and Drug Addictions in Bulgaria, Sofia, 2006; 
Report by Chief Commissioner Valentin Petrov at the Public Hearings of the National Crime 
Prevention Commission (http://www.csd.bg/bg/fileSrc.php?id=2251).
57 At some points of time, attempts were made in Sofia and some other cities to use dealers who 
were not dependent on drugs. If the network is stable and the market is good, a dealer is typi-
cally removed from the network if he ”gets hooked” (starts using heroin). This strategy is often 
neglected due to the shortage of suitable people.
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The fourth level (in Sofia) includes big dealers who have supplied and sold 
heroin without any clearly distinct function for the last couple of years. They 
increasingly turn into middle-level figures who are much better protected and 
hidden in the conspiracy. Previously they were the people to deliver the drug to 
the street dealers and to collect the money from them. Quite indicative of the 
obscurity of their role is the lack of a generic name. They are called in Bulgaria 
anything from ”base” and ”connection” to ”gram dealer” and ”dealer”. Former 
participants in the scheme claim that those at the fourth level get much greater 
income than street dealers. Earlier on, they controlled street dealers, collected 
the money and called the bosses (in case of problems), while now they have 
additional functions including not only the preparation of the product but also 
lending to street dealers. The preparation of the product implies adulterating the 
heroin with the same amount of cut; the profit from the increased quantity is 
usually delivered to the head of the region. Bigger dealers are usually lenders to 
street dealers. Weaker street dealers tend to incur debts and ”debt management” 
is included in the functions at that level. The supply to street dealers is the initial 
step to promotion in the drug hierarchy. The behavior and the personal traits 
determine whether the dealer at that level would be assigned some ”managerial” 
functions, too, or whether he would simply deliver.
Bigger dealers can be assisted by various auxiliary figures, such as couriers (mules) 
and those who prepare the product (packers). The function of the mule is to 
deliver the stuff to the weight dealer. Cover-up is provided to minimize the risk 
through taxi drivers, drivers of vans delivering supplies to stores and even po-
licemen (reported cases in Sofia, Blagoevgrad, Sliven, Bourgas, Kyustendil and 
others).58 Some 100 to 200 grams of highly pure heroin are usually detected 
when such people are detained (this implies adulteration at a lower level). There 
exist the so-called ”big warehouses” where large quantities sufficient to meet the 
demand in several areas or cities are stored. The capital city is reported to have 
two or three places of this type. About five kg of heroin were seized in the raid 
of a big warehouse in Sofia (August 2002).
Parallel to the structures involving jugglers, street dealers and weight dealers, there 
are independent operators working at their own expense. They are perceived as 
enemies of the system and special measures are taken against them. If a street 
dealer obtains drugs from a source outside the area, he is considered to be guilty 
of free riding (shano) and subject to severe punishment. The same term is used 
for those who operate outside the existing networks: free riders (shanadjia) is a 
person who often does not report to drug organizations and uses uncontrolled 
channels to obtain drugs. Free riding can be practiced also by the ”official” deal-
ers in the area: part of the stuff they sell comes from channels other than the 
official ones and it is not reported upwards. In the past, the group of free play-
ers was dominated by Arabs and people from neighboring Balkan countries (they 
imported drugs for their own consumption). As the old distribution system started 
disintegrating, even heads of areas and persons from the last-but-one levels of 
the hierarchy increasingly resorted to ”unregulated” work. The scheme is to buy 
100 or 200 grams of a product which is much purer than what is offered on the 
58 See Domestic News – Bulgarian News Agency, 25 September 2002; Sega Daily, 3 Septem-
ber 2003, 17 August 2007 (http://press.mvr.bg/News/news070817_05.htm), 2 September 2007 
(http://news.netinfo.bg/?tid=40&oid=1092570).
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street and easier to sell. Previously free riders were considered to be easy pray to 
punitive brigades because their property was redistributed. They were eliminated 
through ruinous fines and beating. In more serious cases they were maimed. For 
the last couple of years free riders have typically been eliminated by telling on 
them to the police.
The second, third and fourth levels make up the main drug dealing schemes (not 
only for heroin but also for the other groups of psychoactive substances). These 
three groups may operate in various configurations but the linear type of the 
distribution network prevails. In its typical shape, three or four street dealers 
buy from a single weight dealer and then they sell to their jugglers who are in 
contact with the end customers. A street dealer can deliver the stuff to the jug-
glers two or three times a day. This is the simplest and the most widely used 
scheme but it exposes the participants to risk all the time as it is not difficult to 
trace out drug users, identify the juggler, then the street dealer and even reach 
the weight dealer if the police do a good job. For instance, the bigger quantities 
supplied from the higher levels of the hierarchy to weight dealers are left at a 
secret place. After the allocation of the product by the third-level dealer, the stuff 
is again left at secret laces from where it is taken to be sold n the street. Coded 
messages on the phone are used to agree on the delivery59 and trusted persons 
deliver. Precautionary measures are a must even for the lowest levels. It is, for 
example, avoided (or prohibited) to hand over stuff or money. Usually both the 
money and the doses are placed at secret laces. Cigarette boxes are the most 
common device. Jugglers usually carry only the ordered doses so that to be able 
to claim that they are his personal dose if caught by the police. 
59 They talk, for instance, of coffee, coke, a pharmaceutical, etc. Trials of weight dealers (depots, 
packers or gram dealers) point to such coded words as ”the upper coffee” and ”the lower cof-
fee”. ”The upper coffee” means wholesale of heron of up to 100 or 200 grams while ”the lower 
coffee” is the heroin for the street dealers, which has already been divided into smaller quantities 
and it is about five grams.
60 Injection Drug Users in Bulgaria – Profiles and Risks. Initiative for Health Foundation, Sofia, 2004; 
Bezlov, T., Heroin Users in Bulgaria One Year after the Outlawing of the Dose for ”Personal Use”, Open 
Society Institute & Initiative for Health Foundation, Sofia, 2005.
Table 3. Types of heroin dealers
2003 2005
A dealer you contact on the phone 69.0 59.2
A dealer you meet in the street 44.0 43.2
A dealer you visit at his place 9.5 21.3
A dealer at a café, bar or restaurant 10.7 8.0
From friends 12.4 19.1
Source: Injection Drug Users in Bulgaria – Profiles and Risks. Initiative for Health Foundation, Sofia, 2004; Bezlov, T. Heroin 
Users a Year after the Elimination of the ”Personal Dose” – the Amendments to the Legislation and the New Risks.60
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When the sale is struck, first the buyer leaves the money at a specific place. The 
payment is confirmed and then the place from where the stuff can be taken is 
specified. The Roma version of the linear model involves the whole family: the 
father gives instructions on where to leave the money, the mother collects the 
money, and the children leave the heroin. Although secret laces are used, the 
poor discipline of persons dependent on drugs (customers, jugglers and even 
street dealers) often leads to breaking the rules of the contact-free sales.
When cell phones were introduced and became cheaper (by 2001 – 2002), the 
main model of sales by phone started to dominate. There are many varieties 
of the model. The most common is that of a dealer with a telephone number 
known to the customers. That selling technique emerged as early as the mid 
1990’s,61 when sales were no longer fixed to a specific place (post) but dealers 
make appointments with customers at various places throughout the city. They 
were constantly on the move and hence less vulnerable to the police. The intro-
duction of pre-paid cell phone cards spread the technique all over the country. 
The time, place and quantity are agreed on the phone. The price is usually 
known because it is indicated on the label. For example, ”a ten”, means heroin 
at the price of ten levs, ”a dozen” is heroin for twelve levs, ”a five” or ”a six” 
means heroine at the price of five or six levs respectively.
When jugglers are involved, versions become more complicated – the order is 
taken by the street dealer but the delivery is carried out by the juggler. 
The most complicated version in the cases of sales by phone is that of ”tele-
phone exchanges”. The ”cell” (the autonomous structure consisting of a weight 
dealer, street dealers and jugglers) involves several people with different functions. 
There usually is a ”work” telephone number for the placement of orders and, 
as it will be described further below, these relatively complicated structured are 
used for the distribution not only of heroin but also the other drugs – synthetics 
and marijuana. The customer’s order is taken by the dealer on the phone who 
makes arrangements again on the phone (using pre-paid cards) to send the cou-
rier juggler to take the quantity from the supplying juggler. Typically the juggler 
fulfills only one order at a time so that to be able to claim a personal dose in 
the event of a police raid. 
As well as sales on the street or by the phone, there are sales from the home
of a juggler. Paradoxical as it may sound, in spite of the success of cell phones, 
sales from homes have tended to increase over the recent years. Jugglers us-
ing this technique seem vulnerable but some precautionary measures make the 
model quite reliable. The police have to overcome substantial problems to catch 
them because the street dealer with the cell hone can be caught at public places, 
whereas the entry into a private home requires a special permission. The un-
derlying principle of this model is to ensure the protection of the home against 
penetration (locked door of the apartment block, armored doors, protective grids 
on the windows, etc.). In the case of a police raid the drug is dropped into the 
sewage system, while police officers enter the place. This model of dealer homes 
61 According to old drug users and drug enforcement officers, the first dealer to introduce cell 
phones for dealing was Klyuna who, later on, became a well-known boss.
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is described in various surveys conducted in big Western European cities. It is 
worth noting the tendency for dealers to use their homes as their base when the 
police pressure grows at public places. A special variety of this model is the sale 
in Roma neighborhoods, where a kind of a ”fortress” has developed. In some 
cities this form of distribution influences the market very strongly. Export estimates 
for Varna point to about 80 % of the sales of heroin in the Roma neighborhood. 
In Plovdiv’s62 Stolipinovo district (See Figure 3), the largest Roma neighborhood, 
covers almost the entire consumption of heroin in the city and since 2003 or 
2004 it has turned into a major source of supplies to big cities in Southern Bul-
garia. This phenomenon in the drug distribution could be the subject-matter of 
special research. 
The methods and levels of distribution have different characteristics in the net-
works operating in Roma neighborhoods. The competitive advantage of the sellers 
is associated with many specific features of the ethnic group living there. These 
62 According to data from the Civil Registration Office on the permanent and current residence of 
people by 15 February 2007, Plovdiv is the second biggest city with a population of 377 thousand 
and Varna is the third biggest with 355 thousand inhabitants (See http://grao.bg/tna/tab01.html).
Figure 8. The Roma quarter at the fringes of Varna
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areas most frequently lack any consolidated urban planning rules and houses are 
built in a rather hectic manner. The density of building is very high; narrow paths 
divide one house from another or houses are connected so that jugglers ran run 
through several houses when the police is after them. Dealer houses are located 
in the centre of the Roma neighborhood and there are guard posts on the way 
to them. But given the specificities of the Roma culture, it is even not necessary 
to have posts because when strangers enter the neighborhood the news spreads 
instantly. Drug users tell impressive stories of how the police raid the southern 
part of Stolipinovo, while jugglers continue to operate in the eastern, western 
and northern parts. When police officers move to the eastern part, sales stop 
there but they are resumed in the southern part, and so on. Another competi-
tive advantage of the neighborhood is that users are offered premises for which 
they pay to take their dose in. A neighborhood with over 90 % of its population 
from the Roma minority (often hostile to the police) creates a kind of ethnic wall 
against law enforcement authorities. 
When describing Roma neighborhoods, one should remember that each of them 
is unique and it is difficult to make general conclusions. Plovdiv has three more 
Roma communities outside Stolipinovo but no drug dealing networks have devel-
oped there due to their smaller size and the specific features of the population. 
Figure 9. Stolipinovo, the Roma neighborhood in Plovdiv –
monopolist on local heroin market
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A major precondition for such infrastructure to develop in a Roma neighborhood 
is the existence of drug users among the inhabitants. There are some large Roma 
neighborhoods where the use of heroin is not tolerated and the local popula-
tion persecutes drug users. In Sofia, for instance, aggressive and hostile attitude 
to Roma drug addicts has developed in the biggest Roma neighborhoods like 
Fakulteta and Hristo Botev since the late 1990’s when an epidemic broke out 
there. Similar is the situation in Bourgas. At the same time, there is a late heroin 
wave of new addicts in Stolipinovo in Plovdiv and some smaller cities like Paz-
ardjik, Kyustendil, Petrich, and some others.
The fifth (fourth) level is that of the actual operational management of the mar-
ket in drugs. This is the level of the boss (”the head”) of the territory. He con-
trols dealers’ networks, supplies or controls the supply of drugs (not only heroin 
but also all other groups of psychoactive substances), uses punitive brigades and 
”black” lawyers, and pays a certain rent to the highest level of the underground 
world. This layer is almost untouchable for the law enforcement authorities. It 
is extremely difficult to prove the activities of the boss; he will never touch the 
drugs and bewares of any criminal actions that can be proven (possession of 
weapons, driving stolen vehicles, participation in acts of violence, etc.). The size 
of the controlled market determines the importance of the criminal leader. In 
small cities this can be the wholesale distributor who controls two or three street 
dealers and four or five jugglers and pays rent to enjoy the protection of a boss 
from the big cities (most often Sofia).63 In the capital city the conditional fourth 
level involves the so-called ”chiefs of areas” controlling the operation of several 
heroin networks and several networks for weed and synthetic drugs. The structure 
involves also couriers, packers and other auxiliary persons. The ”office” in big 
metropolitan areas may well involve dozens of ”employees”. The rapidly changing 
environment for the last four or five years comes to show that one can no longer 
speak of a coherent hierarchical system (a pyramid). More often than not, there 
are several bosses in a single network, who ”share the power” without any clear 
subordination lines, while networks cover various areas. This fourth (fifth) level is 
constantly on the move – people rotate up and down within months. Together 
with the area chiefs, there are also at least one or two smaller bosses with quite 
a vague position in the hierarchy.64
One thing that is certain on the drugs market is the undoubted existence of 
subordination lines and division of roles. For this purpose, the distribution of 
territories in the country or, in some cases, in the city is indispensable. A ma-
jor resource of the head of an area is his access to various levels in the police 
structures. Interviews with former and current street dealers make it clear that 
the typical weekly contribution to the police officers specialized in drug enforce-
ment at a police precinct amounts to 15 to 20 levs per street dealer. The work 
63 However, this type of criminal leaders is more vulnerable. They have to communicate with street 
dealers and even get in contact with their stuff.and Varna is the third biggest with 355 thousand 
inhabitants (See http://grao.bg/tna/tab01.html).
64 This duplication and re-duplication of levels sounds in the interviews of jugglers as follows: ”I 
worked for Botse and Mitko Babata is under him”. At the same time, it turns out that Botse 
who is a boss works for Mitko Ruski who, in his turn, has ”agreed with Klyuna...” Stories are 
quite contradictory, e.g. Klyuna wanted to redistribute the territory and, at the same time, he 
worked for both Kosyo Samokovetsa and Meto Ilianski. ”Kiro Yaponetsa is now working only in 
the /Roma/ neighborhoods” but there are areas ”from which he is going to get”, etc.
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charge is paid by the dealer. Besides, interviewees claim that the area boss pays 
to the higher police levels at the precinct to ensure the smooth operation of the 
system. The amounts for which there exists specific and corroborated information 
ranged from 10,000 to 20,000 levs annually over the period 2001 – 2003. It is a 
known fact that dealers and bosses pay additional amounts on top of the general 
arrangements when ”incidents” occur. For instance, the payment is per dose when 
a juggler is caught. When larger quantities are caught, e.g. 200 – 300 grams, the 
third level may reach 10,000 to 15,000 levs to ”redeem”. If a valuable dealer is 
caught, the payment goes for loss of evidence, procedural errors, etc.
These practices have been reported less frequently in the process of the stabi-
lization of the law enforcement authorities observed over the last two or three 
years. Long-standing street dealers say that ”rough techniques” to cover up drug 
dealers have become practically impossible. The prevailing scheme is to rely on 
leaks of information about a raid prepared in the area or to direct the file to 
a suitable police investigator (prepared to do favors or, at least, inexperienced). 
Area bosses pay not only in cash but also in other forms such as restaurant bills, 
repair and maintenance of vehicles and homes, VIP cards for brothels, sale of 
properties and automobiles at lucrative prices (the mark-up is covered by the 
area bosses). One of the most common forms which is mutually beneficial to 
both parties is the disclosure of information and the use of ”sacrifices”. In order 
to preserve the system the chief of the area needs to sacrifice street dealers. Of 
course, the easiest pray to help the career of ”our” policemen are the free play-
ers but it is not always so easy to ”offer” them, i.e. to arrange their arrest and 
to prove the offence.
The integrity of police is compromised at different levels. If a senior official cannot 
be reached, then a subordinate is sought to make the breakthrough at the higher 
level. When three or four officers work at a local precinct, it is quite possible 
for the head not to cooperate but the typical picture is to have at least a half 
of his subordinates abusing of their position. The paradox is that officers reported 
to have abused of heir position are transferred to other precincts or re-appointed 
to another position at the same precinct. Even medium- and low-level dealers 
try to influence police officers. They use the specific police sub-culture in which 
rumors and personal intrigues play a special role in the career development (by 
offering incomplete information or information denigrating or distinguishing cer-
tain officers65). As well as special relations with key local government and police 
officers, area chiefs maintain contacts with public prosecutors. The media have 
reported several cases of contacts with judges in the countryside. Similar to the 
contacts with law enforcement officers, magistrates did favors in the late 1990’s 
and the beginning of his decade. 
An important role in the functioning of networks is assigned to a certain circle of 
lawyers and the so-called ”punitive brigades” managed by this fifth (fourth) level. 
65 The issue of the mutual influence between representatives of the underground world and police 
officers at various levels (from local patrols to directors of special services) has been a hot topic 
for the last 17 years and it is extremely interesting but it is not the subject-matter of this paper. 
It is worth noting, however, that it is often clear who serves whom (whether the informer serves 
the policeman or the policeman serves the informer and whether the recruitment of informers 
helps the law enforcement authorities or organized criminal structures).
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Unlike the typical lawyer in penal proceedings who has diverse customers, the 
lawyer serving criminal structures (the so-called ”black lawyer”66) is specialized 
primarily in serving his contingent. He is called ”black” mainly because of the 
means he uses. The typical black drug lawyer attacks the criminal justice system 
at all levels (police officers at local precincts where the arrest has taken lace, po-
lice investigators, investigating magistrates, public prosecutors and judges), aiming 
at a ”breakthrough” at every step of the pre-trial phase and the proceedings. The 
intention is not so much to have errors and omissions in the penal proceedings 
but to use clientelist privileges or corrupt practices. Black lawyers are usually 
former law enforcement officers or investigating magistrates (the most common 
case), more rarely former public prosecutors and most rarely former judges. The 
role of this group is to be a specific go-between, often offering deals – coopera-
tion on part of the accused, cash payments, arrangements with the police to ”sac-
rifice” somebody,67 leakage of information to the media, etc. It is quite indicative 
of this role that the fees are typically calculated as a percentage of the money 
which should have been used to salvage the respective member of the structure. 
An important feature of the work of these lawyers is their networking. Cases are 
taken over, depending on the ”influence” of the lawyer in the various districts or 
parts of the judiciary. For instance, there will be a lawyer working with people 
accused at Police Precinct No. 3 in Sofia because he used to be an investigator 
there; another one will focus on Police Precinct No. 1 in Varna because he is 
a former police officer there, and so on. If the customer is arrested in a district 
where the lawyer has no contacts, another lawyer will take over the case and 
swap it for other cases where the first lawyer holds good positions. The number 
of black lawyers varies from one city to another. In Sofia, for instance, there 
are some twenty lawyers involved in drug proceedings. It should be pointed out 
that the regional specialization is accompanied by a rather clear-cut hierarchy, 
i.e. juggler cases are assigned to junior members of the group. Unlike ordinary 
lawyers for whom a case lost means income lost, black lawyers are exposed to 
the risk of physical punishment in the case of failure.68 Black lawyers continue to 
be obscure figures in many respects. They differ from the well-known prestigious 
lawyers69 who defend notorious criminal leaders and who typically do not partici-
pate or tend to participate in black operations (collusion with magistrates) only 
66 Black lawyers are members of the legal profession linked to gray or black structures, includ-
ing drug dealing structures, with good experience in penal proceedings which involve serious 
crime.
67 In order to dispel the suspicion that ”access” has been gained to a police precinct, arrangements 
are made with senior officers that one of the better known dealers with a criminal record is 
sacrificed. Sufficient quantities of drugs should be available at the time of the arrest to show to 
the media. Afterwards, it may turn out that this was not heroin but powdered sugar or that the 
search warrant has not been signed, etc.
68 A crucial folklore element in the interviews of police officers and public prosecutors are the 
stories of bruised and beaten lawyers.
69 The role of many well-known Bulgarian lawyers since the beginning of the transition has been 
quite controversial, undergoing various stages and intertwining with politics. For this reason alone 
it deserves special research. Here it is examined only in the context of the penal proceedings 
related to drugs and organized crime. Members of Parliament claim in their interviews that many 
well-known lawyers have been involved as consultants in the legislative drafting process because 
of their professional expertise. MPs say that some consultants suggested amendments to the pe-
nal law (supported by Members of Parliament some of whom were also well established lawyers 
continuing their practice during their term of office), evoking suspicion that the intention was 
to directly or indirectly evade justice. Thus even a mediocre lawyer could win a case, although 
the police officers, the investigators and the public prosecutors might have done a good job.
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from time to time. The ”top-level” cases are entrusted to popular lawyers, while 
black lawyers perform mainly auxiliary functions such as pressurizing witnesses, 
making arrangements for the loss of important evidence, etc.
Alongside with police structures and lawyers’ networks, punitive brigades play 
a special role in the functioning of the hierarchy and the zoning principle. The 
violence committed by these structures is indispensable to the formation of closed 
territories, the control over the distribution of shipments, and the punishment for 
breaking the rules. The available information suggests that punitive brigades of 
the type which existed back in 1994 – 1997 become unsustainable. Instead, each 
head of an area has three or four persons at his disposal (”a carload”) to maintain 
good discipline. One or two might be the personal bodyguards of the boss. The 
survey conducted in 2002 – 2003 reveals that the costs for the maintenance of a 
participant in a small brigade amounted to some 300 levs a week plus the extra 
costs like cell phones, drinks and food at the restaurants of the boss, prostitutes 
from the contingent of the boss, etc. The fines imposed on the jugglers and the 
property seized remain for the punitive brigade. The head of the brigade gets 
about 1,500 levs a week. He has a special status and might be a co-owner in 
the business. A member of the punitive brigade may receive less than a juggler 
since the market for violent services has shrunk and the level of pay should be 
geared to that in normal security companies where the employees gat two or 
three times less than members of punitive brigades.70 Generally, punitive brigades 
are used also in other spheres of organized crime such as collection of penalty 
interest, punishment of pimps and restaurant owners, etc. In fact, for the last 
three or four years, these structures of the drugs market provide violent services 
to almost all other black markets in all big cities of the country.
Since 2004 – 2005 the maintenance of independent punitive brigades has be-
come increasingly difficult. Semi-professional structures have occurred with the 
participation of street dealers involved in the network: young, healthy guys usu-
ally selling weed and amphetamines who get together, if necessary, with free lanc-
ers and indebted heroin dealers. They get extra pay and special bonuses for each 
punitive action but their main source of income is dealing. This flexible approach 
relieves the ”head” from additional costs and also makes it possible to use the 
services of different people who are less vulnerable to the police. Punishments
can be conditionally divided into three levels: (i) a fine – depending on the sever-
ity of the breach, the person pays a certain amount ranging from several hundred 
and several thousand leva; (ii) beating – there are degrees of injury but gener-
ally the breaking of bones or severe injuries are avoided; and (iii) maiming – 
cutting of ears, stabbing of the bottom parts of the body, breaking of bones which 
are difficult or impossible to heal, such as elbows, knees, etc.
Both in the late 1990’s (the emergence of zoning) and now (the beginning of its 
disintegration) punitive actions were used and continue to be used to threaten 
jugglers deviating from the rules. Two or three persons take part in the action. 
”More serious measures” require the involvement of people from thee or four 
areas.
70 See: Bezlov, T., The Drug Market in Bulgaria, Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, 2003.
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The fifth level consists of the so-called big bosses. The names and nicknames at 
this level are a favorite topic of the mass media, police officers and politicians. 
All interviews with police officers, dealers and criminal leaders (conducted since 
2002) have shown that the heads, i.e. the fourth (fifth) level report ”up”. It is 
mainly personal stories that we have to illustrate the functioning of the system 
at the higher levels. The only exception so far is the investigation of the Bourgas
boss Mityo Ochite, which took about a year and ended up with his arrest in 
April 2007. One can draw the conclusion that the bosses at the top level are 
persons whose biography is linked to former extortionist groups (including former 
police officers). They have already developed a sustainable legal business which 
can prove substantial incomes. At the same time, their legal operations cannot 
exist without gray or black economic practices providing considerable financial, 
organizational and human resources. Big bosses are never involved in black 
market operations – they do not know and are not interested to know who is 
who in the dealers’ networks, where the stuff goes, who carries it, who will be 
rewarded or punished at the lower levels. Their main criterion for assessment is 
the availability of ”normal” revenues. Loyalty and the lack of problems in the 
organization are the other criteria. It is not clear to what extent big bosses are 
involved in the negotiations on the allocation of territories, to what extent they 
”license” dealers, to what extent they control the supply of drugs, the quality and 
prices. The interference of a big boss in the day-to-day affairs, even when serious 
problems occur in his territory, is quite an exception. As a result, especially over 
the recent years, the heads and big dealers start relying on the passive attitudes 
of big bosses and working on their own. However, a traceable principle is to have 
a proxy on each big market. The police reports and dealers’ stories related to the 
last five or six years mention various names of proxies such as Anton Miltenov 
Klyuna, Pesho Shtangata, Shileto, Ivo Gela, Rasho, etc. They control the areas 
in cities like Sofia, Plovdiv and Varna.71 Two proxies in a big city (Sofia, Plovdiv, 
Varna and Bourgas) mean conflicts and frequently leads to wars. The division of 
people into those of VIS and those of SIC on the drugs market is reported to 
have disappeared since the beginning of 2002 but certain perimeters are retained. 
It is claimed, for instance, that in cities like Sofia and Varna amphetamine and 
marijuana belong to SIC, while cocaine belongs to VIS. The history of the drugs 
market for the last six or seven years is full of stories how some heads have 
managed to become strong enough in the control of violence and have sought 
the protection of a big boss against their old leader. 
These descriptions of the big bosses raise the issue of the factors which determine 
their influence. The systematic review of confirmed fragments from known events 
related to them and their biographies leads to the assumption that alongside with 
their authority built through violence during the golden age of extortionist groups 
and their substantial financial resources, what matters ьие also their capabilities 
of influencing law enforcement and judiciary authorities at the national level and 
their access to politicians at the local and national level. The development of the 
country since the beginning of this decade, the public killings in 2001 – 2005 
and some of the most notorious persons quitting the country lead to the ques-
71 The situation is somewhat different in Bourgas. Law enforcement officers and dealers claim in 
their interviews that the proxy is Yanko Pomoriiski who is reported by the police to be ”comple-
menting” to Mityo Ochite.
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tion whether underground celebrities untouchable for justice continue to have the 
same importance for the functioning of the market in drugs. 
The Zoning Principle
The zoning of the drugs market is an extremely interesting phenomenon typical 
of Bulgaria. The in-depth interviews with police officers and dealers lead to the 
hypothesis that the late 1990’s saw the emergence of territories the control over 
which was subject to negotiations. Members of former local extortionist structures 
were ceded the control over the drugs market in their area. Sofia is the most tell-
ing example to this effect. Until 2001, it was divided into ”points” or ”posts” in 
the heroin distribution. The typical organization consists of a boss with four or five 
street dealers and one or two suppliers. There was a clear connection with either 
of the former groupings VIS and SIC.72 The zoning of Sofia is an illustration of how 
organized criminal structures effectively agree on zones of influence. Historical re-
constructs show that, in the wake of a series of incidents (the killing of Polly Pantev 
and Lyonyata Djudjeto73 in 2001), tension mounted and made representatives of 
the two groupings at medium- and high level to meet and negotiate the consensus 
solution to divide the territory of Sofia. The paradox was that the boundaries of 
the drug territories followed the boundaries of operation of local/district police 
precincts.74 Thus Sofia was divided into nine areas, corresponding to the nine po-
lice precincts in the city. The principle of having a boss or a head of each are was 
adopted.75 The head is assigned with the management of the whole organization 
of delivery and distribution, punishments, prices, etc. He ”owns” the street dealers 
and controls their territory of operation. The dealing in another area, be it on the 
other sidewalk of the street, the sale of drugs from external sources or the work 
for another area boss are subject to punishment.
Drug dealers and members of the underground world who have impressions of 
the way in which drugs are distributed say that it is only natural to have this 
coincidence between the drug dealing areas and the territories of operation of 
police precincts because of past experience and the key role of the police in 
the redistribution of territories.76 It is impossible to protect the territory without 
contacts with the respective police precinct. The experience of posts (street deal-
ers selling in more than one area) showed that if police officers from more than 
one police precinct are to be involved and paid, the coordination became very 
complicated, costs increased and the risk of rivalry among corrupt police officers 
(in the presence of non-corrupt officers) was very high.
72 See: Bezlov, T., The Drug Market in Bulgaria, Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, 2003.
73 Polly Pantev was shot dead on the island of Aruba on 9 March 2001. He was believed to be the 
most influential person on the drugs market who controlled the supply of heroin and cocaine. 
Leonid Fotev (Lyonyata Djudjeto) and his girlfriend were slaughtered in his apartment in Sofia 
on 16 September 2001. He was believed to have controlled the distribution of drugs in Sofia at 
that time.
74 See: Bezlov, T., The Drug Market in Bulgaria, Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, 2003.
75 ”Head” was the title used when areas were demarcated and probably reflected the subordination 
to the biggest criminal leaders at that time.
76 The corruption in law enforcement and judiciary authorities is of crucial importance for the 
development of crime in Bulgaria. Coalition 2000 has dedicated special research to this topic 
(See http://www.anticorruption.bg). The theme has been repeatedly discussed also by the policy 
makers at the Ministry of the Interior.
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It is noteworthy that the old model of posts has not disappeared since the time 
when the territories were divided. It continues to operate but posts function 
within the area. They receive the drugs and report to the boss of the territory. 
There are also some general posts, i.e. places known to heroin addicts, which 
account for most of the sales. They are located downtown – the monument to 
Patriarch Evtimii (”Popa”), Orlov Most (”Sinyoto”), the monument to the Soviet 
Army (”Baba Yaga”), etc. The situation is similar in Bourgas and Varna. The main 
problem with this distribution of public posts is that the places of dealing become 
known to the general public and the police cannot afford to ignore or neglect 
them. In the beginning of the decade cell phones became so common that the 
Western model of telephone sales was introduced in Bulgaria, too. As a result, 
the old forms of control became more difficult to exercise. New dealers ap-
peared and ”took customers away from reporting dealers”. The balance between 
the bosses controlling the posts was tilted and that reduced the proceeds of the 
two extortionist structures (VIS and SIC). 
Unlike the division of Sofia, the countryside was divided in a more spontaneous and 
natural way. Local leaders (from the former subsidiaries of the extortionist group-
ings) were entitled to get control over the distribution of heroin. In 2002 – 2003 
the analysis made by the Center for the Study of Democracy using at least two 
different sources77 developed a conditional map of the allocation of the country, 
specifying the major criminal leaders exercising control in the big cities.
The logic of the control over drug distribution territories followed two principles. 
The first one related to the size of the regional market – larger markets subordi-
nated the smaller neighboring markets. The second one was the strength of the 
local organization of organized crime. An organization is more important when it 
uses violence more effectively and has penetrated the local government institu-
tions, the local law enforcement and judiciary authorities more effectively. Un-
like Sofia, smaller cities usually do not need zoning. An exception to this rule is 
Varna, where the drug market is big enough. In smaller cities the drug distribution 
networks are part and parcel of the distribution network of the neighboring big 
city. There are some areas like South-west Bulgaria where not only the regional 
centre (Blagoevgrad) but also the smaller cities close to the border with Greece 
are intricately interwoven into the hierarchical structures of at least four criminal 
leaders in Sofia.
All interviews held in 2002 – 2007 point to a single main theme in the explana-
tion of regional markets, i.e. their subordination to Sofia. Except for Bourgas and 
partially Plovdiv, the influence of the capital city is very tangible. People often talk 
of ”permission from Sofia to take the heroin” or ”permission to deal also in weed 
and amphetamines”, ”monthly contributions to Sofia”, etc. The most realistic ex-
planations are that the capital city continues to provide for the importation of the 
77 Information from special services, local police structures, interviews with street dealers and push-
ers, publications in the mass media, etc. After CSD published The Drug Market in Bulgaria, many 
and diverse comments and information on the maps were received. All this gives us grounds to 
believe that, in spite of some inaccuracies, the 2003 national map have a true reflection of the 
distribution of drugs. This map contains the names of some leaders who were omitted for one 
or another reason in 2003.
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main bulk of the wholesale heroin and cocaine and to organize the production 
of synthetic drugs. The belonging to the networks centered on the big structures 
in Sofia safeguards the regularity of supply and also gives access to additional 
human and financial resources. There are typical cases of seconded dealers from 
Sofia and rescheduled payments for the drugs. On the other hand, isolation and 
disobedience lead to problems for the local criminal boss. He runs the risk to 
be exposed to the central law enforcement and judiciary authorities. While some 
events are controllable at the local level, area bosses stand no chance if the 
operation comes from Sofia. He might be taken at surprise, be refused contacts 
with senior police officials and magistrates or even be confronted with informa-
tion and evidence of his operations.
2.2.2. The Soft Drugs Market
All component drug markets bear strong similarity to the core heroin distribu-
tion chain and the patterns in which it functions. In the late 1990s, soft drug 
consumption topped all other drugs and became the portion of the market 
most attractive to organized crime. At this point, local crime leaders started to 
invest consistent efforts to control it, competing for school neighborhoods and 
Figure 10. Areas of control over Bulgarian heroin market, 2003
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The more intensive the color, the higher the consumption of drugs in the respective area in 2002–2004. For instance, it was the highest 
in Sofia, while in cities like Gabrovo, Lovech, Targovishte, Smolyan and others the use of drugs was minimal.
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other public spots. Until 2001–2002, however, weed was regarded as low-profit 
for two main reasons–its low street price and the frequent ups and downs in 
consumption.78 As heroin demand shrank, though, the situation changed rapidly. 
All available surveys confirm the steady growth of soft drugs use in the period 
2001–2006.79 The First National Population Survey on Drug Consumption in Bul-
garia conducted by Vitosha Research in early 2003 found that those who had 
tried marijuana at least once (lifetime prevalence) were around 130,000. In 2007 
already, the survey recorded 160,000 people who had tried the drug. Another 
survey conducted by the National Focal Point on Drugs and Drug Addictions 
in 2005 captured a much higher lifetime prevalence of 4.4%,80 or 200–210,000 
people. The latter survey, however, did not cover under-18 marijuana users, 
which, according to data from the National Center for Drug Addictions, would 
add another 60–80,000 users to the total.81
In contrast to heroin, most locally consumed soft drugs are also locally produced. This 
deprives crime enterprises of one of their main competitive advantages–contacts with 
transnational supply networks and the cross-border routes they control. Moreover, cli-
mate across the country is favorable to growing cannabis practically anywhere and a 
large portion of users grows their own plants. This is the main difference between soft 
drugs and amphetamines, which are much more complex to produce and depend 
on the import of precursors that the average user could hardly undertake. Early in the 
decade the market of cannabis products was already well established and sufficiently 
developed. Selling to friends and through small-scale pushers were the most common 
methods of distribution. They could meet growing demand due to the effectiveness 
of networks stretching out to many remote and small places, which bought out the 
crop, sold it at large or pushed it in the street.
The 2002–2003 survey82 demonstrated that at thе time, the markets of heroin, 
synthetic drugs and cocaine controlled by organized crime were independent 
78 Heroin addiction where the need for a daily fix and withdrawal symptoms in its absence could 
drive users to do anything, to the point of getting involved in crime and prostitution to buy 
the drug. The sales of marijuana and other cannabis products, though, depend on a number of 
factors, such as weekend recreational use, seasonal peaks, holidays, the frequency of friendly 
gatherings or celebrations, etc.
79 Estimates are based on the annual population surveys of drug consumption in Bulgaria made 
by Vitosha Research in 2002–2007. See also: Annual Report on Drugs and Drug Addictions Issues in 
Bulgaria, 2006, National Focal Point on Drugs and Drug Addictions.
80 Standard questionnaires measuring prevalence with questions, such as: ”Have you ever tried (any 
type of drug)?” are virtually asking respondents to self-report the commission of an offence. It is 
not clear, however, what portion of Bulgarians would willingly self-report their personal use of 
drugs. Vitosha Research have consistently used the same set of question from 2002 up until 2007 
to put together the profile of users who „had tried at least once in their lifetime” a certain drug, 
and the findings suggest that with the introduction of harsh punitive measures for drug offences 
the number of respondents who would self-report drug use has plummeted. School surveys show 
that marijuana using students are increasing each year. In addition, most of old users are still 
living in Bulgaria. This gives us ground to suppose that part of the respondents would not self-
report in fear of legal consequences. This is also the reasons that different sociological surveys 
produce disparate results.
81 National Population Survey on the Use of Alcohol and other Drugs in Bulgarian Schools (9-12 
Grade) conducted by the National Center for Drug Addictions and the National Center for 
Public Health Protection as part of the European School Survey Project on Alcohol and other 
Drugs (ESPAD) in May 2003 and surveying 1,400 students from 75 sections in various general 
and special secondary schools.
82 See: Bezlov, T., The Drug Market in Bulgaria, Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, 2003.
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from each other and none of them had any links with the market of cannabis 
products. Up to 2003, the dominant cannabis distribution patterns in most large 
towns83 were either through friends, or by independent dealers. Surveys from 
that point on84 bespeak the gradual monopolization of the market. Distribu-
tion networks that dealt in synthetic drugs and marijuana started to merge. Even 
the vernacular names assigned to marijuana suppliers in most neighborhoods or 
towns, such as ”the firm” or ”the monopoly” confirm that organized crime had 
taken control of the market. 
Several factors led to the capture of the marijuana market by criminal organiza-
tions. The first factor was that criminal enterprises established control of whole-
sale deliveries. Police measures targeting cannabis production and access to the 
crop had a major role in this respect. In the late 1990s, when the market was 
split between criminal organizations and numerous small free players (either 
marijuana-using sellers or black market entrepreneurs), the latter bought small 
amounts directly from growers (usually around one kilo of dry cannabis) and 
sold it to friends and acquaintances. As police clamped down on producers in 
the notorious cannabis cultivation area around the town of Petrich, the access of 
casual buyers to the region was significantly restricted. Interviews with users long 
engaged in small-scale marijuana dealing have revealed that around 2004–2005 
it had become nearly impossible for an outsider visiting a pot-growing village in 
the Bulgarian south-west to buy it freely and leave undisturbed. In most cases the 
police would seize the stuff and caution them against repeat visits. Interviewees 
were convinced that the police’s stint was rather to watch out for competition of 
the area’s true masters than enforce the law. The police, on the other hand, claim 
that local departments are not appropriately staffed and equipped to counteract 
the sophisticated techniques used by criminal organizations. They take particular 
safety measures during the riskiest part of the supply chain–transportation, send-
ing two or three reconnaissance cars ahead and using mules as drivers of the 
vehicle where the cannabis is loaded, so as not to harm the organization in case 
the police seize the batch.85 The local members of crime syndicates are familiar 
with every single police officer in the area and must keep track of where they 
are patrolling on the day when the deal takes place. Even if officers from other 
departments were to be posted in the area, they would stick out in the sparsely 
populated local villages and towns. As a result, local growers have stopped taking 
risks and only sell to a selection of trusted clients. On the whole, even if the 
suspicion of police complicity is waived, law-enforcement bodies prove unable 
83 Varna and Bourgas are an exception to this pattern.
84 Since 2002 the Center for the Study of Democracy and Vitosha Research have performed six 
annual victimization surveys containing a significant bloc of questions on the use of the most 
widespread psychoactive substances. In addition to that in 2006 and in the first half of 2007 the 
Center conducted a series of in-depth interviews with drug dealers and justice and law-enforce-
ment officials.
85 Interviewed officers also criticized internal police regulations on counteracting cannabis growing, 
describing them as ”intentionally impractical”. One of the rules reads that guards must be placed 
around any discovered cannabis field until the plant matures, then a specimen is to be sent for 
analysis and if it confirms that the plant is indeed cannabis, only then the field can be lawfully 
ploughed out to destroy the harvest. Thus, any police force unlucky enough to have found green 
cannabis must assign guards functions to its officers. In 2006, for instance, the border police had 
to place guards round fields throughout the summer, despite the severe staff shortages. Later on, 
they took care not to find not to find cannabis fields again.
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to compete with the professionalism of criminal structures. In contrast to small-
scale entrepreneurs, whose career would end if deprived of one kilo of cannabis 
and registered by the police, organized criminal players can easily recover from 
damage and loss due to police operations. 
Second, and perhaps even more significant, was the creation of an organized 
cannabis distribution network within particular regions or cities. Some of the big-
ger cities, such as Varna and Bourgas, were seized rather quickly back in the early 
1990s. Others took longer time and greater effort to control, e.g. Plovdiv and 
Sofia. These differences were due to several factors, but mainly that in the two 
coastal cities criminal enterprises’ hit squads managed to oust the small suppliers 
and that there were no marijuana growing spots in close proximity. In contrast, 
the only district within the city of Plovdiv firmly held by organized crime is the 
Roma neighborhood Stolipinovo, while also and a number of villages and towns 
in the countryside around town grow marijuana readily available to users through 
networks of associates. 
The socio-demographic profile of marijuana users is different from that of heroin 
users from the margins of society. These are secondary school youths, university 
students, and career oriented professionals under 3586–an age group associated 
with relatively high income. Soft drug distribution was therefore organized around 
different assumptions. It is hard to decide whether the local drug lords based 
their distribution schemes on rational analysis, considering the ineffectiveness in 
employing heroin dealers for soft drug distribution both because of the social 
differences between target clients and popular apprehension that soft drugs are 
a transition step to heroin use. However, they engaged in the networks mainly 
amphetamine dealers who would not sell heroin. Interviewees confirmed that 
marijuana dealers were recruited in two basic patterns. Some dealers came from 
among neighborhood offenders and hooligans, some of them partly experienced 
in school sales–muscular and aggressive pushers who worked for a fixed salary, 
percentage of the sales and bonus payments. They also acted as hit squads in 
some districts in Sofia and Varna. In the cases when former independent pot 
dealers had to be forced to join the network or give up the competition. The 
second recruitment line relied on incorporating exactly those petty sellers to work 
under a certain crime boss. They were coerced either through threats of reporting 
them to the police or through violent physical assaults. Economic benefits such as 
the guaranteed regularity of supplies and payments were also used to convince 
the independent players to join. Part of old marijuana dealers were compelled to 
start selling amphetamines as well. Besides school pushers, the soft drug networks 
recruited dealers that had been involved in amphetamine distribution in the areas 
of Sofia and Varna. Thus, early in the decade the typical marijuana street dealer 
was never wholly involved in the drug selling business, albeit it could be his chief 
source of income, but always had some other occupation (e.g. student or profes-
sional). With the advent of organized crime on the cannabis market, however, 
street-level dealership was professionalized. 
86 According to the Vitosha Research victimization survey of 2006, around 75% of those who have 
tried marijuana are between the age of 15 and 35. Also, the Annual Report on Drugs and Drug 
Addiction Issues in Bulgaria, 2006 of the National Focal Point on Drugs and Drug Addictions 
announced that 8.7% of people from the 15 –35 age group ”have tried” marijuana ”at least 
once in their lifetime”.
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Criminal enterprises gained serious advantage through their most effective diffu-
sion scheme involving mobile phone coordination of orders and sales. In Sofia, 
Varna and Bourgas, this has been the dominant pattern in the last couple of years 
on the four main markets–of heroin, amphetamines, marijuana, and cocaine. 
Each drug is delivered by a separate supplier. The busiest phone dealing networks 
bar any face-to-face contacts between dealers and supplier both for safety from 
law enforcement and to prevent theft of drugs from the dealers. Delivery to 
clients is made in various ways. For instance, the supplier can bring a large sack 
of grass in the local park with users swarming around and the police patrolling 
about, but not guarding the exact site, or a taxi driver can pick a customer from 
a designated address, deliver the staff and drop him half a mile down the street.87
Taxi drivers, though, are easy to identify through license plate and the company 
they work for, so, to escape detention, a fake client to carry the drug in case of 
vehicle often accompanies them search. 
A number of methods are used in the capital city to hold supplier and dealers 
in check. Supervisors may impose fines on supplier for delaying the delivery, 
especially for serious delays that often make clients withdraw the order. Mari-
juana quality is also monitored, as supplier sometimes contaminate it with plain 
grass and weeds to increase volume and make an extra profit from that. This is 
why, much like in the legal sales practice, supply bosses arrange ”mystery cli-
ent” monitoring, client surveys (regular customers are contacted via phone to be 
asked about quality of the weed delivered), and even hotlines for complaints. 
The pattern involving phone sales and supplier deliveries88 has suited well the 
rapidly spreading soft drugs market. The older between-friends distribution model 
was much more convoluted, as any member of the circle deciding to try stuff 
from the same dealer had to wait for him to come, then order a certain amount 
in the presence of the connection, and then again wait for the delivery. The 
phone model is a shortcut, as one only has to dial a number and soon has a 
supplier at the door or elsewhere. Some less widespread methods are also used 
by organized crime, such as a street dealer walking on a fixed beat (e.g. in the 
”Emil Markov” residential area in Sofia) where potential buyers can find him at 
certain hours. This pattern is reminiscent of heroin some distribution approaches 
from a decade ago. Organized crime remains firmly established in schools as 
well, with sometimes paradoxical cases occurring–in a school in Sofia the ”of-
87 Taxi drivers and companies are worthy of a separate survey. These are legitimate entities pro-
viding ample jobs of great mobility and numerous contacts with customers which makes them 
attractive to a large number of individuals involved in (organized) crime. Deviant behavior in taxi 
drivers can also occur as a result of some companies’ culture comparable to that of marginal 
social groups as well as the shaky profits that can be very low due to fierce competition in the 
sector and foster the seeking of supplementary income. Various crime structures use the services 
of taxi drivers in car theft and burglary, or in prostitution where they are engaged as guards and 
”cashiers”. They can perform various roles in drug distribution as well. In the mid-1990s they 
used to drive heroin addicts to sites where they could buy a fix–in Sofia these were mainly 
spots (often in the open) in the Roma populated neighborhood Fakulteta. In the late 1990s in 
Plovdiv many taxi drivers acted as mobile suppliers to end-users. At about the same time, they 
started transporting heroin from the main storage facility to those set up in the housing projects 
or even directly to street-level dealers.
88 The same model was copied by a distributor unrelated to the dominant crime syndicates. In 
Sofia, a former underboss from distribution Area 6 started his own network of appointment 
dealing. However, it is quite probable that his activities were authorized by the syndicates and 
he might not be a retailer proper, as the scheme involves managing large staff.
66 The Drug Market in Bulgaria
ficial” cannabis dealer they had employed was in fifth grade and selling to older 
students. The choice of someone so young for a pusher was probably made to 
reduce suspicions. His clients, of course, had no doubt that the youngster was 
tied to criminal structures.
The regulatory environment in Bulgaria also significantly affected the advance 
of crime enterprises on the soft drug market. In particular, in 2004 the Bulgar-
ian Criminal Code was amended to abolish the provision specifying that addicts 
were exempt from criminal responsibility when caught with only a single dose 
(allegedly intended for personal use). The Bulgarian pro-legalization movement 
Promjana conducted a pool among the members its website forum concerning 
the relation between marijuana price and quality and the dealers that sell it. It 
showed the link between Criminal Code amendments and drug diffusion, identi-
fying three distinct periods in which different patterns were dominant: up to April 
2004, from mid-2004 to late 2006, and from early 2007 on. Due the new strongly 
restrictive provisions for possession introduced in 2004 independent retailers (so 
called sole traders) gradually dropped out of the market. In 2006, weed users in 
most Sofia districts and the larger cities reported that they were buying from a 
”monopoly” or ”firm” (the street jargon name for controlled dealers). Within the 
first two months of 2007 independent retailers reemerged again. Organized crime 
networks at the same time have not stopped operating. Findings from the sum-
mer of 2007 even indicate a tightening of control by crime enterprises in Sofia, 
Varna and Bourgas.89
Interviews with dealers to friends suggest that a more repressive legislation (as was 
the Criminal Code in the period 2004–2006) places independent retailers in a 
more vulnerable position and they cut distribution to a minimum not because of 
direct violence or threats from organized crime, but rather to avoid being caught 
by the police. They can’t risk selling but to a very limited number of friends, 
as the bosses offer prizes to those who identify an independent retailer. Once 
such a dealer is identified, he is more likely to be investigated by the police 
than battered by a hit squad. Most probably, in the recent dismantling of two 
cannabis-growing greenhouses in downtown and suburban Sofia,90 the police had 
received reports from organized crime. Thus criminal enterprises rely partially 
on law and its enforcement to gain advantage in their own access to the crop 
and in the retail market. Current prices are a good indicator whether a market 
is controlled by organized groups–with the same quality of the drug, syndicate 
crime imposes prices twice as high as in free retailing.
Cannabis quality has been on the decrease, and adulterated stuff is increasingly 
on offer. Many teenage users in Varna, for instance, believe that a joint is only 
smokeable when ”you put something inside” to enhance the effect. This is a very 
disturbing trend, as the cutting agents used (benzodiazepines, amphetamines, 
even heroin) can harm users to a much greater extent than marijuana. Youngster 
89 Data associated with Bourgas is actually about the nearby resort Slanchev Bryag. It is highly pos-
sible that in this case Sofia-based organized groups have temporarily moved out their markets 
after the marijuana networks crisis in the capital city which occurred with the capture of its main 
bosses.
90 Greenhouses were discovered in 2004 in a flat in the downtown residential district Lozenets and 
in August 2007 in a summer house in Pancharevo, a village at the outskirts of Sofia.
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have visited emergency rooms with acute heart disorder symptoms after smoking 
weed cut with large amounts of amphetamines. Another potential harm is the 
increased chance of getting hooked. It must be noted, though, that cut grass may 
not be too widespread and Varna might be an exception, as very little evidence 
suggests that it is commonly used in Sofia and there is no such evidence for 
other cities. 
The described dealing patterns suggest that following 2004–2005, the soft drug 
trade in the large Bulgarian cities came to be dominated by organized crime. 
Marijuana dealing networks attached to existing local drug distribution run by 
organized cartels. Their place in the hierarchy, though, is dependent on local 
patterns, of which three basic types can be distinguished. 
The first one is highly centralized with distinct branches by type of drugs, all 
accountable to the top level. Organized drug dealing in Bourgas up to the spring 
of 2007 had precisely this structure. Marijuana distribution is thus one of four 
main substructures, managed by a ”lieutenant”91 responsible for cannabis sup-
plies and dues collection; another lower-level lieutenant supervises the dealers. 
Bourgas and small nearby towns (Nesebar, Slanchev Bryag, Pomorie, Sozopol and 
other smaller coastal villages where the available population in the tourist season 
doubles) have formed a market with a single clear-cut organizational pyramid
with monopoly undisputed over the last decade. Thus, the profits from the sepa-
rate drug submarkets flow into the same hands at the top. 
In Varna and the several distinct zones in the capital Sofia, marijuana was integrated 
into a zoning pattern of distribution. It is a compound structure where each zone’s 
boss sells strictly within the bounds of his zone through a well-developed area net-
work of dealers, and buys it in large from a single or several supply channels. 
Smaller towns (Blagoevgrad, Pleven, Dobrich, Haskovo, Sliven, Razgrad, Silistra, 
etc.) have a totally different model based on the control over independent 
dealer groups. These small groups have their own supply channels and rules of 
profit distribution. However, they are made to pay dues to the town supervisor 
authorized by one of the few drug lords of national influence. 
2.2.3. The Synthetic Drug Market
If drugs could supply a metaphor of transition, one would be tempted to call 
heroin the anesthetic needed to alleviate its shocks, as opposed to cannabis 
and synthetic drugs, representing the drive to entertainment of a society slowly 
getting to normal. After the severe political crisis of 1997 followed by increasing 
economic stability, the latter portion of the drug market grew due to souring 
use. As various surveys confirm, there is an obvious parallel and cross-influences 
between the soft drug and amphetamine markets. Data from the national popula-
tion surveys on drug use show that 80% of amphetamine users in the country are 
also using marijuana.92 The growing use of marijuana can be traced to changing 
91 Data based on interviews with police officers and prosecutors, as well as drug dealers who have 
operated in Bourgas.
92 Analysis is based on findings of the annual Vitosha Research surveys throughout the period 
2002–2007.
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attitudes among the 14 to 30 year-olds who were looking for chill out on sub-
stances more potent than alcohol and tobacco, but less destructive than heroin. 
The younger and better-off generation was searching for a safe recreational drug 
to enhance and vary their experience through soft and synthetic drugs, instead 
of sliding down the escapist routes offered by heroin.
Synthetic drugs production
Domestic demand for synthetic drugs emerged in the late 1990s,93 when the 
taste for techno music and the whole entertainment style around it, with designer 
drugs at the core, became popular. Similar to the marijuana market, at this stage 
two markets seemed to coexist. One was formed around the underground music 
scene with club DJs making extra income and friends selling to friends. The other 
segment developed in the commercial entertainment venues (discos, clubs, and 
bars) run by organized crime. The clients of both segments showed a marked 
preference for domestically produced amphetamines, ignoring varieties imported 
from Europe, which were excessively expensive. At that time locally manufactured 
drugs were chiefly exported to the Middle East and did not supply the European 
or the domestic market. Similar to heroin, the channels for synthetic drugs ex-
port were run by Bulgarian residents of foreign origin. Interviews with users from 
the underground culture scene confirmed that such traffickers were their early 
suppliers. The second group of users, who bought at night clubs owned by orga-
nized crime players, was supplied straight from the producer. Despite the lack of 
detailed reliable evidence, it seems that in the late 1990s the leaders of former 
racketeer insurance companies and even some oligarchs94 had entered this rather 
hermetic business. 
Existing production facilities and methods sustained for deliveries to the Middle 
East began to supply the domestic market. The early production and export cycle 
had been rather simple, involving one or two chemists who knew the production 
technology, a couple of mules to transfer the ready product to the Middle East, and 
one or two suppliers of equipment, precursors and chemical agents. Sometimes, 
manufacturing in Bulgaria and dispersion in the market countries were supervised 
by local authorized organizers. At first, the amphetamine production workshops did 
not take any special measures to conceal their activities. From the former state pro-
ducers deliveries were made straight to the newly set illegal laboratories,95 whereas 
the outbound produce cleared customs at the Bulgarian-Turkish border (on its way 
to the Middle East) by simply being declared for chemicals and medicaments. In-
country deliveries were also easy to operate. Couriers took the illegally produced 
pills straight to the clubs or even to private homes.96
93 Earlier local use was rather limited to a small circle of young techno music promoters who 
organized rare parties in abandoned industrial sites and warehouses.
94 The Opitsvet case described below shows that the group of black market entrepreneurs also saw 
opportunities for vast profits in synthetic drugs production.
95 Captagon left over from the pre-1990 produce of state pharmaceutical companies has report-
edly been exported later by black market entrepreneurs who exploited previous contacts with 
the Arab world to make continuing deliveries to Middle Eastern countries in the next couple of 
years. With the running out of drugs in stock, they turned to setting up clandestine labs, now 
draining the state producers from skilled chemists, precursors and technologies.
96 Interview with an ex bodyguard of a crime leader from Sofia’s underworld.
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The first such amphetamine workshops were discovered by Bulgarian law enforce-
ment bodies as they engaged in consistent cooperation with European anti-drug 
agencies to trace the import of precursors.97 Laboratory operators and trafficking 
channel runners were then easy to track down. It is not clear to what extent 
the relations between Bulgarian special services and resident citizens of Middle 
Eastern origin98 affected the organization of illegal local amphetamine production, 
but obviously, after the Opitsvet disclosures in late 199799 the production and 
export cycle was radically changed. Amphetamine producers turned to a hydra-
like mode of operation guaranteeing that the enterprise would remain safe in 
any case when a workshop is busted or a large delivery is caught. Although the 
police often seize precursors and ready amphetamine pills, dismantle laboratories 
and capture couriers, their actions have seemingly little effect on the production 
process, as damages are anticipated and risks are accordingly provided for. 
The system also resembles the hourglass structure used by Peter Reuter100 to 
represent cocaine distribution. According to this scheme, the widest upper part 
of the inverted triangle is occupied by the ”workers,” hundreds of low-skilled 
97 Interview with former high official at the anti-drug department at the National Service for Com-
bating Organized Crime (NSCOC).
98 Various evidence suggests that even at the beginning of the present decade special services main-
tained dubious relations with this group of foreign nationals, most of whom had been informants 
of the communist State Security. On the one hand, the National Service for Combating Orga-
nized Crime (now General Directorate) raids amphetamine laboratories and investigates their 
masterminds. On the other hand, these foreigners are still used as informants by the National 
Security Service.
99 The largest facility for Bulgarian production of amphetamines so far was a laboratory in the 
village of  Opitsvet, where 330 kilograms of amphetamine base powder and 666 kilograms of 
Benzylmethylketon (BMK) were seized. Of the people involved in their manufacture one, the 
chemist Valeri Velichkov, was arrested on site, while Kristian Mladenov was later detained in 
Hungary through Interpol (see Sega daily, February 26, 1998, Demokratsia daily, May 4, 1998, and 
http://www.kriminalist.info/50s2.html).
100 Reuter, P., Do Middle Markets for Drugs Constitute an Attractive Target for Enforcement, 2003.
Figure 11. Synthetic drugs seizures in Bulgaria (kilograms), 
1997–2005
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hands101 who receive cheap equipment,102 precursors, and accurate instructions 
(to minimize errors via simple technology). Once the essential precursor Benzyl-
methylketon (BMK) is secured, it is very simple to produce amphetamines. Even 
the least qualified could follow the production technology, as the synthesis of 
amphetamines becomes as simple as alcohol distillation, practiced on a mass 
scale by Bulgarians. To minimize possible losses, the chemical equipment is 
kept at laboratories separate from workshops operating tablet making machines. 
After the year 2000, illegal workshops detected by the police were found to 
employ staff with basic schooling, rather than qualified chemical engineers. The 
level below is populated by several dozens of couriers handling the shipping of 
precursors, sub-products, the amphetamine powder and the ready tablets. The 
second to last level is taken by those organizing the import of precursors103 and 
chemical engineers,104 while the bottleneck of the scheme is saved for the bosses 
(”investors” and production facility and channel owners). At this point, the regular 
pyramid starts, which is similar to that of heroin distribution (Figure 12).
What is new is that expensive qualified chemical engineers do not assume the 
risk to participate in direct production, as this is the most vulnerable link of the 
cycle.105 The whole point of the hourglass structure is that the risk is greatest 
for those at the bottom of the hierarchy–the laboratory workers who function 
similarly to the street dealers. Thus, only moderate financial losses are incurred 
through confiscated equipment during police raids over laboratories. Therefore, 
laboratories are scattered all over the country, working on and off106 to escape 
detection. Due to the increase of illegal workshops and the simplification of the 
production process, the active ingredient in the ready tablets (Alpha-methyl-
phenethylamine) captured by the police has seriously dwindled to levels sev-
eral times as low as its proportion in the captagon formerly produced in the 
state-owned pharmaceutical companies. 
101 Although less than one hundred people at a time labor at amphetamine workshops, their total 
number over the last decade would amount to several hundred (as in the case of dealers).
102 Owners tend to buy the cheapest possible equipment, normally at a maximum cost of 50–60,000 levs.
103 There is strong evidence suggesting that to avoid the risks of border crossing, production facilities 
have been set up in Bulgaria for the total synthesis of precursors.
104 According to special service experts, there are many indications that some of the most promi-
nent Bulgarian chemists have been put under pressure and recruited by members of organized 
crime, particularly those who had taken part in developing technologies for the production of 
captagon. In proof of this assertion come the ostentatious killing of the daughter of a famous 
chemist, and the detention of several individuals working with non-controlled chemicals allegedly 
used in exotic technologies for the production of amphetamines.
105 As illustrated by the Opitsvet case, any well-educated participant in the production threatens the 
whole venture with full disclosure, investors and organizers included. Although they had only very 
partial information, they managed to describe the whole scheme to the investigators assigned to 
the case. What saved the enterprise and its bosses was a fat sum of money given to a Supreme 
Court judge–something obviously possible back then. Convicted at first and second instance, 
defendants were found innocent at the third, where the court ruled that the 330 kilograms of 
amphetamine base powder and 666 kilograms of Benzylmethylketon had been used in a chemi-
cal experiment. According to a former high official at the NSCOC, the lab’s ”investor” paid for 
this verdict a total of $150,000, of which ”only” 50,000 were pocketed by the last-instance court 
lady judge, now retired.
106 Special precaution are taken to conceal clandestine facilities, e.g. they will work in winter 
months, when electric power consumption generally increases, and will be housed in sites where 
the specific smells are harder to discern, such as cattle-sheds or buildings at the banks of fast-
current rivers.
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Interviewed special service officers claim that besides Turkish and Middle Eastern 
criminal groups Bulgarian amphetamine production is linked to the Serbian crime 
syndicates. It is not clear whether these are facilities set up in Bulgaria by Serbian 
organized crime for safety reasons after the Saber Action107 or whether they had 
been participating in the production from the early days of the war in Yugoslavia. 
During the interviews some high officials from Bulgarian special services spoke 
about reports that after 2005 Serbians have been moving laboratories to Turkey 
and the Middle East where they can function at a lower risk. This can account 
for the smaller number of clandestine shops detected in recent years. However, 
it is equally likely that the drop in disclosures could be due to the turmoil that 
shook the NSCOC in 2005.108
107 After the assassination of Serbia’s Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić, police clampdowns on criminal 
enterprises compelled some underworld actors to run away to Bulgaria and manage all ship-
ments to the Serbian drug market from Bulgaria throughout the operation.
108 In the fall of 2005 five high-ranking officials at the NSCOC resigned in protest to pending re-
structuring of the service.
Figure 12. Production and distribution of amphetamines
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Amphetamines, whether made in Bulgarian or Serbian-owned laboratories, were 
of markedly poor quality, which has not improved in the last ten years.109 It can 
be speculated that Middle East markets are successfully targeted with lower-qual-
ity drugs, whereas opportunities for trafficking them into the EU are less attractive 
for local producers.110
In contrast to imported drugs like heroin and cocaine, the existence of local 
production strongly influences domestic consumption. The amounts manufac-
tured for overseas markets are many times as big as those for home retail, but 
the latter are of equally poor quality. Although this significantly diminishes local 
demand, no investments are made to improve the product. The extremely low 
retail prices alone are sufficient to dissuade both organized crime and user-deal-
ers from importing better-quality drugs produced elsewhere.111
The trends observed after 2001 confirm the dependence of retail distribution on 
domestic production. Crime leaders have opted for street price reduction through 
cheapening production, rather than improving the quality of amphetamines on 
offer. They gave up the tableting part of the production process, as it both 
raised the price and the risk of discovery. Most probably, this choice was the 
easiest route to profit, rather than a purposeful policy. On the contrary, making 
improvements would mean recruiting qualified chemical engineers, developing 
international contacts to import good precursors and, most importantly, expanding 
retail trade in Central and Western Europe. Apart from upgrading the manufac-
109 The quality of amphetamines trafficked abroad was ascertained in the mid-1990s when the first 
large quantities were captured en route to Turkey by law enforcement bodies.
110 The reasons why Bulgarian-made amphetamines are not exported to Western Europe is not 
known. Apart from the obvious explanation that such low quality would not be competitive, 
several other are probable. For instance, the retail trade in the EU is supplied predominantly by 
amphetamine producers in Western and Central Europe, whereas in the Middle East, Bulgarian 
produced amphetamines are traded without much competition. In addition, local production 
may be financed and supplied with precursors by Middle Eastern structures and persons in 
control of their local retail markets interested in buying out Bulgarian output in full.
111 Long-time users report that the first imported synthetic drugs were ecstasy pills smuggled in by 
Greek students studying at Bulgarian universities and sold for 30 levs.
Figure 13. Amphetamine laboratories uncovered by the police
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tured amphetamines, they would have to start making ecstasy pills as well, or 
else they would never penetrate the lucrative West European markets. If such an 
expansion was to be undertaken, though, Bulgarian-run enterprises would have 
to compete not only with organized crime networks based in Holland, Belgium, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, etc, but also with the powerful transnational cocaine 
corporations. 
Groups of Synthetic Drug Users
The price-cutting strategy increased the demand for powdered amphetamines that 
came in plastic sachets or in bars. The switch to amphetamine powder changed 
consumption patterns and new groups of users emerged. The first group com-
prises young experimental users who regard it as an opportunity to imitate the 
techniques learned from cocaine use, most often driven by the wish to actually 
consume cocaine, a model drug which they could not afford due to the very 
high price. Users usually pop designer drugs (excluding ecstasy) together with 
large amounts of alcohol to induce trips reminiscent of cocaine use. Thus, they 
both comply with the alcohol-related stereotypes of their milieu and seek differ-
ent effects. 
The second group of users comprises night clubbers motivated by the cheapness 
of amphetamines compared to alcohol prices at discos. They opt for the pow-
dered variety as they can dilute it in mineral water or soda. Several respondents 
from various middle-sized towns agree that ”you can have two sachets for 2–3 
levs each that will last you the night, but with two vodkas it’s more expensive”. 
This is true mostly of towns with lower average income, where amphetamines 
are sold extremely cheap. Users quote an additional advantage of this mode of 
use–drug tests cannot detect amphetamines when the powder is dissolved in 
soda, and users are thus made invulnerable to police investigation. 
A third group are occasional users (either marijuana users or people with no 
previous experience with any illegal psychoactive substances) who only try it a 
few times or switch to a regular combination use of amphetamines and alcohol/
marijuana. Among the variety of users here, there are also students persuaded to 
use it prior to exams for maximum achievement. After discovering that amphet-
amines can help one pass an exam after only three or four days of preparation, 
some of them switch to regular use in pre-exam periods. High school students 
also tend to use amphetamines to improve scores in computer gaming, table 
football, pool or other races that require prolonged periods of high concentration. 
Another subgroup is that of extreme sports aficionados partaking in amateur car 
and motorcycle races, bungee jumping, etc. Usually, such users can afford the 
more upmarket cocaine, but they also consume amphetamines and methamphet-
amines to enhance performance. Yet another subgroup consists of teenage girls 
and young women that would pop amphetamines to lose weight and become 
psychologically dependent on them. Users from these groups may also switch to 
recreational use at clubs, concerts and home parties. Thus, amphetamines are 
becoming central to entertainment habits. 
A fourth group of amphetamine users comes from the ranks of heroin addicts. 
A comparison is possible with Western Europe and the US in this respect, where 
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long-term users of heroin have been switching to cocaine. For a country like 
Bulgaria such a shift would hardly work, due to the very high price of cocaine. 
Therefore, amphetamines become a natural, cheap surrogate. The heroin crisis in 
2002–2004 forced many heroin networks to look for a replacement drug. A survey 
among long-term heroin addicts, made it clear that in summer of 2003 already 
there was a sweeping wave of amphetamine use. In a subsequent survey Sofia 
and Bourgas seem to be the cities worst affected by the outbreak, with 40 % 
and 60 % of heroin addicts respectively having used amphetamines in the pre-
ceding month.112
Unit-Doses, Prices and Available Synthetic Drugs
Dosage with amphetamines is similar to heroin and prices match the amount in 
a unit. In Sofia, Varna, Bourgas and the environs there are various unit doses, 
such as fivers, tens, fifteens, twenties costing five, ten, fifteen, and twenty levs 
respectively.113 Like heroin, they are dosaged with the help of blister packs. For 
a fiver, the amphetamine powder is placed into the cavity of a Vitamin C blister 
card. For the larger doses, aspirin and lozenge blister strips are used. Thus, sellers 
do not need to weigh the dose with electronic scales. The ready doses are then 
packed in plastic or paper sachets. The preferred dose differs from area to area 
depending on the purchasing abilities of the population. Dealers continue to sell 
amphetamine pills as well. Police records of seized amphetamines indicate that 
while early in the decade this was the dominant form in which retail amphet-
amines came, currently only one tenth of all domestic market sales is occupied 
by pills, while the rest is amphetamine sulphate.114
The linkages between production and distribution are more apparent with 
amphetamine in pills. Police data about pills seized in mid-delivery, as well as 
interviews during the research confirm that the old captagon pills are only pro-
duced for export destinations accustomed to the product. The domestic market, 
on the other hand, is saturated with pills in a great variety of colors, shapes and 
imprints in order to stimulate demand in users who are expected to associate 
the brand with certain quality. Producers are obviously trying to copy the design 
of the ecstasy pills consumed in Western Europe, using the same logos–stars, 
smileys, Mitsubishi’s, dollars, Armani’s, Mickey Mouse’s, etc. There are dealer net-
works and user circles who stick to single a brand. Often, however, new models 
are promoted with copy claims, such as ”Be a star”, ”Stretch yourself like Pinko” 
and the like. In the larger local markets dealers are trying to create perceptions 
that certain pill types produce particular effects. The price range of pills is rather 
broad, starting from 2–3 levs (Plovdiv, the winter of 2006) up to 30 levs (Varna, 
the summer of 2007). Most commonly, though, pills cost 10–15 levs. Prices tend 
to be lower if bought earlier on in the selling of the batch or from a trusted 
connection. Often, users buy them in bulk to distribute in among friends. If one 
purchases 100–200 pills in total, the price can go down to 1.50–2 levs per pill. 
112 See: Bezlov, T., Barendrech, K., Injection Drug Users in Bulgaria – Profiles and Risks, Initiative for 
Health Foundation, Sofia, 2004.
113 Elsewhere in the country where incomes are lower a dose can sell down to 3 levs.
114 However, amphetamine pills are usually sold to better-off users whom the police capture much 
more rarely.
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The supply of pills with particular shapes and logos depends on the availability 
of well-equipped, fast-working workshops ready to manufacture on demand. 
Some dealers claim that such units are often operating within cities. The ”cooks”, 
as they are sometimes called, also have the task to dilute the amphetamines, a 
process similar heroin dilution. One of the methods involves the adding of any 
substance that could mix with the amphetamine–from teeth cleaning powder to 
plaster of Paris. Sometimes, medical substances are added, such as caffeine or 
vitamins. There are also more sophisticated ways of cooking115 tailored to pro-
duce specific effects on users. For instance, amphetamines are mixed with bogus 
Viagra116 and advertised as a brand new recreational drug which is a sexual 
stimulant, whereas classic pills only enhance dancing and aural experiences. It 
compensates for amphetamine side effects such as erectile dysfunction, and more 
than that, amplifies sexual perceptions, enhances the libido and improves sexual 
performance. Master cooking can also seek to produce pills with hallucinogenic 
effects by adding ephedrine or in some cases even LSD. Apart from the various 
pills, the police have occasionally seized related synthetic drugs in the form of 
sticky mass known as ”plasticine” which, after testing, has been proven to contain 
ephedrine and amphetamines. In addition to the widely used technologies for 
amphetamine production, a methamphetamine commonly referred to as ”piko” 
is also produced in Bulgaria. Little is known about this production, but it is re-
portedly identical to the popular Czech drug Pervitin. The story circulated in the 
criminal world suggests that the technology was imported to Bulgaria by pimps 
from the town of Sliven long involved in prostitution rings in Central Europe. 
Popular perceptions in Bulgaria undoubtedly define ecstasy as the top designer 
drug. Police records on seized drugs117 testify that МDMA is rarely used as the 
active ingredient. Population surveys118 show, however, that over half of the re-
spondents reporting to have used synthetic drugs, claim that they use or have 
tried ecstasy. Inexperienced users seem to make a very rough distinction, relating 
content to the form in which drugs come; thus, all pills are ecstasy, and any 
powder is amphetamine. Another false distinction is between capsules and pills, 
where the former, especially if high-priced are regarded as the real thing. The 
popular belief is that ”the expensive real ecstasy pills from Holland” are available 
for 20–30 levs, although if lucky, one can get them at 10 levs. Chemical analyses 
usually find ephedrine and amphetamines in pills that even long-term users claim 
to be authentic ecstasy. Probably, some ecstasy is imported irregularly, but police 
seizures so far, even of pills containing MDMA (invariably in minimum quantity 
and of poor quality), have always proven to be of local origin. It could also be 
surmised that like cocaine, upmarket pills are only affordable to foreign tourists 
or domestic upper middle-class members, who are generally not targeted (or are 
intentionally avoided) by the police. 
115 ”Cooking” is common jargon in many cities which refers to the preparation of more sophisticated 
synthetic drugs by dealers and users.
116 It is thought that various generic drugs for treating erectile dysfunction, such as sildenafil (most 
popular under the brand name Viagra), vardenafil (Levitra) and tadalafil (Cialis) are imported from 
Asia for the purpose.
117 Unfortunately, so far no independent evaluation has been made of the psychoactive substances 
sold in Bulgaria.
118 Data from the Vitosha Research representative surveys regularly conducted from 2002 to 2007.
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Interviewed dealers and former police officers now running amphetamine busi-
nesses believe that there have been numerous attempts to manufacture ecstasy 
in Bulgaria. Some report this to have happened and several batches of standard 
quality drugs to have been produced in Southern Bulgaria. These units are again 
supposedly run by Bulgarian procurers operating in Holland and Belgium, who 
have imported the technology and established channels for smuggling in the 
right precursors. Certain police officials, though, claim it is much more likely 
that original Dutch ecstasy is occasionally imported than produced in domestic 
facilities. 
Distribution
As described in the production section, there are two distinct ways to deal 
synthetic drugs, roughly definable as ”professional” and ”amateur”. The first 
type of dealing is done through the upmarket night venues, while the second is 
related to the alternative/underground scene. In the first case the most popular 
entertainment places in the largest towns are either set-up, or bought out by 
former racket protection businesses. Dancing clubs and discos are supplied with 
Bulgarian-made amphetamines, which are considered a booster to customers’ fun. 
Owners allow in or support dealer networks to enhance the buzz of the place.119
In the late 1990s, it was common practice for bartenders and guards to inform 
clients about whom to call to get the stuff and they would receive a commission 
for each customer. Dealers, too, would sell openly, arrive in taxies, deliver at the 
entrance and get paid inside the joint without disturbance.
The more amateur distribution strand emerged earlier. The typical setting would 
be a club at an industrial hall selling cheap drinks, a hangout for pot smokers, 
but also for techno music fiends for whom designer drugs came were an emblem. 
Initially, such sites were supplied with ecstasy and (meth)amphetamines from 
Central and Western Europe, which were soon displaced by the cheap domestic 
variety to match customers’ low solvency. Stuff was mainly marketed by music 
event organizers and DJs. Some of the interviewed in-crowd members claimed 
it was at that time local (and Balkan) crime enterprises got linked to amateur 
friend-to-friend dealing networks. This how the underground music scene gained 
easy access to inferior, but inexpensive locally produced synthetic drugs.
With the fast spawning of nightclubs, the boom of electronic dance culture, and 
the rising welfare of the general population after 2001 synthetic drug distribution 
entered the maturity stage. The new mainstream discotheques, bars and clubs 
targeted customer groups of specific lifestyles and incomes. The underground 
scene strove to satisfy newly sprung music tastes through concerts and raves, 
although with less variety than the dance music industry. Both entertainment 
scenes therefore provided a home-grown version of house parties. The friendly 
synthetic drug networks of the underground variety, however, were taken over 
by organized crime quite early in the decade, as it was later to happen on the 
marijuana market. Although DJs at techno parties and rave organizers continued 
119 In the words of an interviewed career bartender involved in drug dealing, describing that period, 
”a place looks ‘dead’, in decline, if you don’t see people enjoying themselves, jumping around 
and dancing for hours. Often, when a venue stopped being fancy and was half-empty, the inces-
sant dancing of a few stoned youth would change the impression.”
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to gain most of their income through the sales of designer drugs, they had be-
come inferior to crime bosses.120
Synthetic drug distribution exploited most of the schemes known from the heroin 
and cannabis markets. All levels of the heroin hierarchy are employed. Method-
wise, direct and networked phone sales, couriers and door-to-door deliveries are 
also present. 
Synthetic drugs were also retailed within the cannabis distribution networks. As 
mentioned before, when organized crime took possession of soft drug networks, 
nearly half of all cannabis pushers also sold amphetamines both in the street (via 
phone orders) and around their circles of friends (the quasi open market). 
Nevertheless, synthetic drug distribution has its own specifics that distinguish it 
from both the heroin and the cannabis networks. They center on the night habits 
and musical tastes of users. 
Synthetic drug use is closely dependent on the type of nightlife settings where 
the drugs are sold and inside which they are consumed. In that respect the 
larger Bulgarian cities display several similarities to the 1990s upsurge of designer 
drug use in Spain.121 As in Spanish cities, there are several types of urban dealing 
venues for synthetic drugs. Users also gravitate around certain types of places. 
Within a city there are four rough zones. One is the inner city with the highest 
concentration of night clubs, discotheques, bars and restaurants. Another zone 
comprises places beyond the downtown area, at attractive location or outer resi-
dential estates. The third zone is located at the fringes of the city (ghettoized 
neighborhoods). They are marginal and frequented by local residents. A separate 
fourth zone is formed in student villages which are as densely packed with en-
tertainment places as city centers. There is an altogether different waterfront zone 
in coastal cities, where joints and crowds are of the highest density. 
Apart from cityscape considerations, designer drug (and to a lesser extent co-
caine) distribution in the last couple of years at entertainment venues, it also 
depends on the type of venues. Roughly, they are divided into: strictly dancing 
places, drinking places with a dance floor, and drinking and eating places. The 
last type is rarely a retail spot, as when a person consumes synthetic drugs, their 
appetite for food subsides. Further types would be: bars, small clubs, discos and 
mega-discotheques. 
Synthetic drugs use is not only dependent on the setting, but also on temporal 
factors. Nighttime, as is common in South Europe, has three stages–pre-party, 
party and after-party. Cities are at their most bustling early in the evening. Be-
tween 10 p.m. and 1 a.m. people bunch at private homes or public establish-
ments and mostly drink alcohol or smoke marijuana if they go to an underground 
hangout. The second stage kicks off round midnight to 1 a.m.–the crowds go 
to clubs and discos that hold all-night parties. In recent years after-parties are 
120 Thus, any of them who broke the rules would be punished in the same way as deviant dealers are.
121 See: Synthetic Drugs Trafficking in Three European Cities: Major Trends and Involvement of Organized 
Crime, Gruppo Abele, in cooperation with TNI – IECAH and with the support of UNICRI, 
2003.
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increasingly in vogue, echoing nightlife trends in Western Europe. After-hour 
places are frequented after most discos are closed–at about 4.30 to 6 a.m. and 
sometimes go on until noon. 
Synthetic drugs are used most sparingly in early evening, only by heavy users. 
By the time of the after-party 50-60% of those present have consumed some. 
The drugs are usually bought before one enters the venue, but a large part of 
users take them inside. They usually make a phone order and deliveries peak in 
between the pre-party and the party proper.
In the last couple of years a new trend has emerged–together with entertainment 
spots, designer drugs are increasingly used in private homes. A large number of 
users choose this setting due to the growing prices at public places and as an 
alternative to alcohol consumption. In cities smaller than the metropolitan Sofia 
and Varna, especially in university towns, users stick to home environments and 
the cheap amphetamines sold locally, thus saving money from night entertain-
ment in town. It is precisely the smaller town context that explains the exponen-
tial growth in synthetic drugs use.122 New ways to treat a friend have emerged 
in Bulgarian youth culture. It is now common to offer a girl a ”sweetmeat” or a 
”line” instead of buying her a drink. A young professional (for instance, an interior 
designer) would not buy his buddies the usual case of beer, but opt for 2 grams 
of amphetamine instead. 
Drugs are sold in public (usually close to drinking or dancing places and con-
cert venues, and much more rarely inside them) by the so-called ”semi-closed 
networks”. Whether at an underground music event or at upmarket night spots, 
drugs are not normally sold to strangers. Even if the street dealer does not know 
the client’s name or if it is another dealer’s client, he would only sell the drug to 
a ”face” he has met elsewhere ”hanging out with the right people”. Such peculiar 
face control123 is indispensable for street dealers of synthetic drugs and cocaine. 
If observed more closely, this safety strategy can be described in detail as fol-
lows: the number of users of a regular night joint124 with 200–300 visitors on a 
122 Interviewees working in bars, clubs and other nightlife venues claim that they make more money 
by letting in synthetic drug dealers than by selling alcohol.
123 The practice of face control already commonly used in Western European nightlife was first intro-
duced during security checks at night clubs. The crime world was quick to adopt this technique 
to get into guarded venues, but also for their own purposes. It has become an essential survival 
technique for pimps, drug dealers and criminal hit squads.
124 The role of joint owners is key to describing drug dealing networks covering night spots. It is 
common knowledge that many of the clubs in large cities are still owned by members of the 
former racketeer groups. Some owners deliberately allow the use of synthetic drugs inside the 
place, so that it looks livelier with drugged youngsters bouncing about. The better part of joints, 
though, have special measures installed to keep drugs out. As this is a highly competitive busi-
ness, in recent years owners and managers of night clubs have been extremely cautious in three 
areas–legal employment contracts for all of their staff, selling licensed alcohol, and the preven-
tion of drug-related incidents (including drugs sneaked in by competitors). Breaking any of these 
three rules could lead to the closure of the joint, which may mean dropping out of business 
permanently. To avoid problems, owners pay the police to warn them about coming checks of 
their premises. Interviewed high police officials claimed that in recent years drugs have rarely 
been found in searches of night spots. In the words of one interviewee, ”In the past, when we 
did sudden checks, the floors of the clubs would turn white from the pills and sachets thrown 
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weekend night, is roughly 50–70 persons. In this case, five or six dealers service 
three to four joints and know all their regular customers.125 Larger venues often 
accommodate over 1,000 people at a time and 3,000 clients drop in throughout 
the night. The number of users in such places is much bigger, yet dealers would 
not venture selling to strangers. Any first-time buyer needs to find an intermediary 
known to the dealer. In case they approach the dealer independently, they need 
to have frequented the place often enough for the dealer to have remembered 
their face. 
Alternatively, dealers sell only to a small number of privileged clients. Interviews 
with such clients suggested that the principle of between-friends distribution still 
holds. More often than not, buyers are prone to purchasing from friends, from 
whom they would also take larger quantities. This approach enhances clients’ 
feeling of safety from police traps, and their confidence that the stuff bought 
is of good quality (which is especially important having in mind, the quality of 
most drugs in Bulgaria) and at a discount price. Thus, the person who has a 
dealer friend would collect the orders of the people he hangs out with for the 
dealer to perform,126 winning a bulk purchase discount and being certain to buy 
decent quality. This is how the friendly networks reduce the risk for dealers. The 
latter are normally from the same social group as their customers–insiders, such 
as secondary school and university students drawn into the drug business in vari-
ous ways, but retaining the lifestyle of their community. They work professionally, 
although they may also study or have a legal job. They are attached to the area 
boss (supervisor) and may have trouble quitting. The best case scenario for them 
is to be allowed to walk out of business after finding a replacement to succeed 
them. 
The third approach resembles the user-seller segment of heroin distribution. These 
are young heavy users that have special appointment phones. Each passes the 
synthetic drugs to a large number of friends and acquaintances. They are usually 
on standby for quality, quantity and price-wise special offers of dealers. In con-
trast to the heroin distribution model, though, amphetamine users are not depen-
dent on a single dealer, but can get supplies from up to ten to fifteen different 
sources. Some specialize in a particular substance, while others sell everything. If 
one is to make a visual representation of these networks, it will resemble a thick 
web made up of dozens of dealers, selling down to hundreds of heavy users, 
who in their turn supply three or four circles of friends. Quite probably, it is the 
retailers at this level that later become dealers. At some point they may meet a 
wholesaler ready to offer them a significant quantity discount. In such cases, the 
very low prices can bring huge profits. 
out of customers’ pockets. Now we only find a sachet or two on rare occasions.” It is not clear 
what the links are between bar and club guards and street dealers. Guards claim that all such 
deals are done outside the joints. Some bartenders claim that the staff working at those places 
makes bigger profits from clients who have asked about a drug dealer or a hooker than from 
the alcohol they sell.
125 The total number of faces a dealer has to remember then is no more than 280 (assuming that 
they tend for four joints each with 70 amphetamine users).
126 Privileged clients are surveyed in advance about the volume their circle of friends is likely to 
order.
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In this context, the role of the wholesalers ought to be discussed. As organized 
crime groups run the local production of amphetamines, it can be assumed 
that they also control wholesaling. Dealers and police officers, however, report 
that in recent years shano (free players) have been extremely common. Possibly, 
wholesalers manage to make independent orders to manufacturers, overstepping 
the area principles of organized crime control. The police have caught several 
wholesalers so far, who are not subservient to any of the bosses that have carved 
the bigger cities between themselves. These people act like traveling salesmen, 
delivering amphetamines to a number of criminal leaders in various cities. Strik-
ingly, they run their business in a market oriented way, driven by local demand 
and competing with wholesalers fully subordinate to organized crime structures. 
This leads to two suggestions: either some free enterprise is granted to producers 
to sell to clients of their choice, or regional bosses try to push the extra quanti-
ties not exported to the Middle East to domestic areas in someone else’s control. 
The shano are thus able to supply friendly networks, selling by the familiar faces 
model. This is obviously the approach that keeps such a person at a safe distance 
from both the police and local drug cartels. As a result, in the last couple of years 
these semi-closed networks have grown at a fast pace in middle-sized towns. 
Another factor that helps phone-sales within friend communities is that the user-
sellers who operate them are mostly middle-class. Both crime leaders and the 
police prefer to avoid pressure or violence against them. 
Some fragmentary data suggest that those networks of free black market entrepre-
neurs order the quantities they need to various amphetamine producing facilities 
across the country. It is odd that wholesalers do not buy better-quality synthetic 
drugs from Central and Western Europe, as do their counterparts in Spain and 
Italy.127 Perhaps the basic reason is the clear stratification by user income of the 
market of stimulant drugs. Cheap amphetamines are massively consumed by 
poorer individuals, whereas the well-off opt straight for cocaine. It can be fore-
casted that with Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, distribution networks for imported 
designer drugs, ecstasy in particular, will emerge, especially taking into account 
the plummeting prices of this group of controlled substances. 
2.2.4. The Cocaine Market
Bulgaria’s domestic consumption of cocaine is much below Western European 
levels, yet it forms a market in its own right that enjoys special attention from 
both distributors and users. A number of surveys suggest that cocaine (dubbed 
”white stuff”) is considered an elitist drug of the highest possible quality, cov-
eted by most users, but so high-priced that it is affordable only to a select few. 
However, in the last five years there has been a clear-cut trend of growing use. 
The national population surveys128 have captured a rapid increase in the share 
127 See: Synthetic Drugs Trafficking in Three European Cities: Major Trends and Involvement of Organised 
Crime, Gruppo Abele, in cooperation with TNI – IECAH and with the support of UNICRI, 
2003.
128 Since 2002 the Center for the Study of Democracy and Vitosha Research have performed six 
annual victimization surveys containing a significant bloc of questions on the use of the most 
widespread psychoactive substances.
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of users who ”have tried cocaine” from 0.1 % in 2002 to 0.8 % in 2007. The 
National Focal Point on Drugs and Drug Addictions in its survey captured an 
even higher portion–1.1 %.129 The relative share peaks for the age group 18–34 
where it is 2.4 %. Cocaine, it turns out, is used by a socially heterogeneous 
group of people–heroin users (10% of whom declare to have used cocaine in 
the last month), university students (1.2% report use in the preceding month, 
and 4.9%–in their lifetime),130 and secondary school students (1.6 % stating to 
have tried in their lifetime).131
Cocaine is most widely consumed among high-income groups, such as skilled 
professionals and managers. However, surveys among this group are hard to 
conduct. The in-depth interviews conducted with several members show that the 
consumption pattern resembles that of amphetamines–the consumption peaks 
on Friday and Saturday nights, Christmas and Easter time, summer and winter 
vacations. 
Dealers distinguish between two relatively well-defined user groups. The first 
group consists of well-off people that buy only cocaine. Most of them have noth-
ing in common with racketeer businesses. They regard amphetamines as low-qual-
ity and risky and have unrelenting requirements about the purity of cocaine. They 
go to smaller VIP clubs, rather than popular discotheques. A large part of them 
prefer joint where a specific type of local music called chalga is played. These 
are places that also serve food, which is absent in amphetamine use. Private 
home parties are also typical of the all-cocaine group. These are closed-up circles 
where cocaine is on offer alongside classy liquor. Dealers supplying stuff to such 
parties claim that often some of the leading underworld bosses would supervise 
the organization of these deliveries in order to gain access to exclusive profes-
sional communities, e.g. of managers, policemen, customs officials, high-ranking 
magistrates, etc. Police statistics show that this user group is practically immune 
to law enforcement. This is due not just to their hermetic organization and high 
social status, but also to police reluctance to penetrate those circles.
The second group comprises people who use cocaine only occasionally. As a 
rule, they use amphetamines and only sometimes can afford cocaine. Their co-
caine consumption has a strong influence on amphetamine sales. Some dealers 
have claimed that if a client of theirs has cocaine on Friday, he would refrain 
from amphetamines not only on the next day, but also in the next few weeks. 
Part of this group reverts to cocaine only as they get older and a more affluent 
life style becomes affordable. 
Cocaine distribution has a number of peculiarities. In large cities it is completely 
independent from the other submarkets. Police officers and dealers testify that 
in Sofia, it is controlled by VIS,132 represented by a drug boss named Таке. His 
129 Annual Report on Drugs and Drug Addictions Issues in Bulgaria, 2006, National Focal Point on Drugs 
and Drug Addictions.
130 University Students and Psychoactive Substances 2006, national representative survey among 
Bulgarian students, National Focal Point on Drugs and Drug Addictions.
131 National Center for Drug Addictions and National Center for Public Health Protection, National 
Population Survey on the Use of Alcohol and other Drugs in Bulgarian Schools (9-12 Grade), 2003.
132 See Chapter 1 for details of the origins on this group.
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proxy, nicknamed Sako has operational control over large deliveries and is ac-
countable to the boss. The drug is distributed among wholesalers, specialized 
cocaine phone appointment dealers and area dealers of other drugs. The cocaine 
branch has certain agreements with area supervisors, but they have no opera-
tional functions in the distribution itself. Dealer networks from the other branches 
are in customer-seller relations with the cocaine network, making purchases when 
their clients want cocaine and selling it at a profit. The regular cocaine users buy 
straight from cocaine dealers. It is not clear what rent street dealers who sell 
near entertainment spots pay to area supervisors, but the fact that they can work 
undisturbed is a sign of previous agreements between them and the supervisors. 
The situation in Varna is similar. Up to 2005–2006, cocaine distribution had an 
independent vertical structure headed by a crime boss nicknamed the Camel. 
After he left Bulgaria, one of the two retailing segments was inherited by Vesko 
”Politsaya” (The Policeman), whereas upper-level distribution is now handled by 
a guy called Sevata. 
Bourgas is the only large city where the cocaine market is considered to be 
under the control of a single crime organization (up until 2007), the so called 
Pomorie group whose boss is Mityo ”Ochite” (The Eyes). As mentioned earlier, 
however, drug distribution in Bourgas has independent segments dedicated to 
each drug and serviced by an autonomous criminal network. After Miyto Ochite 
was arrested, the cocaine structure started to fall apart. In the summer of 2007, 
cocaine in the largest markets in the district–the sea resorts of Slanchev Bryag 
and Nesebar, is handled by the Sofia division of VIS. 
Little information is available about the sources of cocaine dealt in Bulgaria. It 
is particularly scarce after the assassination of Poli Pantev, believed to control 
cocaine supplies (who allegedly stole a large batch from a Colombian cartel, 
part of which was later retailed in Bulgaria). Neither the price, nor the exact 
amounts of cocaine imports are known. The nickname of the local crime lord 
largely involved in cocaine trafficking is Brendo. Police sources disclose that he 
does not supply the domestic market, though. Cocaine mules from Bulgaria 
have been caught in Europe (Spain, Holland, Italy) and Latin America, but their 
activities have not proven to have any relation with the home market. Whether 
these were ”swallowers”133 carrying only small amounts or yacht crews escorting 
tons of cocaine, in none of the cases the smuggled drugs were directed at the 
Bulgarian market. 
2.3. DRUG MARKET SIZE, TRENDS AND POSSIBLE SCENARIOS 
FOR THE FUTURE OF DRUG DISTRIBUTION
Before reviewing the distribution dynamics of the four main groups of psychoac-
tive substances, an attempt for assessing the size of the overall market will be 
made. The calculations presented below should be regarded as provisional, as 
data about the number of users and the scale of consumption, as well as the 
important price/quality relationship, is rather fragmentary.
133 People who transfer cocaine in their stomachs by swallowing small packages of it.
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2.3.1. Drug Market Size
By the most conservative assessments heroin users in Bulgaria are between 
15,000 and 25,000. These buyers are not simultaneously present on the market. 
As shown by quantitative surveys conducted in a number of cities, at least one 
third of this group normally refrains from use for a variety of reasons. Most often 
this portion of users consists of people serving a sentence, undergoing treatment, 
staying abroad134 or have quitted, which is usually temporary. This means that the 
number of active users at one at the same time is around 10,000–16,000. Surveys 
investigating the average number of doses have found that they are dependent on 
the current quality of heroin and on the number of gaps appearing in distribution 
at a certain time. In the period 2003–2005 the average number of daily doses 
used varies between 1.5 and 1.8.135 The average price per standard dose (of any 
amount or quality) throughout the country ranges from 5 to 10 levs. Multiplying 
the number of users by the average daily dose and the average dose price, one 
gets an annual turnover on the heroin market ranging from 32 to 105 million 
levs. This size is estimated on the basis of street prices, but part of the heroin 
is used by dealers of the highest standing. The research team considers that the 
above figure is probably equal to one fifth of actual heroin consumption. 
The size of the cannabis market is even more difficult to estimates, as use tends 
to be uneven and so far no quantitative surveys have been dedicated particularly 
to this substance. National representative surveys among secondary school and 
university students provide data about the proportions of these groups that have 
tried cannabis, but do not capture consumption patterns. The only fairly reliable 
estimates are those of daily sales in the big and medium-sized cities. Thus, it can 
be assessed that annual cannabis consumption is between 15,000 and 20,000 
kilos. Street prices range widely, depending on the type of location, whether the 
local market is controlled by a monopoly and other factors. The average price in 
the first half of 2007 in the largest cities is approximately 3,300 levs per kilo (or 
3.3 per gram). Thus, annually the soft drug market amounts to 50–66 million 
levs. Available data indicate a tenfold growth of the soft drug market compared 
to 2002–2003, with an annual growth of 3.2 to 5 million levs.136 This market could 
probably grow by the end of the year, as currently criminal enterprises are trying 
to push the price of 10 levs per gram on its largest segment–the capital Sofia. 
The synthetic drug market is as hard to assess. With 7,000 to 10,000 regular users who 
consume on a daily or weekend basis (Thursday to Sunday) and an average cost of 50–60 
levs according to the in-depth interviews, the average amount generated per year would 
be 14–24 million levs. There are also around 30,000–40,000 occasional users. According 
to available data their monthly expenses are 20–40 levs, which amounts to an annual 
consumption of between 7 and 19 million levs. If the two groups are combined,137
the size of the synthetic drug market would reach 21 to 43 million levs per year.
134 In-depth studies have shown that part of heroin addicts either seek jobs abroad, as do many 
Bulgarians, or go abroad for treatment, as they believe they cannot get effective treatment at 
affordable prices at home.
135 Bezlov, T., Heroin Users in Bulgaria One Year after the Outlawing of the Dose for ”Personal Use”, Open 
Society Institute & Initiative for Health Foundation, Sofia, 2005.
136 See Bezlov, T., The Drug Market in Bulgaria, Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, 2003.
137 The various user groups of these drugs are provisionally divided into two basic groups to facilitate 
calculation.
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The cocaine segment is most assessment-proof of all, as the regular users are few, 
gathered in small elite communities. Incidental use is also observed with low-in-
come strata, such as secondary school students and unemployed heroin abusers. 
Calculations are further made difficult if one is to consider the significant con-
sumption by foreign tourists in the seaside and winter resorts for which very few 
data are available. Some drug dealers who have close observations on the market 
in big cities, such as Sofia, Varna and Bourgas claim that in the last year, cocaine 
sales have increased to roughly half the market of synthetic drugs. Thus, the co-
caine market may be estimated at around 10–20 million levs annually. 
The sales at the four segments taken together provide an annual estimate of the 
overall drug market amounting to between 108 and 234 million levs per an-
num.
2.3.2. Drug Market Trends
As noted before, developments at the outset of the new century blurred the 
differences between distribution patterns of the separate illegal psychoactive sub-
stances at the middle level. The usual approach in most towns is to have one 
dispersal structure selling all types of drugs. At the lowest level, though, street 
dealers seem to specialize in particular drugs. Although the processes on the dif-
ferent submarkets and distribution levels are often indistinguishable, for the sake 
of clarity the trends on three separate levels will be described.
The Street Level
This level comprises dealers with various specializations, but nevertheless, the 
most prominent trend that has affected the markets of all drug types in the 
last four-five years are the several crises in heroin distribution. The main factor 
is probably the decreasing number of heroin users due to several factors. First, 
adolescents are already making a clear distinction between heroin and the rest 
of drugs. Second, an increasing number of clients are enrolled in methadone 
treatment programs. Third, migration to Western Europe either for the purpose 
of seeking better treatment programs, or jobs, has grown with the waiver of 
Schengen visas. As a result of harsher law-enforcement and judicial measures 
more people are convicted to imprisonment.138 According to some estimates 
around one third of all 12,000 people serving an imprisonment sentence, have 
used heroin. As a result, the number of heroin users at large diminishes, which 
restricts the appearance of new users. As described earlier, long-time heroin ad-
dicts play a key role in street distribution. When their numbers dwindle, this af-
fects the availability of pushers and dealers, and consequently, less new users get 
hooked. These developments have shaken distribution networks, depriving them 
of the steady income from heroin dealing and bringing about financial gaps that 
limit the supplies. To compensate for these crises, distributors resort to diluting 
the available heroin even further. Financial hang-ups are not only affecting the 
import, but also professional violence providers, so that violence is increasingly 
applied in a haphazard manner. 
138 Not all of the sentences were issued for drug dealing; some of them are for other criminal of-
fenses.
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While the heroin market has lost dealers, pushers and profits, the opposite 
trend is observed on the cocaine, soft and synthetic drug markets. The number 
of structures involved in their distribution is on the rise. However, control over 
dealers of these drugs is much harder to apply than it is with heroin. In the last 
couple of years, apart from the increase of the total number of dealers, free 
lancers have also recurrently increased.
The Middle Distribution Levels
The changes at grassroots level that occurred 2002 also caused reshuffles on 
the upper levels. Criminal bosses are nearly immune from law-enforcement, yet 
internal conflicts in their circles often lead to clashes in which extreme violence 
is used. Such events are particularly typical for the largest district market in Bul-
garia–the capital city. A ”war of the areas” into which Sofia is divided started in 
2002 when one of the most powerful area bosses, Anton Miltenov ”Klyuna” (The 
Beak), attempted to gain control over the whole district. This conflict indicates 
that violence in the underworld is indispensable when drug market (re)distribution 
is concerned. They inevitably reverberate in related criminal markets, such as 
consumer goods smuggling, car thefts, prostitution, etc. In 2004 the conflict was 
put to an end through the assassination of Klyuna after which the capital was 
carved in two big domains. The boundary that divides them, as explained by 
interviewed police officers and drug dealers goes along one of the key roads 
Bulgaria Blvd. and down the Perlovska River that crosses the city. Thus, the new 
Southern zone is controlled by Zlatko ”Baretata” (The Beret), while the remainder 
of the city is held by Pesho ”Shtangata” (The Rod). Two years later, a new clash 
led to the ousting of Pesho Shtangata and a new boss called Rasho came to 
preside over nearly the whole local market. 
Figure 14. Fourth level area bosses in Sofia 
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The succession of the figures that control the district also leads to reshuffles at 
the top of the constituent areas in Sofia. Comparing area supervisors through the 
years, it can be seen that only two of those who ran an area in 2003 remain 
supervisors in 2007.
Such repeated conflicts can also be observed in Varna. After several successive 
replacements of supervisors have been made, currently the city is controlled 
by two criminal leaders. Based on the accounts of police officers and dealers, 
Valyo ”Bandita” (The Bandit) is in charge of the following residential projects: 
Vladislavovo, Vazrazhdane, Mladost, Kaisieva Gradina, Aksakovo and Asparuhovo, 
whereas Vesko Politsaya runs the distribution in Chaika and Levski, as well as the 
resort of Zlatni Pyasatsi.
In smaller towns, the middle level is structured differently. Due to the narrower 
scale of the market, even when a local crime leader controls the distribution 
of all groups of drugs across the whole town, he still makes less profit than the 
pettiest of supervisors in Sofia and Varna. At the same time, the ”tenure” of such 
bosses is rarely longer than two or three years.
Table 4. Sofia drug distribution areas and their bosses
2003 2007
Area 1 Rosen ”Zhivotnoto” 
(The Animal)
Rasho Apart form his role as the boss of most distribu-
tion areas, Rasho also controls directly the most 
lucrative Area 1. This is why the respective net-
work serves not just the large Mladost residential 
project (Area 1), but also nearly the rest of Sofia. 
After a 2–3-year absence Rosen Zhivotnoto has 
also reappeared in the area and controls syn-
thetic and soft drug distribution.
Area 2 Androvtsite 
(The Andreys)
Temeruta Until the assassination of Bobara in 2006 the 
area was divided 
Area 3 Kosta and Bobby Kosta and Bobby
Area 4 ”Bobara” 
(The Beaver)
Kosta, Bobby and 
”Kasorakiya” 
(The Short-armed 
Man)
Kosta and Bobby have been trying to conquer 
the area after the assassination of Bobara, but 
have come across severe competition. This area 
is also very lucrative, as it covers the whole of 
downtown Sofia.
Area 5 Sigmata Dzhambetsa
Area 6 Kaloyan Maxa Kaloyan Maxa A distinctive feature of this area is the shano
(free rider) that runs his own phone distribu-
tion system.
Area 7 Rosen Zhivotnoto Koko (Bogdan)
Area 8 Rosen Zhivotnoto Banzo
Area 9 Blazho Mirkata This are is least controlled by organized crime 
and most populated by active shano.
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Top Level Developments
Looking at the top ranks of the drug market bosses after 2003, it seems that 
already in the summer of 2007 none of the top figures were the same. Some of 
the old bosses were assassinated or died, others emigrated or were extradited, 
still others quit voluntarily or charges were pressed against them (see Figure 14). 
Kosyo Samokovetsa was shot dead in 2003 in Amsterdam. Meto Iliyanski disap-
peared in the same year. They were two of the three drug lords in Sofia. In 
April 2004, Belana, the Montenegrin national who led drug proliferation in North-
Western Bulgaria was extradited. Anton Miltenov ”Klyuna” was killed in July, 2005. 
Two other drug bosses were imprisoned in 2006–Stoyan ”Kravata” (The Cow) and 
Maninkata. Kamilata emigrated to South America, while the last notorious drug 
boss active in the period covered by the preceding survey, Mityo Ochite, was 
arrested in the spring of 2007.
Despite the emergence of new leading figures, such as Rasho (in Sofia), Sand-
zhaka (in Plovdiv), Valyo Bandita and Vesko Politsaya (in Varna) the dissolution 
of the top level is increasingly apparent. The larger distribution areas are left un-
controlled. In contrast to the 1990s and the early years of this century, criminal 
figures are much less willing to risk having legal businesses together with gray and 
drug-related ventures. The most prominent among them have opted to quit the 
drug market altogether and invest their savings in the legal economy. 
Figure 15. Drug market distribution by individuals in control
�����
������
������
������
�������
������
�����
����������
�����������
����������
�������
�������
���������
�������
������������ ������
������
������
�������������� �����������
�������
������
��������
�������
�����
������� ������������
������������
�����������������
�������
��������������
���� �������
��������
��������
�������
���������
�����������
�����
����������
���������
�������������
��������������
�����������������
�����������������
�������������
��������������
������������
����������
���������
��������������
����������
�������������
������������
������������
88 The Drug Market in Bulgaria
2.3.3. Possible Scenarios for the Future of Drug Distribution
The future of drug distribution can be lined up under three basic scenarios drawn 
from observations of its current state and the potential routes of its develop-
ment.
The pessimistic scenario draws on the possibility of recurrent growth in heroin 
consumption. A sizeable group of heroin abusers will be released from prison. It is 
safe to suppose that a lot of these people will relapse into their addictive habits 
due to the lack of sufficient and effective treatment programs. The supply chains 
will be revitalized, as top-level control is lifted and mid-level bonds between 
Bulgarian and Turkish drug networks are strengthened. Plovdiv is already an ex-
ample of this trend. With a better sustained market, the quality of the heroin on 
offer will improve and it will become easier for first-time users to get addicted 
(in contrast to the present when the concentration of diamorphine is really low). 
The young generation will not be scared off heroin use, as there will be less 
examples of old addicts available. The synthetic drug submarket will develop fast 
due to the ease of travel and transfer of precursors and drugs from the rest of 
the EU, and a synthetic drug outbreak could possibly occur. Currently, marijuana 
use is still below the level in the rest of the former communist countries, but it 
will steadily grow. The use of cocaine will become much more common, as the 
population’s income increases and, similar to Spain, it will also have to supply 
the burgeoning tourist industry.
The realistic scenario is based on the preservation of the status quo. Heroin 
use will increase, but this will be followed by a drop in consumption. However 
low in efficiency, the existing treatment programs will manage to draw new us-
ers and help them stay out of street pushing. There will be no snow ball effect 
or a heroin outbreak as the one in the late 1990s. The synthetic and soft drugs 
on offer will improve in quality, but also grow in price, which will prevent an 
uncontrollably rapid growth of consumption. Bulgarian youth will preserve their 
conservative attitudes to psychoactive substances, and although many will engage 
in experimental use, few will become regular users.
The optimistic scenario assumes that the state will follow the model of developed 
democracies and increase public spending on treatment and social integration 
programs, instead of applying harsh punitive measures. Law enforcement bod-
ies will be restructured, so as to raise their efficiency and coordination between 
the police engaged in tackling street level drug dealing and anti-organized-crime 
units which will be able to deal blows to the middle and top drug market levels. 
Currently, law enforcement affects only the lowest levels of distribution and it is 
precisely the lack of efficient inter-agency exchange that keeps the bosses safe. 
In addition, prevention and outreach programs able to target real problem areas 
and groups will be put in place and regular assessments of their effectiveness 
will be made.
3. PROSTITUTION AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING
In the past 5-6 years, prostitution has become a much debated issue in Bulgaria 
for two notable reasons. First, owing to the connection between paid sex servic-
es and organized crime, and secondly, because of the association of prostitution 
with human trafficking and sexual exploitation, which has attracted the attention 
both of large international organizations and of western governments.
The young women victims of sexual exploitation who have sought help in West-
ern Europe provided the first indications of the scope of the problem of Bulga-
rian prostitution. The data from countries such as Germany and the Netherlands 
have been particularly important in this process – their publicly accessible and 
systematic approach has helped reveal that a small country has become one of 
the largest suppliers in the human trafficking industry. According to the four an-
nual reports of the Dutch National Rapporteur, between 2000 and 2003, 14% of 
these victims in the Netherlands came from Bulgaria, making it the most common 
country of origin for the period monitored.
The fact that Holland does not represent some kind of anomaly in the forcible 
supply of human flesh finds confirmation in the largest sexual services market 
in Europe – Germany. According to the annual analyses of Bundeskriminalamt 
for the period 2001-2005, Bulgaria ranks third worldwide by number of female 
victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation (see Table 6). 
The cases of trafficking for sexual exploitation purposes periodically registered 
in Austria, Greece, Italy, Belgium and Spain in particular, suggest the conclusion 
that this extremely grave crime against the person is similar in scope to that re-
corded in Germany and the Netherlands, but the information is regrettably not 
systematized.
The data from Germany or the Netherlands concerning sexual trafficking raise 
one major issue: what makes it possible for an 8-million country to account 
for trafficking comparable in absolute terms with that originating from Russia 
and its 150-million population, Thailand with 65 million, Ukraine with 46 million, 
as well as to surpass countries having three to five times its population, such as 
Poland and Romania.
It was the initial goal of the present analysis to explore the typology and organi-
zation of the prostitution market in Bulgaria; however, the research on trafficking 
in women in Western Europe found shocking statistics about the extent to which 
the country is represented in view of its demographic profile (see the victim 
coefficient in Table 6). 
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In this context, several important questions emerged: first of all, what is the 
scope of the Bulgarian export of prostitutes for Western Europe? As indicated 
by the analyses, 90% of the victims are trafficked for sexual exploitation pur-
poses. At the same time, studies on prostitution in Western Europe show that only 
a tiny proportion of the women engaged in prostitution in foreign countries have 
sought help and have thus been registered as trafficking victims. Consequently, 
the records of the number of victims of Bulgarian origin may be viewed as the 
tip of the iceberg beneath which there are actually huge numbers of women 
engaged in prostitution outside Bulgaria. Secondly, what might be the reason 
for this important Bulgarian presence among prostitutes in Western Europe? 
And thirdly, whether this high Bulgarian representation among trafficking victims 
is the outcome solely of socio-economic factors or can be accounted for by the 
specifics of crime in this country.
Table 5. Victims of sexual exploitation in the Netherlands by 
country of origin
2000–2003
Number of 
victims
Percentage of the 
victims
Bulgaria 166 14%
Nigeria 122 10%
Romania 67 6%
Russia 73 6%
Netherlands 65 5%
China 45 4%
Ukraine 49 4%
Czech Republic 31 3%
Lithuania 42 3%
Sierra Leone 39 3%
Albania 19 2%
Cameroon 21 2%
Moldova 30 2%
Poland 28 2%
Brazil 13 1%
Guinea 15 1%
Thailand 12 1%
Unknown 161 13%
Other 227 19%
Total 1,225 100%
Source: Trafficking in Human Beings – Dutch National Rapporteur
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The problems raised are only part of the complex socio-economic phenomenon 
of Bulgarian prostitution. Undoubtedly, the ”export” of girls offering sexual ser-
vices in Western and Central Europe is the most profitable market for Bulgarian 
prostitution but it would not be possible without the domestic prostitution mar-
ket. That is why it is the object of the present study to tentatively reconstruct the 
emergence of the Bulgarian paid sex market, as well as to examine the structure 
and organization of prostitution in this country. Being one of the first attempts to 
analyze the problem of prostitution139 in Bulgaria, the present chapter makes no 
pretence at exhaustiveness.
139 Different types of theoretical analyses have tried to account for the spread of prostitution in a 
society. The studies on the topic can generally be resumed to four basic approaches to explain-
ing women’s involvement in prostitution: pathological model, model of social disorganization and 
criminal subculture, model of the economic situation and poverty, and model of male violence. 
The logic of the pathological model is that it is some kind of inherent individual anomaly or 
pathology that drives a woman to engage in prostitution. Its advocates view prostitutes as being 
completely different from ”ordinary” women. 
The social disorganization and criminal subculture model focuses on the woman’s relationships and 
position in her broader environment to account for her involvement in prostitution. What mat-
ters is the extent to which a woman is likely to fail in what is perceived as normal and in her 
professional and family relationships. Women engaged in prostitution are viewed as violating 
the established normative system, which makes their involvement in prostitution practically in-
evitable.
The economic position model highlights the specific economic conditions conducive to involvement 
in prostitution. It is viewed as an economically motivated decision since prostitution is assumed 
to be an economic activity. This approach generally takes two forms: 1. women are forced 
and/or choose to take up prostitution because the lack any other means of making a living; 2. 
women choose to engage in prostitution because they can earn far more money through it than 
by any of the other economic options available to them.
The sex discrimination and male violence model assumes there is a difference between prostitutes 
and other women and that it stems from the effect of prostitution on women. Proponents of 
this model also account for prostitution as the outcome of male control over female sexual-
ity. Women become prostitutes because of earlier abuse by men. Prostitutes are perceived as 
‘victims’ of the male domination system in which they are women with little or no resources to 
oppose the powers that be. 
Table 6. Trafficking victims by country of origin, 2001–2005 
Number of 
victims in the 
period 2001–
2005
Victim Coefficient 
for 2003*
Russia 747 1.2
Ukraine 520 1.6
Bulgaria 432 12.7
Romania 425 4.3
* The coefficient is calculated for women in the 15-30 age group per 100,000 persons for the respective country
Source: Bundeskriminalamt, 2002–2005
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3.1. THE EMERGENCE OF THE DOMESTIC MARKET 
AND THE BALKAN CONTEXT
Following the collapse of the communist regime, the countries of Eastern and 
Central Europe underwent complex political, economic, and social changes. The 
cataclysms associated with the economic transition led to mounting unemploy-
ment and a drastic drop in the standard of living.
Some specialized studies140 note as one of the consequences of these changes 
the fact that for a large number of women prostitution has become the only 
means to earn a living for themselves and their families and that almost all of 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and most notably the Balkan states, 
have registered a dramatic increase in the number of prostitutes.
The armed conflicts in the countries of former Yugoslavia have been another 
factor conducive to the growth of the prostitution business in the Balkans. The 
poorly guarded borders, the presence of international troops, as well as the lack 
of a working judicial system create the perfect conditions for a flourishing sex 
industry in the countries of this region. A large number of prostitutes stay in the 
vicinity of the military bases to offer sexual services to the soldiers. Since in most 
countries in the Balkan Peninsula prostitution is prohibited by law, it is becoming 
not only a serious social problem for the region,141 but also an important source 
of income for organized crime.
What is happening in Bulgaria is in many respects preconditioned by the Balkan 
context and the considerably more severe economic upheavals compared to 
central Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the sexual services market developed at a 
relatively slow pace. Although almost immediately after 1990 the police stopped 
implementing repressive measures against women offering sexual services, it 
would take another 7-8 years for prostitution to become a mass occupation.
Unfortunately, there are practically no studies explaining the reasons for either 
the delayed development or the dramatic surge in prostitution in the late 1990s. 
Interviews with police officers, prostitutes, pimps, club owners, and investigative 
journalistic reports point to several interrelated factors accounting for the slower 
expansion of prostitution – from the socialist heritage and the strong family and 
kinship ties to the extremely reduced incomes, which in turn limited the domestic 
demand.
A tentative reconstruction of the emergence of the domestic market for paid 
sexual services quite revealingly shows that in the early 1990s, the places need-
ing such services, e.g. hotels and night clubs, actually imported prostitutes from 
Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia. In the early years of the transition, most of the 
recruits were socially disadvantaged girls (of Roma origin, coming from small 
settlements, etc.) and girls with deviant behavior who were retained in the in-
140 See for ex., Sarang, A. and J. Hoover (eds.) 2005. Sex work, HIV/ AIDS, and Human rights in Central 
and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The Central and Eastern Europe Harm Reduction Network. 
p. 19.
141 Ibidem.
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dustry largely by systematic violence. In fact, in Bulgaria, prostitution without the 
involvement of procurer networks or of club owners is practically impossible. At 
the same time, at all levels of the paid sex market (from street prostitution to 
beauty pageants), which had already been structured by 1992-93, it is possible to 
detect the involvement and control by organized crime.
The slow development of the Bulgarian domestic market, however, does not pre-
vent it from linking up with the international procurer networks. The emigration 
wave of 1989-91; Bulgarian repeat criminals pardoned in 1990 and settling down 
in Central Europe; the war in Former Yugoslavia in the summer of 1991, and the 
breakdown of the USSR were only some of the factors that helped ‘lock to-
gether’ the emerging Bulgarian market for sexual services with that of Central 
and Western Europe. It became common practice for Bulgarian prostitutes to 
be supplied by Balkan and East-European procurers, with the Albanian pimp net-
works predominating initially. Here violence is omnipresent, both in the process 
of recruiting girls, typically by abduction, and in controlling the prostitutes, with 
physical punishment being the standard procedure in case of failure to fulfill the 
daily norm. What is most characteristic of Bulgarian prostitution, however, is 
the influence of Russian-speaking organized crime. The model of fixed loca-
tions and preliminary distribution of the places reserved for each pimp and his 
girls has been adopted by Bulgarian procurers, as well. The latter prefer the term 
”post” rather than the Russian ”tochka”, but it has exactly the same structural and 
organizational role – market distribution. Depending on the profitability of the 
area and the number of posts, the pimp pays his dues to the bosses of organized 
crime and to the law-enforcement authorities (typically police and prosecutor’s 
office) and the administration.
As the violent entrepreneurs flourished during the Yugoslav embargo (see Chap-
ter I), the cooperation with organized crime structures in the Western Balkans 
and Central Europe in the trafficking of girls for prostitution became stable and 
developed along the same lines as the other operations involving the crossing of 
Balkan borders – trafficking of oil products, drugs, stolen goods, etc. In turn, this 
in many respects created similar conditions in the sex services market. 
In the first half of the 1990s the export of prostitutes underwent serious evolu-
tion and repeatedly changed its channels before turning into a sustainable activ-
ity. Historically, Hungary and the Czech Republic were the first destinations 
for export of prostitutes and respectively, where the first Bulgarian procurer 
networks were formed. The proximity and easier access to these former socialist 
countries made them a preferred destination and the Bulgarian procurers made 
use of the base put in place by Bulgarian car thieves. In the former CMEA (the 
communist trade bloc) countries, Bulgarian prostitutes worked mostly in locations 
close to the borders with Germany and Austria, where sex tourism was most ac-
tive. Whereas in the early 1990s, access to Western Europe was sporadic owing to 
visa limitations, by 1993-94, the first groups of pimps and prostitutes had settled 
in more liberal countries like the Netherlands and Belgium and there began the 
process of expansion of the Bulgarian communities. The third destination was to 
Greece and Macedonia, whence the route continued to Italy. The fourth destina-
tion for export of Bulgarian girls was to countries of former Yugoslavia in the areas 
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where peacekeeping forces were stationed – initially Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and subsequently, Kosovo.
By the mid 1990s, the structure of the Bulgarian prostitution market had taken 
shape. There appeared three strata – street, night club, and elite prostitution. 
These three levels in turn yielded two other forms of Bulgarian prostitution – re-
sort and export prostitution.
The legalization of prostitution has been widely debated in the specialized literature and in public discourse.142
There are essentially two opposed views – that it should be criminalized and that it should be legalized – with 
each side putting forth arguments in support of their position.
The advocates of criminalization generally have three types of arguments. One is based on traditional and religious 
morality – prostitution is regarded as a sin and symbol of social depravity completely at odds with the moral 
values that should be upheld. The second line of reasoning emphasizes that prostitution is conducive to crime and 
disease. Finally, many feminists argue that prostitution leads to degradation and subordination of women.
Those in favor of legalizing it claim this may even be a social good. The freedom to dispose of one’s own body 
is believed to be a fundamental human right. Two main arguments are put forward in this context: of a financial 
and medical nature. The former highlights the revenues that prostitution stands to bring to the national budget 
of a given country in the form of taxes. In the second case, it is argued that making prostitution legal would 
help improve the health and physical condition of prostitutes through mandatory medical checks and tests for 
HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. The advocates of legalization further point out that this would 
allow the state to regulate the number of prostitutes and designate licensed locations where they would be able 
to offer their services.
Depending on the socio-economic history, cultural values and institutional development, the various states have 
implemented very different legislative solutions. These can generally be reduced to three basic models: prostitution 
is banned; prostitution is allowed; there lack straightforward regulations. Bulgaria clearly falls within the group of 
countries that have chosen the absence of a clear-cut legal framework. Or rather, the sex industry has adjusted 
efficiently to the fragments of legislation remaining from socialist times and those created in the chaos of the 
transition period.
Box 3. Legalizing prostitution: pros and cons
142 See for ex., Liberator, M. 2004. Legalized Prostitution: Regulating the Oldest Profession. <<http://
www.liberator.net/articles/prostitution.html>>; Phoenix, J. 1999. Making Sense of Prostitution. 
London: Antony Rowe Ltd; Katyal, N. K. 1993. ”Men Who Own Women: A Thirteenth Amend-
ment Critique of Forced Prostitution” Yale Law Journal 103: 791-826.
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In the Bulgarian Penal Code prostitution-related crimes are covered in Chapter II of its special part on crimes 
against the person, section VIII, ‘Debauchery’ (mainly in Art. 155, Art. 156 et seq.), as well as in Section IX, ‘Hu-
man Trafficking’.
Article 155 incriminates the act of inciting a person to engage in prostitution, procurement, and the provision of 
premises for sexual intercourse or fornication. In the first two cases, the penalty provided for is up to three years 
imprisonment and a fine of 1,000 to 3,000 levs, and in the latter case, a term of imprisonment of up to five years 
and a fine of 1,000 to 5,000 levs. When such acts were committed for profit the penalties are harsher – 1 to 6 
years imprisonment and a fine of 5,000 to 15,000 levs. The law provides for 5 to 15 years of imprisonment and 
a fine of 10,000 to 50,000 levs for inciting or forcing another to use narcotic substances for prostitution purposes. 
The punishment is even more severe (10 to 20 years of imprisonment and a fine of 100,000 to 300,000 levs) 
when the act was committed:
1. by a person acting on behalf of an organized criminal group;
2. against a minor or mentally irresponsible person;
3. against two and more persons; 
4. repeatedly.
The above provisions evidently do not concern the prostitutes but the procurers.
Article 156 incriminates abduction for the purpose of debauchery. This act is punished by imprisonment for a 
term of 3 to 10 years and a fine of up to 1000 levs. More severe penalties (5 to 15 years of imprisonment) are 
provided for when:
1. the kidnapped person is under the age of 18;
2. the kidnapped person was subjected to debauchery;
3. the abduction was carried with intent of debauchery outside the country;
4. the act was committed by a person acting on behalf of an organized criminal group;
5. the kidnapped person was subjected to debauchery outside the country;
6. the act was a dangerous repeat offense.
In the latter three cases, the law provides for a fine of 5,000 to 20,000 levs in addition to imprisonment.
 Article 159a incriminates human trafficking (recruiting, transporting, concealing or harboring individuals or groups 
of individuals) for the purpose of prostitution. The act is a crime even if committed with the victim’s consent and 
is punished by imprisonment of 1 to 8 years and a fine of up to 8,000 levs for domestic trafficking, and 3 to 8 
years of imprisonment and a fine of up to 10,000 levs if the victims were taken across the border. More severe 
punishment (2 to 10 years of imprisonment and fine up to 10,000 levs for domestic trafficking; 5 to 10 years of 
imprisonment and fine of up to 15,000 for trans-border trafficking) is provided for if the crime was committed:
1. against a person who is under the age of 18;
2. by coercion or deceit;
3. by abduction or unlawful restraint;
4. by taking advantage of a state of dependency;
5. by abuse of power;
6. by promising, providing, or obtaining a gain.
Article 159b provides for a punishment of 5 to 15 years of imprisonment and fine of up to 20000 levs when the 
trafficking was carried out by an organized criminal group or constituted a dangerous repeat offense and in ad-
dition the court may order confiscation of the whole or part of the perpetrator’s property.
The Bulgarian Penal Code does not give a legal definition of the term ‘prostitution’ and does not provide for 
liability for the very provision of sexual services. Yet, even though the voluntary practice of prostitution by an 
adult is not prohibited in itself, it is not subject to explicit regulation in Bulgarian legislation and its admissibility 
is therefore not obvious.
Box 4. Prostitution in Bulgarian legislation 
3.2. TYPOLOGY OF PROSTITUTION IN BULGARIA
The primary information used has been collected through in-depth interviews with 
representatives of the main groups involved or concerned with prostitution. On 
the one hand, these are the prostitutes themselves and their procurers, and on 
the other, police officers dealing with the problem.144 The interviews conducted 
with representatives of NGOs concerned with prostitution-related problems and 
working with prostitutes in the field equally proved highly useful.
Based on these data, the following main types of prostitution will be considered: 
street and highway prostitution; club; and elite prostitution.
Street and Highway Prostitution
The data indicate remarkable similarities between street and highway prostitution 
which is why they will be considered together. Street and highway prostitutes 
only differ by the locations where they pick up clients, as well as by the specific 
occupations of their customers, mainly professional drivers in the case of highway 
prostitutes. 
In terms of their social characteristics (reputation, practice, profits, clients, and 
level of protection), street and highway prostitutes occupy the lowest levels in 
the stratification scale of prostitution. At the same time, this is the most con-
spicuous form of prostitution which is why street and highway prostitutes most 
commonly get apprehended in police raids. 
Street prostitutes are usually girls with low social status, mostly of Roma origin. 
They work in proximity to the train stations in the bigger towns (the central sta-
tions in Sofia, Plovdiv, and Bourgas are typical examples), the ring roads and the 
suburbs of the big urban centers, and in the towns and ports along the Black Sea 
coast. Highway prostitutes are typically found along the highways and the busy 
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Furthermore, procurement, which is punishable, is hard to establish and prove, not least because the prostitutes 
themselves tend to cover up for their pimps, saying they are their boyfriends or husbands. Yet survey143 data 
indicate that fewer than 5% of the prostitutes in this country are working without a procurer. This, together with 
the ambiguous legal framework, undermines the efficiency of investigative and court authorities, as evidenced by 
official data on convictions for procurement of prostitution.
According to National Statistical Institute data, in the past 5 years, charges of debauchery have been brought 
against 350-390 persons on average per year, of whom hardly more than 10-15 convicted of procurement of 
prostitution. 
Box 4. Prostitution in Bulgarian legislation (continued)
143 Arsova, T. Prostitution and sex workers in Bulgaria: Analysis of the situation and the risk with regards to 
HIV/AIDS/STDs. Health and Social Development Foundation, Sofia, 2000.
144 The study has also drawn on interviews with representatives of the above-specified groups from 
the archive of the Center for the Study of Democracy, conducted by other teams, on different 
subjects and at different times but highly relevant to the issues at hand.
Organized Crime in Bulgaria: Markets and Trends 97
international roads in the territory of Bulgaria. They normally wait at parking lots, 
close to motels, roadside bars and restaurants, and places where drivers can easily 
pull off. In this case large truck drivers are the most common customers.
Official MoI data145 indicate there are 366 gathering spots for prostitutes in Bul-
garia, of which 109, along the highways across the country.
There are several ways of recruiting street and highway prostitutes. In some Roma 
families, there is a tradition to sell children to become prostitutes. All too often, 
the girls are resold from one procurer to another, with the price ranging from 
500 to 1000 levs.
Unemployment and utter poverty, together with lack of education and skills also 
drive some women to take up this occupation of their own free will. According 
to some representatives of NGOs with field experience, quite a few of the pros-
titutes with whom they have had contacts had entered the profession voluntarily 
and even preferred it to ”normal” work because it paid far better.
Another method of recruitment is by kidnapping young women. These are mostly girls 
from broken families, from orphanages, girls who are vulnerable and cannot expect 
any help from family and friends. Most exposed are the girls from small towns and vil-
lages whom the procurers lure with promises of well-paid jobs and housing in the city.
The price of the service offered by street and highway prostitutes is usually ne-
gotiated with the customer and is in the range of 5 to 30 levs depending on the 
location, the quality of the girl, and above all, on the type of service requested 
by the customer. On some international roads and in towns close to the border 
(e.g. Svilengrad and Sandanski), these prices are quoted in euro.
With this type of prostitution the procurers typically resort to two kinds of con-
trol. In one case, the procurer supervises the girls at all times. He waits nearby 
and watches them; thus he sees each customer and immediately after the session, 
the prostitute hands over the money earned. Most of the time, the procurer gets 
70% of the takings and the prostitutes keep very little.
The other form of control is by setting a daily target amount that the prostitutes 
must earn or else bear sanctions, often involving the use of physical violence. 
The daily norm is usually 100 levs and the procurer only comes by a few times 
a day to check on the girls and collect the money they have made.
Street and highway prostitutes usually work in groups of 3-4 but sometimes as 
many as 10, and inside the cities there are some gathering spots where they can 
be even more numerous. The pimp makes sure no independent prostitutes turn 
up in his territory. In the event that they do, he immediately invites them to work 
for him. If the woman refuses he forces her by resorting to threats and violence. 
If she belongs to another procurer the matter is settled between the two of them. 
One procurer usually has 2 to 6 girls working for him and living with him.
145 The data were announced before the National Assembly in late 2003 by Minister of Interior 
Georgi Petkanov and have repeatedly been cited in the media, see for ex., ”Petkanov Counted 
4611 Prostitutes”, Trud daily, May 31, 2003.
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It was established through the interviews that for a given procurer to work in a 
particular place he needs to pay the police officers in the respective area, as well 
as a representative of the criminal ring operating there. The prostitutes said that 
every day they allocated a certain amount, typically 20 levs, for a racketeer who 
was charging a fee for the particular location.
The information collected shows that although prostitutes are often apprehended 
by the police, in the absence of legal regulation of prostitution in Bulgaria, they 
rarely remain in detention for more than 24 hours, after which they go out in 
the streets again. Some of the respondents told of cases when police officers, 
in their efforts to cope with street and highway prostitution, actually charge the 
prostitutes with violation of traffic regulations.
What is particularly alarming in the case of street and highway prostitution is the 
fact that some of the girls are very young, under 18 or 16. Furthermore, street 
and highway prostitutes are highly exposed to high risk and often fall victim to 
crimes, both on the part of the procurers and the customers. The victims rarely 
report the crimes to the police and do not seek legal protection. The lack of 
any other sources of income, public ostracism, as well as the control exercised by 
the procurers makes it almost impossible for the women who have once become 
street or highway prostitutes to put an end to their involvement in this activity.
Club Prostitution
This form of prostitution is the most common one in Bulgaria on the middle 
level. It occupies the middle ground between street prostitution and the so-called 
elite prostitution. 
With club prostitution the procurers take care of the logistical details – they es-
tablish contacts with the customers, provide premises, and watch out for police 
checks. They also make sure the girls in their clubs go through the necessary 
medical checkups.
Club prostitutes enjoy greater security than street and highway ones, both in 
terms of arrests and with respect to violence by customers and procurers. Few 
club prostitutes are resold by procurers as is common practice for street prosti-
tutes and they are rarely made to work by force. Most engage in this activity out 
of financial interest. Often they even approach the procurers themselves in order 
to work in their clubs and to secure their protection and support. Unlike street 
prostitutes, those who work in clubs get days off and money for clothes and un-
derwear. While street prostitutes are mostly from minority groups, club prostitutes 
are of Bulgarian origin for the most part, but there are some foreigners, too - 
mostly Russians and Ukrainians. The girls engaged in this type of prostitution are 
typically 18 to 30 years old.
The rates of club prostitutes range between 30 and 70 levs an hour, typically 50 
levs, with the price usually increasing by 50% in case of nonstandard requests by 
the customers. Club prostitutes charge hourly as well as nightly rates, the latter 
in the range of 200-250 levs per night. The money is usually split 50:50 or 30:70 
in favor of the procurer.
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According to expert estimates, there are about 300 clubs in Bulgaria, about 100 
of them in Sofia.146 In the capital the highest concentration is found along the 
border of the first zone of the town’s municipal division. It is believed that in the 
big cities in the country, there is an oligopoly model in club prostitution, with 
the capital, for example, divided among about a dozen owners.147
The interviews conducted clearly showed that when speaking about club prostitu-
tion the different respondents actually had in mind different types of prostitu-
tion. They were generally referring to: brothels; call girls; or clubs under the 
guise of bars and restaurants. The information collected indicates that these 
three in fact coincide by all of their basic characteristics and in each case the 
prostitutes work for a club, which is why they will be considered as subtypes of 
club prostitution.
The interviews further revealed that the three types tend to intertwine and over-
lap. For example, many brothels also offer and deliver prostitutes to an address 
of the customer’s choice as requested by phone. 
Brothels
In a brothel there are usually 3-4 girls, a procurer and bodyguards. However, 
some brothels have 7-8 prostitutes. The procurers rent apartments and turn them 
into brothels, all while dealing with the promotion of the establishment, running 
ads in some papers, and in recent years, they have even been advertising their 
”goods” quite actively on the internet. Most clubs use ads not only to offer escort 
girls and prostitutes, but also to recruit them. 
A large number of the apartments converted into brothels are located on the 
first floors of the buildings. Sometimes they operate under the cover of massage 
parlors. In this way, the brothels sidestep the law, which as noted above, neither 
explicitly bans, nor allows, prostitution. The only official requirement is the pay-
ment of patent tax for escorts and masseurs. The respective tax rates are fixed in 
the Appendix to Chapter VII of the Natural Person Income Tax Act.148 They depend 
on the category of the respective settlement.
For escorts, the due tax depends on the location:
Group І
Sofia 
Municipality
Group ІІ Group IІІ Group ІV, V
Group VI, 
VII, VIII
6,440 5,200 4,200 3,520 3,000
146 See „I pay 15 grand a month to the Sofia Internal Affairs Directorate and nobody touches my 
brothels”, Monitor daily, April 21, 2007, ; an interview with a former official with the MoI Inspec-
torate Directorate revealed that the MoI has conducted various investigations of brothel owners 
for racketeering and prostitution.
147 The opinion expressed by an anonymous owner cited in Monitor daily of April 21 was confirmed 
in part by police officers and girls working, or who have worked, in Sofia.
148 Natural Person Income Tax Act (Promulgated State Gazette No 95/24.11.2006, effective as of 
01.01.2007)
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For masseurs, the due tax depends on the location:
Group І
Sofia 
Municipality
Group ІІ Group IІІ Group ІV, V
Group VI, 
VII, VIII
1,680 1,300 960 660 500
According to the Natural Person Income Tax Act, the revenue to the national budget 
from a single escort girl should range between 3,000 to 6,440 levs per year, de-
pending on the type of settlement. Under the cover of massage parlors, however, 
they are liable for much lower patent tax rates and have to pay 500 to 1,680 levs.
Call girls
The clubs also take telephone orders for home services. It is usually the procurer 
who answers the phone or in his absence, one of the more experienced girls. 
The customer is told the price, conditions, and the available girls are described 
to him. The girl is delivered to the address by car either by the bodyguards of 
the club or by some trusted taxi driver working with the club and who waits until 
the session is over. As soon as the time paid for runs out, the prostitute leaves 
the address, and should the customer wish to prolong the session, she informs 
the bodyguards who wait close by. Extra payment is required for the taxi ride in 
addition to the prostitute’s rate.
In addition to driving the girls and, when necessary, ensuring their protection 
while they are with customers, the taxi drivers are a link between customers 
and the clubs offering sex services. Should a client express an interest, most taxi 
drivers will recommend clubs with prostitutes and they usually have a deal with 
the procurer from the club to get a commission for each client they bring in, in 
the range of 5 to 10 levs. 
Bars
Some prostitute clubs operate under the cover of bars and nightclubs, with the 
prostitutes officially presented as dancers or waitresses and the procurer acting as 
the manager. He informs the customers about the prices and conditions. They are 
usually offered a room for which in some places they have to pay about 20 levs 
extra. In some of the more luxurious establishments of this type, the prices ex-
ceed those for the other forms of club prostitution and can reach 100-200 levs.
The customer may choose to use the services of the prostitute outside the es-
tablishment or call and ask for one by phone, in which case the delivery takes 
place in the above described manner. There are usually about 10-15 girls in such 
establishments. Most of them are Bulgarian but there are also quite a few from 
the countries of the former USSR. The majority have taken up this occupation 
of their own will.
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In the case of club prostitution, conflicts between the procurer and the prostitutes 
most typically arise because of non-compliance with the financial terms of the 
deal, usually when the procurer fails to pay the girls the percentage promised. 
Another reason for conflicts is the wish on the part of the prostitutes to leave the 
profession, in which case the procurer demands a forfeit, i.e. even if a woman 
initially started voluntarily she will find it hard to withdraw when she chooses.
In Bulgaria, a procurer rarely manages more than one club. He is connected to criminal 
organizations and pays them for working in their area and for their protection. These 
are usually criminal groups in charge of drug distribution, which additionally impose 
their control on the procurers and prostitutes. Insubordination by procurers is taken 
care of by the so-called ”punitive brigades” at the disposal of these criminal rings.149
Elite Prostitution
The scope and influence of elite prostitution could be the object of a special 
study. Here the topic is merely outlined in order to provide a better idea of the 
Bulgarian prostitution market.
Whereas street and highway prostitutes are regarded by the procurers as ‘goods’ and 
those in the brothels can be said to be ”workers”, the so-called elite prostitutes rank 
highest in the stratification scale and could even be considered entrepreneurs.
What is characteristic of this type of prostitution is that it seems to escape the 
attention of the police, the media, and the politicians which is due to the utmost 
discretion of the parties involved.150 Therefore, the sources used to collect infor-
mation about this type of prostitution were limited to former and current fashion 
models studying at higher education establishments in Bulgaria and Western Eu-
rope. On the one hand, they were interviewed themselves; on the other, they in 
turn interviewed friends and acquaintances of theirs who have been or are still 
involved in this kind of activity.
The following model of elite prostitution can be construed based on the thus 
collected information.
The organization of elite prostitutes is centered on fashion modeling agencies.151
The latter are typically owned by influential businesswomen, wives and girlfriends 
of leaders of economic groups and the former violent entrepreneurs.
149 One such brigade consists of 3-4 people (”a carfull of people”) who punish the erring pimps. 
For more details on punitive brigades see Center for the Study of Democracy, The Drug Market 
in Bulgaria, Sofia, 2003, p.36-37.
150 Notwithstanding the general discreetness in political and criminal scandals, the names of models 
and agencies do sometimes come out in the mass media. In 1996, Interior Minister Lyubomir 
Nachev was filmed by the National Television surrounded by models on the day when three 
police officers were shot and was forced to resign. In 2006, there appeared pictures and con-
tracts with modeling agencies of the former Head of Sofia Central Heating Company, Valentin 
Dimitrov, accused of scams amounting to millions. In 2007, the subject of compromising pictures 
with models came up again in the media in connection with the scandal involving Minister of 
Energy Rumen Ovcharov and the Head of the National Investigation Service, Angel Alexandrov.
151 The names of the agencies about which most information is available have been left out in order 
to avoid possible disputes and claims.
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All of these companies are engaged in normal business activities providing mod-
els for fashion shows, advertising campaigns, TV shows, promotions, participation 
in film productions, magazine photo sessions, and other traditional services for 
modeling agencies. At the same time, the leading principle with this kind of 
companies is the blurring of the boundaries between strictly modeling and 
escort-related duties of the models. In the case of the latter, the transition from 
escort to paid sex services becomes of key importance to the agencies known for 
luxury prostitution. It should be noted that such a mixing of functions is observed 
throughout Eastern Europe and is particularly characteristic of Russia and Ukraine. 
With this kind of company, the structure may be described as comprising a core 
of two layers: an inner and a peripheral one.
Most fashion models in Bulgaria essentially receive two kinds of job offers. The 
first one includes typical modeling assignments – fashion shows, photo shoots, 
advertisements, promotions, etc. The second involves attending various functions 
and parties as agreed between the organizers and the agencies. At the agencies 
specializing in elite prostitution, event attendance jobs are assigned to girls from the 
”periphery”. Models are often used by owners of entertainment establishments – 
mostly bars and discos – for whom the agencies provide a certain number of 
girls to simply hang around and attract customers. With this job the girls are not 
required to do anything else but act as customers of the establishment.
It should be noted that all of these services offered by model agencies are not 
illegal and it is not possible to speak of prostitution in this case. Furthermore, the 
girls involved take on the assignments of their own free will. This is essentially con-
sidered regular modeling work where the agency pays the model about 30-50 levs 
a night.
However, hiring is irregular and temporary. Anyone who is attractive enough and 
meets the age requirements is eligible. Such activities as a rule are more common 
in the largest towns in the country. It is an effective form of recruitment for both 
the normal model and photo agencies and those offering paid sex services. To the 
latter, it is an opportunity to form their inner ”core” while making a profit and 
building an image of a regular modeling agency. At the same time, when involved 
in such peripheral activities they often exert steady and even aggressive pressure 
on the attractive looking models in order to hire them on a permanent basis.
Unlike the temporary jobs in the periphery, the inner core of the agencies is 
made up by girls on permanent contracts. The agencies involved in the market 
for luxury prostitution take special care in recruiting these girls. The chief mecha-
nism is through beauty pageants which are held at least once a year in the larger 
towns of the country. The event is preceded by an active advertising campaign 
throughout the region in order to cover the smaller settlements, too. The main 
target group are girls aged 15-16 but there are many older participants, as well. 
The selected girls have to agree with the obligatory condition of moving to the 
agency’s ”modeling school”, with all her expenses covered by the agency. Presum-
ably this is done because the girl needs training and schooling in order to evolve 
and have a successful modeling career. The interviews, conducted for this paper, 
revealed that such offers are perceived as an opportunity to achieve very high 
social status. Even in families of very good social and financial standing, such 
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a career is regarded as extremely prestigious. It is uncertain what percentage 
of the girls (families) accept these offers. In such cases the conservative bent of 
the Bulgarian family comes into conflict with the prestige enjoyed by modeling 
agencies. Interestingly enough, there is very little public awareness of the risk 
of prostitution in modeling agencies. The interviews showed that acceptance of 
the offer for the girl leads to a dependence of sorts on the agency. Once they 
join the modeling schools, the girls are cut off from the old family and school 
environment, they get a taste of luxury consumption, and with subsequent access 
to individual advertising contracts, international contests and important clients, 
they gradually come to identify themselves with the agency. The transition from 
professional modeling to paid escort services and ultimately paid sex takes 
place on the basis of this dependence on the agency in the absence of coercion 
and violence. It was actually found in the interviews that the sex service acquires 
special value, it is perceived as an important and highly effective business instru-
ment. According to the respondents, the agency owners and managers let go 
the girls deemed risky. As a rule, the acceptance of escort activities on the part 
of the girls occurs ”spontaneously”. The agencies, in their turn, operate without 
exerting particular pressure insofar as out of 10-15 new girls recruited there rarely 
drop out more than 2-3 in the early career stage.152 With more valuable models 
(very beautiful girls) special efforts at ”socialization” might be made, such as extra 
investments in luxury consumption for the girl in question, inclusion in privileged 
social networks, etc.
In cases of mass recruitment of new models, for instance upon appearance of a 
new client, within two-three weeks the obligation to accept sex services as part 
of escort duties is explained in clear-cut terms and no efforts are made to retain 
those who prove unwilling. 
The recruitment of new girls is of key importance in terms of keeping up service 
quality for the agencies offering elite prostitution owing to the extremely high 
attrition rate among the girls who have been working for 3-4 years. Leaving the 
business (temporarily or for good) because of ”finding” a steady boyfriend or a 
husband is an ongoing process regarded as normal by the agencies. This manner 
of leaving the agency has become a standard procedure, particularly among the 
older models, in order to avoid their humiliating exclusion from the group serv-
ing important clients.
The most important part of the agencies engaged in luxury prostitution is the 
core. The models included in it get the best offers and have personal relationships 
with the managers and owners of the agencies who often belong to the top 
ranks of organized crime. When the agencies are associated with a semi-criminal 
ring or economic group, there is specialization of the girls from the core with 
regard to particular key figures. The models are aware of their agency’s affiliation 
and respect the established influence zones of competing rings. In this respect, 
there is a certain ambiguity, as well. First of all, it is uncertain where personal 
relationship ends and sex service begins. Those who have worked longer for a 
particular agency owned by a shadow structure usually have steady intimate 
152 Interviews with owners, managers and girls who have worked or are still working for modeling 
agencies and who wished to preserve their anonymity.
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relationships with the management and their close associates and partners. Sec-
ondly, the models themselves commonly choose to start intimate relationships 
with company owners – usually businessmen who become clients of the shadow 
structure thanks to these relationships. All too often, elite prostitutes are used 
as instruments to gain influence over politicians, magistrates, and representatives 
of big multinational corporations. Such relationships, however, are voluntary and 
may not have been planned and arranged by the agency managers or owners, or 
the leaders of the ring. With services of this type, and in the event of success – 
the conclusion of a desired contract (e.g. a public procurement contract or con-
tract with an international company), for instance, the girl is given a percentage 
of the contract amount.
On the whole, these relations between agencies engaged in elite prostitution 
and economic groups are of a highly clientelist and hermetic nature. Outside 
individuals and companies are not involved.
Because of the small size of Bulgaria, all the larger and more stable business 
structures are well-known and there is hardly a problem with unfamiliar persons 
and entities. As for foreign companies, there are two types of relations. If the 
company has already entered into clientelist relations with the respective Bulgar-
ian economic group, it is entitled to the services described above. The situation is 
different when a company enters Bulgaria without the help of the main business 
players. In such cases, the advertising and PR departments of the large shadow 
structures try to establish relations through advertising contracts and after some 
initial probing they proceed to ”bonding” at which stage the agencies offering 
elite sex services may be actively involved. The main goal is to secure deals for 
companies associated with the economic structure. In the event of deterioration 
of the relations with the foreign company, racketeering might be resorted to, 
but it would in all likelihood take place through a government institution rather 
than with the use of violence.
It should be borne in mind that, in addition to modeling and photo agencies, 
the shadow structures have their own advertising companies where there also 
are some representatives of luxury prostitution among the administrative or sec-
retarial staff.
Possibly one of the biggest advantages of advertising agencies is that they pro-
vide the perfect cover for sex services in the form of advertising contracts in 
compliance with all international auditing requirements.
When analyzing the luxury prostitution structures they should be distinguished 
from the normal modeling and photo agencies that also offer escort services 
and attendance of promotional events. These agencies often employ models of-
fering sex services but they do so without the backing of a company. There may 
also be some staff members who have a good idea of ”who is willing to take 
on extra services for money”. When they approach the girls with such propos-
als, however, they are essentially working for themselves even if they enjoy the 
protection of leaders in organized crime. The independent intermediaries play the 
part of the typical procurer. They secure the client, guarantee payment, discre-
tion, etc. These intermediaries may be from outside the fashion business and will 
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approach both girls working for normal agencies and for agencies specializing in 
luxury prostitution. In any case, at least half of the girls work in some other area. 
What is interesting about the latter group is that it includes the so-called stars – 
popular singers from the Bulgarian pop-folk genre; familiar faces from television, 
etc. However, these girls only work episodically, at very high rates, and only ac-
cept offers of some special interest to them. The role of the procurer, who in this 
case acts more like an agent, is to secure girls for wealthy clients. The procurer 
is often a woman and there is hardly any violence involved.
Luxury procurers work in a network with several centers and in many respects 
are independent. Compared to them, however, the agencies offering elite pros-
titution have a great advantage – the access to international markets. It should 
be noted that the admission of Bulgarian models into the international modeling 
agencies only became possible with the transformation of the world fashion in-
dustry, the end of the super-model era, and the invasion by elite models from the 
third world, which began in the mid-1990s.153 To Bulgarian agencies participation 
in the international fashion shows in New York, Paris or Milan is now a matter 
of largely technical effort not requiring too big investments.
The free access to international fashion shows, international modeling agencies, 
beauty pageants, etc., have created remarkable opportunities for access to ex-
tremely wealthy customers abroad. The information about this aspect of the 
business, however, is scarce and distorted because access to such channels is 
granted largely to girls from the agency cores. They are very discrete about their 
prized foreign customers. Yet, the little that we know does shed some light on 
this type of international activity. There are the notorious cases of providing girls 
for yacht parties in the Mediterranean, as well as dozens of cases of hiring of 
girls for cruises in Greece, Italy, and Spain. The cooperation works the other way, 
too – when the foreign management of a Bulgarian telecommunications opera-
tor managed to get through several dozens of girls from the ”luxury pool” of 4 
agencies, they had to resort to seeking new girls in Serbia on a barter basis. The 
practice also exists to pay for temporary import of girls from the former Soviet 
Union, mainly of Ukrainian origin.
153 See ”Strike a Pose, Count Your Pennies: At 18, Bianca Gomez faces the new economics of 
modeling -- lower fees and a surge of Russians,” WSJ February 3, 2007, (”http://blogs.wsj.com/
runway/2007/02/03/strike-a-pose-count-your-pennies); Not Just Another Pretty Face: The End of 
the Supermodel Era by Hilary Rowland, Hilary Magazine online retrieved July 7, 2006 (”http://
www.hilary.com/fashion/supermodels.html), Death of the Supermodels by C. L. Johnson, Urban 
Models October 21, 2002 online retrieved July 13, 2006 (http://www.urbanmodels.co.uk/model-
ing.php?page=supermodels). Although there is no shortage of names with supermodel preten-
sions, such as Gisele Bündchen, Carmen Kass, Heidi Klum, Yfke Sturm, Karolina Kurkova, Laetitia 
Casta, Kate Moss, Tyra Banks, Adriana Lima and still that of Naomi Campbell, and more recently, 
Doutzen Kroes, Robin Arcuri, Daria Werbowy, Julia Stegner, Natalia Vodianova and Liya Kebede, 
nearly all fashion experts are talking about the end of the supermodel era. Various reasons are 
noted: from the trend to use famous movie actors, singers, athletes and other celebrities, to the 
wish of fashion designers to focus the attention on their collections rather than the model. The 
chief factor, however, has undeniably been globalization, which secures an unlimited supply of 
exotic third world beauties. One of the most popular sites, Models.com, reports 15,000 hits a 
month from places like Bulgaria, Kazakhstan or Mozambique (see WSJ February 3, 2007).
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The elite prostitutes own expensive cars, live in luxurious apartments, and spend 
enormous amounts of money on cosmetics and cosmetic surgery. Some of them 
use drugs, mainly cocaine.
The rates of elite prostitutes start from 500 levs and they are typically engaged 
for the whole evening rather than on an hourly basis. That is why the price can 
exceed 2000 levs. Their income can generally be said to be 3-4 times higher 
than the average earnings of the Bulgarian prostitutes working in Western Europe, 
moreover with considerably fewer customers and less risk. The reason is not so 
much in the higher rates but the fact that a larger share remains for the girl com-
pared to the prostitutes working at the mid-level (brothels, windows, nightclubs) 
in Western Europe.
With this type of prostitution, the price of sex services can often not be directly 
calculated or fixed per time period. The deal usually covers a more extended 
period and the commitment is less straightforward. Payment can often come in 
the form of expensive gifts, even property, company stock, etc. In cases when 
foreign companies hire luxury prostitution agencies and win a contract, they pay 
a percentage of the contract amount to the girl (and the agency). There have 
been instances of corruption-related mediation and compensation in the form of 
luxury prostitutes.
It is in this context that in the late 1990s some foreign agencies put forward 
the hypothesis that organized crime is successfully pursuing its plans to gain 
influence over the elites of East European countries (the focus was chiefly on 
Russia) through luxury prostitution. The development of this type of services in 
Bulgaria suggests that it is a chaotic process rather than a matter of systematically 
pursued influence.
Resort Prostitution and Sex Tourism
With resort prostitution and prostitution related to sex tourism from Western 
Europe, which in many respects resemble export prostitution, the bulk of the rev-
enues is generated by foreign nationals and is associated with the tourist season 
in both the summer and winter resorts of Bulgaria. Regarding sex tourism, even 
though there were attempts to offer such services already in the early 1990s, 
there has only been real growth since 2001, when Bulgaria came to be perceived 
as a safe country and the number of foreign tourists started growing by double-
figured percentages each year.
What is typical of resort prostitution is that, at the onset of each season there 
begins a process of migration of prostitutes from the big cities in the interior of 
the country towards the Black Sea resorts – Sunny Beach, Golden Sands, or the 
mountain resorts – Borovets, Pamporovo, Bansko. This specific form of Bulgarian 
prostitution seems to occur in the border regions, as well – Svilengrad, Petrich, 
and Sandanski. Here, too, non-Bulgarian citizens constitute the principal source 
of revenues.
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It is characteristic of this model of prostitution that it adheres to the structure 
described in the preceding sections, and at each level provides girls of the re-
spective price range.
Thus, for instance, even in the resorts and border towns, the prostitutes take up 
the fixed posts, positioning themselves at highway junctions and streets away from 
the expensive hotels; the girls from the clubs are also grouped in accordance 
with the class of the establishment they come from. The main difference is that 
in the resorts and border areas, the prices are twice as high.
The level of the prostitutes matches the class of the hotels. The prostitutes work-
ing in cheap hotels differ little from street prostitutes and many of them, when 
they do not have customers at the hotel, go out in the streets of the resort to 
look for them. However, even the prostitutes from the cheapest hotels earn more 
than street prostitutes, with their rate usually ranging between 30 and 50 levs an 
hour.
In higher-class hotels, the rates are several times higher, in the range of 100 to 
200 levs and can reach up to 500 levs in some of the most luxurious ones. In the 
largest seaside resorts, such as Sunny Beach and Golden Sands, prostitute rates 
depend on hotel proximity to the sea. The first lane (i.e. closest to the beach) is 
the most expensive one, with the second and third lanes coming next. Working 
in superior hotels has certain advantages, such as wealthier customers, and higher 
safety and discretion for the prostitute allowing her to avoid public condemnation 
and police checks, which are far more infrequent than out in the streets. Yet, the 
interviews found the paradox that with street prostitutes, the number of custom-
ers is far higher and the daily turnover and income of the procurer, respectively, 
may be larger than in luxury hotels.
Resort prostitution is well-organized, with high involvement of hotel owners. 
Some of them have stable connections with the political elites and for this reason 
usually remain out of the reach of police and prosecution authorities, who tend 
to concentrate their efforts on street prostitution, especially when it becomes 
more aggressive and conspicuous. At the same time, all of the consulted sources 
of information indicated that prostitution in the resorts is almost entirely under 
the control of the former semi-criminal rings, with the prostitutes and procurers 
operating as ‘employees’ of the respective ring rather than autonomous economic 
agents. Prostitution generates side revenue for these rings, primarily engaged in 
other, criminal as well as legal, activities.   
A good illustration of the distribution of prostitution in Bulgarian resorts among 
the criminal rings is found in MoI intervention in early 2005 to prevent the war 
between two rings fighting for control over prostitution in Pamporovo resort. 
According to official reports, 52 people were apprehended in the police raid, 
members of the Plovdiv Club 777 ring and SIK.154
154 „The role of the Ministry of Interior in the fight against crime and the interaction between the 
special services and similar European and world structures”. http://press.mvr.bg/Projects/Other/
PP, accessed on December 9, 2005; Zhelyazkova, Z. 2005, ”MoI Chief Secretary Punishes 
Chiefs of Regional Police Departments in Plovdiv and Assenovgrad.” http://tvevropa.com/news.
php?id=7986 accessed on November 26, 2005.
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The development of events after the detentions in Pamporovo, as well as various 
incidents involving prostitutes in Varna, Bourgas, Golden Sands, and Sunny Beach 
have shown that the local law-enforcement and municipal authorities have ir-
regular relations with this business.
Resort prostitution can in many respects be viewed as a stage preceding what is 
currently emerging as a market for sex tourism in Bulgaria.
3.3. EXPORT OF PROSTITUTION AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING. 
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN
Unlike prostitution inside the country, the export of prostitutes as an international 
problem has been the object of research and analysis in reports by many interna-
tional organizations and governments concerned with human trafficking, such as 
the International Migration Organization, US State Department, Germany’s Fed-
eral Criminal Police Office (the BKA), Bulgarian and foreign NGOs. There have 
also been some investigative reports on the issue by Bulgarian journalists. Yet the 
focus in most of these studies has been largely on human trafficking rather than 
the export of prostitution and in particular, the prostitution of Bulgarian citizens 
abroad.
It should be noted that, similarly to the structure of the domestic market, prostitu-
tion abroad has many different forms, often not involving violence and organized 
crime. Nevertheless, human trafficking calls for special attention not only because 
of the utmost gravity of this crime and because it is a matter of international 
concern, but also because it constitutes a good starting point allowing a better 
grasp of the comprehensive phenomenon of Bulgarian prostitution abroad – 
the existing trends, profile of prostitutes, role of conventional and organized 
crime, etc. For this reason, we shall first consider the problems of trafficking in 
women for sexual exploitation and then attempt a broader overview of the ex-
port of prostitutes and the Bulgarian participation in the market for sex services 
in Western and Central Europe.
The Trafficking Problem and Its Definition
The 1999 estimate by Animus Association Foundation that 10,000 Bulgarian wom-
en fall victim to trafficking each year provoked open disagreement on the part of 
MoI authorities and the judiciary and ironic remarks that at this rate, in 7-8 years 
Bulgaria would be left without any female population aged 15 to 30. Skepticism 
and accusations of speculation still obstruct rational analysis. As a result, there 
is still no realistic assessment of the trends and dimensions of trafficking in Bul-
garia.
One of the chief obstacles to the study of trafficking is its definition and how 
it is applied in practice. The principal elements of the definition (according to 
the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons of Pal-
ermo 2000 and a multitude of other tentative definitions preceding or following 
the Protocol) are: recruitment, transportation and subsequent exploitation of 
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persons. Exploitation includes sexual exploitation, forced labor, the removal of 
organs, slavery and servitude.
Despite the seemingly clear-cut terms of the definition, it poses a number of 
difficulties to researchers as well as law-enforcement institutions. For instance, 
the elements of recruitment and transportation may lack altogether in cases of 
voluntary emigration with subsequent exploitation. In other instances, the exploi-
tation may be ”voluntary” to some degree since it is hard to say to what extent 
the poor remuneration and conditions for certain types of prostitution, even if 
illegal, are an indicator of exploitation or simply a matter of underpaid labor 
under deplorable working conditions. The point of view of an individual deprived 
of the possibility to earn a living in his/her own country may be quite different 
from that of the legislator or the human rights activist.
An additional complication in defining human trafficking stems from the fact that 
it often tends to intertwine with illegal migration. As a result, the difference 
between trafficking and smuggling of persons all too often remains unclear. For 
example, in Bulgarian, the term ”human trafficking” is commonly used to refer to 
”smuggling of persons”. According to Europol, ”as a result of the confusion of the 
terms ‘human trafficking’ and ‘assisted illegal immigration’ (or smuggling), the two 
are often taken to mean the same thing. Which is not the case.”155 The Palermo 
Protocol on trafficking distinguishes between the two phenomena, as well.
Indeed, differentiating trafficking from smuggling and vice versa can be extremely 
difficult. According to Inspector Paul Holms, expert with the International Migration 
Organization and former member of the London Police, in operative terms, the dif-
ference is the following: when the service/money exchange takes place in advance, 
we are dealing with smuggling; when a debt is to be paid off after arrival to the 
desired destination, it is a matter of trafficking.156 From an analytical point of view 
this working definition only solves the problem partially. This is so because many 
instances of trafficking involve smuggling at some stage of the process. Furthermore, 
some of the women involved in trafficking enter the European Union as temporary 
immigrants or tourists with regular visas and passports and without the assistance of 
other persons. In these cases smuggling is not present as an element at all.
Additional confusion in defining and identifying human trafficking occurs because 
quite a few victims manage to adapt to the situation of forced prostitution and 
exploitation. Thus, from trafficking victims they move to another category – that 
of the illegally residing or illegally working, who have to some extent come to 
terms with the situation in which they find themselves (or would like to improve 
their situation but not if they have to go back to where they came from).157 This 
155 Traffic in people for secual exploitation: the viewpoint of Europol, Europol 2004 (http://www.
europol.eu.int/publications/SeriousCrimeOverviews/2004/THB.pdf).
156 Personal conversation, 2002.
157 Beate, Andrees and Mariska N.J. van der Linden Designing, Trafficking Research from a Labour Mar-
ket Perspective: The ILO Experience, 2003, International Labour Organization, Geneva, Switzerland. 
The survey on human trafficking for forced labor purposes by Andrees and van der Linden, for 
instance, differentiates between persons involved in forced labor who do not identify themselves 
as trafficking victims and successful immigrants. The distinction is based on the degree of decep-
tion which they have been lured into, on their own assessment of the situation, and individual 
strategies for coping with subordination and coercion.
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type of adaptation is often observed with sexual exploitation when under the 
influence of a number of factors – psychological (traumatic disorder or other con-
sequences) and external ones (abuse, relationship with the trafficker/procurer, and 
others) – the trafficking victims turn into individuals who to some extent prostitute 
themselves voluntarily and get some payment for their work (even if minimal com-
pared to the money they actually earn from the sex services provided).158 In this 
sense, the trafficking process can be defined as highly dynamic. If a girl who 
was made to leave was to be detained at the border of Bulgaria with Macedonia, 
for example, she could still be identified and self-identify herself as a trafficking 
victim.159 The same girl, after six months in a Dutch (or other) brothel, may no 
longer identify herself as a victim and would not be recognized as such. And since 
trafficking is such a dynamic phenomenon, unless it is identified in time, there is 
no case of trafficking. The number of such cases thus appears smaller than it actu-
ally is. Another typical situation would be a girl thinking she is going to work as a 
hotel maid, for example, and leaving of her own accord (smuggling may or may 
not be involved depending on how the emigration is arranged). At the time of 
crossing the border and in the absence of any information about what is to come 
there is no reason to identify the girl as a victim. However, once she finds herself 
in a brothel instead, without any id papers or money and deprived of freedom of 
movement, she becomes a trafficking victim. In a few months time the same girl 
may still be a victim but may also prove to have adapted to the trafficking situation. 
Such examples by no means make trafficking a less grave crime and human rights 
violation but unfortunately they do make it harder to define, identify, and punish. 
Paradoxically enough, there are occasionally attempts to take advantage of such 
cases as well as of cases of women emigrating in order to work in the sex industry 
of their own free will and subsequently caught up in trafficking and exploitation. 
The case of trafficker Ivan Glavchev, alias Vanko 1, can be cited in illustration. The 
victims were actually aware that they would be prostituting but counted on sharing 
the profit equally with the procurer.160
Tentative Assessment of the Scope of the Problem by Recent Data 
According to most researchers and analysts, Bulgaria is largely a country of 
origin and a transit country with regard to the trafficking in women for pros-
titution. According to the European Centre for Crime Prevention, 80-90% of the 
trafficking in Europe occurs for sexual exploitation purposes.161
Since 1999, the figure 10,000 from the above-mentioned estimate of Animus Associa-
tion Foundation, has been reproduced mechanically from one report to another. In 
fact, it is unclear what data were used to make this estimate or how it was arrived at. 
Furthermore, even if this was indeed the number of victims for the period 1998-99, 
it is naïve to assume it has remained unchanged through all these years. By a more 
recent estimate of the European Centre for Crime Prevention and Control, the annual 
number of trafficking victims in Bulgaria ranges between 3,000 and 4,000.162
158 Assuming that providing sex services is work, which too has been subject to fierce debate.
159 In the present text, the term ‘victim’ is used in the sense of ‘victim of crime’ and does not 
intend to further victimize the people caught up in trafficking.
160 See the interview with investigator Evgeni Dikov, Trud daily, 13 May 2005
161 Animus Association. Trafficking in Women: Questions and Answers, 2000
162 Heinu, Lehti M. Trafficking in Women and Children in Europe, Paper N 18, 2003
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The little reliable data on trafficking include the number of victims who have 
been identified by the police or have sought the help of a non-governmental 
organization in Bulgaria or abroad. Such is the data used in the present overview 
of trafficking in Bulgaria, as well. By data of the Regional Clearing Point (RCP) 
with the Stability Pact in Belgrade, the number of victims – Bulgarian and foreign 
nationals – who have received assistance in Bulgaria between 2000 and 2003 is at 
least 423. Of these, 352 were Bulgarian citizens and 71, foreigners.163 The group 
of the Bulgarian citizens is made up largely by girls and women who came back 
to Bulgaria of their own accord with the help of assistance programs, as well as 
girls and women identified as victims by the police in the country where they 
used to reside. The data produced by RCP are a minimum estimate and come 
close to those collected by the International Organization on Migration (IOM) 
and published in 2005, which constitute the most exhaustive source to date on 
the cases of trafficking registered in Bulgaria. According to IOM, the number of 
victims of Bulgarian nationality identified and assisted in Bulgaria in the period 
from January 2000 to December 31, 2004 was 620 and the number of foreign 
nationals identified in Bulgaria in the same period was 86.
According to RCP, who cite data by Animus Association Foundation obtained 
through partner organizations abroad, in addition to the victims identified in Bul-
garia, between early 2000 and May 2002, there were 485 Bulgarian women who 
became victims of trafficking and sought help outside Bulgaria, and 21 women 
and girls received assistance in Italy in 2002.165
We could further add data about crimes related to prostitution and sexual ex-
ploitation from Belgian and German criminal statistics for 2001-2005; data from 
Greek criminal statistics for 2004-2005; trafficking victim data from the Nether-
lands for 2000-2003 (see Table 8). According to the data from all four countries, 
a total of 938 girls were registered as trafficking victims.
163 Stability Pact Task Force: Belgrade, First Annual Report on Victims of Trafficking in South Eastern 
Europe. Counter-Trafficking Regional Clearing Point of the Stability Pact Task Force, 2003, p.49
164 IOM, International migration data and statistics. World Migration 2005: costs and benefits of 
international migration, Geneva, 2005.
165 See RCP 2003, p. 55. In addition, 9 Bulgarians applied for a B9 residence permit (granted to 
victims of trafficking) between 1996 and June 2002 in the Netherlands. No information is avail-
able about the number of applicants per year. (Dutch National Rapporteur, 2003)
Table 7. Number of identified trafficking victims in Bulgaria 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
Foreign nationals 24 41 4 6 11 86
Bulgarian citizens 46 96 164 172 142 620
Source: Data published by IOM164
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Clearly, IOM and Animus Association have by no means used all of the data from 
Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, and Greece, since the sum of the registered girls 
in these 4 countries in 2002-2004 exceeds the figure cited by the Bulgarian and 
the international organization.
It should equally be noted that for the period from late 2003 to the end of the 
first half of 2005, the Bulgarian National Investigation Service (NIS) conducted 60 
investigations on human trafficking and worked on 56 requests for investigation 
from court authorities of foreign countries. Nearly half of these requests came 
from the three countries for which data is available – 6 from Belgium, 8 from 
Germany, and 19 from the Netherlands.166
Based on Animus Association data on trafficking victims who turned for help to 
the organization’s Crisis Center on more than one occasion in 2003, 2004, and 
2005, it is possible to make a rough estimate of the annual flow of trafficking 
victims coming from Bulgaria.
166 National Investigation Service (NIS), Genezis, razvitie i projavni formi na organizirana prestapnost v 
Balgaria, Sofia, 2005, p.121
Table 8. Registered victims of trafficking 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
Germany 24 91 128 127 62 432
Belgium 11 44 74 29 182 340
Netherlands 19 40 59 48 147
Greece 10 9 19
Total 75 194 250 166 253 938
Table 9. Victims seeking help from the Animus Crisis Center
Year One-time visitors Repeat visitors
2003 32 3 in 2004
2 in 2005
2004 50 3 in 2004
4 in 2005
2005 33 2 in 2005
Source: Coordinator of the AAF crisis unit, January 2006
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Using the capture-recapture method,167 it is possible to make the following 
estimate: the number of victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation in 2003 is 
estimated at a minimum of 267, and in 2004, at least 275. Since data on repeat 
visits are only missing from one support center for victims in Bulgaria, these 
figures should be added to the results obtained on the basis of data from other 
organizations to obtain a very crude estimate of the scope of trafficking in women 
for prostitution in Bulgaria. Thus computed, it remains incomplete due to lack 
of accurate information about the number of victims who sought assistance from 
other organizations, as well as the number of repeat visits. Comparing the data 
from Animus Association with those of IOM on the overall number of identified 
trafficking victims (see Table 7) it is possible to estimate the number of trafficking 
victims at approximately 1,436 in 2003 and 781, in 2004. Once again, these are 
tentative figures assuming the rate of visits is similar in the various centers. If this 
is not the case, the figure may well be in the range of several thousand girls and 
women, as estimated by the European Institute for the Prevention of Crime – 
3,000-4,000 per year.168
Profile of Trafficking Victims in Bulgaria Based on Registered Cases
IOM reports that 88% of the victims who sought help from its victim assistance 
programs between early 2000 and July 2004 came from Romania, Ukraine, 
Moldova, Belarus, Bulgaria, and the Dominican Republic. These data are not 
representative about the number and origin of trafficking victims from Bulgaria 
or about the country’s place in international trafficking since the IOM data base 
compiled over the past 5 years only includes information from the organization’s 
regional offices that have been established in some Balkan countries, including 
Bulgaria, as well as in some countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.169 Nev-
ertheless, this information does provide some idea about the profile of traffick-
ing victims in Bulgaria although according to IOM and other researchers, victim 
profile is difficult to define on the basis of the available data. 
Age and Social Status of Trafficking Victims
According to IOM, most of the Bulgarian citizens, who become victims of traf-
ficking are women aged between 18 and 25, typically unemployed and with 
no regular income, with low education and coming from problem families.170
Table 10 shows the age-group distribution of Bulgarian trafficking victims. 
167 The basic capture-recapture method is based on a ”two-sample model”. It involves an initial 
random sampling of the population, marking the samples, releasing the marked samples back 
into the population and then recapturing another sample randomly from the population. Based 
on the number of individuals captured in both samples, it is possible to estimate the total 
population. The assumption is that all individuals have the same probability of being captured.
168 See Heinu, 2003
169 IOM 2005, p. 418; IOM have an office and programs for trafficking victims in Santo Domin-
go.
170 IOM 2005: p. 6 and pp. 418-420; according to NIS data, a mere 5% of trafficking victims are 
male.
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According to RCP, based on data from IOM, as well as other victim support 
organizations in Bulgaria and abroad, nearly half of the cases registered in 2002 
involved girls aged under 18 and one-third, young women aged 18 to 24. Thus, 
in 2002, the largest proportion of trafficking victims were under-aged girls (48%). 
The cases reviewed by Stateva in the 1997-2000 period also involve girls under 
18 and young women under 21.171 The recurrent 15-21 age profile finds another 
confirmation in the conclusion of NIS of 2005 that the average age of the victims 
is 18 to 25 and there is generally a trend toward falling age of the victims.172
According to RCP (2003), 10-15% of the female victims in 2002 had children 
(there is no data about whether they had children before they fell victim to 
trafficking or gave birth later), and by IOM data, 27% of the Bulgarian women 
assisted under their programs between 2000 and 2004 had children, with 82.8% 
being single mothers.
Education
A large number of the Bulgarian female victims included in the IOM database 
only went to school to the 4th or 6th grade, 30.8% and 22.4%, respectively, and 
4.7% had no education at all. Thus 57.9% of all female victims have no high-
school education and 28.9% have graduated high school.173 If we go back to 
older data about Bulgaria, a similar education profile is found for the women 
victims of trafficking in 1997-2000, with 37.5% having primary education and 
33.4% still school students.174 According RCP (2003), most of the women victims 
in 2002 also had relatively low education (the data are contradictory as to the 
proportion of high-school graduates and of those with primary education). 
Family History
The information about the family history of trafficking victims for the period 2000-
2004 is scarce. The available data on the women involved in trafficking between 
1997 and 2000 who visited the Rehabilitation Center with Animus Association in 
171 Stateva, M., Izsledvane na sluchai na trafik na zheni, Sofia, 2001
172 NIS 2005, p. 121
173 IOM 2005, p. 419
174 Animus Association. Trafficking in Women: Questions and Answers, 2001 p. 46-47.
Table 10. Age distribution of trafficking victims in 2000–2004 
Under 14 Per cent
14–17 years old 6.54%
18–24 years old 64.49%
25–30 years old 12.15%
Over 30 14.02%
NA 2.80%
Source: Data published by IOM; IOM statistics on international migration
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that period shows that 10 women (43.5%) had grown up in families with severe 
forms of domestic violence and 6 women were victims of incest.175 International 
studies on prostitution and trafficking have found that among the women and 
girls engaged in prostitution in general, quite a few have experienced some form 
of abuse (including sexual) in the family, as well as sexual abuse outside the 
family. A 2004 study by the British Poppy Project, which offers victim support, 
found that of all female trafficking victims interviewed (of whom 75% came from 
Eastern Europe), 38% had experienced various forms of abuse prior to getting 
involved in trafficking; 46% were victims of sexual abuse and/or rape; 31% had 
suffered sexual abuse in their childhood; and 46% had experienced domestic 
violence in the family (typically as children).176 Additional insight into the family 
environment of trafficking victims is provided by the Animus Association data of 
1997-2000: 13% were found to be children of divorced or separated parents; 
25.7% came from single-parent families (for some of the women, it was a single 
mother with more than 3 other children); 4.3% of the victims included in the 
survey were orphans.
Regions of Origin
According to the National Investigation Service, the following regions in Bulgaria 
are most affected by human trafficking: Bourgas, Russe, Plovdiv, Pazardjik, and 
border regions like Svilengrad and Petrich.177 Animus Association data provide 
additional information about the victims’ places of origin. The towns of Varna, 
Dobrich, and Russe, the border regions of Blagoevgrad, Kyustendil, Kurdjali, and 
Petrich, as well as smaller settlements in these regions, are places where there 
are many women victims of trafficking. In an analysis of trafficking in Bulgarian 
women of 2001, the National Coordinator of La Strada Program for Bulgaria, 
Nadya Kozhuharova,178 mentioned a village in Varna District where three traf-
ficking victims were found to come from. By Animus Association data, they are 
not the only victims from that location.179 Such cases call for closer analysis in 
terms of the ways of involving the girls in trafficking and the role of organized 
criminal groups in the process. Equally worthy of attention are the areas where 
there seems to be no human trafficking (if that really is the case). According to 
NIS, such regions are Smolyan, Montana, Lovech, and Yambol.180
Recruitment Methods
Up to 2001, Bulgarian citizens needed visas to travel to most European Union 
countries. In 2001, the visas for most European countries were dropped. It is only 
logical to assume that with the lifting of visa limitations, there would be changes 
in the dynamics of human trafficking and of migration practices in general since 
traveling abroad had become easier. Thus IOM reports that human trafficking vic-
tims increasingly cross the borders through the official checkpoints with regular 
175 Stateva, M., op.cit., p. 47
176 Kelly, E. ”You can Find Anything You Want: A Critical Reflection on Research on Trafficking in 
Persons within and into Europe.” – International Migration, January 2005, vol. 43 (1–2).
177 NIS, 2005, p. 122
178 Animus Association. Trafficking in Women: Questions and Answers, 2001
179 Ibid, p. 19
180 NIS, 2005, p. 122
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identification documents.181 NIS confirms this trend and what is more, all too 
often, after expiry of the three-month term of residence in an EU country the 
victims are brought back to Bulgaria and subsequently taken out again. NIS also 
notes that some countries issue working visas for prostitution of Bulgarian citizens 
(e.g. Austria).182 In connection with the opportunities created by visa-free travel, 
Dutch researchers have observed that the number of Bulgarian prostitutes in 
Amsterdam visibly increased after 2001.183 There is, however, no reliable informa-
tion as to whether human trafficking has increased or it is a matter of increasing 
migration for the purpose of working in the sex industry.184
RCP point to unemployment and the wish for a better life as the main factors for 
exposure to trafficking. Between 2000 and May 2002, 59% of all those surveyed 
left to work in the entertainment industry and services (deceived with promises of 
jobs in clubs, hotels, and restaurants); 4% received an invitation (the survey did 
not register the purpose of the visit); and 1% left for the purpose of marriage. 
The ways of involvement in trafficking prior to 2001 are largely in practice even 
now. In view of the victim profile outlined above, it would seem that the reasons 
and conditions conducive to trafficking have undergone little change over the 
past years even though none of the cited sources provides representative data. 
According to an unpublished survey of Animus Association Foundation, 38% of 
the victims were kidnapped in the street; 33.3% were lured by promises of good 
jobs abroad; 22.2% were sold by relatives; 2.8% left as tourists; and 2.8% were 
blackmailed on account of financial debts. The percentages have been calculated 
on the basis of 36 cases on which information was available and the data are 
not representative regarding the involvement of Bulgarian women since some 
(even if few) of the victims registered with the Animus Association center were 
not Bulgarian citizens. Nevertheless, they do provide some idea about trafficking 
practices in Bulgaria up to 2000. A comprehensive review of all studies on traf-
ficking in women in Bulgaria from the late 1990s to 2005 shows that the largest 
number of victims were involved in trafficking by false promises of employ-
ment. For example, RCP data for 2000-2002 indicate that Bulgarian women and 
girls were for the most part involved in trafficking by job promises.185 It was 
likewise observed in the NIS report of 2005 that job offers usually concern the 
following occupations: waitresses, dancers, actresses, housemaids, photo models. 
The proposed remuneration by far exceeds payment in Bulgaria.186 Based on 
investigation findings, NIS further concluded that in Bulgaria, many cases of traf-
ficking occur with the victim’s consent, and the use of violence and threats is 
not as common (there is no indication of whether this consent was the result 
of deceit). Thus, according to NIS, more than one-fourth of the women realized 
or supposed they would be working in the sex industry abroad. What most of 
181 International migration data and statistics. World Migration 2005: costs and benefits of interna-
tional migration. IOM, 2005, Geneva.
182 NIS, 2005, p. 115
183 Trafficking in Human Beings – Third report of the Dutch National Rapporteur, Bureau NRM, The 
Hague, 2005.
184 First Annual Report on Victims of Trafficking in South Eastern Europe. Counter-Trafficking Regional Clear-
ing Point of the Stability Pact Task Force 2003. Stability Pact Task Force: Belgrade.
185 Counter-Trafficking Regional Clearing Point of the Stability Pact Task Force 2003. First Annual 
Report on Victims of Trafficking in South Eastern Europe. Stability Pact Task Force: Belgrade., p.50
186 NIS, 2005, p. 119
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those leaving of their own accord are not aware of are the working conditions, 
which include poor remuneration, abuse, insecurity, performance of sex services 
without protection. According to NIS, the women’s expectations, typically includ-
ing a considerable degree of independence and control of their own work, are 
drastically at odds with reality.187
The following trend emerges among the mechanisms of involvement: in many 
cases the victims know, and sometimes are related to, the recruiters (Table 11). 
According to NIS, the involvement of family relations is particularly characteristic 
of trafficking of persons of Roma origin. IOM data (2005), which are incomplete 
since information is not available on all of the cases registered, indicate that 
57.94% of those who actually involved the victims in trafficking were male and 
30.8%, female. According to NIS statistics, 95% of the perpetrators are male, a 
large number of them with low level of education and previous convictions of 
violence.
There are various mechanisms of control over the victims and these are often 
applied in combination. They include: binding through indebtedness by demand-
ing reimbursement for greatly exaggerated costs of organizing the trip; depriving 
the victims of their identification papers; isolation; frequent transfers from one 
place to another; abuse (emotional, physical, and sexual) and threats against the 
victim’s family and friends.189
The Role of Organized Crime in Human Trafficking 
According to analyses by the authorities, as confirmed by numerous studies in 
the past 15-20 years, a large part of human trafficking in Europe, particularly for 
sexual exploitation purposes, is in the hands of organized crime. The chief pre-
condition for this is that in many countries the sex industry is held in monopoly 
by organized criminal groups. It is worth noting that organized crime is most 
187 Ibid.
188 IOM, 2005, p. 421
189 See Chomarova, 2001, pp. 22-26; NIS 2005, p. 120
Table 11. Persons responsible for involving the victim in trafficking
Per cent
Family member/Other relative 8.41%
Partner 3.74%
Friend 23.36%
Procurer 0.93%
Stranger 38.32%
Other –
NA 25.23%
Source: Data published by IOM in 2005188
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active in this very type of trafficking – for prostitution purposes – because of 
the huge profits generated by this particular crime. NIS reports, for instance, 
that a single girl can ensure € 12,000 to 18,000 net profit a month;190 six girls 
are thus enough to secure an income of €1 million a year.
In this sense, the trafficking in women, girls and less commonly, men, for sexual 
exploitation purposes and organized crime are directly connected. This applies to 
a high degree to Bulgaria, too, where prostitution is controlled by criminal rings 
and independent practice, by some opinions, is virtually impossible. 
At the same time, the claim that the entire traffic for sexual exploitation purposes 
from and to Bulgaria is run by organized crime is clearly a misrepresentation. The 
screening of accessible criminal investigations on trafficking in Bulgaria, Central 
and Western Europe has shown that there are numerous cases of small groups 
and individually operating procurers of whom there is no evidence of affiliation 
with organized crime. Most of the information, however, is fragmentary and some 
of it comes from indirect sources such as media publications and investigative 
reports. It is therefore difficult to determine the actual influence of organized 
crime.
What is common with individual, group, and organized crime is that, as a rule, 
human trafficking for prostitution begins long before the stage of sexual exploita-
tion since the transportation and crossing of the border checkpoints, arranging 
legal visas or false papers, financing the trip and the other formalities in the 
process of emigration are all areas of criminal activity. This is a process that may 
involve national criminal organizations and networks of several criminal organiza-
tions cooperating on specific projects, as well as individual local participants.
Types of Organization of Human Trafficking by Criminal Rings
Even though there exist various forms of trafficking for sexual exploitation that are 
unrelated to organized crime, the available data gives reason to assume it plays 
a structurally determining role. This is why organized crime models in human 
trafficking are of special interest in analyzing the problem in Bulgaria.
According to Monzini,191 the criminal groups involved in trafficking in women 
can be divided into three main categories: small and loosely connected criminal 
groups, middle-size criminal groups, and complex transnational criminal orga-
nizations. With the first kind, the recruiters also act as transporters and exploit-
ers. They are often friends or acquaintances of the future victims. Abroad, they 
establish contacts with local criminal networks (preferably of the same nationality) 
operating at the lowest levels of illegal prostitution. For instance, Monzini cites 
Czech groups in Austria, Albanian groups in Italy, and Polish ones in Germany. 
The next category deals largely with recruitment and transportation, ”selling” their 
victims to middlemen, usually in capital cities and border areas. Some of these 
groups also organize the so-called ”mobile prostitution” – moving women from 
190 NIS, 2005, p. 118
191 Моnzini, P. Trafficking in Women and Girls and the Involvement of Organised Crime, with Reference to 
the Situation in Central and Eastern Europe. Paper presented at the first Annual Conference of the 
European society of Criminology, September 6–8, 2001.
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one town or brothel to another. They are relatively well-organized and include 
recruiters, bodyguards, people who choose the routes and arrange transporta-
tion, and decision-makers who negotiate the financial conditions with pimps and 
nightclub owners. The last category – that of transnational organizations – includes 
organized criminal groups able to coordinate each phase of the trafficking pro-
cess. These are criminal networks with a high degree of specialization by area 
of activity (from recruitment to laundering the profits). Their leaders are usually 
engaged in some legal business and do not have any direct and/or visible con-
nection to human trafficking.192
Elisabeth Kelly193 reviews the models of organized crime and trafficking in women 
in Eastern Europe proposed by Louise Shelley, et al.,194 and the UN Office for 
Drug Control and Crime Prevention. According to these models, the criminal 
groups dealing with human trafficking in Eastern Europe and the Balkans have 
the following characteristics:
192 Ibid.
193 Kelly, E., Op. cit., p. 251
194 Shelley, L., ”Trafficking in Women: The Business Model Approach,” Brown Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. X, Issue I, 2003.
195 Kelly, L., Op.cit., p. 251
Table 12. Typology of organized crime and typology of human 
trafficking in the Balkans and Eastern Europe 
Typology of organized crime (general model 
common in Eastern Europe and in China)
Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
Typology of human trafficking
Source: Louise Shelley195
Standard hierarchy 
• Single leader
• Clearly defined hierarchy
• Internal discipline
• Known by a specific name
• Strong social/ethnic identity
• Violence essential to activities
• Influence/control over the defined territory
Natural resource model (characteristic of post-soviet 
organized crime)
• Chiefly dealing with trafficking in women
• The victims are treated as a natural resource
• The victims are sold to the most proximate buyer 
• High degree of violence and violation of the victims’ 
human rights
Violent entrepreneur model (characteristic of the Balkans)
• Almost exclusively dealing with trafficking in women 
• Middlemen to Russian organized crime 
• Increasingly well-integrated as they take over the sex 
services market in the destination countries 
• Connected to top-level law-enforcement officials in 
the home country 
• Profits from trafficking used to finance other illicit 
activities; invest in property and businesses abroad 
• Significant use of violence
120 Prostitution and Human Trafficking
While the UNODC model is more general, the models outlined by Shelley to 
some extent overlap with the groups described by Monzini. There is not sufficient 
data to decide which one is more relevant to trafficking in women from Bulgaria. 
There is a certain reason to believe that different types of criminal groups are in-
volved in human trafficking in Bulgaria, some of which regional ones (e.g. groups 
from Bourgas, Pazardjik and Sliven196). No specific information is available on the 
organization of trafficking for forced labor or for other purposes. 
Organized Crime Roles at Various Stages in Trafficking in Women
Regardless of the type of group to which they belong, the members of criminal 
groups take on the following roles in the trafficking in women:
• Selecting and recruiting potential victims.197 The role of the trafficker may 
be to kidnap a girl or a woman from the street or to get friendly with a 
woman and propose a relationship or job (usually abroad). At the lowest 
levels the traffickers are usually local people who know (sometimes only 
indirectly) a specific woman or girl or her family and friends. Part of the 
process of recruitment is the collection of information about the victims 
and their families. It is used to decide which girl is suitable, as well as to 
subsequently threaten and blackmail the victim. Thus, for instance, if a traf-
ficked woman has a younger sister she will be threatened that if she does 
not obey her trafficker or procurer and tries to escape, her sister will be 
forced to prostitute herself, too. Such cases are familiar to the victim sup-
port organizations. Information matters even when selecting the victim – if 
she comes from a very poor family; or from a dysfunctional family; if her 
mother is a prostitute or the father, an alcoholic; if she lives alone with her 
elderly grandmother because her parents abandoned her (all examples from 
real-life case histories of trafficking). The less resources the woman has to 
defend herself (at the time of recruitment and later), the easier it is to lure 
and recruit her. In some Roma meta-groups, a very common recruitment 
method used by the criminal groups (especially a few years ago) is the 
promise of marriage and many girls get officially engaged to their traffickers 
with the consent and approval of their families.198 The practice also exists 
for a woman to be sold for trafficking by friends, family, or acquaintances. 
Even these cases are usually connected to organized crime. Last but not 
least, there is the practice of abduction, also carried out by organized 
criminal groups. Specific cases of kidnapping are familiar to victim support 
organizations.199
• Subjugating the victim. As a rule, those who first use physical and psy-
chological violence against the victim are members of criminal groups. The 
abuse may include sexual abuse, torture, beatings, humiliation, hunger, iso-
196 NIS 2005; also, 168 Chassa weekly, April 1-7, 2005.
197 In this case ”victim” is only used to refer to a victim of crime.
198 Such practices have been described for Albania; the approval concerns the engagement and does 
not necessarily imply awareness that they will be involved in trafficking; see Davies. Aspects of 
Albanian trafficking methods: reinventing the Kanun as the extreme of co-dependency, А briefing docu-
ment prepared for the French Court of Appeal. Migration Research Centre, University of Sussex, 
2000.
199 An account of such a case appeared in Trud daily, August 8, 2001.
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lation. All too often, violence is resorted to even before leaving the country 
and the victim may be forced to prostitute herself in Bulgaria first, usually 
in some other town.200
• Making the travel arrangements and transporting the victims. Criminal 
groups are involved at this stage, too. An important task is to secure the 
necessary documents, organize transportation and make other travel ar-
rangements. Prior to 2001, mainly forged visas and passports were used 
but since then they have not been necessary for initial trafficking to most 
West-European countries. Sometimes, with her behavior and being unaware 
of the actual purpose and risks involved, the girl herself can make it easier 
to cross the border. In some cases, resisting women are drugged during 
the trip so as not to create problems. Border crossing can also be arranged 
with the help of corrupt officers from the border agencies. A great many 
women actually choose to prostitute themselves outside Bulgaria.
• Upon arrival in the destination country they are met by a middleman or 
procurer and ultimately end up in a nightclub, brothel, private home, or in 
the street, all controlled to a varying degree by criminals. It is not uncom-
mon for the victim to be sold by one criminal group to another, different 
from the one that initially recruited her for trafficking.
• Controlling prostitution. As mentioned above, in many countries, particu-
larly in ones where prostitution is prohibited but even in countries where 
it is legal, the sex industry is largely controlled by criminal groups.
Because trafficking is a process, organized criminal groups and members there-
of may only be involved in some of the above-outlined stages. At other stages, 
the victims or the middlemen may not have interacted with organized criminal 
groups, e.g. in emigration assisted by relatives or emigration with the aid of a le-
gitimate agency or friends and acquaintances but which ends up as trafficking. 
The Evolution
The above-outlined stages in the organization of trafficking in many respects re-
flect the period up to 2001-2002.
In this context, it is necessary to bear in mind the developments in Eastern Eu-
rope and the Balkans that are creating increasing risk of emergence of procurer 
networks forcibly exploiting young women. In the early years of the transition, 
in countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, the Bulgar-
ian and international procurer networks used systematic violence. However, after 
the economic and social stabilization of these countries there were a series of 
law-enforcement operations that dismantled dozens of structures using Bulgar-
ian girls. A similar situation occurred in the Balkan counties with the end of the 
regime of Milosevic and the disappearance of the areas of military operations. 
In Bulgaria, the semi-criminal rings started avoiding recourse to violence as early 
as 1997-1998 (the first attempts to reduce violence date back to 1995). Once 
200 See Trafficking in Women: Questions and Answers, p. 5 and p. 34
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the negotiations for the country’s EU accession were under way and particularly 
as the issue of Bulgarian organized crime was brought up with special emphasis, 
even the freelance procurers began to adjust their criminal activity to the new 
situation. There emerges an ever more definite orientation toward the market 
models of voluntary prostitution.
In the opinion of officers working in the area of trafficking in women for sexual 
exploitation, as confirmed by NIS reports, the following notable tendencies have 
emerged in the past 3-4 years:
• The use of threat and violence, particularly in international trafficking, is 
becoming ever less common. 
• Persons in financial and social difficulty are most at risk. 
• The victims are aware of the nature, but are deceived about the conditions, 
of work.201
NIS also notes an evolution in trafficker-victim relations. According to NIS, threat 
and violence have given way to payment schemes including fines and penalties. 
In some cases the victims manage to earn the procurer’s trust and get to work 
under better conditions while supervising other trafficking victims.202 Rudiments 
of this tendency were observed as early as 2001 and 2002 in the Netherlands 
where, according to Van Dyke, 26% of the traffickers were women and most 
were victims of trafficking themselves.203 There have been reports in the press 
about specific cases when control over Bulgarian prostitutes in the destination 
country is entirely taken over by women who have earned the procurers’ trust 
and not all of whom are trafficking victims.204
The Export of Prostitution Beyond Human Trafficking
The focus of foreign governments, as well as of Bulgarian and international NGOs, 
on the human trafficking problem has left aside an alarming social phenomenon 
of unforeseeable consequences for Bulgaria – the mass export of prostitution from 
the country and the Bulgarian share in the sex service markets of Central and 
Western Europe. The interviews conducted under the present study, surveys car-
ried out in Western Europe, and analyses by police agencies in various European 
countries all point to the fact that voluntary prostitution outside the country is
in fact the typical phenomenon while forcible prostitution is considerably less 
widespread. The data indicate that forcible prostitution outside the country was a 
common practice in the early to mid-1990s, when export was still highly limited 
and affected an insignificant percentage of the population. As Bulgarians entered 
the sex service markets in Central and Western Europe on a mass scale, the prac-
tices started to change. Prostitution came to be perceived as ”a very well-paid job 
in the West” and the procurer’s position, as a necessary logistical role.
201 NIS 2005, pp.118-119
202 Ibid, p. 121
203 Dutch National Rapporteur, 2003 Report
204 168 Chassa weekly, April 1-7, 2005
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It was further established in the course of the research that allegations of traf-
ficking and sexual exploitation have become an effective instrument used in the 
competition between different procurer networks. In many EU countries, self-
identification as a trafficking victim proves to be a good opportunity for legitimi-
zation in the labor market, including for continued unproblematic prostitution. 
Attempts to follow up on the fate of the victims of sexual exploitation have found 
that in a huge proportion of cases the girls continue to work for another procurer 
network, independent procurer, or on their own.
The focus on the trafficking in women for sexual exploitation and the realization 
that it only accounts for a small part of the Bulgarian share in the European 
market for sex services have raised the issue of the magnitude of the prostitution 
export phenomenon.
Tentative Estimate of the Export of Prostitution
According to the main Bulgarian participants in the market for sex services out-
side the country (former and current prostitutes, procurers, and brothel owners), 
non-voluntary prostitution (involving various forms of coercion) hardly exceeds 
5-10%. Similar findings were reported by the Women’s Alliance for Development 
survey conducted in 2006, namely that 92% of the prostitutes outside Bulgaria 
were volunteers.205 While it is unclear what methodology was employed and even 
though representative surveys of prostitution are basically impossible to conduct, 
the data do provide some insight in estimating Bulgarian prostitution abroad.
The proportion of forcible to voluntary prostitution makes it possible to fix the 
coefficient with which to multiply the data on the trafficking in women for sexual 
exploitation and thus roughly estimate the number of prostitutes. Assuming that 
the voluntary prostitution coefficient is in the range of 10 to 20, i.e. correspond-
ing to 90-95% voluntary prostitution, and using the data on trafficking from the 
four countries of Greece, Belgium, Netherlands, and Germany for the period 
2000-2005, when the average annual number of victims was 200-250, then the 
total number of prostitutes in these countries alone, for any one year, should 
amount to 2,000 to 5,000 (depending on whether multiplying by 10 or by 20). If 
the trafficking estimate obtained by the capture-recapture method is taken, with 
data of 1436 trafficking victims in 2003 and 781 in 2004, this would produce 
an estimate of 8-14,000 prostitutes annually. The problem with this approach is 
that the timeframe of one year is insufficient to assess the scope. Interviews with 
former prostitutes and procurers have found that the length of service in the 
sex services sector is usually under 10 years but more than 5 years on average. 
Therefore, the question arises, what percentage of the new prostitutes entering 
the market seek assistance and what percentage of all prostitutes seek assistance 
over the minimum period of five years. Several factors need to be taken into 
account in this respect but they are difficult to measure owing to the shortage of 
quantitative empirical information. The only available data for a more extended 
period of time are from Greece, Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. These con-
cern 2000-2005 but information is not available for each year and country. The 
205 Quoted in ”Market for sex services on the rise, the public acts surprised,” Trud daily, August 6, 
2006
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total number of registered victims is 938 and if we multiply this figure by the 
minimum coefficient of 10, we would obtain at least about 10,000 girls for these 
4 countries alone. It is unclear, however, what percentage of these girls were reg-
istered as victims more than once. The data from European criminal services indi-
cate that 30 to 50% of the victims have previously worked in another country.206
In order to minimize risk, the procurers and prostitutes often change cities and 
states. Interviews with Bulgarian officers have revealed that a definite number of 
the girls have sought assistance in two or more EU countries. In this connection, 
it remains uncertain what proportion of those registered in 2000-2005 in Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and Germany sought assistance in more than one country. By 
estimates of Bulgarian officers working with trafficking victims, hardly more than 
20-30% do so on more than one occasion. Therefore, within a five-year period 
in all 4 countries, the likely number of victims seeking assistance for the first time 
is 600 to 700. In turn, using the minimum coefficient of 10,207 this means a total 
of 6,000-7,000 girls.
In addition to these four countries, it should be borne in mind that there is 
also a considerable Bulgarian presence in Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
particularly in France, Italy and Spain. Unfortunately, only fragmentary data are 
available for countries such as England, Ireland, Portugal, and Scandinavia in 
general. According to the interviews conducted within the present study, in the 
period 2002-2005, France, Italy and Spain in particular, have become preferred 
destinations for prostitution. In view of the demographic characteristics and based 
on what little information is available from police services in these countries, the 
number of girls working there can be estimated at about 7-8,000. Adding less 
popular destinations, but nevertheless known to host Bulgarian prostitutes, such 
as Great Britain, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, the total 
estimate would be about 18-21,000 women.
This quantitative framework finds confirmation in unofficial estimates by the po-
lice of the number of procurers and pimps by town. In the large Bulgarian towns 
(with population of 50-100,000) where prostitution is weak in intensity, such as 
Pazardjik, the number of procurers is in the range of 100, and the number of 
prostitutes, about 300; in towns characterized by higher intensity, such as Sliven, 
there are about 500 procurers and 1,000 prostitutes. Based on these unofficial 
estimates for the 30 largest Bulgarian towns208 (more than 40,000 residents), the 
number of prostitutes would be approximately 21-22,000. If the 40 largest (more 
than 20,000 residents) towns209 are considered, their number can be estimated at 
25,000. Furthermore, at least 70-80% of these girls are believed to work abroad 
on a permanent or temporary basis. When using these police estimates it is 
important to take into consideration two opposing factors. The first one is that 
the police continue to take into account prostitutes and procurers who have left 
206 See Trafficking in Human Beings, Fourth report of the Dutch National Rapporteur, Bureau NRM, 
The Hague 2005
207 In this estimate it is assumed that all of the victims of sexual exploitation sought help, which is 
hardly likely to be the case.
208 These towns manage to attract the girls ready to engage in prostitution from the smaller settle-
ments.
209 According to official national statistics, the thirty biggest towns of the country have between them 
approximately 4.1 million inhabitants or 48% of the country’s population; the respective figures 
for the forty biggest towns are 4.85 million or 56%.
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the sex trade and thus the figures constantly increase with the addition of new 
people. The second factor works in the opposite direction. As a rule, at the local 
level, the police manage to get an idea of the lowest segment of the market – 
street and highway prostitution and the brothels, to some extent. They fail to take 
in the brothels whose owners pay bribes,210 as well as the entire class of the elite 
prostitutes. However, the largest group escaping attention is made up by the girls 
who have directly started prostituting outside the country. 
In addition to estimating the Bulgarian share in the market, trafficking victim data 
also make it possible to examine the evolution of export in time. It can best be 
described as having snow-balled over the years. It was found from the interviews 
with officials from domestic security institutions in the Netherlands and Belgium, 
as well as in Bulgaria, that after the initial establishment around 1993-95 of pro-
curer base centers in Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Austria, the activity 
gradually expanded, moving to the Netherlands and Germany,211 Italy and Spain, 
with the number of prostitutes increasing slowly yet steadily until the end of the 
1990s. With the realization that the revenues from prostitution are times higher 
than in Bulgaria, there occurred a chain reaction, with procurer networks sending 
an increasing number of girls who had started prostituting in Bulgaria. A genuine 
snow-ball effect was observed in 2001-2003 after the lifting of Schengen visas in 
April 2001. These observations, as expressed in the interviews, find a most elo-
quent confirmation in the data from IOM and Germany on Bulgarian trafficking 
(the large number of cases guarantees data reliability).
The data from IOM and Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office, which cover 
longer periods of time, point to concurrent tendencies in human trafficking. The 
initial growth rate was almost 300% in 2001 and 2002 in Germany. After a peak 
in 2003, there was a downward trend. The same development was observed in 
2001 and 2002 in Belgium and the Netherlands. As suggested by respondents 
from the main groups involved in Bulgarian export, the drop occurred because 
the recruiter networks and prostitutes had adapted to the new situation rather 
than a depletion of the sources of women and girls.
At the same time, the Bulgarian participation in the prostitution market in 
the EU has undergone notable changes. Whereas in the late 1990s, the typical 
Bulgarian prostitute in Western and Central Europe had previous experience in 
Bulgaria, in the new situation there is a veritable boom of participants without 
such experience. Moreover, prostitution is now found in all social groups wishing 
to emigrate and looking for steady or temporary jobs in the European Union – 
from maids and nurses to students at prestigious universities. What is more, short-
term entry into the sex trade is so widespread that it is difficult to make even a 
rough estimate of this semi-professional periphery.
210 See ”I pay 15 grand a month .....”
211 As mentioned above, the first procurer structures formed around the networks of car thieves in 
Central Europe. After the German police cracked down on their organization in Germany, they 
moved on to Italy and Spain. The procurer networks followed.
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Mass Prostitution outside the Country
The estimate of the number of prostitutes outside the country at 18-21,000 at 
least, raises a number of questions in view of the demographic characteristics of 
a country such as Bulgaria. Set against the number of Bulgarian citizens working 
and living abroad, these figures may seem rather paradoxical. Considering that an 
estimated 500,000 Bulgarians have been living abroad since 1990 (excluding those 
who moved to Turkey in 1989) and based on survey findings that 60-65% of 
that population are male, there are about 175-200,000 women living outside the 
country. This would mean that 9-12% of the female population abroad works in 
the sex industry. And if it is recalculated in terms of the female population aged 
15-35, the percentage would be even more shocking. Naturally, the proportion 
is probably considerably smaller since about 30% of the prostitutes in Western 
and Central Europe live permanently in Bulgaria and another 40% come back 
regularly and are registered as permanent residents in their respective home-
towns in Bulgaria. At the same time, if we consider the number of prostitutes 
in proportion to the general population, Bulgaria is by no means a country with 
exceptionally high share of prostitutes. Based on the estimate of 25-30,000 
prostitutes (including those practicing inside the country), 0.32-0.39% of the 
country’s population would appear to be engaged in prostitution.212 In com-
parative terms, in countries like Germany and the Philippines with about 400,000 
prostitutes,213 the proportion is 0.49% and 0.47%, respectively; in South Korea, 
for example, the 1.2 million engaged in prostitution represent as much as 2.45% 
of the population.214 It should be borne in mind when comparing the data that 
in Western Europe the official estimates based on special government surveys are 
considerably lower. Thus, for instance, a survey by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of 2000 reported 20-25,000 engaged in prostitution (with a population 
of 16.4 million, this means barely 0.12-0.15%); Austria officially estimated the 
proportion of prostitutes at 0.21% in 2003; Belgium, at 0.12-0.29%, etc. These 
official estimates, however, have been criticized as seriously understated by law-
enforcement and academic institutions alike. The critics argue that the official 
estimates fail to take in the unregistered prostitutes, who represent a huge per-
centage. They do not seek legitimization since it would create family and profes-
sional problems once they decide to withdraw from the sex trade.
Nevertheless, the surveys in these West-European countries suggest that, on the 
one hand, these are data that do not concern illegal prostitution, which is esti-
mated to be 3-4 times larger, and on the other hand, that 70 to 90% of those 
engaged in prostitution are foreigners.
To analyze the mass scale of prostitution in demographic terms it is necessary to 
use finer optics capable of magnifying the details. In this respect, for the scale 
of Bulgaria, a town such as Sliven is a good example of the large provincial 
town model. It is particularly suitable because of the publicly known facts con-
cerning access to almost legal work in the sex windows in Brussels. In most other 
212 According to the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute (NSI), the population numbered 7,679,290 
in 2006. See http://www.nsi.bg/Population/Population06.htm
213 See ”http://www.hydra-ev.org 
214 ”Sex Work in South Korea”, Asia Monitor Resource Center. Accessed on February 10, 2006 
(http://www.amrc.org.hk/Arch/3309.htm)
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large towns, the export of prostitutes and work in the sex industry are part of 
a covered-up, non-transparent process and only criminal incidents may lead to 
occasional public disclosures. There are about 200-210 windows registered in 
Brussels, operating in two shifts. It is estimated that 90% of the girls come from 
Bulgaria and that 90% of the Bulgarians are from Sliven. In the opinion of Bul-
garian and Belgian officers, this Bulgarian town has managed to take over the 
window prostitution in Brussels from the Albanian pimps owing to its specific and 
effective procurer organization. Based on the data on Sliven there emerges an 
interesting demographic framework of the prostitution phenomenon. The town 
has a population of 100,000, of whom roughly half are women. The number of 
girls and women aged 15 to 30 would thus be about 15-17,000. As noted above, 
the number of procurers is in the range of 400-500 and of prostitutes, 800 to 
1,000. Therefore, one in 15-17 women is likely to be engaged in prostitution. If 
only those with ”marketable looks” are considered, as the interviewed procurers 
put it, the proportion might reach 5-6 to 1. In addition, it should be noted that 
the prostitutes are no longer recruited from the socially disadvantaged sections 
alone. For example, there are hardly more than 30-40 prostitutes from the very 
large Roma ethnic minority in town (in excess of 20% of the population). 
Unlike Sliven, in the other large towns it is usually the procurers with criminal 
records and the prostitutes from the low social strata that tend to be more trans-
parent. Those registered with the police are typically girls of Roma origin, from 
socially disadvantaged families, from problem families, girls with deviant behavior 
before reaching legal age. The findings are that almost nothing is usually known 
about the procurers or prostitutes in their hometowns after they moved to anoth-
er place. Most of the time, the local police officers know the tale told to family 
and friends. As a rule, when these persons return, they buy property in locations 
other than the ones where they used to live (except for those of Roma origin and 
the lowest social groups). In this context, if in a town such as Dobrich, Pazardjik, 
Vidin, or other with a population of 40-50,000, the police are aware of 300-400 
women engaged in prostitution, this number does not include the persons from 
the middle social groups known to work elsewhere in Bulgaria or abroad.
If the proposed estimates are accurate, the high rate of prostitution puts forth 
a number of social and criminological questions. In the long history of pros-
titution there have been towns half of whose female population was engaged 
in prostitution. There are equally countries such as South Korea, Thailand, the 
Philippines, and some countries in Central America that nowadays have a high 
proportion of women engaged in prostitution compared to the general popula-
tion. The question is how did Bulgaria, which in its modern history up to 1989 
was a country with predominantly conservative mores and where prostitution 
used to be highly limited, end up with such mass-scale prostitution over a period 
of 16-17 years.
The analysis of the statistics on human trafficking suggests that the transition from 
a deviant and marginal occupation to the perception of prostitution as a ”normal” 
job by average Bulgarians took place around 2000-2001. Up to 2001, prostitution 
abroad more or less passed through criminal channels, often directly or indi-
rectly controlled by organized crime. Owing to the legal restrictions, leaving the 
country called for special efforts (securing legal or illegal documents), arranging 
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transportation, housing, residence permits, (with regular or false documents), etc., 
which was carried out through the well-developed market for criminal services. 
After the lifting of the Schengen visa requirements, however, the opportunity for 
free access to the grey sector of the EU labor market without recourse to 
criminal middlemen eventually led to the discovery of the highly profitable 
European market for sex services. According to the survey by the Women’s 
Alliance for Development, 12-13% of those engaged in prostitution have higher 
education and 34%, secondary education.215 This is a very different profile from 
the one of trafficking victims. The opportunity to earn €15-20,000 - versus a typi-
cal €1,000-2,000 for unskilled labor – is an incentive for 90-95% of the Bulgarian 
emigrants who left the country in large numbers in 2000-2003 and work in the 
lowest segment of the West European labor market. It is difficult to say exactly 
what transforms girl working as a babysitter, for instance, into a prostitute; or a 
young man working as a construction worker into a procurer. A specialized study 
would probably provide better answers to that question. What appears certain is 
that in 2002, the models of Bulgarian prostitution abroad changed - instead 
of girls who started prostituting in Bulgaria and were exported by club owners 
or procurers, the predominant model became the small and family business one 
and that of self-employment, with women who engaged in prostitution for the 
first time in the territory of the European Union.
Attributing the cause to the difficult Bulgaria transition and deep economic crisis 
is the most straightforward and common explanation but such a far-reaching 
social deformation calls for much more specific answers. Regrettably, most of 
the explanations that emerged in the course of the research drew on a limited 
number of interviews and a few journalistic investigations and analyses. Many of 
the factors seem to have acted conjointly in the period between the economic 
crisis of 1996-1997 and the lifting of the Schengen visa requirements. Below is 
an attempt to outline some of the more notable ones. 
In the interviews conducted within the present study, the most commonly cited 
reason for entry into the profession (for both prostitutes and procurers) was 
unemployment and the lack of income to ensure even a minimal standard of 
living. This finds confirmation in the data on unemployment since 1990. Large 
sections of the population came under particularly hard pressure in the period 
1998-2001. Up to 1997, the labor market reforms were slow-paced and radical 
job cuts were put off. It was only with the aggravation of the crisis under exter-
nal influence, particularly on the part of IMF, that drastic layoffs and enterprise 
liquidations began. In comparison, whereas in the summer of 1996, the rate of 
unemployment was about 10%, by the spring of 2001 the unemployed had in-
creased to 19.3%.216 According to surveys by NGOs, the rate was even higher 
and exceeded 23.6%.217 Moreover, the rise was not evenly distributed – in some 
regions of the country unemployment reached 30-40%. As an outcome of the 
radical and chaotic enterprise liquidation after 1997, a huge number of small 
settlements with only one or two enterprises were left without any employment 
opportunities while the big towns lost between half and two-thirds of the jobs.
215 ”Market for sex services on the rise.....”
216 The data are from the Employment Agency, see ”http://www.az.government.bg
217 See Early Warning Report, January-February, 2001, UNDP.
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A similar situation is found with respect to income levels. Bulgaria is probably 
the only country in Eastern Europe (except countries in armed conflict areas such 
as Serbia, Georgia, and Armenia) where household incomes shrank so drastically. 
By various estimates, in 1997 the average income was about 30% of the 1989 
level. Even though in the late 1990s there were countries in Europe with lower 
average income (such as Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine), Bulgaria – in addition 
to ranking among the poorest European countries – was the one with the most 
dramatic drop in income.218
The severe and long-lasting economic crisis had a grave impact on the funda-
mental institutions responsible for the socialization of children – the family and 
education.
In the period 1990-2003, the Bulgarian family went through deeply destructive 
processes. Whereas in the last pre-crisis year of 1989 the annual number of 
marriages was 63,000, by the late 1990s they had dropped to about 35,000 and 
in 2001-2002, to under 30,000 a year. In 1989, out-of-marriage births made up 
11%. By 1995 they had reached 25.8%, in 2000, 38.4%, and in 2003, amounted 
to 46.1%.
A similar adverse impact of the economic crisis of 1996-1997 and the stagnation 
that followed in 1999-2001 was to be observed in secondary and higher educa-
tion. Compared to the countries of Eastern Europe, in 1996-2000, Bulgaria had 
the highest school dropout rate among the 15-19 age group – about 38-39% on 
average, versus 16% in Poland and 19% in Hungary and the Czech Republic.219
Surveys in that period found the average absentee rate in secondary schools to 
amount to about 20%.220 Data from international comparative studies on the 
state of secondary education conducted by UNESCO Institute for Statistics and 
the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) suggest that 
Bulgaria was unique in terms of the drop in its education level.221 According 
to the TIMSS survey, from ranking fifth in 1995 in science, Bulgaria fell to the 
17th place in 1999 and ranked 24th in 2003. None of the 40 countries surveyed 
displayed a drop of such magnitude.222 These data suggest that while it still had 
some inertial force in the first 3-4 years of the 1990s, the secondary education 
system steeply deteriorated after 1996-1997. Many of the respondents’ accounts 
of their first experience with prostitution were associated with their high-school 
years precisely in that period.
Another aspect of the crisis in the Bulgarian family and society conducive to the 
mass spread of prostitution is the lifting of the sexual inhibitions fostered by the 
traditional cultural and value system. While it has long been known that Bulgar-
ia’s population is among the least religious in Europe, up to the end of the 20th
218 The contrast is only comparable to some countries engaged in military operations, in the Cau-
casus and former Yugoslavia.
219 ”Education at a glance OECD Indicators”, OECD, 2002; NSI.
220 See Kolyo Kolev, Andrey Raichev, Andrey Bundjelov, School and Social Inequality, Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, Social Democratic Institute, 2000
221 A Policy Note, Bulgaria – Education and Skills for the Knowledge Economy, World Bank 2006, see also 
Overview of Public Expenditures; Education - State, Problems, and Opportunities, Ministry of Finance, 
2004.
222 See http://nces.ed.gov/timss/
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century sexual mores still remained rather conservative. With the onset of the 
1990s, the number of sexual partners rose sharply. One of the most commonly 
used indicators of these processes in the remaining East-European countries is the 
rate of syphilis infection. In the Czech Republic, for example, where the number 
of those engaged in prostitution is estimated at 10,000 to 25,000, a record-high 
increase was registered, from 1.6 per 100,000 population in 1990, to 13.7 per 
100,000 in 2001. In comparison, there was talk of a syphilis epidemic223 in Bul-
garia, with the rate of infection reaching 32.6 per 100,000 in 1998 from 4.3 per 
100,000 in 1990. Even though Romania had a similar syphilis rate in 1998 – 34.7 
cases per 100,000 population – the dynamics were less pronounced as the in-
crease started from 19.8 cases per 100,000 in 1989.
With the end of Schengen visa restrictions in April 2001, Bulgarians wishing to 
work in the European Union gained a great tangible advantage over the rest of 
the Balkan states (in Romania, the visas were lifted nearly a full year later) and 
the former Soviet Union. The record-high unemployment and extremely low 
income levels combined with access to the Schengen area in fact created the 
model of mass emigration. Whereas in the preceding period, between 1991 
and 2001, about 19,400 people left the country each year, in 2000-2003, the 
processes acquired the dimensions of a natural disaster with the average annual 
number of non-returning migrants to the EU reaching close to 100,000.
Even though the process of mass transition from job-seeking outside the coun-
try to prostitution and procuring remains unexplored in many respects, certain 
insights were gained from the interviews with respondents with first-hand expe-
rience. Poor education and the related lack of qualification came up against 
labor market constraints in the EU. Moreover, the Bulgarian short- and long-term 
emigrants were late to enter this market compared to those from Poland, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Baltic republics. These difficulties led a huge 
number of Bulgarian job-seekers to take up activities requiring little qualification 
and paying just as little. 
It was established in the interviews that in the very period between 2000 and 
2003, the sex trade offered times higher remuneration compared to unskilled 
jobs and proved an irresistible temptation in economic terms. The most com-
monly shared opinions accounting for this phenomenon cited as the main reason 
the exceptionally high level and the security of the income. These opinions 
were practically identical across the entire range, from the lowest segment of the 
market – Roma girls working in the streets of Italy and Southern France, to the 
high-end segment of prostitution in the Netherlands and Germany. To the Roma 
girls, ”this is the best job for a Gypsy”, ”you make more money in a single day 
than in a whole month in Bulgaria”, ”you have more money than the neighbor-
hood moneylender”. The same was told by Bulgarian students working in two 
different Dutch cities as escorts: ”The only really high-paying job accessible here 
is that of a prostitute”. The other motive that often came up concerned the con-
trast between real consumption afforded by wages of low-skilled workers and the 
purchasing power that can be secured by prostitution. In the words of a girl who 
223 Dencheva R; Spirov G; Gilina K; Niagolova D; Pehlivanov G; Tsankov N, ”Epidemiology of 
syphilis in Bulgaria, 1990–1998,” International Journal of STD & AIDS, Volume 11, Number 12, 1 
December 2000, pp. 819-822
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started prostituting after working 6 months as a cleaner in London: ”When you 
don’t need to spend weeks of dumb work to afford a decent piece of clothing, 
the humiliation is not that hard to live with.”224
Many times this actually proves the only option for girls and women leaving the 
country without having secured employment in the EU where they are unable 
to get even unskilled regular jobs. Quite a few respondents also referred to the 
pressure of the environment when talking about the transition to prostitution. 
Typical stories include girls driven to prostitute themselves for fear of losing their 
jobs at restaurants, bars, shops, or even as assistant caregivers for children and 
elderly people. The above-mentioned lack of moral inhibitions owing to the crisis 
in the family and the education system, as well as the lack of religious feelings, 
no doubt facilitate the economically rational choice.
When trying to account for the growing Bulgarian share in the sex industry, one 
of the most significant factors is that the Bulgarian infrastructure for the sup-
ply of sex services was already in place. In 2000-2001, the procurer networks 
that were established in the mid-1990s had the capacity to take on the sharply 
increased supply. At times, the infrastructure of Turkish, Albanian, and Serb pro-
curer networks in countries such as Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands is 
also used. These channels are accessible not only to Bulgarian citizens of Turkish 
ethnic origin, but also to Turkish-speaking Roma.
In addition to the domestic factors, it is also necessary to take into consideration 
the changing realities in the European Union. One of the most notable develop-
ments is the sharp rise in demand for sex services in Western Europe. In the 
largest market in Europe – Germany – in the beginning of the 1990s the number 
of those engaged in prostitution was estimated at 50,000 to 200,000,225 but cur-
rent estimates are of 400,000 prostitutes serving 1.5 million customers on a daily 
basis.226 In Great Britain, the second largest market for sex services in Europe, 
it has been found that the turnover of the sex industry doubled between 1990 
and 2000.227 It is revealing that the increase was not related to any noticeable 
reduction in the prices of sex services which would have indicated increased sup-
ply. The reasons for this phenomenon should be sought in a number of social, 
political, technological, geographical, and even pharmaceutical, factors influencing 
both the demand and the supply of sex services.
Possibly the most important change was related to the wave of legislative 
amendments legalizing prostitution. In the Netherlands, brothels became com-
pletely legal as of October 2000 and in Germany, the amendments were passed 
in 2002. 
224 This view was repeated several dozen times by girls with different experience in the sex trade.
225 B. Leopold, E. Steffan, N. Paul: Dokumentation zur rechtlichen und sozialen Situation von Pros-
titutierten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Schriftenreihe des Bundesministeriums für Frauen 
und Jugend, Band 15, 1993
226 German Prostitution Law Has Failed, No Reduction in Crime Through Improved Legal Status by Wolfgang 
Polzer ”http://www.spcm.org/Journal/spip.php?article5939
227 A survey by Imperial College London covering 11 000 respondents established that, whereas in 
1990 one out of 20 had paid for sex in the course of the year, by 2000 one in ten respondents 
had done so. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/4482970.stm
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With the gradual lifting of restrictions on workforce movement within the Euro-
pean Union, more and more people have been migrating in search for better-
paid work. The accession of the new member countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe marked the culmination of this process. 
As throughout human history, those seeking sex services are largely young men, 
who are not always able to take their families (if any) with them or to have a 
steady relationship with a woman in the host country. Higher demand can also 
be observed among another specific group – men over middle age. The members 
of this group are usually better off and the demonstration of sexual activity, main-
ly with young women, is often considered admirable among them. Until recently 
men over middle age had limited capacity to consummate the desired ”goods”, 
not so much because of financial, but purely biological, constraints. The appear-
ance in the market of the so-called erectile dysfunction medications (Viagra228 was 
followed by Levitra, Cialis, and other such pharmaceutical products) drastically 
increased their sexual activity and respectively, the demand for sex services.
Main Types of Prostitution Schemes
Engaging in prostitution independently – the ”self-employed” work alone or in 
groups (usually of two or three) for their own profit and at their own risk. Up to 
2002-2003, this model was considered risky, particularly in the low-end market 
segment (streets, parking lots, etc.) of sex services in Western Europe. It is more 
widespread among elite prostitutes but in the past 2-3 years has been growing 
more common, especially in export prostitution and among those who manage 
to obtain official work permits in the countries where prostitution is legal. This 
group may use the services of the procurer infrastructure – premises, transport, 
and even protection – and pay for these at negotiated rates.
Engaging in prostitution within a partnership. Procurers often agree with one or 
more girls to provide protection against customers and the local competition, to 
take care of the logistics of regular prostitution, to help overcome administrative 
barriers in the foreign country (work permits, medical security and other insur-
ances), etc. Under this scheme, the prostitute pays a negotiated price for the ser-
vice (either a percentage per transaction or a percentage of the daily, weekly, or 
monthly revenue). The business partners are often in an intimate relationship and 
it is not uncommon for them to be legally married.229 The one prostitute/one pro-
curer model seems more widespread among girls coming from small or medium-
sized towns in Bulgaria. These family businesses often operate in ”friendly net-
works”, thus ensuring easy mobilization against the competition (incl. assembling 
punitive brigades, mobilizing large groups of 20-30 people demonstrating readi-
ness to resort to violence), sharing of information and cooperation in overcoming 
bureaucratic obstacles in Bulgaria and the EU. They further ensure mobility upon 
emergence of better market opportunities or upon exiting high-risk markets and 
make joint investments (usually acquiring property in Bulgaria). Regarding the 
financial terms, the earnings are usually split between the procurer and the girl 
228 The medication became accessible in Western Europe and USA in 1998.
229 Legal marriage offers a number of advantages in terms of legitimization before European court 
and law-enforcement authorities. The court is evidently less likely to believe that the husband is 
acting as a pimp for his wife and forces her to prostitute herself.
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or girls fifty-fifty; so are the expenses. With procurers regarded as successful in 
the business, i.e. securing larger revenues, the proportion may reach as much as 
70% for the procurer, with the expenses covered by the girl. The model where 
the parties are of unequal standing is more likely to involve abusive practices 
on the part of the procurer. On the one hand, he enjoys far greater power and 
control, as well as a competitive advantage - assured higher income compared 
to other procurers. Yet, under this scheme, the procurer also runs the risk of the 
girl putting an end to the disadvantageous relationship and even of her seeking 
assistance from law-enforcement authorities with all the ensuing consequences.
Engaging in prostitution as hired labor. The relations under this scheme, as in 
normal business, are those between an employer and an employee. The former 
may be an individual (procurer, bar owner, etc) or a legal entity (employment 
agency, transport company, entertainment establishment, massage parlor, etc). The 
formal or informal structure hires the prostitute and they negotiate the conditions 
of work outside the country, often in very vague terms. The employer ensures a 
place at an establishment in Western or Central Europe, protection, accommoda-
tion, transport, documents, etc. Payment follows the partnership model and may 
range from 10 to 90% for the girl, with the latter covering the expenses, as well. 
However, the most typical arrangement is 30-40% for the girl and 30-40% for 
the Bulgarian entrepreneur, with another 30% paid to the foreign partner.
The size of the enterprises may vary: from one girl, in which case this model 
hardly differs from the partnership scheme; through medium-sized structures 
with a staff of 3-4 workers; to the big procurer networks employing 10-15 girls. 
Sometimes there are as many as 40-50 girls and these rings often operate with 
the involvement of entrepreneurs.
3.4. ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE EXPORT OF PROSTITUTION
The market principles of operation in the export of prostitutes, the small family 
businesses, friendly networks and all of the other above-outlined schemes related 
to small-scale entrepreneurship do not mean organized crime is not involved in 
the export of these services. On the contrary – the mass Bulgarian presence in 
the high-profit markets for sex services in the EU is a priority area of activity for 
Bulgarian organized crime as it provides unparalleled revenues at minimal risk. 
Judging by interviews with leading members of the Bulgarian criminal world,230
prostitution, together with the real estate business are probably the most at-
tractive markets at the present time, surpassing drug dealing, trafficking in 
goods, money forgery, etc. The main problem facing the structures of organized 
crime is how to make sure they get regular and as high as possible income from 
those engaged in prostitution and their procurers. The task became all the more 
complicated once access to the European Union became practically free in 2001. 
Moreover, since 2003-2004, the internal security institutions of the EU have paid 
particular attention to human trafficking from Bulgaria and have generally man-
aged to get increasing cooperation from the respective Bulgarian institutions.
230 This opinion was shared by 6 respondents who are among the best known car thieves in this 
country and one of the living bosses of a semi-criminal insurance company.
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The interviewed respondents outlined different schemes describing the forms of 
direct or indirect influence by organized crime. As noted in the analysis of 
human trafficking, the involvement of organized crime is possible at all stages – 
from the recruitment of the girls, through the crossing of the borders, to orga-
nizing the sex service supply in the foreign country. The situation is similar as 
regards prostitution outside the country under all three organizational schemes 
(self-employment, partnership, and hiring), as well as at all three stages of orga-
nizing operations in the foreign markets (recruiting the girls, organizing access to 
the foreign market, and the actual supply of sex services). It is often extremely 
difficult to define where the line is between the selling of a service to voluntary 
prostitutes, small and family businesses, and the monopolistic control over certain 
areas of activity, the racket, etc, by organized crime. When considering the activity 
of Bulgarian organized crime in prostitution markets in and outside Bulgaria one 
finds many of the characteristics of the above-outlined three typologies of human 
trafficking. Depending on the specific town/region, there may be examples of 
the hierarchical model of varying complexity and scope; of the natural resource 
model, where the self-employed, the small and family businesses are treated as a 
resource or as goods; or of the entrepreneurial model, when the criminal bosses 
act as entrepreneurs at some or all stages. Unlike trafficking for sexual exploita-
tion, however, there is hardly any coercion or violence. The prostitutes work to 
earn an income or pay members of organized crime in order to do so, all while 
considering it a matter of personal choice and a normal occupation.
There is but fragmentary information about the mechanisms of operation of Bul-
garian organized crime outside the country. Even if it does not provide exhaus-
tive answers about the inner workings of the mechanisms, it points to several 
important patterns.
• European market distribution. As in the domestic markets, the procurer 
networks distribute the posts, i.e. the workplaces in the EU market (whether 
streets, hotels, bars, windows, etc). Obtaining and controlling new posts is 
indicative of the power and influence of a given procurer. The comparative 
analysis of the data on the origin of those engaged in prostitution (regis-
tered and extradited; interviewees) found a number of Bulgarian towns/
regions that appeared to cover corresponding towns/regions in Europe (as 
well as several US cities), such as:
– Pazardjik, Stara Zagora, and Haskovo export girls to Austria, France, 
Germany;
– Plovdiv exports girls to Italy, France, and Belgium;
– Sliven, Varna, and Bourgas export to Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, 
France;
– Kyustendil, Pleven, Blagoevgrad, and Russe export to Italy Spain, and 
Greece.
In addition to regional specialization, there appeared to be town-to-town 
affiliations over certain periods. For example, Sliven with Brussels, Dobrich 
with Mannheim, Gabrovo with Valencia, Varna with Lyon, etc.
Presumably, the underlying reason for such territorial distribution is that 
the locally established criminal structures in Bulgaria transferred their or-
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ganization to the respective region in Western Europe. Moreover, procurer 
networks are probably only one part of the criminal city/regional networks. 
They trust the same girls as in the regions where they operated in Bulgaria 
and even help competitors with whom they negotiate prices and territory 
limits. One theory is that the regional partitioning of Europe is the out-
come of the lessons learned in the early 1990s on how to avoid conflicts. 
As a rule, incidents (killings, fights, escaping girls, etc) lead to activation of 
law-enforcement and criminal justice institutions and draw the focus on 
Bulgarian procurer networks.
• Communicating vessels. In many respects, the partitioning of West-Euro-
pean territories is conditioned by the need to maintain constant communi-
cation with the towns/regions where the procurers come from. In fact, the 
European town/region in which a given procurer network is operating is 
like a reservoir connected to another one in the respective Bulgarian town/
region. As the European reservoir fills up, the Bulgarian one dispenses. At 
the border checkpoints one sees hundreds of girls leaving (voluntarily) to 
work as prostitutes abroad. The reason for this flow is that, up to January 
2007, the legal term of residence in the European Union was 3 months, 
after which they had to go back home and get replaced by a colleague 
waiting her turn in Bulgaria. Minivans shuttle back and forth on a regular 
basis, serving the scheme of three-month stays in the European Union. 
The level of organization is evident from the good coordination of the 
prostitute replacement schedules and the timetables of the minivans – with 
fixed departure and arrival times and locations (for example, leaving from 
a filling station in a town with a population of 50,000 in Northern Bulgaria 
and passing through 3-4 European cities in France and Spain). It should be 
noted that the Bulgarian reservoir is usually a large town or several small 
settlements which in turn are filled from other locations. The reason is the 
small size of Bulgarian towns (except for the four largest ones - Sofia, Plo-
vdiv, Varna, and Bourgas), making any affiliation with procurer networks too 
visible to family and friends. That is why the reservoirs in Bulgaria work on 
an exchange basis, drawing prostitutes from other locations. During their 
required stay out of the European Union, the girls usually do not work in 
the Bulgarian domestic market, largely because it is very small (excepting 
Sofia, Varna, and the resort towns during the tourist season). This applies in 
particular to the new wave of prostitutes who entered the profession after 
the end of the 1990s. A considerable proportion of these girls have not had 
any previous experience in Bulgaria and do not try to work here. 
• Specialization. One of the chief arguments in support of the conclusion 
that the export of prostitution is organized crime, is the highly specialized 
and decomposed nature of the process. There exist certain functions, some 
of them modifications of the functions identified in human trafficking (in 
fact, the same individuals may operate in both systems). The main roles 
are: 
1. ‘New flesh hunter’ – a person recruiting girls in Bulgaria. It is the same 
type of role as in trafficking but with the export, the job offer makes 
it quite clear that the work involves prostitution (even if it is not only 
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prostitution). The recruitment of girls has been the object of many crimi-
nological studies in Western Europe and USA, yet none at all have been 
conducted in Bulgaria to date. This model includes various schemes. The 
first one is related to having the girl selected (referred to as ”fresh meat”) 
go through the Bulgarian domestic market first, i.e. she is not exported 
immediately but undergoes training in Bulgaria for a few months at least. 
Given the new opportunities, however, prostitution in Bulgaria pays far 
less and the stay in the country is considered loss-making. In the past 
few years, direct export has been an increasingly common practice. The 
second one involves recruiting the girls (”the hunt”) in the respective Eu-
ropean country where they are working or studying. There, chances are far 
greater for a woman to find herself in a critical situation (lack of money, 
losing a job, housing problems, indebtedness, administrative problems with 
the authorities, petty crime charges, etc.) and this considerably facilitates 
recruitment. Under both schemes, the ”hunter” simply needs to appraise 
correctly the financial and psychological problems. He may not have to 
do anything about the recruitment but only to transmit the information. 
In this process, the procurer is of key importance – he is also the chief 
exporter. With more primitive networks, the hunter and the procurer are 
one and the same person. It is common practice in the low-end segment 
(street and highway prostitution) for the prostitutes to be sold by one pro-
curer to another, with their price in Western Europe being twice as high as 
in Bulgaria. With family businesses and small businesses the selection and 
hiring of the girl (partnership) are carried out by the same person, who 
also takes on all of the roles and pays for the services within the system.
2. ‘Mules’ – guides who take them to the respective country, usually by 
minivans, in which case they are often the drivers, but sometimes by 
regular coach lines when the guides accompany the girls. If the drivers 
work for some large structure they may provide the service for a fee to 
family and small businesses. 
3. Procurer – the person who picks up the girls upon arrival and assigns 
them to the prostitution locations agreed in advance. This role may also 
involve provision of services to small businesses and offering posts to 
new market entrants. 
4. Supervisors (‘Madam’, ‘first girl’) – these are usually promoted prosti-
tutes watching how much money each girl working for a given procurer 
network is making, whether she reports all her earnings, if she is making 
unauthorized calls, if she has any risky customers (through whom she 
might get away from the business) and so on; they further keep an eye 
on the profits of the small businesses so as to fix the right rate of pay-
ment (”criminal rent”). 
5. Money carrier. It is characteristic of the Bulgarian sex trade abroad that 
the money earned is returned to Bulgaria. There are several ways of 
sending the money to the bosses. In the 1990s, the most customary one 
was to use the drivers of the cars, minivans and buses (including drivers 
and attendants on regular coach lines between foreign countries and 
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Bulgaria) or trusted girls who come back after a fixed time. The most 
common method is still the use of the international money transfer sys-
tem Western Union where the sender remains anonymous. In turn, the 
bosses to whom the money is sent usually use related financial houses 
and currency exchange offices that do not record the identity of the 
recipient and thus all of the persons involved remain unidentified. The 
more sophisticated networks may even have a financial team organizing 
and changing the repatriation and laundering schemes through various 
financial institutions.
7. Investor(s)/legitimizer(s). These are often trusted businessmen and 
lawyers responsible for investing and legalizing the repatriated funds. 
Depending on the size of the structure, they may serve one or more 
organizations. There are instances of perfectly legitimate accounting and 
legal firms that are actively involved in this process. ”Small businesses” 
may be offered participation in an advantageous investment against a 
percentage or as a favor (for the rent). 
8. The Boss. At the very top of the organization, the boss is based in Bul-
garia and controls the other participants in the scheme. In addition to 
the prostitutes exported by him, he may also get protection racket for 
prostitutes and procurers in the respective region in Bulgaria. The boss is 
often engaged in other businesses, legal as well as illegal (e.g. trafficking 
in drugs and in stolen cars).
The described mechanisms in many respects predetermine the structure and man-
ner of functioning of the foreign market for sex services. The evolution under-
gone by Bulgarian organized crime towards small loosely connected networks 
does not mean that the former hierarchical structures are gone. They may be 
smaller but they still exist and depend on more or less well-known emblematic 
figures (former members of semi-criminal rings, local and national oligarchs).
With this type of hierarchies, the man on the top has a perfectly legal business 
and is not concerned with day-to-day operations. The formal owner or manager 
of the European business with prostitutes is often one of the trusted associates. 
He is authorized to manage a certain number of girls himself, to keep records 
of the payments by smaller entrepreneurs gravitating toward the structure, and 
to collect the protection racket from the small independent businesses. Prostitu-
tion – domestic and international - is typically just one of the areas of activity 
covered. This type of hierarchies work as holdings of legal and grey sector com-
panies, which essentially deliver services – from transport to housing. Judging from 
the interviews conducted within the present study, as well as press publications, 
many shadowy bosses already appear to have acquired hotels, entertainment 
establishments or shares in such ventures in the West-European countries where 
they operate. In the different towns and regions, there appear to be three dif-
ferent models of operation. In the biggest cities, such as Sofia, Varna, Plovdiv, 
and Bourgas, and in some smaller towns in Southwest Bulgaria, these structures 
control the market – street prostitution, brothels, modeling agencies, and through 
them, the procurers exporting girls. The small and family businesses usually find 
ways to secure protection for themselves, often unaware of who exactly is provid-
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ing it. In the smaller towns, they control the major procurers and through them, 
part of the procurer networks. The third model is related to direct ownership by 
the big local bosses. Some may have as many as 40-50 girls working for them,231
who are sent to different European cities. 
The most typical and widespread model, however, is that of the networks, with 
dozens of procurers coming together for protection, usually on the basis of the 
town/region they come from. This model proved highly effective in the mid-
1990s against the already dominating structures of organized crime in Western 
and Central Europe grouped by nationality – Albanian, Serb, and Turkish ones, 
as well as the aggressive Russian, Ukrainian, and Caucasian newcomers. These 
structures tend to escape the attention of West-European law-enforcement be-
cause they appear as a chaotic group of Bulgarians lacking the characteristics of 
organized crime. With this model, all the members are seemingly equal, regard-
less of how many girls a procurer has.
A number of facts, however, give reason to assume that these are not typical networks 
of equal partners. Some of them are known to be backed by some obscure structure 
whose top levels are found in Bulgaria (or a third country where the Bulgarian bosses 
feel safe enough). As already mentioned, the degree of specialization is quite high 
and a system of internal subordination is in place (some roles rank higher and/or are 
more independent than others). The top ranks are usually at the town/regional level. 
Thus, for instance, in Sofia, there are 10; in Varna - 4; in Bourgas - 3; in Sliven - 3, 
etc. There exist big bosses and less independent ones. Their chief role is to make 
sure their networks are well-protected. The security of Bulgarian territory (the Bulgar-
ian ”reservoir”) is ensured precisely by the paid protection of the big bosses. This 
means that each pimp pays his dues to the local town bosses. If an independently 
working prostitute, family- or small business do not participate in the region-based 
or friend network in the respective European city, with the never-ending conflicts 
with competing prostitutes and procurers they run the risk not only of being pushed 
out of the market but of exposure to violence against which they have no recourse. 
Their vulnerability with respect to both foreign ethnic networks and Bulgarian ones 
force the freelancers to seek cooperation with already established Bulgarian procurer 
networks. It is common practice for independent prostitutes to be denounced to the 
police not only by anonymous reports, but also by false testimonies (subsequently 
withdrawn) in order to drive them out of the local market.
In addition to protection abroad, the bosses also provide security inside the coun-
try. Various instruments are known to exist for neutralizing the representatives 
of law and order – from VIP member cards for classy brothels, through paying 
for their children’s education, taking on the mortgage payments, to the funding 
of offshore accounts. Probably the best illustration of police support, centrally and 
locally, are the cases of detention and extradition. The comparison of the police 
databases on two West-European countries only, reveals hundreds of cases of 
extradited girls who go back within days of their extradition. Another practice is 
to change the name or even a single letter in the name of the person in ques-
tion, which can be done even without the knowledge of the security authorities, 
231 The Plovdiv rapper Vanko-1 is probably the most notorious example of such a personal struc-
ture.
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but the speed at which this happens indicates a smoothly working system con-
nected to many and different levels of power. In the past 5-6 years, the public 
has learnt about instances of senior prosecutors (in Russe) and judges (in Pleven 
and Peshtera) connected to notorious procurers. In any case, those at the very top 
adhere to the fundamental principle of mutual interest and economic benefit. 
Everyone in these large, loosely structured organizations is participating because 
it allows them to work. Starting with the girls, who know they would be exposed 
to high risk on their own, both in terms of other procurers and the police, to the 
investors, who are getting huge amounts – for the scale of Bulgaria – of ”hot” 
money. It should not be ignored that the instruments of violence are inevitably 
present in this market. In peaceful times, the small bosses usually hire one driver 
and one bodyguard but when the tension rises there may be as many as ten. 
The typical approach is to hire persons with criminal records who are used to 
execute punishments, provide protection, etc. In this type of structures there is far 
more subordination but the underlying principle remains that of mutual interest.
There is likewise a hybrid form in between the networks and the hierarchies. 
It involves several dozen girls and several dozen procurers but the top level is 
occupied by a kind of syndicate including various influential figures on the lo-
cal level. Unlike the towns/regions, where there are 1-3 big bosses and about 
a dozen small ones, this type of syndicate takes control over the entire local 
market, including the resorts and export.
3.5. PROSTITUTION IN BULGARIA: THE SIZE OF THE MARKET 
AND EXPECTED TRENDS
3.5.1. Tentative Estimate of the Prostitution Market
The estimate of the prostitution market in Bulgaria is based on official data on 
the practicing prostitutes in the country and the mean rates charged.
For the purposes of the estimate, it is assumed that in Bulgaria a prostitute on 
average works 20 days a month. It is further estimated that club prostitutes see 
three customers a day and since their average rate is 50 levs,232 one girl makes 
150 levs a day or 3000 levs a month. A club usually has 4 to 8 girls, meaning 
that a brothel’s takings amount to 900 levs per day or 18,000 levs per month.
With street prostitution, where the daily target is typically 100 levs, the calcula-
tions show that one girl’s takings average 2,000 levs per month.
Based on MoI data,233 according to which the number of prostitutes in Bulgaria 
is 4,611 (even though it is far greater in the opinion of most of the respondents), 
the total monthly revenue of the prostitution market in this country can roughly 
be estimated at 9 to 14 million levs at the minimum. Its annual turnover is thus 
232 This average rate does not take into account the latest developments of the Fall of 2006 when 
an attempt was made to raise prices to 50-70 levs an hour in some of the big cities in the 
country.
233 Trud daily, May 31, 2003
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in the range of at least 110-170 million levs. This amount does not include re-
sort and border-region prostitution, nor the telephone lines/websites for ordering 
under-aged girls as these are extremely difficult to quantify. According to experts 
with the Ministry of Interior, a conservative estimate would be at least 30% 
higher than the above-cited higher figure, i.e. about 230 million levs.
According to most surveys and the information collected, a prostitute’s monthly 
takings abroad amount at the very least to €5,000-10,000 per month. Thus, if 
our minimum estimate of 18,000 prostitutes is accurate, it follows that Bulgarian 
prostitutes abroad make a total of €90 to 180 million per month or between 
€900 million and 1.8 billion per year. With this estimate it is assumed that the 
prostitutes work 300 days per year on average, i.e. due to visa restrictions, they 
stay outside the European Union for two months each year. By expert opinions, 
about one-fifth of the money is repatriated to Bulgaria, i.e. between €180 and 
360 million per year. This minimum estimate represents a mean value includ-
ing the low-paid street prostitution. However, the conservative estimate of the 
revenues from sex services has been criticized on the grounds that the situation 
has changed radically and the Bulgarian prostitutes in the low-end segment no 
longer make up such a large proportion as in the 1990s. First of all, they have 
adapted and have moved up to the middle segment of the sex services market in 
Western Europe. Secondly, as already noted above, unlike the period up to 2001, 
when mostly girls from the lowest social strata were involved and used to practice 
mainly in the streets and in cheap hotels, in recent years, all social groups have 
been represented – including university graduates - and operate in the high-end 
segments of the market. In view of these considerations, their monthly takings 
are more likely to be in the range of €15-20,000 or higher. Thus, following the 
above method of calculation, the annual revenue earned by those engaged in 
prostitution abroad may well exceed € 3 billion. In terms of the country’s GDP 
in 2006, even with the conservative estimate of €900 million-1.8 billion, this 
would constitute 3.6 to 7.2% of GDP (with a GDP of €25.1 billion). In com-
parison, a similar proportion is reported in South Korea, where the Ministry of 
Gender Equality and Family estimated the South-Korean market at $22 billion or 
4% of the country’s GDP.234
3.5.2. Trends in the Prostitution Market
The described structures and functioning of the domestic and foreign markets of 
the sex trade in many respects provide a static picture of the state of Bulgarian 
prostitution. Yet the processes in this country have been evolving dynamically 
after 2001 and since the accession to the European Union in January 2007, many 
of the outlined characteristics and mechanisms have been undergoing changes, 
even as the present study was still in progress.
The tendencies observed in the period 2004-2006 could be described as contradic-
tory and of unforeseeable consequences. First of all, after the European market 
for sex services opened up (2000-2002), the export of girls reached record-high 
234 ”Comfort woman before and after Japanese rule–Korea’s sex indusrty”, ”A Youthful Mistake”, Mer-
edith May, The San Francisco Chronicle, October 8, 2006. Second of a four-part series. Accessed 
on October 27, 2006.
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levels and in all segments of the domestic market the number of those prac-
tic-ing prostitution began to fall. Whereas the late 1990s were marked by full 
clubs with 10-12 girls on average (and as many as 40 in the big clubs), in the 
past few years, the average number of girls has dropped to 5-6. By police data, 
a considerable proportion of the registered street and highway prostitutes are 
no longer in the country. According to NGOs engaged in the area of HIV/AIDS 
risk reduction among prostitutes, in 2006, a large number of the girls had had 
administrative restrictions imposed on their stay in the European Union, known 
as ”black stamps”. It is the main reason keeping them in this country.
At the same time, the data point to rising domestic demand for sex services, 
particularly in the biggest cities of the country. The reasons are both the increased 
purchasing power of the population and the double-figured growth of the num-
ber of foreign tourists since 2001. As a result, there has been a pronounced trend 
of increasing prices.
The second factor, acting in the opposite direction and pointed out in the sec-
tion on the export of prostitution, is related to the mass-scale development of 
the sex trade. In addition to the above-outlined internal and external channels 
for recruiting prostitutes, there has emerged a new process, which in the opinion 
of market participants and police officers, has been acquiring epidemiological di-
mensions in the past 3-4 years. It is the boom in amateur and semi-professional 
prostitution. Without going into the preconditions,235 or its actual scope, it is 
possible to distinguish two basic patterns of involvement. The first one consists in 
accepting offers for paid sex of varying intensity – from 1-2 a month to 2-3 times 
a week, which may involve benefits other than cash compensation in the form 
of additional consumption,236 i.e. gifts, payment of bills, etc. The second pattern, 
which has been gaining increasing popularity, comes closer to the Asian model 
known as the ”second wife”. This model is often practiced with more than one 
client (except in the case of a very rich client or low intensity of prostitution). 
The number of partners usually ranges between 3 and 5. Various configurations 
are possible under this scheme – it may be a relatively closed one comprising 
several clients and several, partnering or competing, girls. There also exist open 
schemes comprising core customers and girls and peripheral customers and girls. 
Under this form of prostitution, too, the compensation may consist in covering 
rent or utility bills, cell phones, cars, trips abroad, etc. In between these two, 
there exist hybrid forms where in addition to the regular partners the girls see 
incidental customers, too.
Under both schemes, access to customers generally takes place outside the exist-
ing channels for professional paid sex services despite the efforts of various sex 
entrepreneurs to take advantage of the mass invasion of the sex trade by the new 
235 The explanation could probably include a number of preconditions, starting with various socio-
economic factors, through the lifting of certain socio-cultural limitations, to the reduced violence 
and control of the domestic market by the procurer networks. Similarly to the phenomenon of 
switching from regular work or study to prostitution, observed in the European Union, the boom 
of amateur and semi-professional prostitution is completely unexplored in this country.
236 A survey conducted by MBMD on commission from the Bulgarian Center for Gender Studies 
reveals that girls generally do not see any difference between payment for sex and gifts by men, 
see Duma daily, ”Bulgarians Tolerant to Paid Love”, 11 April, 2006..
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type of participants. Typically, the amateurs and semi-professionals find clients 
through their own social networks (friends, acquaintances, other customers) and 
in places offering easy access to the right social groups, such as bars and clubs, 
hairdressing salons, and even specialty stores.237 Undoubtedly, however, the fast-
est-developing sector for attracting new customers is the internet where competi-
tion with the professional networks has been growing noticeably fiercer.
Amateur and semi-professional prostitution appears to have two distinctive char-
acteristics. The first one is the freedom to choose and respectively, to refuse, 
customers. The second one is the absence of regularity in service delivery. The 
customer cannot expect to get the same service over an extended period of time. 
It is worth noting that most of the women appear to withdraw from the business 
temporarily or permanently within 1-2 years. They typically perceive the services 
they provide as a temporary occupation. Many of the respondents living in Bul-
garia and abroad said they were going to leave the business once they complete 
their education, pay off their apartment, car, loan, etc. Similar exit strategies are 
common among the professional prostitutes as well, but judging from the available 
empirical information, they are considerably less likely to be put to practice.
Another pronounced characteristic of both professional and semi-professional 
prostitution is the blurred boundary between more regular occupations and pros-
titution. Similarly to the Asian model, it is hard to tell at what point the waitress, 
sales girl, nurse, or person with some other occupation involving interaction with 
customers, crosses the line from normal service delivery to paid sex services.
The third factor, which is likely to radically change Bulgarian prostitution in the 
future, is the advancement of new technologies related to the use of internet and 
some GSM technologies. As a result of the fast expansion of the access to internet, 
since 2003-2005 there have appeared numerous websites for sex services and various 
smart solutions for the offer of paid sex through chat forums, search engines, online 
video servers, etc. In this context, it would seem that communication technologies 
provide a good opportunity to overcome the moral stigma, particularly among the 
older generation. Up to now, the sex service supply and demand have been very 
difficult to conceal in the Bulgarian environment (possibly with the exception of the 
one-million city of Sofia). In a country where family and friendly networks dominate 
everyday life, a visit to a brothel can hardly go unnoticed. At the same time, the 
discrete schemes of seeking prostitutes or customers are limited by the technical 
imperfections of the means of communication (ads in specialized media) or require 
the presence of well-paid middlemen. In this respect, the internet offer unlimited 
opportunities for the anonymous search and offer of sex services – a fact that greatly 
reduces the moral cost of involvement in such activities. The adoption of the new 
technologies not only facilitates amateur and semi-professional prostitution, 
but also allows the professional prostitutes in the middle segment to sidestep the 
owners of brothels and clubs and directly solicit customers. The response of the 
owners was to use the internet with active advertising of their brothels and escort 
services. What is more, after 2005 and in 2006 in particular, there was a great deal 
of investment in the creation of specialized products such as internet dating sites, 
237 In this respect there are some remarkable similarities with Asian practices where even coffee 
shops prove efficient places for soliciting clients.
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online search for ”one-time or regular sex”, having prostitutes owned by brothels 
intentionally enter dating chat rooms, forums, etc. These new forms of prostitution 
deliberately seek to blur the distinctions between sex with casual partners, online 
porn services, and paid sex.238
However, to the online sex entrepreneurs the chief interest lies in opportunities 
outside Bulgaria. It is worth noting that an increasing number of Bulgarian paid 
companions in the largest sex markets in Western Europe are offered through 
hybrid virtual online services – internet servers combined with a well-coordinated 
system using Bulgarian drivers to bring and guard the girls and to collect the 
money from the customers. The new technologies make it possible to penetrate 
the sex service markets in European countries where prostitution is legal but the 
access to windows, legal brothels, clubs, etc., is deliberately highly restricted or 
too expensive for Bulgarian sex entrepreneurs. These limitations can be overcome 
with the new technologies, moreover without breaking the law of the respective 
country. All internet or call orders are processed through servers and telephone 
exchanges located in different countries with suitable legislation and the services 
delivered are passed off as Internet services. Each investigation of such interna-
tional schemes and attempts by the police to counter the materialization in reality 
of this virtual grey market ultimately come up against complex legal cases. Owing 
to the as yet limited scope and the invisibility of this market, law-enforcement 
and criminal justice authorities in Western Europe tend to avoid this dark zone.
The impact of the new communication technologies and the escalation of pros-
titution into a mass occupation coincide with the new opportunities opening up 
before this country with its accession to the European Union. Travel to and from 
Bulgaria has been greatly facilitated with the abolition of the internal borders and 
in addition, the country signed the open sky agreement, which has resulted in the 
rapid expansion of low-cost airlines. As a result, the cost of traveling to Bulgaria 
has become comparable to inter-city travel in Western Europe. In view of the 
mass construction of tourist facilities in the period 2001-2006, sex tourism can be 
expected to start competing with the export of prostitution as a business. Bul-
garia already has a certain tradition in this type of service delivery in Southwest 
Bulgaria.239 According to entrepreneurs in the sex industry, importing customers 
238 There exist various models and what is common to them all is the use of popular sites to meet 
people and eventually propose paid sex. It is sometimes difficult to tell apart the use of ordinary 
social networks where voting by SMS leads to a rise up a ranking and respectively, generates 
income for the owners of the website; or where one is dealing with a paid chat with interac-
tive sexual content; or finally, where entering a virtual club means access to real paid sex. At 
present, there is reason to claim that the sphere of the virtual/real is an almost unexplored and 
non-transparent zone. What are the methods of selecting the persons to whom propositions are 
made; to what extent this is a system using traditional statistical methods familiar from advertising 
to monitor which pages the consumers are viewing, whom they are talking to, etc; whether the 
whole process is still in a chaotic and primitive phase; these and many more questions are still 
difficult to answer. Revealingly, there is hardly any major free torrent server without advertise-
ments of paid sex services from Bulgaria.
239 In the mid-1990s, agricultural producers from northern Greece became the first organized sex 
tourists in the winter season. As a result, towns of a population of 30,000 such as Sandanski and 
Petrich turned into major Greek destinations for sex tourists, where they are served by several 
hundred girls. In the past 5-6 years, similar specialization has been taking place in the largest 
towns of the country, with companies organizing charter flights with male passengers only; ad-
vertising ‘escort services by female students’ in foreign specialized sites, etc.
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is a better option than exporting girls. The risks are significantly lower owing to 
the possibility of influencing the Bulgarian law-enforcement and criminal justice 
authorities and the daily expenses (accommodation, food, etc.) are considerably 
smaller, as well. In illustration of the competitive economic advantages of the 
import of sex tourists comes the fact that Bulgarian prostitutes actually prefer to 
offer paid sex close to the Greek border rather than in Greece itself. There is 
reason to predict that, if part of the tourist industry should decide to try and 
boost hotel occupation rates during the off-season, with the cheap flights, the 
Bulgarian seaside, mountain and particularly spa resorts stand to become serious 
competitors to the Prague and Budapest hotels specializing in sex tourism.
In view of the above-outlined recent trends in Bulgarian prostitution on the national and international level, and 
given the current legal framework, it is possible to formulate the following forecasts in the short and medium 
term:
• Prostitution will continue to be a priority area of activity to organized crime groups in Bulgaria;
• With the accession to the European Union, the export of Bulgarian prostitutes to member countries will 
most probably increase;
• New channels and destinations for the export of prostitutes are likely to emerge;
• Organized crime structures will seek specialization in a variety of sex tourism schemes;
• Mutual penetration and interaction between local and international organized crime structures will be in-
tensifying;
• Efforts to launder profits from prostitution and to invest them in the legal economy can be expected to 
step up;
• Prostitution is likely to remain associated with other criminal activities;
• Prostitution practices will continue to be covered up under the guise of legal business activities;
• Sex exploitation of under-aged girls is not likely to end soon;
• The problem with Roma prostitution will persist and probably worsen;
• Unless the current legal framework is amended, police counteraction capacity will remain highly limited.
Box 5. Trends in the prostitution market
4. THE VEHICLE THEFT MARKET
4.1. FROM THE ECONOMY OF DEFICIT TO THE BLACK ECONOMY
The market of stolen vehicles in Bulgaria is more than simply a criminal phe-
nomenon. Mapping its development could yield a picture of the history of local 
organized crime and provide a specific angle of looking at Bulgaria’s transition 
to democracy. A number of formative factors at play long before that period 
preceded the emergence of motor vehicle theft as a full-fledged market in the 
1990s. Private cars became the property in highest demand (closely following the 
possession of a family home) as they started to be regarded by the population as 
a marker of higher social status and purchasing power conducive to a different 
lifestyle altogether. The communist elites, on the other hand, imposed the view 
that cars, as luxury goods which communist society could not afford, spoilt the 
population by fostering Western consumerism. In emulation of the Soviets, the 
Bulgarian state introduced complex restrictions to control demand, due to which 
the average wait time to purchase a car was 6–10 years, while to acquire one 
took 10–15 years of saving for an average Bulgarian household. 
Due to the shortage of family cars many households turned to the stolen vehicle 
market. Criminal records from the pre-1990s indicate that car theft was a rather 
frequent offense. At the same time, the vehicle recovery rate was rather high 
(near to 100%) and the clear-up rate for car thefts was fairly high as well (thieves 
were found in 85 to 90% of the cases). According to investigation service officers, 
at that time cars were rarely stolen for financial gains. Vehicle thefts were usually 
committed by a handful of deviant youths involved in joy-rides. 
In the mid-1980s recorded motor theft rates started to rise. While the average num-
ber of stolen cars in the period 1980–1985 was around 2,000 annually, following 
1985 it increased by 18% each year, whereas clear-up rates started to decline.
Totalitarian state controls over the registration of newly acquired cars were nearly 
insurmountable for anyone attempting to sell a stolen vehicle. The authorities 
scrutinized all purchase details from the origin of money of the willing family to 
the technical condition of the vehicle being bought. Thus, there was hardly any 
room for a full-fledged car theft market to emerge.
It is safe to claim that up to 1990 stolen vehicles were occasionally sold to in-
dividuals, but no proper auto theft market existed. Soon after the collapse of 
communism, though, the motor vehicle components market rapidly developed. In 
all probability, the 1986–1987 rise in theft rate was driven by a demand for car 
components. Around this time the communist state had relaxed its grip on private 
enterprise, and private car servicing and taxi driving started to proliferate. Spare 
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parts were no exception from the commodity deficit of the Bulgarian economy, 
so car theft fed the demands of the toddling private business.
Despite the lack of consistent records from the early days of Bulgarian transition, 
it looks probable that the auto-theft market burgeoned soon after 4,000 prison-
ers were amnestied in mid-1990 and the first signs of institutional collapse in 
the fall of the same year. Although hard to define what part of the amnestied 
offenders turned to auto theft, it did become the most frequent offense. The 
groups of car thieves initially formed round certain experienced hands who had 
learned the business in the mid-1980s.240 On their way to Western Europe part 
of the ex-prisoners set up their criminal business in Central European countries, 
such as the Czech Republic or Hungary, as it was easier to bypass the rapidly 
loosening law enforcement of the former communist states. Most of those newly 
formed crime groups engaged in auto theft, as a car stolen in Western Europe 
could shortly and safely be driven to Central Europe. Later on, they became 
involved in other criminal activities such as pimping (which lead to the quick 
emergence of Bulgarian-run prostitution rings) and drug smuggling. The technical 
skills and connections with the Balkans and the Middle East of Bulgarian auto 
thieves proved to be the key advantage that allowed them to compete with 
local and former Soviet Union crime groups. The part of former convicts that 
stayed in Bulgaria established the local vehicle theft market and soon got in 
close touch with their counterparts abroad. The first cars stolen by Bulgarians in 
Western Europe were transferred to Bulgaria in late 1990. In 1992, auto thefts in 
Hungary and the Czech Republic peaked, compelling local enforcement agencies 
to repatriate offenders or convict them and send them to Bulgaria to serve their 
240 One notorious Bulgarian car thief–Radoslav Tsukrovski, a.k.a. Uncle Tsuk–entered police records 
in the early 1980s when he was around ten years old. A former officer at the 1st Area Police 
Department in Sofia recounted the anecdotal case when two traffic cops on duty saw a Lada 
moving down the road with no driver to be seen inside. They signaled at the car to stop and 
when it didn’t they started chasing it. When it finally pulled up, they found out that the driver 
was a boy whose feet were hardly touching the pedals. (see Trud, 14 September 2004).
Figure 16. Stolen vehicles and clear-up rate of car thefts 
(1979–1989)
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sentences.241 A large group of renown car thieves (including Ivo Karamanski, later 
to be known as the godfather of Bulgarian mafia, and a few others, such as Mitko 
the Turk and the One-Armed Man242), were among those repatriated to Bulgaria 
by Hungarian and Czech authorities. 
Apart from the formation of criminal enterprises in Bulgaria and their connection 
to Bulgarian-run criminal businesses in Central Europe, it is worth viewing local 
car theft mechanisms in a larger context. 
Rigorous hurdles to private foreign trade lasted up to February 1991, but individu-
als and small companies had started importing used cars in late 1989. As prior to 
that demand was largely unsatisfied, such new opportunities became even more 
attractive to the people willing to purchase a car. Dealers tried to meet different 
criteria segmenting the market according to price, make, year of manufacture, 
and country of origin of the vehicle, but the overall home demand could not be 
fully satisfied until 2002–2003. Undersupply and the severe lack of import regula-
tions provided fertile ground for the first auto theft gangs to spring up.
Shortly after the fall of the Berlin wall, car theft took endemic proportions in 
Europe to form a ”common market” of 5 million stolen cars per year in the early 
1990s. As Eastern Europe liberalized its markets, used cars flooded into former 
communist states. A substantial portion of the booming used-car market was gray, 
as importers commonly evaded taxes and duties. It was quite easy to traffic 
stolen vehicles along the used-car routes and channels. In the early 1990s a 
huge number of cars stolen from Europe passed through Central Europe before 
being transported to the Balkans, the Middle East and the former Soviet republics 
(mainly Russia, Ukraine, and the Caucasus). 
Bulgarian and other Eastern European law enforcement agencies were poorly 
equipped to fight organized stolen car trafficking. The route of a stolen car from 
source to end user was a complex chain of 5–6 links involving auto theft groups/
individuals as well as corrupt police and border officers from the various states 
which trafficked cars crossed. 
Another factor that increased post-1990 stolen car demand was the conspicuous 
consumption drive typical for the first years of transition. The nouveau riches 
liked to show their Western cars off as a sign of their advancement even more 
so than a car showed one’s social standing during socialism. A car served the 
purpose of conspicuous consumption better than owning an office or home and 
was easier to spot than expensive clothes or watches. In the early 1990s, new 
or developing businesses considered it imperative to purchase a car right after 
striking a profitable deal. It was acceptable to spend half of a business loan on a 
car or buy a luxury vehicle even when the company was going bankrupt as a last 
resort to convincing possible partners that their business was sound. As Bulgarian 
businesses sought to buy expensive vehicles that they could hardly afford, luxury 
241 No precise data are available on those sentences, but some media reports in later periods sug-
gest that many of them did not serve their sentences at all.
242 There are several ”one-armed” auto thieves in Bulgaria, but this particular man is operating 
chiefly on the Sofia market.
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cars started to be supplied through the less costly auto theft market offering ve-
hicles at 50% to 70% lower prices. 
By 1991–1992, the two major black vehicle markets were fully formed. Car parts 
were sold in numerous outlets owned by individuals of Arab origin. The market 
burgeoned mainly due to the severe deficit after the trade system among com-
munist states fell apart and car components trade agreements became void. First, 
it was nearly impossible to legally purchase parts for East European produced 
cars. Apart from that, car sellers could sell dismantled cars at a much higher profit 
than fully fitted cars. The great demand for parts entailed diverse infrastructure 
and actors, service stations, automotive parts warehouses, car mechanics to disas-
semble the stolen cars, and organized car theft rings. 
The second black market segment was that of stolen cars. As institutional con-
trol declined, stolen cars registration became so easy as to make them a widely 
accessible item. At first, the local market was supplied with a small number 
of stolen Western European average class automobiles. Later, used cars started 
to be imported in greater numbers at an up to 200% profit. The import chain 
involved Bulgarian auto theft gangs in Central Europe, drivers to transport them 
to Bulgaria, corrupt customs and police officers and local used car dealers. Car 
thefts at home also peaked, as some of the thieves based in Central Europe re-
turned, lured by the nearly 100,000 imported Western cars found in the country 
in 1992. Police figures show that between 1989 and 1992 domestic car thefts 
rose by 224%.
Figure 17. Recorded car thefts (1987–1996)
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4.2. THE RISE OF RACKET
1992 police statistics show that a total of 12,711 car thefts were recorded, but 
interviewed investigators and police officers claimed that around that time citizens 
stopped reporting one in every three stolen cars. Underreporting was probably a 
direct result from the fact that thieves started offering to recover the car to its 
owner if paid 1/3 of its value. Interestingly, ransom for getting one’s car back in 
Russia was exactly the same proportion. 
The theft-for-ransom scheme created a third specific segment of the auto theft 
market. Between 1992 and 1994, the market for vehicles stolen at home and par-
ticularly for trafficked ones was gradually overtaken by the major mafia-type crime 
groups in Bulgaria known as grupirovki. In that period most car thieves as well as 
the market for stolen premium class cars came to be controlled by one of the 
main grupirovki. The criminal private security firms that imposed protection racket 
on businesses expanded their racketeering services to include protection of private 
vehicles. Thus, a refusal to accept the service led to theft, damage, or bombing 
of the vehicle. In that period, the racketeers hired the services of various car-theft 
crime groups. Due to their connections with police and politicians and capacity to 
use violence, the grupirovki also took control over the car-thieves’ groups. In some 
medium-sized towns this was done rather quickly. In the major cities, such as So-
fia, Plovdiv and Bourgas, extreme violence was used against the auto theft groups, 
especially when they had dared against a car owned by an organized crime boss 
or crony. Thief chases ordered by victim bosses sometimes went on for weeks, and 
when tracked, the group was compelled to sign under the larger enterprise, vouch-
ing to stay loyal for several years as a compensation for the theft.
Some members of the brigades who performed the actual protection racket also 
started specializing in car theft using unabashed violence to take away luxury 
vehicles at traffic lights, parking lots or even in front of the victim’s home. Cars 
were further sold fairly easily, as the thieves did not even bother to forge the 
engine or frame serial numbers, knowing that a 5% bribe to a traffic cop would 
get them a new registration (e.g., if the car cost on average 2,000 in the then 
popular German marks, they would offer a 100 payoff to the official to register 
the vehicle and provide a new license plate). 
1993 was a key year in the development of the Bulgarian car theft market. 
Crime groups got increasingly involved, as together with cigarette and alcohol 
smuggling it became the most lucrative black market. The creation of the Schen-
gen area established an EU-wide market for stolen vehicles, which were more 
easily trafficked into Eastern Europe through fewer border controls. A car stolen 
in Portugal could reach Poland smoothly without checks at the Spanish, French 
or German border.243 Regulatory disparities in the different countries and the 
lack of experience of Bulgarian law enforcement and private insurance compa-
nies in dealing with such cases facilitated the car theft market across Europe.244
243 Europol, An Overview of Motor Vehicle Crime from a European Perspective, January 2006. http://www.
europol.eu.int/publications/SeriousCrimeOverviews/2005/overview-Motor_vehicle_crime_2006_
1.pdf 
244 Insurance fraud also peaked in this period. Individuals would sell their cars to crime groups to 
traffic them out of the country and after that, report the theft to the police to receive insurance.
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In addition, crime groups from across the Balkans took advantage of already 
established trafficking channels for embargoed goods to Yugoslavia to smuggle 
stolen vehicles (see Figure 18). In Bulgaria, customs, border-controls and police 
were largely controlled by the grupirovki (many of whose members were former 
law-enforcement officers). Thus, crime groups had ways to track a legally im-
ported car as it crossed the border and further into the country until they found 
a handy occasion to steal it. Bulgarian auto theft gangs used this as a main as-
set against other East European crime groups operating in Western Europe even 
before 1990.
Two domestic trends also helped boost the market. First, the grupirovki gradu-
ally spread their power around the country, therefore being able to guarantee 
security of insured vehicles nationwide. Besides protection, they now sold the 
service of restoring stolen property. The main protection groups were quite ambi-
tious to render services beyond the bounds of a single town, but their coverage 
was disrupted by their competing interests. Whether a grupirovka of strongmen 
originated among athletes from different sports (karate, wrestling, boxing, etc.) or 
in a particular town (Pernik, Pazardzhik, Haskovo or somewhere else), conflicts 
would periodically exacerbate and despite temporary negotiations or coalitions, 
it was market competition that finally ruled. Secondly, the grupirovki were forced 
to restrain violent racketeering and to switch to a tactic where car-theft became 
an important instrument to racketeer businesses and individuals. 
Figure 18. Main stolen car trafficking routes in Europe 
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As a consequence, in 1993 and 1994, at least according to official statistics about 
new and used car imports and reported car thefts, the latter reached 20-25% 
of all imports. 
According to police officers, during that period, the real number of stolen vehicles 
was at least twice as high. Estimates point to about 40,000 car thefts annually 
between 1993 and 1995–a number lost to statistics due to underreporting. As a 
result of bulging thefts for ransom, victims who would opt for getting their car 
back were forbidden to report the theft under threat of ”complications”. In many 
cases they would receive a phone call within 20 minutes after the car was stolen. 
Theft-for-ransom turned out to be less expensive for crime groups and quicker 
than theft for selling the car further on, as they did not have to look for a trust-
worthy car dealer, wait for a buyer or register and officially transfer the vehicle 
to a new owner. By 1994, the theft of East European vehicles for components 
constituted only 20% of all car thefts. It may safely be supposed that in the four 
years from 1990 to 1994 one in every three cars in the country was stolen. 
Figure 19a. Car imports vs. car thefts (1993–1994)
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4.3. MARKET CONSOLIDATION
Toward 1994 local car theft markets had transformed into a country-wide single 
market. At that time the VIS-1 grupirovka already had national coverage. It con-
fronted or allied with smaller regional players, such as Group 777 in Southern 
Bulgaria (Plovdiv, Sliven, etc.) and First Private Militia in the port city of Bourgas. 
Already in 1995, essential changes occurred as the Law on Private Security Com-
panies was amended and protection firms had to be licensed by the Ministry of 
Interior. This opened an opportunity to transform the private security firms into 
insurance firms. Insurance became a new form of a protection racket, especially 
targeting the growing number of Western cars likely to be stolen. The regular 
insurance companies, which at that point were mainly state-owned, were not will-
ing to provide car insurance as the odds for a vehicle to be stolen by the end of 
the year was 30%. At about that time the protection racket group VIS-1 closed 
down and registered an insurance group under the name VIS -2, thus circum-
venting the new restrictions on private security services and entering the largely 
unsaturated car insurance market. They sold security in disguise, as in the cases 
when a car protected by them was, stolen they offered to pay compensation 
to the victim. As VIS-2 has controlled many car-thieves, their insurance coverage 
usually came down to ordering the thieves to return the stolen car, and on rare 
Figure 19b. New and used car imports vs. car thefts 
(1979–2006)
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occasions paying for it. The newly emerging insurance sellers at service stations 
and parking lots promoted VIS-2 insurance as highly effective with a main argu-
ment that VIS-insured cars rarely got stolen (the statistics being about one in every 
ten stolen cars). Strangely, at times even the national media supported the same 
assumption, quoting data that it was extremely rare for a VIS-insured car not to 
be found and restored to its owner (one or two in every ten stolen cars. 
As VIS gained new grounds, it became harder to hold together its structure lo-
cally. In early 1995, some of the VIS-2 members departed to form an alternative 
insurance racket grupirovka, called SIC. Within a year, the market became split 
between the two grupirovki both in terms of drawing in local racketeer groups 
and controlling car-theft networks, and exerting undue influence over government 
officials. The two companies’ stickers became ubiquitous on offices, vehicles, 
and stores. Their adoption of the structure and management model of insurance 
companies turned the mostly loose racketeering groups into well structured and 
subordinated entities. They hired a large number of insurance professionals, ac-
countants, lawyers, and administrative staff who worked side-by-side with teams 
of hit-men that specialized in punishing disobedient car-thieves and restoring 
stolen vehicles. Between 1995 and 1996 smaller regional splinter racket-insurers 
appeared (e.g. Apolo Balkan, Korona Ins., Levski Spartak, Zora Ins., etc.). 
The Bulgarian racket insurance market displayed several distinctive features. First, 
in 1995-1996 the import of stolen cars from Western and Central Europe245 con-
tinued to grow. Dozens of crime groups in Western Europe stole and trafficked 
to Bulgaria mainly higher class cars that were in demand in the country, using 
a range of approaches from theft to insurance frauds, counterfeiting car and 
personal ID papers, transporting the vehicles to Central Europe, forging engine 
and frame serial numbers, etc. Interestingly, after the stolen car was sold to a 
Bulgarian customer and insured by the grupirovka, it was often stolen again and 
resold/restored for ransom or exported to the Middle East or elsewhere in the 
Balkans. The complex coordination of criminal activity is exemplified in the 
popular understanding of those involved in the networks that ”a stolen car must 
earn you a sum at least three–four times its price to be worth the effort”. They 
also managed to pin thefts at such precise moments as between the expiry of 
the vehicle’s insurance policy and just before it was newly insured. 
Racket insurance was thus practically in control of the car-theft market. In con-
trast to protection racket in the early 1990s, which resorted to immediate violent 
response to those who had refused property protection, blunt brutality was no 
longer part of the method. Instead, the new insurers convinced the unwilling cli-
ents or those delaying to renew insurance by making them the target of repeated 
incidents. The car-theft supply chain starting in Western through Central Europe 
and reaching the Balkans and the former Soviet republics also flourished, making 
deliveries to each important city and area. Insurers would typically increase their 
market through a scheme in which the car once stolen from Western Europe 
would be sold in Sofia, sold again in a smaller Bulgarian town, stolen from its 
245 There are numerous sources on the car theft market in Bulgaria, among them reporter Kristi 
Petrova’s book War of the Grupirovki, Sofia, 2006, and the much less accessible investigation files 
of the Customs Agency and the National Service for Combating Organized Crime on cases that 
have been terminated at various stages for various reasons.
154 The Vehicle Theft Market
latest owner and then exported to a neighboring country. Thus, insurers profited 
from both their legal business and from theft and repeat sales.
Second, racket insurance earned its prominent place in business largely due to 
its car theft links. Pervasive corruption within the border and national police 
forces and by the law enforcement background of key grupirovki members greatly 
facilitated insurance companies and their schemes. ”We have close contacts at 
all border check-points. I have been a police officer myself. We also keep good 
relations with district police departments, which help us a lot, actually they track 
most of the lost cars [...] For each car they trace they will get their 1,500 Ger-
man marks, no matter if it is a senior or front-line officer who found it.” Thus, 
the older of the Margin brothers, notorious SIC leaders, explaining the factors that 
rocketed the company to success in 1995. At that time a police officer’s monthly 
salary was about DM 200–250.246 Moreover, during this early phase of political 
and economic transition, if a prominent politician or businessman’s vehicle got 
stolen, the victim would remove any area or district police chief for failing to find 
it in less than the blink of an eye. Careers were saved when the stolen car was 
traced, but the obligation for services long afterwards remained. 
A third feature, closely deriving from the second one, was the continued control 
over a variety of crime gangs. Insurance companies were genetically linked to the 
criminal world and continued to draw upon it widely in their business. Through 
their offices the dominant insurers gathered first-hand local knowledge of auto-
theft groups and if their members were all local or coming from remote places/
groups, on their helpers and the outlets (service stations, parking lots and car 
dealerships) involved in distributing the loot. Having thus mapped an area, force-
using insurers would periodically consult local police officers on its accuracy. In 
case any trespassers or rule breakers appeared, the teams of hit-men were ready 
to get them back on track. Alternatively, it was the police that punished them, 
not least because this provided a booster to the local of cleared-up crimes. 
Most importantly, large racket insurers were able to exert rather big influence 
upon political and economic elites. Elected officials, judiciary, entrepreneurs, 
bankers and even diplomats would go to any lengths to get back a stolen car, 
more often than not contacting the local or country-wide operating racket insurer. 
Thus, incumbents in office were in the position of regular customers of those who 
controlled the car-theft market,247 and in high probability ensured the smooth 
transition of racket insurance into numerous other legal businesses through which 
they could launder their considerable wealth.
One of the methods used by VIS-2 and SIC to widen their coverage was to oust 
smaller independent auto theft groups that did not pay any tribute to them, if 
necessary by using violence. Police bulletins in that period invariably informed 
about detentions of gun or bat-armed BMW-riding gentlemen holding SIC or 
VIS-2 membership cards. SIC leader Krasimir Marinov presented the police with 
an exact list of their employees to avoid ”abuse of membership cards” and keep 
the company’s good repute, while Dimitar Popov, a respected career insurance 
246 See Trud daily, May 5, 2006.
247 Media reports from this period recount numerous stories of both ruling party members and op-
position having relations with criminal insurers.
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expert and SIC CEO, claimed none of the people using violence were affiliated 
to the company. 
Nevertheless, the most violent conflict that raged on the car-theft market remained 
between the two largest insurance entities. Despite the efforts of both companies’ 
headquarters to negotiate the partitioning of the market, VIS-2 affiliated thieves 
continued to steal SIC-insured cars and vice versa. At times it resembled a mob 
war with wounding, killing and property damage which subsided after negotia-
tions and surged as conflict areas increased. 
Notwithstanding turf struggle and the chaos of copycats and free players, racket 
insurers needed to work effectively to win substantial clientele. As shown by police 
records in the period 1995–1996, car thefts dropped by 12% in 1995 and 26% in 
1996 because of racket insurance (see Figure 19b). It is particularly interesting to find 
out how big the black car market was during this golden age of racket insurance, 
as car theft stimulated its development and vice versa, thus bringing double profits 
to insurance companies. The insurance–theft pattern developed in stages–from a 
monopoly of VIS-2, it was later on joined and rivaled by SIC, and finally by a few 
other smaller companies (such as Apolo Balkan, Korona Ins., Levski Spartak, Zora Ins., 
etc.) gradually becoming a fairly normal market. Independent players unattached and 
unaccountable to any of the larger insurers, however, still continued to operate.
The year 1995 can be taken as a basis when trying to assess the size of the auto-
theft market.248 By official data a total of 16,700 vehicles were stolen in that year, 
but having in mind the probable 60% of non-reporting and the average price per 
stolen car of 2,500 levs, the total could be estimated at 66 million levs. Besides that, 
there was the market of luxury cars where vehicle prices varied between 20,000 – 
40,000 German marks (the currency most widely used in the mid-1990s249). Count-
ing police recorded car theft and the unreported stolen luxury vehicles would add 
another 500 cars per year or 15 million levs. After 1995, as racket protection com-
panies turned to the insurance industry, the auto theft market was complemented 
by car insurance. Reportedly, in 1997 VIS and SIC held 15% of the gross premium 
income, which amounted to around 250 billion levs (250 million after the denomina-
tion later the same year), nearly the same amount as the year before. Thus, in the 
period 1995–1997 they received an annual income of 40 million levs from insurance, 
where car insurance was accountable for around 70% of it. Apart from the 66 mil-
lion levs from car theft, they made a further 28 million from car insurance. It is a 
bit more complicated to calculate what profits were generated through car trafficking 
around Europe. Some of the modest estimates point that around 10% of all cars 
stolen across the EU member states–around 200,000 vehicles annually–were trafficked 
through Bulgaria. With the average fee for trafficking a car through or the price of 
selling it in Bulgaria between 500 and 1,000 German marks this market amounted to 
around 150 million levs. The figure may be inflated, but even if in reality it was no 
more than 30% of that, the total black market in the 1990s easily amounted to 
150–160 million levs. From the perspective of Bulgaria’s dire economic situation in 
that period this was a huge market accounting for nearly 1% of the GDP. 
248 In March 1996, the economic crisis in Bulgaria was already manifesting itself and influencing 
the market with a set of new factors. Data from that year to a great extent would distort the 
estimate.
249 The estimates do not take into account the inflation since then.
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4.4. POLITICAL STABILITY AND MARKET REDISTRIBUTION
The beginning of the end of the racket insurance companies arrived with the po-
litical changes and the new government in February 1997. The United Democratic 
Forces which won the elections made a political decision to ”win the country 
back from criminals”. Despite the fact that SIC, and especially VIS-2, had invested 
a lot in particular politicians and funded the building up of regional structures 
of the ruling party, in late 1997 it was more than clear that the new incumbents 
were determined to put an end to large crime syndicates such as the racket 
insurers. By 1998, all insurance companies had to be re-registered and specific 
provisions in the new Law on Insurance banning private security services by in-
surance companies led to the gradual abandonment of racket insurance prac-
tices. Insurance companies had to be licensed by a National Insurance Council, 
whereas operational level control over the insurance market was to be exercised 
by the Insurance Supervision Directorate at the Ministry of Finance.250
The first wave of licensing reduced the nearly 100 insurance firms to 27. Union 
Ins (as SIC had renamed itself), Planeta Ins (as VIS-2 was then named), Zora Ins., 
Korona Ins. the Multigroup splinters Sofia Ins. and Sofia Zhivot, Apolo Balkan, 
and Levski Spartak, set up by former members of Ministry of Interior’s Antiterrorist 
Unit, were among those denied license. Racketeer groups were purged from the 
insurance market through partially repressive methods. The police demonstrated 
their determination to fight the grupirovki by such means as forcing citizens to 
remove the protection stickers from their car/store window or warehouse door 
without any explicit regulations in the law banning it. Further on, however, 
amendments to the Law on Insurance banned private security companies from 
managing or owning insurance companies. 
By 1998, while criminal insurers were trying to negotiate licenses with the new 
government and the MoI was attempting to purge from its ranks various level 
officers who were related either to previous ruling elites, or the criminal world, 
the car theft market shrunk to very small proportions in, nearly reaching its 1991 
level. 
During that period not a single grupirovka leader was prosecuted, as the politicians 
chose to reach an agreement with them. In the following two years (1999–2000) 
VIS left the insurance market and SIC managed to transform some of its business. 
As a result, car-thefts started to increase again, growing by 13% in 1999 and by 
another 1/3 in 2000.
The growth in car theft in the period 1999–2000 has been attributed to a num-
ber of factors. The most common interpretation was that in 1997–1998 people 
were financially discouraged from reporting theft, as with the closure of criminal 
insurance companies, insurance purchases dwindled. Thus again, only around half 
of all car thefts were recorded. The police had its own motives for under-re-
cording sensitive offences, car theft among them–pressure from high government 
officials. Adding to this was a 1999 prison amnesty, when about 2,000 criminals, 
250 The Insurance Supervision Directorate was established with the Law on Insurance in 1996, but 
did not start operating until late 1997.
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car thieves among them, were freed causing a general rise of the crime level. 
Monthly police records of that period show that within a couple of months the 
number of police-registered stolen cars soared. One highly probable factor for 
this was the fact that insurance companies received their new licenses. They rea-
soned that if car theft continued to decline at the same rate as in 1997–1998, 
people would stop buying car insurance. Besides, once they had a license, they 
could do as they pleased. It is hard to say whether this was an important factor 
at all, or whether auto-thieves could secure any immunity from law enforcement 
with the new police and prosecution chiefs that came with the new government. 
However, in 1999–2000 the insurance company that succeeded SIC managed to 
draw the greatest number of clients, including many former VIS-2 motor insur-
ance buyers. According to data from that period the cars insured with them were 
stolen much less often. Auto thieves and the police claimed that the reason was 
their hit squads were still active. Violent insurance, however, was well past its 
prime (1995–1996) and a number of insurance companies appeared, also selling 
car insurance, that followed regular civilized practices. Some of them did employ 
former law enforcement officers, who were equally well related to the racket 
insurance and auto theft business, but their role was limited to intelligence gath-
ering. The newly established insurance companies did not make payouts unless 
the car-theft was registered with the police, which soon became regular practice 
for all insurance companies. 
Several new trends appeared in auto theft. Data gathered in 2000 by the Bulgar-
ian Association of Insurance Companies showed that around 50% of all stolen 
cars were disassembled and sold for components. Police reports analyzing the 
auto theft market at that time conclude that spare parts were assembled anew 
and the ready cars sold at legal markets and service shops controlled by the 
grupirovki. The Association further found that on 25% of those cars ransom was 
paid, while 25% were exported. 
The companies denied an insurance license continued to traffic stolen cars 
along three main routes. Colonel Velikov, former deputy head of the National 
Service for Combating Organized Crime, describes them as follows: to the former 
Soviet republics, assisted by Russians, Georgians and Ukrainians in Bulgaria who 
were related to their local crime syndicates; to the Middle East, shipped with 
the aid of residents of Arab origin; through Macedonia to Albania, by networks 
involving Macedonian and Albanian nationals.
With the demise of racket insurance and the decline of car theft in Western and 
Central Europe the import to Bulgaria of cars stolen abroad also changed. It 
was no longer profitable to import for the mass buyer. In addition, there was 
a shift in the pre-1997 corruption levels that had facilitated trafficking. Earlier, 
police and customs border control officers worked in symbiosis with traffic chan-
nel operators who preferred to pay a monthly ”subscription” for uninterrupted 
import, rather than bribe officials for every single vehicle. The traffic police and 
notary publics were also more than willing to assist stolen car deals inside the 
country. Now, the Bulgarian Customs and border police were stepping up coop-
eration with international security institutions to increase control over insurance, 
the safety and speed of transnational electronic data exchange, etc. Criminals 
were forced to invest much greater effort and resources to circumvent controls, 
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e.g. changing identifications numbers on most parts of the vehicle–from engine, 
through frame, windowpanes, seats, mirrors to safety belts. They also had to forge 
a long list of papers, including insurance and even driver’s ID papers in both 
the source and the market country. All expenses related to disguising a stolen car 
ranged between 2,000 and 3,000 German marks251 –the price of a second-hand 
car in Western Europe. Adding the transportation and other transfer costs, import-
ing stolen vehicles for the mass market became financially unfeasible. In the late 
1990s a steady trend to import high-class vehicles sold at about 20,000 to 30,000 
emerged German marks. It was mainly such cars that were trafficked through the 
two border points preferred by car smugglers–Kalotina and Rousse. Furthermore, 
in 1998, for no apparent reason the National Service for Combating Organized 
Crime closed its specialized unit against car trafficking. 
An inquiry of the newly established car trafficking team at the Rousse Regional 
Customs Directorate disclosed a trafficking scheme that gives a good idea of how 
such channels operate. The investigative team asked Interpol for information on 
stolen cars in Europe–a direct move that skipped the usual circuitous information 
gathering route and forestalled the moves of traffickers further along the channel. 
This was the first occasion in the 1990s when a well functioning luxury car smug-
gling channel was monitored. The Rousse customs compared the cars imported 
through their border point in the period 1996–2000 with a value between 50,000 
and 200,000 German marks with data about vehicles of the same value range 
stolen in the same period in Western Europe. This helped narrow the scope of 
checked cases from about 1.5 million (cars stolen annually) to several tens of 
thousands. The vehicles imported through Rousse were mostly Ferraris, Porches, 
SUVs, limousines and several rarer makes. The inquiry found out that among 
the persons involved in the smuggling channel were several high-ranking local 
customs officials and road traffic officers.252 The channel had been controlled by 
SIC. Its local units had been in charge of securing the vehicles, customs clear-
ance and further registration with the traffic police. On most occasions, the same 
Serbian, Kosovar and Bosnian truck drivers were involved. The smuggled stolen 
vehicles equipped with legal papers inside Bulgaria were further sold to vehicle 
dealerships in Sofia.253 As the probe progressed, however, the National Service 
for Combating Organized Crime and the Rousse Regional Prosecution Office254
took steps to terminate the inquiry. None of the officials involved in the scheme 
was dismissed. A similar channel for smuggling vehicles stolen from Europe ran 
251 To stabilise the economy Bulgaria operated under a currency board starting in 1997 when the 
exchange rate was pegged to the German mark and later to the euro.
252 As evident from the inquiry papers of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Department at 
the Rousse Regional Customs Directorate.
253 Investigative reporters claim that part of the cars sold by the Rousse channel can be traced to 
the auto market owned by the late Fatik–a crime boss shot in 2003.
254 The then regional prosecutor Lyulin Matev’s involvement was covered by Nikolay Ganchevski, 
head of the Military Department at the Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation (and former 
Regional Prosecutor of Rousse), who was also a close friend of the then Prosecutor General 
Nikola Filchev. Later on in 2006, Matev was investigated for links with the Spanish based boss of 
the Rousse branch of SIC, dubbed Mazola. Soon after the probe was initiated he resigned from 
the Rousse Prosecution Office. His deputy from the time when the car trafficking inquiry was 
subverted (1999–2000), however, has not only remained in office, but is still Rousse’s regional 
prosecutor (see Capital weekly, July 8, 2006; July 15, 2006; 24 chassa daily of July 17, 2006; 
Bankerof June 9, 2007).
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through the Kalotina crossing at Bulgaria’s border with Serbia.255 Partial informa-
tion from probes into this route and another channel passing through the south-
ernmost border checkpoints to Greece (Kulata) and Macedonia (Zlatarevo) was 
made public in 2006.256
4.5. CONTEMPORARY PERIOD 
As most other black markets in 2001–2002, auto theft underwent a shift carrying 
several implications to its aftermath, specifically, the period 2005–2006.
After 2001, car sales rose dramatically–whereas in 2000 around 100,000 new and 
used cars were imported, in 2005 they reached 180,000. Thus, supply outstripped 
demand for the first time since the 1960s when cars first became a mass com-
modity in Bulgaria. Besides the oversupply of cars within all price ranges, the 
most important shift concerned average prices which plummeted, so that it did 
not pay to buy a stolen car. 
As confirmed by police officers working to prevent car trafficking, border control 
improved considerably in 2002–2003. The creation of the Bulgarian Integrated Cus-
toms Information System (BICIS) made it possible to exchange data with EU member 
states’ customs authorities, including data about imported and exported vehicles. Bor-
der police control also tightened, and thus both the influx of Europe stolen cars to 
Bulgaria and their trafficking across the Balkans to other destination started to drain. 
Falling car theft rates in Western Europe also caused car trafficking to shrink. 
From the record-breaking 2,074,000 thefts in 1993 they decreased to 918,000 in 
2004 (see Table 13). Germany in particular, which was a source country favored 
by Bulgarian auto thieves, displayed a significant drop from its 1993 level–the 
276,000 thefts went down to an all-time low of 35,000 in 2004–even lower than 
Poland which registered 51,000 stolen cars in the same year. 
Insurance companies started making timely payments for car theft, so insured 
victims were already much less willing to pay ransom. Whether total damage or 
theft was involved, car owners tended to get paid within three months, unlike the 
period up until 2002–2003 when the average wait time was six to nine months. 
Insurers also required costly car owners to equip their vehicles with the latest 
security systems, such as alarms, GPS, immobilizers and unique markings on the 
components. The newly introduced car loans also discouraged people who would 
buy an expensive vehicle from buying a stolen car. 
Due to the ineffectiveness of anti-car-trafficking units at police departments, the 
MoI established new specialized bodies at district centers. Thus, expertise could 
be accumulated and sustained, officers could be monitored more successfully, 
and the pressure of criminal networks over local officers–common practice at 
area police departments–could be restricted.
255 See Sega daily, December 11, 2001.
256 Cars stolen in Spain had been trafficked through Kulata and Zlatarevo in the course of two years. 
In April 2006 the Blagoevgrad Regional Directorate of Interior held 13 such cars in a smuggling 
attempt. There is an ongoing investigation into the case (see Monitor, October 26, 2006).
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Bureaucratic obstacles that had hindered the recovery of stolen cars found by 
the police were removed. Tracked cars or vehicles confiscated as material evi-
dence used to stay parked for months in front of police departments and those 
that wanted to avoid waiting, used to pay bribes to police officers and prosecu-
tors ranging between 200 to 15,000 levs. High-class expensive cars had usually 
had their identification numbers forged and were hardest to get back from the 
police, involving the biggest bribes. 
The removal of Schengen visas for Bulgarians in 2001 was followed by an emi-
gration wave to Western Europe. Among those that left the country were various 
criminals, including auto thieves, most of whom chose to move to Spain and 
less often Italy, as there were already large Bulgarian communities to which they 
could attach and the local police forces had no experience in tackling criminals 
of Bulgarian origin. 
All those changes contributed to the overall shift in the auto theft market. In 
2002, the car theft rate dropped by 30% and despite the slight rise in 2003, 
the downward trend remained steady in the following years, marking an average 
12.8% decrease for the last five years. 
Apart from shrinking in size, the auto theft market structure also changed. In 
the late 1990s its largest segment was taken by the sale of vehicles stolen in 
Bulgaria or abroad, whereas after 2001 it became difficult and costly to manage 
Table 13. Stolen cars in the EU (1990–2004) 
1990 1993 1995 1997 1999 2000 2002 2004
Austria 9,078 8,593 7,514 7,043 6,992 10,541 5,099 5,973
Belgium 37,603 35,242 35,780 33,395 25,050 19,104
Denmark 42,697 35,696 36,737 42,701 35,195 33,730 27,677 9,838
Finland 18,233 21,059 19,772 22,015 29,611 26,391 12,264 12,353
France 433,494 506,888 453,525 417,360 395,947 401,057 252,084 186,430
Germany 106,973 276,745 262,620 190,585 140,636 127,750 57,402 35,034
Greece 6,845 9,660 12,678 16,555 17,091 16,550 17,889 15,010
Ireland 12,182 13,244 11,754 13,589 14,851 15,964 14,598 9,065
Italy 313,400 311,256 305,438 301,233 294,726 243,890 203,694 221,925
Luxembourg 589 1,145 1,196 675 626 542 519 526
Netherlands 49,814 44,044 40,902 37,309 37,831 38,320 30,785 22,989
Portugal 15,542 17,334 22,792 28,163 26,428 22,173 14,832
Spain 135,559 107,698 98,847 133,330 138,961 134,584 106,524 122,248
Sweden 88,687 73,782 70,299 78,826 78,216 86,820 45,160 38,058
United Kingdom 537,354 649,346 553,848 443,975 414,700 375,840 328,186 214,000
TOTAL FOR EU-15 1,754,905 2,074,698 1,930,067 1,763,230 1,669,326 1,571,802 1,149,104 918,843
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such sales, so the segment diminished down to several types of vehicles. As this 
segment was now safer and more profitable, many car thieves turned to the 
business of restoring stolen vehicles to their owners instead of direct involvement 
in theft.
Structure of the Bulgarian Auto Theft Market 
In an attempt to adapt to recent developments Bulgarian auto thieves managed 
to organize in a way rather singular in Europe. Based on interviews with police 
officers and people involved in car theft networks, the structure of the Bulgar-
ian auto theft market can be described as follows. The hierarchy-based market 
from the period of racket insurance was altogether replaced by networks involv-
ing auto thieves on a par with a number of other supporting actors. Besides a 
group of thieves, a network’s infrastructure is usually also available to brokers, 
technical experts, lawyers, car sellers, police officers willing to leak intelligence, 
etc. Networks are not fixed, but dynamically changing according to the project 
underway. The activities/actors of different networks may overlap, and they fall 
apart easily when they cease to be competitive. An auto thief, for instance, could 
move from group to group without actually leaving the broader network. 
The country is unofficially carved into regional markets around the larger cit-
ies, such as Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna and Bourgas. Each of them has several squads 
working within one or more car theft networks. This regionalism raises the com-
petitiveness of local groups and networks as they know the market much better, 
including the road infrastructure, the available hideouts and places to modify, 
dismember and sell the stolen vehicles, to negotiate prices with possible buyers. 
Finally, they are familiar with local enforcement and judiciary officials. Thus, an 
auto theft group based in Pazardzhik will not risk stealing a car in Sofia as they 
don’t know the city well and the getaway roads are few. Close familiarity with 
the place is indispensable in the capital city as well, which is also divided into 
smaller areas where particular car theft gangs act. In middle-sized towns, how-
ever, it is also important to operate outside the town, to avoid being caught by 
the police. Thus, thieves from Varna would extend their ventures to nearby Shu-
men or Dobrich, or even to the remoter Pleven. The groups also need to be part 
of networks with countrywide coverage to increase their effectiveness, assisting 
and rivaling each other at the same time. Such networking makes it possible to 
return a car to its owner from Pazardzhik even when it was stolen in Bourgas, 
as regional networks are also linked to each other.257
When juxtaposing regional markets, Sofia stands out among all other regions as 
it is accountable for more than half of all auto thefts in Bulgaria. To compen-
sate for size and profits, most regions have to rely on networks among the 
other larger cities. South and North Bulgaria, for instance, have thriving auto 
theft markets, as their main cities are well interlinked (Pazardzhik–Plovdiv–Stara 
Zagora and Varna–Shumen–Dobrich, respectively), whereas in regions with less 
important towns and poorer roads car theft has weakened since the late 1990s 
(e.g. Rousse, Vidin, Montana, Kardzhali, Smolyan, etc). The second largest car 
theft market gravitates around the Plovdiv–Bourgas axis with the Trakia highway 
257 Interview with respondent D.
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(and the byroads near the stretches that are still under construction) as its back-
bone. Thieves from Pazardzhik, Assenovgrad, Haskovo, Stara Zagora, Sliven and 
Yambol are drawn around Plovdiv, but Haskovo, Yambol and Sliven also belong 
to the network centered round Bourgas, which also attracts smaller towns along 
the Balkan mountain range traditionally strong in car theft. Varna is the pivot of 
a less important regional network including the towns of Dobrich, Shumen and 
Pleven. In addition to the described factors, since 2001 Bulgarians have emigrated 
to Western Europe in large proportions, and the two larger networks’ markets 
have declined considerably. 
Participants in car theft networks grouped around their roles at the different stag-
es of the theft. The main role at the first stage is that of car watchers–residents 
of various towns around the country whose task is to spot and pass information 
about suitable targets. They have to note details, such as the car’s color, make, 
year of manufacture, presence of an alarm system and the driving and parking 
routines of the owner. It is also imperative to learn whether the car may be 
exchanged for ransom–if it lacks coverage or if the victim can be persuaded to 
pay ransom. When a target is decided upon, they follow the vehicle’s course and 
keep continually in touch with the action team preparing to steal the car. Car 
watchers are paid only after the operation is completed. Sometimes they perform 
extra services, such as securing a garage and bribing police officers to stay away. 
As a rule, they are hired by theft groups that do not operate locally.
Security guards, commonly called cover-ups, provide another important link in 
the car theft chain. If the car theft team is small, this role may be performed 
by a members of another thieving group or a different group altogether. Often, 
it is a local police vehicle patrol that provides security while the car theft is be-
ing committed in their area. They sometimes also act as car watchers for the 
thieves,258 but their main function is to cover the theft, especially in the case of 
well protected cars. 
The main part is played by the thieves (called bowler hats in the vernacular 
of the area around Sofia). According to police officials around 200–300 profes-
sional car thieves have operated in Bulgaria in the period 2003–2006.259 They 
act in small groups (50–60 in total) and constitute the action core of the net-
works described above. They call themselves brigades, a label inherited from 
the grupirovki era. A brigade can comprise 3 to 6–7 men, but the small-sized 
ones are predominant. 
Roughly, the groups are either closed–unwilling to admit new members as they 
have stuck together for years, or open260–one or two established auto thieves 
drawing less experienced men, sometimes from other cities, to complete a partic-
ular mission. After 2001 car theft groups became increasingly mobile. They often 
migrate to Europe, and sometimes to the US and Canada, especially the most 
258 The police are supposed and believed to guarantee the public’s security, but paradoxically 
enough they are sometimes involved in car theft using their mobility and knowledge of the local 
area to help thieves.
259 Interview with respondents А and B.
260 Interview with respondent А.
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experienced one, half of whom are reportedly abroad. Some of them migrate 
both ways several times a year.261
The class of vehicles targeted and the techniques and equipment used in theft 
also serve to differentiate between the groups. There are elite auto theft teams 
specializing in luxury car thefts, such as Mercedes, BMW and Audi, whereas the 
bulk of other gangs steal common makes such as Volkswagen, Opel and Renault 
that do not require special technical skills to steal and are easy to sell afterwards. 
Some groups specialize in vans, lorries, trailer trucks or Soviet made cars. The 
methods of the different types groups vary from rough to refined. The forceful 
methods involve busting a vehicle open with a metal bar, slim jim and the like, 
and if the alarm goes off the thieves either cut the cables or crash the device 
with a hammer. Electric shock batons are also used to disable the security system 
through a brief high voltage shock and break into the car. When the light emitting 
diode on the dashboard is targeted with the baton, most vehicle security electron-
ics used in Bulgaria would crash under the electric shock, the alarm would die 
and the car could be started. 
Methods of medium complexity. Apart from the rougher approaches, medium 
class cars are stolen through alarm code breaking. To make them cheaper, most 
cars commonly used in Bulgaria are equipped with similar hard code security 
systems which are easy to break and deactivate the alarm.
Methods of high complexity. What is common between the teams that use more 
advanced theft methods is that they plan their moves meticulously. It involves a 
long investigatory period in which either car watchers, or thieves from the team 
provoke minor incidents to be able to define the type of security system, which 
they would later decode, and finally, disable the alarm. The next step is to un-
block the engine and ignite the car in the regular way–a task that requires high 
skills and expensive devices (worth about several thousand euro) possessed by 
only a few auto thieves in Bulgaria, who usually target high-class cars. There is 
also an external condition that has to be secured–the car must be accessible for 
a sufficiently long stretch of time–usually by police officers covering and barring 
access to the larger area where the car is parked.
Superior cars are supplied with convoluted defenses, specially protected alarm 
systems, immobilizers with several paths to block ignition, GPS and other elec-
tronic security devices. Nevertheless, in the last couple of years the thieves that 
focus on first-rate vehicles are easily overcoming even such strong security without 
applying any exceptional technical competences. Sometimes, complex technologi-
cal solutions are used, but their main principle is that of economy–instead of 
straining to beak trillion-combination codes, they will produce false keys, over-
run GPS signals or break into the car, drive off and rip the GPS system out. 
GPS devices are often found hanging from roadside trees or stuck to bypassed 
vehicles. When the vehicle has very advanced blocking systems, the theft teams 
are compelled to employ costly unblocking devices in order to remove the full 
electronic system. For that purpose they follow the latest developments in vehicle 
261 Unfortunately, there is no information available about the reasons behind the repetitive migra-
tions of renowned auto thieves.
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security and spend sizeable amounts for tools to break them. In several cases the 
police has caught whole minivans full of mechanical instruments and electronic 
devices, but it is more common for car thieves to carry all of their arsenal in a 
briefcase, usually containing a laptop with code-breaking and engine unlocking 
software, GPS blocking devices, immobilizers, factory made deterrents and wiring 
defenses. 
A car theft group will usually divide in two and the first two thieves will drive 
off in the open car and disable the GPS,262 while a third member in a differ-
ent vehicle stands close by to watch for police or possible witnesses from the 
neighborhood and follow the stolen car for protection. Sometimes there is also 
a second escorting car, especially when the stolen one is costly. The first one 
drives in front to signal if any risks arise, while the second could be a powerful 
jeep with a sizeable bumper that follows behind and is ready push in case the 
engine, wheels or the electronic controls stalled. This method is quite simple, 
as the car could be pushed for miles on end; it is also better suited when the 
stolen car has to be left behind during the flight than if the car is tugged by a 
preceding vehicle.
Theft of keys is another modus operandi of car thieves, especially when they 
would like to deal in the easiest way with the immobilizers of newer cars. The 
method involves the theft of the car keys alongside the devices necessary to turn 
off the alarm and immobilizer and saves any other efforts or expenses associated 
with breaking car security. 
A third method is car jacking through a variety of approaches. One of them, 
known as the Spanish method, was in popular use in 2004–2005. It involves tying 
a tin can to the targeted car that would make noise when the car is in motion and 
compel the driver to stop and check the problem, and at this precise moment the 
car is hijacked. Thieves would also cause intentional light road accidents or block 
the car’s parking place to coax the driver out of the car. On some occasions, the 
thieves may go from theft from robbery or use violence against the car owner.
The thieves’ next task is to drive the car to a hiding place. In cities the size 
of Sofia or Varna it is considered that the vehicle is relatively safe if taken 2–3 
kilometers away from where it was stolen.263 The vehicle would be stowed in 
paid car parks or narrow downtown alleys with another member of the ring 
staying in a car nearby to guard it. With expensive cars the usual step is to hire 
a garage by using false ID cards or by paying someone to hire it. The highest 
class vehicles are supplied with several hideouts and often moved from one to 
the next. The car may be left in one place until sold, moved to be taken apart 
for components or trafficked out of the country. If it must be moved to a safer 
place, the gang faces several risks. The car is already reported missing and the 
police stop most cars matching its profile. The transfer must be done as quickly 
as possible, although the driver must take care not to attract attention with reck-
less moves or speeding. 
262 GPS tracking can be diverted for only a short period of time.
263 ”I don’t steal cars, I just love driving. What I do is drive the cars from one estate to another”, 
says the legendary auto thief Uncle Tsuk.
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Both former and active auto thieves claim that it is essential to keep a cool head 
in sticky situations or road incidents. Special value is attached to the ability to 
trick the police in a car chase. With the exception of several shootouts in such 
chases in the 1990s, the police have not used firearms against fleeing car thieves. 
They prefer ”not to risk the lives of officers, once the guy is in the car and off”, 
and as the thieves know the limits the police set, they do not consider a chase 
excessively risky. 
At the same time, auto theft circles have built a myth around car chases. All kinds 
of chasing stories circulate among them. Stories are told of repeat escapes in a 
single night, speeding through narrow alleyways and into the opposite lane; of a 
gang running for a week and leaving several cars behind until they break away 
in a ”super car”. Auto thieves are prone to following movie stereotypes just as 
many local mafia leaders would emulate mobsters from famous films. Emulation 
is not limited to reckless driving in car chases, but to the way they organize a 
theft. Most auto thieves believe a car is more valuable than anything they might 
have in life–more than one’s wife, family or friends. Thieves claim that they are 
in a way addicted and cannot resist cars of outstanding quality. Many of them 
have become well-to-do men and have withdrawn from the stealing business, but 
are often drawn back if an exceptional target appears.
The auto market prospers when there are enough craftsmen–technicians to tam-
per with the stolen car’s identity as well as people to forge its documents. The 
simplest modifications, such as the change of license plates or painting the ve-
hicle a different color is performed by common mechanics in the garages where 
the car is usually hidden at the start. 
The most sought after mechanics are called chisel men–they hew out new license 
plate numbers to replace the original ones. Some of them may specialize in Soviet-
era and old cars, while others may be skilled to falsify the identification numbers 
of cars with dozens of security codes placed by manufacturer or insurer (various 
numbers on the frame, engine, gear box, immobilizer, etc.). In the first case the 
cars are modified in small repair shops, as the more cars they handle, the greater 
their profit.264 The engines and controls of the most expensive and modern cars, 
though, are equipped with advanced technological defenses which could only be 
handled by very skilled men in possession of enough hi-tech devices. They must 
restyle the stolen vehicle so as to make it fully unrecognizable. The best qualified 
chisel men take great pains to protect themselves from prosecution. There is hardly 
any case when the police have caught one of those craftsmen in the middle of a 
car disguising effort. As a rule, they work in other people’s repair shops and even if 
a stolen car was found there by the police while the master mechanic was present, 
there wouldn’t be direct evidence pointing to him as the perpetrator. After 2001, 
many of the best qualified among those mechanics emigrated to Western Europe. 
The skilled mechanics go to the car, not the other way round, they change auto 
repair shops and never get caught (in contrast to auto thieves). Another group of 
car mechanics deals specifically with dismantling cars for components and with 
reassembling such stolen car parts into new cars. 
264 There are mechanics whose work is anecdotally efficient. A man dubbed the Togliatti, who 
worked in the mid-1990s and specialized in the Soviet make Zhiguli, could reportedly refashion 
10 to 15 cars in a single night.
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The other craft associated with stolen cars is changing its identity on paper. As 
documents vary in the degree they are protected, an inept forgery could fail the 
car theft chain. Counterfeits should be both technically well elaborated, but also 
well researched, as all the right kind of documents must be supplied. Sometimes 
the genuine papers of a crashed car are taken or the documents are stolen from 
a car somewhere in Europe, so that later in Bulgaria or a country other than the 
one where the vehicle was stolen, they could forge another car’s identifications 
signs to match the papers. 
As at some point the auto theft market had shifted to theft-for-ransom, another 
group, the so called retrievers became an important link between the thieves 
and the victim. The reliance on small-world265 model of connections is probably 
the peculiarity that distinguished all branches of organized criminality in Bulgaria 
from their counterparts in other countries. Auto-theft action groups would easily 
get back to almost any of their victims through the network of retrievers. This pat-
tern was probably successful due to the fact that the number of people servicing 
the chain–thieves, retrievers, mechanics, police officers, car importers, sellers at 
car dealerships and other insiders–was no greater than the population of a large 
village (2,000–3,000 people). 
265 First described in: Milgram, S. The Small World Problem, Psychology Today, No. 2, 1967, pp. 60-67.
Figure 20. Auto theft networks
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After the theft is accomplished the perpetrators call one of the three or four well-
known retrievers–they are the people at the hub of most networks of thieves 
and intermediaries. There are a few other less famous brokers/coordinators, but 
the core of the networking system comprises several well-known names. The ones 
that have risen to prominence in the last four or five years on the Sofia market 
are Mitko the Turk, Zagorski and Omaiski. These men are impossible to pros-
ecute, as they act mostly as telephone exchanges, and neither money, nor cars 
can be found on them. Their main strength is the trust they managed to build 
as retrievers in the mid-1990s when theft-for-ransom became frequent practice. 
The victims could rely on the retriever’s good name that they were going to have 
their car restored. Any failure to do so detracted from the retriever’s authority. 
Another trick for keeping a retriever’s reputation intact in case of failure was to 
keep their involvement in the theft-for-ransom chain anonymous.266
Towards the late 1990s the car theft market was almost never violent. As theft-for-
ransom came to the fore, those that would use violence were marginalized. The 
market regulated itself and any network member from the thieves to those with 
supporting roles would drop out if they failed to fulfill their part of the task. 
Retrieval networks provide the link between the victim’s social circle of friends 
and relatives and the actors on the auto theft market. Interviews with individuals 
experienced in ransom taking confirm that it is usual practice to contact a person 
close to the victim, very often someone whose own car has also been stolen 
once or more. Thus, trust is again involved, as the victim could only give a large 
amount of money to someone close whom they trust unconditionally. This person 
must know someone from the auto theft networks–a mechanic, police officer 
or local crime leader–to contact, so that he can access the retrievers. After the 
ransom is received and the car is restored to its owner, he/she may be paid a 
small sum by the thieves for providing the link. 
In contrast to the 1990s when the thieves would reach the victim and state the 
required ransom directly, the process now involves a number of intermediaries 
and the victim is expected to be actively seeking contact with them. The victim 
has to approach the retriever and negotiate with him the ransom terms. In case 
they do not agree on a price, several options remain. If the car is expensive 
and transfer risks are low, it may be trafficked out of Bulgaria. Alternatively, it 
may be dismembered and sold for parts. Finally, the car could be put on fire 
in a way of demonstrating power. In fact, a victim resisting pressures for ransom 
could become the target of a long list of retributions. Reportedly, some people 
refusing to pay ransom would have their next newly acquired car(s) damaged as 
a punishment for their refusal to pay ransom. In addition, cheaper cars, especially 
if the police engage in a chase and the thieves decide it is not worth the risk, 
could be abandoned in a remote street and left there for months before the 
police find it.
When ransom negotiations are brought to an end, the money is to be delivered 
to the thieves, which usually involves several other links to make tracking the 
ransom harder. This modus operandi was adopted after auto theft units were set 
266 Interview with Х, a prominent retriever. 
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up within the police, which became increasingly effective in ransom catching. 
Thieves switched to using three to four ransom carriers, which made it easier 
to cover their tracks. The persons who take the money from the car owners are 
put at greatest risk, but when caught they usually stick to the explanation that 
they were simply doing a personal favor to the victim. It is not impossible to 
detect where the ransom goes after being taken from the victim, but only up to 
the second person involved. Often, he or the third person in the chain goes to 
a designated office and exchanges the money into foreign currency, which is a 
good track covering strategy, even if someone in the chain cooperated with the 
police and used marked banknotes.267
For these reason, it is extremely difficult to detect and present evidence in theft-
for-ransom cases. Intermediaries and thieves use coded language in their phone 
calls which, even when recorded by the police, will not hold in court, as car 
related vocabulary is carefully avoided. If the chosen target was a yellow Volk-
swagen Passat located anywhere in the country (as opposed to the capital city) 
or abroad, they would talk about yellowish rustic-style pâté, or if they mentioned 
that blue Olympics were needed, they would actually be referring to a blue Audi 
being in demand. 
A long chain of intermediaries, however, lowers the profit from a car theft. 
If ransom intermediaries get 100–200 levs and the main link receives a percent-
age of the profit, the thieves themselves could be left with quite a small sum. 
Data from the 2004 and 2005 National Crime Surveys in Bulgaria and interviews 
with police officers and car thieves revealed that ransoms amounted to only one 
third of the car’s price. With the average price of a stolen car about 6,100–6,200 
levs,268 those that risked the actual performance of the theft may end up with a 
mere 1,000 levs if they can get a ransom for it. In 2005–2006, however, a new 
trend was observed–as the number of stolen and retrieved cars dropped, the 
average ransom increased, thus demonstrating the auto theft market’s adaptability 
to new conditions.
There are two other key actors on the auto theft scene–the mule and the or-
ganizer. The mule can be tasked with transferring cars from abroad–Spain, Italy, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, but also with many other different tasks, such as 
carrying the ransom money to the thieves. The organizer is usually the man who 
orders a particular car or sort of cars to be sought. Often such people manage 
the whole chain–the car-watching (in Spain or elsewhere), the mechanics, the 
mules based in Central Europe, the Bulgarian car dealerships, and the traffic of-
ficials to issue its new legal documents. Interviews confirmed that organizers are 
at the top of the pyramid, despite the crucial role of retrievers. They are equally 
well protected, but in addition they have a much greater say in guiding the 
course of the operation.
Another figure invariably present close by the criminal world in Bulgaria is the mob 
or ”black” lawyer. No actor in the auto theft business (from car thieves to car deal-
ers) would fail to budget for such a lawyer, as they could defend them or minimize 
267 Intermediaries have been caught equipped with ultraviolet lamps ready to check for marked 
notes.
268 Crime Trends in Bulgaria 2000 – 2005, Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, 2006.
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damages whenever anything goes wrong or a theft is effectively detected and 
prosecuted. There are mob lawyers specializing in auto theft, ransom and coun-
terfeiting who would see a client through from police inquiry to second-instance 
court (for more on mob, or black lawyers, see Chapter I). 
Mob lawyers, however, are a ready target for both the police, who are dissatis-
fied that the lawyers use illegal methods to make null police evidence at court, 
and the auto theft players (thieves, mechanics, retrievers, etc), who are sometimes 
sentenced despite the fat amounts they pay the lawyers. 
The car theft market structure cannot be fully comprehended without analyzing 
the role of car insurance companies. Interviewees have pointed out that cur-
rently three insurance firms are involved in violence and ransom seeking through 
car theft. Referred to as ”the mobsters floor” by regular insurance employees, 
the violence using groups are not on the insurance firms’ payroll. Often, they are 
former police officers or professional athletes hired under temporary contracts or 
registered as sole trader companies and subcontracted for services by the main 
firm. Insurance statistics shows that the three such companies hold over 50% of 
motor insurance in the country. However, other insurance companies also sign 
contracts with these satellite violence-using groups. It must be noted, though, 
that violent methods could be successfully applied elsewhere, but in the capital 
city Sofia. 
A look at the relation of auto theft networks to other organized criminal submar-
kets will also help clarify the picture. Notably, stolen cars have been used in all 
Figure 21. The theft-for-ransom process
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major mafia contract killings in the last fifteen years. The fact that the murdered 
mob lords were involved in the drug market, contraband, VAT frauds, prostitution 
rings and so on, indicates that the auto theft market is related and supportive to 
most other branches of syndicate crime. With a few exceptions, though, in the 
last six–seven years auto theft itself has not been associated with violence. 
The only auto theft leaders killed in that period were Dragomir ”Drashko” Iliev, 
in August 2006 and Nikolai ”Kolyata” Petrov, in December 2003. Some analysts 
claim that car theft networks are highly influential because of their indispensable 
role in strategic criminal world killings that they do not need to resort to violence 
in their own primary activities. 
Market Dynamics and Recent Car Theft Methods
The auto-theft market’s geography has changed due to the described multi-par-
ticipant model of intermediation during stolen car retrieval, as well as strong 
pressure from law enforcement and the insurance companies. There are few safe 
places left on the map for auto thieves–mainly the capital and the small satellite 
towns around it. Police records reveal that despite the falling trend, car theft 
in Sofia is growing relative to the total number of thefts in Bulgaria, reaching a 
share of 55% in 2006. 
There are several factors behind this pattern:
• Apart from Sofia, most towns are too small-sized to allow the formation of 
large networks protected by anonymity. In the last four years the average 
Bulgarian towns with 30,000 to 100,000 inhabitants have had no more than 
two or three active car theft groups, which has made the tracking of any 
stolen car deal rather easy. 
• Provincial courts are prone to issuing harsher sentences for car theft of-
fenses, particularly when the local police and local branches of insurance 
companies put pressure on them. This is done even with weaker evidence 
than any court in Sofia would normally accept.
• The violence used by the three aforementioned insurance companies. In-
terviewed local car thieves from Varna suggested that two locals dealing in 
car theft have been killed. 
• Since 2001 many car thieves have fled the Bulgarian countryside in search 
of larger Western European markets, particularly to Spain and Italy. 
Increased emigration and the imprisonment of major local car thieves were fol-
lowed by a significant drop of 30% to 50% of auto thefts, which is visible in 
most towns/districts. 
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Table 14. Car thefts by district police directorate (DPD)
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Sofia City Police Directorate 6,208 6.75 39.29 5,450 6.15 50.31 2,796 7.30 55.03
Bourgas DPD 550 20.36 3.48 647 8.96 5.97 473 12.90 9.31
Varna DPD 1,899 9.58 12.02 1,137 7.30 10.50 350 22.00 6.89
Plovdiv DPD 1,280 14.38 8.10 630 12.54 5.82 220 20.00 4.33
Stara Zagora DPD 451 21.29 2.85 318 21.70 2.94 152 35.53 2.99
Sofia DPD 354 32.49 2.24 296 16.22 2.73 101 26.73 1.99
Pazardzhik DPD 266 31.58 1.68 230 13.04 2.12 87 25.29 1.71
Blagoevgrad DPD 352 24.43 2.23 52 48.08 0.48 84 42.86 1.65
Dobrich DPD 361 27.42 2.28 189 15.34 1.74 73 27.40 1.44
Veliko Tarnovo DPD 310 28.39 1.96 115 17.39 1.06 72 36.11 1.42
Vratsa DPD 242 21.07 1.53 227 15.42 2.10 71 21.13 1.40
Pleven DPD 572 20.63 3.62 154 20.13 1.42 71 30.99 1.40
Shumen DPD 278 27.34 1.76 180 24.44 1.66 52 23.08 1.02
Pernik DPD 573 7.85 3.63 319 16.93 2.94 50 30.00 0.98
Sliven DPD 125 28.80 0.79 77 36.36 0.71 47 29.79 0.93
Yambol DPD 138 34.78 0.87 53 35.85 0.49 45 51.11 0.89
Targovishte DPD 88 38.64 0.56 49 40.82 0.45 41 63.41 0.81
Rousse DPD 376 19.15 2.38 74 22.97 0.68 39 46.15 0.77
Lovech DPD 210 28.57 1.33 73 31.51 0.67 36 41.67 0.71
Gabrovo DPD 162 28.40 1.03 56 41.07 0.52 33 45.45 0.65
Montana DPD 149 28.86 0.94 72 30.56 0.66 33 48.48 0.65
Razgrad DPD 131 44.27 0.83 81 19.75 0.75 33 48.48 0.65
Haskovo DPD 215 28.37 1.36 149 18.12 1.38 33 42.42 0.65
Kardzhali DPD 58 46.55 0.37 19 36.84 0.18 26 92.31 0.51
Kyustendil DPD 144 31.94 0.91 60 33.33 0.55 24 50.00 0.47
Silistra DPD 110 48.18 0.70 50 12.00 0.46 16 37.50 0.31
Vidin DPD 140 56.43 0.89 67 23.88 0.62 14 64.29 0.28
Smolyan DPD 38 65.79 0.24 6 66.67 0.06 6 83.33 0.12
Transport Police Dpt. 
at the General Police 
Directorate
19 42.11 0.12 2 50.00 0.02 3 33.33 0.06
TOTAL 15,799 15.51 100.00 10,832 10.98 100.00 5,081 16.71 100.00
Source: Ministry of Interior
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Assessments of motor vehicle theft based on police records often disregard a 
large segment of the market in the 1990s–vehicles stolen in Western Europe and 
smuggled into Bulgaria. The interviews with car thieves and dealers led to the 
suggestion that such cars with cleaned-up factory numbers and legalized papers 
are available in fairly large quantities, steadily growing since 2001. Interviews with 
police officers suggested that over 30% of the SUVs of several makes, such as 
BMW X5, Audi Q7, Mercedes GL and М, including the rare Porsche Cayenne, 
were restyled.269 Black car market actors, though, claimed that their share was 
even larger, reaching 50% for some stolen vehicle models. None of these figures, 
however, could be verified.270 Compared to 1992–1998–the period when car traf-
ficking channels were working smoothly and registration of smuggled vehicles with 
the home traffic police was practically unhindered, both border and domestic 
controls have improved since successive rounds of measures were introduced 
in 1998, 2002 and 2003. Car trafficking networks that imported cars for sale in 
Bulgaria, however, also adapted their methods to changing policing and insurance 
realities at home and across Europe. The techniques they started to use were 
aimed at keeping the theft undetected for as long as possible, and even after 
detection–at disguising the car, so that it would be difficult to prove the offense 
at court. 
As stated by police interviewees, the sophisticated methods deterring detection 
and making use of the numerous legal lacunae around the investigation of ve-
hicle theft offenses greatly discourage car theft police units, as such cases take 
up ample resources (e.g. 5–6 months of an officer’s working time) with no sound 
prospects for a successful probe. Often, the car under investigation gets blocked 
and unusable by either its current owner (who may be an innocent purchaser 
of the stolen vehicle), or the person from whom it was initially stolen. In many 
cases, the latter has already been paid insurance and wouldn’t go further to 
get the car back, much as the insurance company wouldn’t be willing to make 
any extra expenses. For this reason, the police prefer focusing their efforts on 
less convoluted mass-produced car theft cases, in which no advanced falsifica-
tions techniques are used. The leading car trafficking players know the regulatory 
framework as well as police attitudes in detail, which helps them keep ahead of 
the situation.
The major approach used in trafficking vehicles stolen abroad is that of car 
doubles–a process having several distinct stages. At the first stage, the car deal-
erships and importers must be identified. They must have clients convinced that 
they can buy a new, luxury car at this specific outlet at a special discount, say 
10–20% cheaper than elsewhere in the country.271 Other clients will deliberately 
choose to buy a stolen car in order to save half or more of its regular market 
price. A third group of clients will order a specific model of car with particular 
269 Here again, the resemblances with the Russian auto theft market are striking. Gerber, G., and 
Killias, M. The Transnationalization of Historically Local Crime: Auto Theft in Western Europe and Russia 
Markets, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 11, No. 2 / May, 
2003.
270 In contrast to the common type of car theft, nearly 100% of which are registered, stolen and 
uncovered cars that have been tampered with are either not registered or their records are 
mixed with other types of records from customs, tax administration and traffic police.
271 A variation of this behavior occurs when the owner of a crashed car would order the same 
model, being well aware that he will be supplied with a vehicle stolen in Western Europe.
Organized Crime in Bulgaria: Markets and Trends 173
equipment. The traffickers will then make a rough estimate of the number of 
cars the selected dealerships could sell to their clients and order the batch of 
vehicles. Such luxury cars, however, should not be imported in conspicuously 
high numbers, as that may provoke suspicions. 
At the second stage, the target vehicle is identified and stolen. Europol272 and 
national police data from Spain, Italy and France reveal that the modus operandi 
in vehicle theft is changing to several technically unencumbered methods, such as 
car jacking with use of violence and theft of original keys, so that the offenders 
do not need to disable the sophisticated security features of modern cars. 
The third stage is transportation to the Bulgarian market. The stolen vehicle may 
be transported in a regular container supplied with false freight documents for 
goods that are not normally monitored. The risk, however, is high, as container 
shipped cargo is generally closely monitored. The second major task at this stage 
is to find a car double and collect any possible identification number or sign on 
it - on the frame, engine, gear box, immobilizer, windowpanes, mirrors, seats, 
belts, etc. The double may be a wrecked car bought from its owner at a small 
price or one found in car dealership and inspected carefully under the false 
pretenses of intended purchase, during which its identifications are meticulously 
copied. The few such schemes that have been resolved by investigative bodies 
reveal extensive use of advanced technologies. For instance, details about the cars 
in demand in the destination country (Bulgaria) are sent via the internet, mobile 
phone built-in cameras are used to photograph the targeted double’s identity 
numbers, which are then sent back in messages, etc. All codes and numbers 
of the stolen car are then replaced by skilled mechanics using fine instruments, 
so that the falsification could only be spotted with very precise detectors. The 
newly produced double has extremely low odds of being caught, as the original’s 
absence is not investigated in the first place. Indeed, such schemes are rarely 
captured and police recorded at all, and the actual share of cars thus altered 
cannot be calculated with any certainty. Police figures across the EU also show 
that only a small percentage of such cars are found. This raises the question why 
Bulgaria, rather than EU countries, is picked as a destination market. Possibly, 
among the Bulgarian population there are still multiple purchasers believing they 
can get a high-class car at a preferential price or willing to risk driving a stolen 
vehicle that they could never afford under normal circumstances. 
There are two more schemes for importing motor vehicles stolen in Western Eu-
rope. The first was originally used in the 1990s, but is already becoming obsolete. 
It is an insurance fraud employed by vehicle owners who sell their car on the 
black market at a price three times as low as its theft coverage. When all transfer 
procedures are completed and the car is transferred to the market country,273
usually two months after the deal (that is the maximum period admissible when 
applying for insurance), the owner reports the car stolen to the police and the 
insurance company. If his insurance was, for instance, 30,000 German marks and 
272 Europol, An Overview of Motor Vehicle Crime from a European Perspective, January 2006.
273 Interviews with respondents А, S, N; similar practices occur in other East European countries and 
Russia as well, see Gerber, G., and Killias, M. The Transnationalization of Historically Local Crime: Auto 
Theft in Western Europe and Russia Markets, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice, Vol. 11, No. 2 / May, 2003.
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the amount he got on the black market one third of that–i.e. 10,000 German 
marks, he would pocket 40,000 from the non-existent theft. When at some point, 
EU insurance companies shortened the period for reporting the theft to a few 
hours, the scheme became nearly unusable, as for such a short time the car 
could at best be transferred through the border to a neighboring country and 
could be trafficked further only if its identity was changed. Therefore, this modus 
operandi was replaced by the bankrupt company scheme, which came in wide 
use in 2006. It involves the setting up or buying of an extant company abroad, 
which then leases several cars. The cars are transferred to the destination country 
and sold at the black market. The company at the source state is then made 
bankrupt, leasing payments are terminated, and the cars are not restored.
Finally, there is a reverse scheme of expensive car doubles–the original cars are 
found in Bulgaria, with the owner providing all necessary ID, including number 
plates, vehicle documents, and insurance papers, which are exported to Western 
Europe. A stolen car of the same model is then imported, which has to be exam-
ined by the traffic police before its Bulgarian registration documents are issued. 
The original car is taken to these examinations and thus the trafficked double is 
provided with legal documents. There are cases in which a car has had four to 
five such clones. 
Volume of the Auto Theft Market
In contrast to the mid-1990s, in recent years the number of car thefts not re-
ported to the police has dwindled to 1–2%. Current estimates of recent police 
statistics suggest that over 60% of car theft victims are offered to have their car 
restored against a certain sum. Ransoms are usually demanded when the car is 
not covered against theft. With insured cars, which, according to expert estimates, 
are around 30%, the thieves approach the insurance company to offer a deal. 
All in all, it can be calculated that ransom was demanded from 3,500 people in 
2005 when the number of stolen vehicles was 5,900, and from 3,000 individuals 
in 2006 when 5,000 were stolen.274 Some experts claim that 90% of victims pay 
the ransom demanded of them.275 In around 10% of the cases insurance fraud is 
involved when a person, who has found out about the theft but is not the owner, 
approaches the insurance company to claim the insurance amount.
The above figures could be used as a basis to make a rough estimate of the car 
theft market’s size in 2005–2006. Findings from the National Crime Survey reveal 
that on average the value of a stolen car is 6,100–6,200 levs, whereas the average 
ransom is around 2,200.276 The latest police data, however, show that in 2006 
stolen cars’ value markedly rose to 10,000–12,000 levs. It may be surmised that 
the ransom has also risen to an average of 3,000–4,000. Thus, the total market 
274 Non-existent thefts were reported by 10 to 15% of car owners who wished to get rid of an 
old vehicle or a vehicle that would not pass the registration procedure. In those cases the own-
ers usually sold the car for scrap which made them exempt from fines or fees that could be 
imposed on them.
275 A victimization survey carried out by Vitosha Research in November 2006 found out that 31% 
of car theft victims were asked for ransom, and 56 % of them paid it. The relatively low ratio 
of demanded and paid ransoms could be explained with the respondents’ unwillingness to self-
report behavior that is as an offense under the law.
276 Crime Trends in Bulgaria 2000 – 2005, Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, 2006.
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value of stolen vehicles seems to have gone up from 30 million levs in 2005 to 
55 million in 2006. The total revenues of car ransom seekers have increased 
from 7.7 million in 2005 to 10.5 million levs in 2006. 
To measure the average profits of a car theft ring, it could be assumed that 60% 
of car thefts are committed in Sofia. Thus, ransom revenues in 2005–2006 would 
amount to 4.6–6.3 million levs. The Sofia Directorate of Interior has estimated 
that at the local market where 10 to 20 auto theft groups are active, one group 
could make between 230,000 and 630,000 levs per year. A member of a group 
of 80 to 100 individuals could then make from 45,000 to 80,000 levs annually. 
4.6. CAR THEFT MARKET DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS
A comparison of the stolen motor vehicle market in Bulgaria in 1995 with the lat-
est data from 2006 suggests that its profits have shrunk five to six times, whereas 
stolen car numbers have fallen to the pre-1990 level. This raises the question 
whether car safety has increased to reach socialist-time levels or whether orga-
nized criminal car-theft networks are not any longer the severe problem they 
used to be. Despite the decrease, if the share of thefts not cleared-up is over 
50% this is a sign of the presence of criminal enterprises on the market. As re-
gards car theft Bulgaria remains one of the countries with lowest clear-up rate. 
Considering the convergence of the factors described above (rapid overall de-
crease of auto thefts, invariably low clear-up rate, networks immune to inves-
tigation, emigration of many well-known auto thieves to the EU, and the well 
covered market of doubles) one could outline several probable scenarios for the 
future of the auto theft market in Bulgaria: 
First, an optimistic scenario could be proposed. With this scenario car thefts 
will persistently decrease, as manufacturers will continuously improve built-in de-
fenses. Factory made electronic devices will only be available at franchise dealer 
service points and gray car workshops will disappear. The growing number of 
insured cars (due to attractively priced comprehensive insurance and third party 
liability packages) will discourage their owners from paying ransom in case of 
theft. Due to advanced equipment for total video surveillance and comprehensive 
electronic data storage, the police will improve evidence gathering and effectively 
detect motor theft offenses. These trends will compel more experienced thieves 
to exit the auto theft market.
A more realistic scenario will be for the decline of auto thefts to stop when it 
reaches an average of 4,000 stolen vehicles annually. At present, the number of 
stolen cars per capita in Bulgaria is one of the lowest compared to the rest of the 
EU. At the same time, theft and trafficking remain a lucrative business, as Bulgaria 
is surrounded with the much less controlled car theft markets of other Balkan 
and Black Sea states, and regions like the Caucasus and the Middle East. It could 
reasonably be expected that new cross-border possibilities will open up to Bulgar-
ian auto theft networks after the borders of EU states were lifted in 2007.
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The pessimistic scenario takes into account cyclical trends captured by both 
home and EU statistics. Such records demonstrate that after long-term lows, car 
thefts tend to rise again. As more expensive and newer cars will increase in 
number, Bulgarian auto thieves could focus on this segment by developing new 
theft methods and enhancing their ties with actors on the international car theft 
market.
277 EU crime experts point out that data about car thefts in Germany may lack in realism, as local 
statistics only records stolen cars for which charges are pressed.
Table 15. Stolen vehicles in the EU (2004)
Vehicles stolen Vehicles not recovered Clear-up rate
Austria 5,973 3,536 59.2
Belgium 19,104 8,173 42.8
Bulgaria 7,569 1,109 14.7
Denmark 9,838 1,391 14.1
Finland 12,353 2,469 20.0
France 186,430 116,472 62.5
Germany 35,034277
Greece 15,010 6,468 43.1
Ireland 9,065 5,399 59.6
Italy 221,925 115,641 52.1
Luxemburg 526 238 45.2
Netherlands 22,989 9,598 41.8
Portugal 14,832 9,222 62.2
Spain 122,248 85,001 69.5
Sweden 38,058 3,304 8.7
UK 214,000 85,000 39.7
Cyprus 427 225 52.7
Czech Republic 24,230 3,786 15.6
Estonia 1,209 625 51.7
Hungary 9,065
Latvia 3,306 1,865 56.4
Malta 825 238 28.8
Poland 51,319
Slovakia 4,801 1,107 23.1
Slovenia 1,026 380 37.0
Source: Europol
5. THE ANTIQUITIES TRADE – DEALERS, TRAFFICKERS, 
AND CONNOISSEURS
In contrast to the strictly illicit and rigorously prosecuted drug business, the 
antiquities278 market involves a wide spectrum of activities from clandestine ex-
cavations and looting through legal sales at auction houses and antique shops to 
displays at established museums or private collections. In many cases, irrespec-
tive of their origin, antiquities can be supplied with false provenance documents 
and sold at auctions as though legally acquired. Sometimes the end owners do 
not even have to go that far–a 1999 study of British archaeologists Christopher 
Chippendale and David Gill demonstrated that a bulky 75% of the artifacts in 
the sample of large private museum collections surveyed are unprovenanced.279
State museums of international repute are no exception. The Director of the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York claims that most of the antique artifacts 
imported in America in the last decade or so have been trafficked in violation 
of source countries’ laws.280
278 For the purposes of this paper the commonly known term antiquities has been used throughout 
to signify moveable cultural property, such as artifacts from the past or old coins, which are 
the main objects of black trade, in alternation with the legal term monument of culture taken 
from Bulgarian heritage legislation (with its variables movable monument of culture and immovable 
monument of culture). The Law on Monuments of Culture and Museums defines the latter term 
as ”any movable and immovable authentic material evidence of human presence or activity 
which possesses scientific and/or cultural value and is of public significance.” Objects of high 
value belong to the category of national cultural assets or treasures. The more awkward cultural 
and historical property is still in official use at certain Bulgarian institutions (for instance, the Min-
istry of Interior), but is becoming obsolete. The term monument of culture is a local coinage that 
differs from internationally recognized terminology. For instance, the UNESCO Convention on 
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property (14 November 1970) adopts the term cultural property and defines it as ”prop-
erty which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of 
importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science and which belongs to the 
following categories: (a) rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, 
and objects of palaeontological interest; (b) property relating to history, including the history of 
science and technology and military and social history, to the life of national leaders, thinkers, 
scientists and artist and to events of national importance; (c) products of archaeological excava-
tions (including regular and clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries; (d) elements of artistic 
or historical monuments or archaeological sites which have been dismembered; (e) antiquities 
more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins and engraved seals; (f) objects of 
ethnological interest”.
279 There are countries such as Germany where any artifact can easily be registered with no re-
quirement to state its source, while the certificate received would commonly read ”provenance 
unknown”. Thus, prosecution is possible only if the artifact was stolen from an already legal 
collection and its previous owner filed a lawsuit.
280 Archeology, May/June 1993, p.17.
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Alerted by the increasing challenges to historical heritage preservation faced by a 
number of nations, in the second half of the twentieth century the international 
community undertook the first round of measures against the trafficking of mov-
able monuments of culture. Europe and the wider world, however, are creating 
a continuing market demand for cultural property that foments its trans-border 
traffic to the present day. 
Heritage legislation in the EU is far from harmonized and even the underlying 
approach to cultural property protection differs from state to state. The regulation 
of the market of illicit antiquities can be addressed through a variety of solutions, 
sometimes complete opposites, precisely because it ravels legal, quasi-legal and 
purely criminal aspects. The major regulation patterns known are the conservative
(or South European) and the liberal (or North European).281 The first approach
is exemplified by the Greek Law 3028/2002 on the Protection of Antiquities and 
Cultural Heritage in General. The second type of regulation can be found in its 
purest form in the Netherlands, known for its liberal heritage legislation and a 
large variety of public–private partnerships in this field. The main points where 
the two models differ concern ownership, the rules governing domestic trade 
and export of antiquities and the powers of the state to regulate that trade. 
Irrespective of the chosen model, however, in all EU member states there are 
private organizations in the field of culture, private museums, auction houses that 
can sell antiquities freely, as well as a long history of antiquities trade and pri-
vate art collections.282 Due to its past affiliation to the communist bloc, however, 
Bulgaria’s private business with cultural goods has remained poor, depleting even 
further with the dissolution of the communist state. 
The scope of this paper allows for a brief analysis of only some aspects of the 
illegal acquisition, trade, collecting and trans-border trafficking of antiquities and 
the ways they interact with the semi-legal and purely legal cultural objects market 
at home and abroad.
5.1. DOMESTIC TRADE IN ANTIQUITIES
Prior to 1989 Bulgaria’s communist regime policed looters283 and controlled the 
export of antiquities rather uncompromisingly. Private collectors who were not affili-
ated to high party officials were openly repressed, as in the case of the renowned 
gold coin collector Zhelyazko ”the Emperor” Kolev. The Law on Monuments of 
Culture and Museums (LMCM) issued back in 1969 defined the cultural objects 
market actors as: government agencies, private collectors and local state-owned 
museums, which remained the case until the democratic changes took place. As 
the communist state with the institutional structure that bound it fell apart, looting, 
trade and smuggling of antiquities in Bulgaria entered their golden age.
281 For further details see Chobanov, T., ”Analysis of Foreign Cultural Heritage Legislation and 
Practices” in: Comparative Study of the National Cultural Heritage Legislation in Bulgaria and Some EU 
Member States, Sofia, 2006, p.45.
282 Ibid.
283 Looters of the old type were treasure seekers who dug up in deserted areas known by word of 
mouth to cache treasure-troves underground. They rarely approached and damaged archaeologi-
cal monuments.
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Looting and Lowest-Level Antiquities Distribution
Driven by the lax law enforcement and the mass poverty that struck the popu-
lation with the social and economic crisis the number of treasure hunters and 
plundered sites in the early 1990s drastically increased. Initially chaotic, archaeo-
logical pillaging grew structured and specialized in terms of the loot targeted and 
the activities performed, gradually forming a hierarchy of participation. Looters, 
middlemen and smugglers practically had free rein, going about their business 
unpunished throughout the late 1990s as well. Two factors contributed to the 
flourishing of illicit archaeological effort and trading in movable monuments of 
culture. 
Society and the authorities tend to be lenient to such offenses, which generally 
remain underreported, as looting and trading in antiquities do not cause direct 
damages to the individual. Furthermore, several striking archaeological findings 
at the start of the new millennium spurred excessive enterprise among looters. 
Newly unearthed sites were swarmed and pilfered even as archaeologists and 
historians were trying to conduct proper explorations. 
MoI experts claim that looters have so far combed the better portion of the cul-
tural layer (estimates mention some 80%), part of which consists of immovable 
monuments–mainly Thracian hills, tombs and other sites dating back from antiq-
uity to the Middle Ages. Estimates about active looters range between 100,000 
to 250,000.284 Despite the striking figure most of these people are either amateur 
treasure hunters, or incidental finders. The professionals among them do not 
exceed several thousands. In the late 1990s the latter were becoming much bet-
ter equipped and regularly used fine-tuned metal detectors (capable of registering 
the type of metal that lies buried several meters underground and provide 3D 
images of the buried artefacts) and more advanced excavation technology (such 
as bulldozers, tractors and navies).
The criminal groups that deal with field exploration and illicit excavations are 
highly mobile. They are most active in summer, making excavations in arable 
lands and forests. Sometimes they purchase fields in close location to archaeologi-
cal sites and deep-dig the soil without any precaution. Alternatively, the land is 
leased or the would-be agrarians are paid to plough it, while their true intention 
One major archaeological site that has been drawing treasure hunters for many years is the Roman settlement 
Ratsiaria whose remnants are located in close proximity to the village of Archar in Dimovo municipality. Local 
looters are assaulting the place as a matter of routine. In 2006 alone the police caught the perpetrators–individu-
als, or whole looting gangs–of fifteen forays to the site. Prompt police investigations led to convictions in seven 
of the cases, while the rest have not yet been finalized. 
Source: Information from the National Police Service of 25 January 2007.
Box 6. The Archar case
284 Interview with representative of the Cultural and Historical Property Contraband Section at the 
NSCOC.
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is to search for loot with metal detectors.285 Apart from looting, which is normally 
prosecuted as a crime, there are other activities, such as construction in areas 
bordering on or within territories protected by heritage legislation, whose ruinous 
effect on cultural sites shouldn’t be underestimated.
Considering their scale and price, local experts have called the domestic market 
of illicit antiquities ”small trafficking” in contrast to cultural property export to 
other, market nations which is ”big trafficking”.286 Domestic trade in cultural 
items should be set apart form criminal trans-border trafficking as in most cases 
the former belongs to the gray, rather than the black market. On the domestic 
market further transactions are made between private collectors trading coins or 
other artifacts with each other. The primary market chain involving local finders, 
local dealers and local collectors feeds into the domestic exchange of coins or 
other collectibles. Another market that in recent years has flourished enough to 
become a self-supporting business for some people is the manufacture and sale 
of fake antiquities. Reportedly, a number of clandestine mints are operating in 
Bulgaria mainly to supply the US coin market. Counterfeiting found or pillaged 
ancient coins before selling them is also common practice among local looters 
and dealers.287
Initially the internal market of antiquities is supplied through a local network 
of looters and dealers to satisfy the demand for artifacts and coins of thousands 
of numismatists across the country.288 Such high domestic demand indicates the 
existence of many illicit private collections, some of them so rich that they rival 
museum deposits. Antiquities can also be found in collections owned by private 
banks. 
Experts claim that artifacts are purchased and sold several times before reaching 
private home collections or trans-border dealers. Large-scale traffickers are several 
dozens.289 Some of them are already permanently based abroad as antique shop 
owners. They are so connected as to be able to produce particular coin types 
and artifacts on demand in the market country by directing a robbery or loot-
ing mission at the right place in the source country. Mid-scale dealers operate 
by regions, selecting the artifacts supplied by local finders and offering the most 
valuable ones to their bosses.
Foreign nationals (mostly Germans and Greeks) are also increasingly involved 
in this business and further play the role of middlemen in illicit export. Greeks 
specialize in supplying Bulgarian Orthodox church-plate to foreign markets, which 
may explain the growing number of church and monastery burglaries committed 
locally. The demand from foreign states and the number of non-local dealers 
285 Report of the Crime Counteraction, Public Order Maintenance and Prevention Chief Directorate 
(CCPOMPCD) of the National Police Service, 25 January 2007, p.2.
286 Interview with Ministry of Culture experts, January 18, 2007.
287 The story of six looters was recently reported in the Bulgarian media. The gang had been digging 
up antiquities from ancient hills, tombs and caves and selling them together with the replicas 
they were producing, Plovdiv21.com, August 10, 2006, <http://www.plovdiv24.com/news/18384.
html)>
288 Ibid.
289 By expert estimates of the NSCOC.
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operating in Bulgaria is expected to increase when much of the border control 
(at internal borders) is stripped after the country joins the EU.
Before antiquities reach the end market they pass through a process of filtering 
in three stages. The first filtering is done when looters and their immediate deal-
ers offer cheap, largely affordable items, such as coins or artifacts of no special 
value. Second-tier regional dealers then engage in repeat filtering to offer rich 
private collectors (bosses) the highest-value or unique objects for prices reaching 
100,000 levs per item or coin. The informal monthly tenders held in the city of 
Veliko Tarnovo are a succinct illustration of the process – first filtering is done at a 
collectors’ meeting held every first Saturday of the month, succeeded by a second 
filtering at a more exclusive meeting of dealers and collectors on the following 
day and a third filtering by the top collectors know as bosses. 
At the core of Bulgaria’s internal antiquities market is a network of legal nu-
mismatic exchanges (at which officially no buying and selling goes on) held at 
various times of the year in several cities. The aforementioned meeting at the 
Poltava disco club in Veliko Tarnovo hosted by the local coin collectors’ society 
is the most prominent example. It is a must for the coin and stamp collectors, 
antique dealers and various other collectors from all over the country. In other 
cities, such as the capital Sofia, Plovdiv and Montana antiquities are usually 
traded in numismatic clubs and more rarely at antique outlets or through face-
to-face encounters between purchaser and seller.
The Veliko Tarnovo club meetings accommodates both legal transactions between 
collectors purchasing artifacts which are not strictly definable as ”monuments of 
Table 16. Overview of the antiquities market
Stages Activities Actors Legality Market type
I looting – looting gang 
leaders
– looting gangs
– occasional 
looters (finders)
criminal black
National
II acting as middleman/
dealer;
maintaining private 
collections
– small dealers 
– regional dealers
– large dealers/ 
collectors
sales qualified as 
criminal, purchases 
de facto legal
gray
III trans-border trafficking – traffickers
– border officials
– large 
international 
dealers
criminal black
International
IV market state sale – international 
dealers/market 
state collectors
legal white (legal)
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culture” and illicit bargains with real antiquities. In isolated cases looters them-
selves come to put their finds for sale. It is more common to come across deal-
ers offering large stocks of coins and artifacts as well as collectors with individual 
objects and old coins. Purchasers also come in two distinguishable groups–the 
private collector and the middleman or dealer commissioned by rich clients or 
bosses to supply them with antiquities of greater value and/or amount. It is 
commonly believed that the most valuable items are traded in privacy, safely 
remote from the numismatic exchanges. There is a growing trend to strike any 
fairly costly antiquity deals outside those legal exchanges, not least provoked by 
law-enforcement clamp-downs such as the police operation disrupting the Veliko 
Tarnovo exchange on December 2, 2006. Such aggressive enforcement seems to 
erode the possibility to monitor the trade of antiquities.
In recent years cultural artifact dealers have been using the internet increasingly 
to market various antiquities and coins with much greater ease. Detailed descrip-
tions and photographs of such objects are offered on specialized commercial 
web pages. Ministry of Interior agencies have also tracked online bids for coins 
of Bulgarian provenance at numismatic sites.290 Some of the old coins pilfered 
in a notorious recent burglary of the Veliko Tarnovo city museum were also put 
on offer in such online auctions. E-commerce is also the preferred method of 
dealing forged antiquities. 
Police data about recorded antiquities-related offences sheds some light on how 
widespread looting is in Bulgaria:291
The 2006 clear-up rate for these crimes was 30.1%, that is 61 cases solved and 
76 perpetrators, most of whom Bulgarian nationals, arrested.292
Another resource of cultural item supplies for both Bulgaria and the major market 
states are the local museums. Throughout the transition years there were persis-
tent reports of burgled museums. On a number of occasions individual museum 
exhibits were found missing or having been substituted with less valuable objects 
(similar old coins in particular can have a hundred-fold difference in price de-
pending on how well preserved they are), or fake items. A prosecution office 
290 Report by the Crime Counteraction, Public Order Maintenance and Prevention Chief Directorate 
(CCPOMP CD) of the National Police Service, 25 January 2007, p. 3
291 Ibid, pp.3-4.
292 Ibid.
Table 17. Cultural property crimes
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Recorded crimes 
involving cultural 
and historical 
property
368 349 298 280 224 204 206
Source: National Police Service
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inquiry in the fall of 2006 established that exhibits were missing in the archaeo-
logical museums of two major Bulgarian cities – Varna and Burgas. Museum thefts 
raise serious concerns as they involve qualified museum staff whose supposed 
mission and duty is to help preserve the national heritage and because of that 
they are even more blameworthy than the common treasure hunter.
Most Bulgarian museums have poor recording practices of the artifacts in stock. 
The general lack of accountability, in particular of museum directors, further ag-
gravates the situation. The Supreme Prosecution of Cassation has confirmed that 
the major museums in Bulgaria have not had an inventory of their core funds 
made for the last fifteen years which suggests that the responsible state bodies 
have completely neglected their duties. The majority of museums do not ob-
serve the international standard for describing art, antiques and antiquities with 
photographs and exact descriptions of each object (the so called Object ID). In 
Bulgarian museums objects are often loosely described in general terms, which 
makes it impossible for them to be tracked, positively identified and restored. 
The dire state of museum documentation dooms to failure any efforts to trace 
stolen coins or other items transferred abroad.
Other property often illicitly traded in and marketed abroad (chiefly in Greece) 
are old Orthodox icons and church-plate items.293 As such objects are property of 
the Bulgarian Holy Synod, however, enforcement agencies are not in a position 
to take full stock of this type of national cultural heritage. Customs officers do not 
normally intervene in the trans-border movement of icons either, as they have no 
staff qualified to make assessment requiring such subtle expertise.294 Nevertheless, 
as foreign demand is rather modest, icons are trafficked out much more rarely 
than they are traded to collectors within the country.
To make their anti-looting and anti-trafficking efforts seem more effective enforce-
ment agencies announce lavish values of the illicitly acquired cultural objects 
they capture. This trend combines with popular beliefs that the antiquities are 
purchased at much higher prices in market countries than at home. Since the 
best developed antiquities market both in Bulgaria and abroad is that of Ancient 
Greek, Roman and Byzantine coins,295 a closer comparative look at their prices 
at auctions may reveal a different picture. The coin market has the following 
distinguishable characteristics:
1. The fairly low price of most coins makes them accessible for mass purchase 
as individual coins are minted in large amounts and the tradition of coin 
collecting has long been established. Price, however, hardly diminishes their 
historical and aesthetic value.
2. Coin trade is firmly internationalized due to the cross-fertilization of 
historical and political developments, commercial relations and the dense 
cultural layering characteristic of the processes that led to the formation of 
the contemporary nation state.
293 Prosecution officials have described staggering cases of medieval frescos being removed from 
church walls to be trafficked out of the country.
294 Interview with a customs official.
295 There is practically no international demand for Thracian coins.
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3. The price of the same type of coins can differ widely as prominent private 
collectors and leading museums set particularly high demands on the qual-
ity of the items they would agree to purchase.
4. Serious devaluations are frequently observed, in particular after abundant 
archaeological finds (treasures) which can cause the price of coins once 
extremely costly due to their rarity to crash.
5. The original location where the coins were struck and circulated plays 
an important role in their grading. Only a small portion of local coins are 
not affected by the high price differential between home and international 
market. Thus, a well preserved medieval coin minted by a Bulgarian tsar is, 
generally, more profitably traded in Bulgaria than it would be in any other 
country. 
6. The growing market saturation with the major specimen in the three main 
ancient coin groups and the slight chances for discovering and appraising 
so far unknown coin types has caused a decline in coin prices worldwide. 
Despite the diversification of trade channels (e.g. over the internet), this 
trend will be generally aggravated except for coins graded ”extremely fine” 
where prices are expected to remain stable or to be tilted slightly higher 
by the cheapening of lower-grade coins. 
7. Price ranges depend fairly strongly on national and regional economic 
factors. The same type of ancient coins in comparable condition could 
be more expensive (but in some cases also cheaper) in EU countries and 
almost always so in the US than in Bulgaria or, say, in Serbia, Macedonia, 
Romania, etc. This shows that local income levels can affect coin prices 
similarly to mass commodities.296
Building on these established trends as well as on empirical data the following 
inferences can be drawn concerning coin pricing at the domestic and foreign 
market and the ways it affects both illicit trade within Bulgaria and trans-border 
coin trafficking.
• There is a clear-cut difference in coin prices in Bulgaria and in other mar-
ket countries primarily resulting from the disparities in purchasing power. 
This fact, however, does not necessarily abet encroachments on cultural 
heritage and illicit coin exportation;
• Coins found during clandestine excavations are sought primarily by local 
private collectors and/or are of fairly low quality. The absolute or relative 
price such finds may reach within the country are often higher than any 
possible foreign auction prices if they were to be trafficked out of Bulgaria;
• It is safe to suppose that purchasing coins abroad and importing them 
in Bulgaria to satisfy demand from local collectors could sometimes bring 
good profits;
296 Pachev, P., Peculiarities of the Pricing of Ancient Coins Compared to Other Heritage Items, pp. 2-3.
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• If local coin dealers aim to make extensive use of the high price differen-
tials at home and abroad in order to strike sizeable profits, they must be 
ready and willing to risk breaking all existing export controls. The only 
target market financially worthwhile, however, would be that of the US due 
to its very size and purchasing power unrivalled by any other industrialized 
state.
• The cultural property business has numerous specifics, such as mutual 
confidence and confidentiality between the trading parties that may take 
years to build, finding purchasers who would willingly engage in an illicit 
transaction or country-specific hurdles such as buyers suspecting they might 
be sold fake antiquities ”made in Bulgaria”. Therefore it is a trade plied by 
few informed participants.297
5.2. TRANS-BORDER ANTIQUITIES TRAFFICKING
Channel Operators and Mules
The volume of illicit antiquities export as well as its history and trends are not 
recorded with any consistency nor are sufficient hard data available. Certain 
figures provided by the customs agency could help draw a rough profile of the 
market states to which Bulgarian antiquities are exported, the actors physically 
involved in their transportation and the number and types of trafficked antiqui-
ties. The table below contains data on the attempts at illicit export prevented by 
border officers:
The main actors in antiquity smuggling are identified as follows:
• The so called mules known from drug-smuggling are paid to perform the 
physical transfer of antiquities often unaware of what is being transported 
or of its exact value, but agreeing to carry the goods across the border, 
sometimes in their private cars, for a certain fee.
297 Pachev, ... pp. 2-3
Table 18. Antiquities seized at Bulgarian borders
Year Number of border seizures Number of antique objects seized
2003 17 1,799
2004 12 517
2005 16 4,435
2006 15 6,220 plus 66 kilos of coins and artifacts
Source: Bulgarian Customs Agency
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• Channel operators run trafficking lines, hiring couriers and bribing border 
and customs officials as necessary. This role is often played by local an-
tiquity dealers who thus go international, entering in contact with foreign 
dealers or collectors. Sometimes human trafficking routes and their opera-
tors are used to smuggle out cultural objects.
• International dealers are traders or collectors, most often Bulgarian born, 
but living and conducting business from Western Europe or the US (roughly 
between 30 and 50 individuals). Some of them are former law-enforcement 
officers or have relatives serving in the security sector, thus having access 
to insider information about the dealing in antiquities and their smuggling 
routes. Apart from managing the financial side, i.e. the international bank 
transfers for purchased artifacts and the payments for transportation, they 
have to bring the antiquities to auction houses in the market countries or 
sell them through their own antique shops.
In recent years increasing attempts are made to use the door-to-door delivery 
services offered either by Bulgarian Posts or courier companies. In 2005 alone, 
108 attempted postal deliveries of antiquities or old coins concealed in parcels 
were intercepted. Most of them were addressed to recipients in Western Europe 
On April 1, 1994 preliminary criminal proceedings were started against Angel Borisov–brother of Nikola Filchev, 
later to become Bulgaria’s Prosecutor General–and several other persons in relation to possible contraband with 
old coins and other cultural goods. Three years later, on December 22, 1997 he was charged with contraband 
of antiquities and the offense was described by the lead investigator of the case as particularly grave. On May 
13, 1998 Angel Borisov was arrested at the Kalotina border check point in relation to the same investigation. 
He was detained in pre-trial custody, but eight days later, on March 21, 1998 the Sofia prosecutor Kiril Ivanov 
suspended the custodial measure without giving due reasons. Straight after his release the defendant left Bulgaria 
unhindered.
On March 23, 1999 the authorities at Frankfurt airport intercepted an attempt to export parcels with ancient 
coins whose sender and receiver were identical–Angel Borisov. The Bavarian customs authorities started a probe 
into the matter to find out that „previously, eight similar parcels had been freighted through Germany to the US” 
with a total weight of „over 1000 kilograms of antique coins and burial objects”. The person who had shipped 
the packages on behalf of Angel Borisov did not in the least try to hide the fact that he was acting on behalf of 
the Prosecutor General’s brother.
Upon request of the Bulgarian Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation all the documents concerning the case, 
in which coins and antiquities whose estimated value was 3,136,112 levs had been trafficked, were sent to them. 
No further information about the case has been publicized after that except a statement by the Prosecution Office 
that the inquiry into Angel Borisov’s case was still underway and that they had evidence that a company owned 
by him was selling antique coins online.
The online news agency Mediapool announced that the name of Angel Borisov, who has been living in Florida 
for several years already, was found under an internet offer selling coins, supposedly part of those stolen in the 
notorious Veliko Tarnovo museum robbery. 
Mediapool.bg. Bulgaria Looks for Its Illegally Exported Antiquities in Various Countries. Filchev’s Brother Still under Probes, 21 March 2007
Box 7. The case of Angel Filchev: dates and figures
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and the US and the senders had tried to conceal the items either in tin-foil, or 
carbon paper wrappings.298
Market States for Bulgarian-Found Antiquities
The main market countries to which antiquities are smuggled out from Bulgaria 
are Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the UK, the Netherlands, and overseas to 
the US and Canada.299 Bulgarian cultural objects are mostly directed to antique 
shops in Munich, Vienna, Geneva and other major cities in Western Europe where 
they are sold to private collectors or exhibited at the famous London salerooms 
where some of them are auctioned off to US purchasers purportedly as part of 
Western European heritage. These export routes are not merely demand driven, 
but also preferred because of simplified procedures with respect to antiquities 
with Bulgarian provenance. Until recently Germany, for instance, did not set any 
import requirements other than clearing customs and paying a fixed fee, thus 
asking no further questions about origin or ownership. Similarly they were easily 
legalized for exhibition at antique outlets and auctioneering inside the country.
Attempts at illicit export are concentrated at particular border points in their 
transit to those major export destinations. Most antiquity smuggling is registered 
at Kalotina, followed by Vrashka Chuka and Bregovo crossing points. At Kalotina 
antiquities were caught 23 times in 2003, five times both in 2004 and 2005, 
and three times in 2006.300 In addition, smuggling plots were foiled at Varna and 
Plovdiv airports in 2006 when four attempts to freight antiquities on passenger 
planes to Western European cities were made.
298 CCPOMPCD Report, 25 January 2007, p. 3.
299 CCPOMPCD Report, 25 January 2007, p.2.
300 Information by the Bulgarian Customs Agency about cultural property export violations.
The widely reported case of a unique Byzantine plate on sale at Christie’s in the fall of 2006 illustrated how dif-
ficult it is to return cultural property once it has been illicitly exported out of the source country. Despite the ef-
forts of Bulgarian Prosecutor General and Culture Minister to stop the tender, the auction was held, but fortunately 
there was no one to offer the minimum price of £300,000. Bulgarian authorities claimed that the dish was an 
object of extremely high artistic value and that it was one of the 13 Byzantine plates found near Bulgaria’s town 
of Pazardzhik in 1999. This set of dishes was the second find in the same area after 1903, when the so called 
Pazardzhik treasure was discovered. Unfortunately, Naiden Blangev, who found the second part of the treasure, 
does not possess the necessary photographic evidence to support Bulgaria’s claims.
Christie’s, on the other hand, claim that the London plate is part of the 13 or 14 dishes originally found in 1903. 
Later on, 11 of those were bought by the British carpet merchant А. Barry. In 2003, nine of the dishes were 
purchased by the private Greek Benaki Museum, whereas the London dish was sold a couple of times before 
reaching its present owner Sir Claude Hankes Drielsma, Chairman of the Windsor Leadership Trust. Dating the 
plate to 1903 means that the item would be beyond the scope of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means 
of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.
24 Chasa, 4 April 2007
Box 8. The London dish from Pazardzhik 
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The largest scale customs haul of antiquities so far was seized at Vrashka Chuka 
in the fall of 2006. A number of cardboard boxes were found in a truck cab 
containing 4,484 antique coins, 54 arrowheads, 27 antique appliqués, 57 rings, 
12 agricultural tools, 14 artifacts made of horn, 2 lead seals, and 375 other 
antique articles, amounting to a striking total of 5,040 objects. A few days later 
another sizeable catch was made on a train crossing through Kalotina–antiquities 
and old coins wrapped in 24 juice and milk cartons, weighing 66 kilograms.
Usually, Bulgarian nationals are involved in the transfer of antiquities in cars or 
buses. In 2003–2004 for instance, 60% of export control violations were per-
petrated by Bulgarians (43 individuals), while in seven cases the offender was 
unknown, as the items were found in postal or express packages, in such parts 
of buses where anyone could have cached them, or had been dumped in the 
surrounding area where they were subsequently found by customs officers. Cases 
of illegal antiquities export far outnumber illicit import–in 2003–2004 there were 
78 prevented exports against 11 caught imports. Although smaller in scale, the 
import of artifacts into Bulgaria testifies to the existence of sustained local col-
lector demand.
As Bulgaria joined the EU, rigorous discretionary checks at internal borders were 
removed. This is expected to channel illicit antiquities export to new destinations 
and pose the need for selective intelligence-led checks which will be made pos-
sible only if coordination between enforcement bodies and other state institutions 
on international trafficking routes and cases is significantly improved.
5.3. REGULATING THE MARKET IN ANTIQUITIES
In recent decades regulations affecting the market of illicit antiquities both 
across states (export prohibitions) and domestically (measures curbing the sup-
ply, e.g. looting and museum theft) have been tightening. The first international 
legislative instrument enacted with that aim was the 1970 UNESCO Convention on 
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership 
of Cultural Property. The Convention tries to establish common rules for tackling 
cultural property claims across national boundaries. Eighty six states had ratified 
the Convention by 1996, including an important market country such as France 
who did that recently, although the UK has not yet ratified it.
Other relevant global regulatory instruments are: the Convention for the Protec-
tion of World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972), European Convention for the Pro-
tection of the Cultural Heritage (1992), the Council of Europe Convention for the 
Protection of the Architectural Heritage in Europe (1985), the 1995 UNIDROIT301
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, and the 1986 Code of 
Ethics for Museums of the International Council of Museums (ICOM). ICOM 
introduces strict rules governing the acquisition and transfer of collections 
and the personal responsibility of museum employees involved in their pres-
ervation. In 1994 Interpol Secretary General, too, signed an appeal to gov-
ernments to take action against increasing illicit transfer. For the purpose of 
301 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law.
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protecting cultural objects that can be classified as ”national treasures” Council 
Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the Return of Cultural Objects Unlawfully 
Removed from the Territory of a Member State is effective in the EU.
Some states such as Germany have started in recent years to implement harsher 
import regulations for antiquities, and even British import controls, formerly 
among the most liberal, are becoming stricter. Traditional source states from 
Southern Europe such as Greece and Italy have greatly improved the coordina-
tion of their anti-trafficking efforts with Central European state, e.g. Switzerland. 
A model approach towards settling antiquities disputes and tackling their traffick-
ing is the pact signed by the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City and 
the Italian government, in which the Met agreed to return twenty-one artifacts302
in its collection that Italy claims were looted from archaeological sites within its 
borders. In exchange for the artifacts, Italy has lent the Met prestigious objects 
from Italian collections. Italy is now pressing the J. Paul Getty Museum in Los 
Angeles for the restitution of a statue of Aphrodite.303
5.4. ADOPTING EUROPEAN STANDARDS TO REGULATE 
THE MOVEMENT OF ANTIQUITIES
Bulgaria has signed a number of international legal instruments for the protection of 
cultural monuments304 and after the EU accession all legislation concerning culture 
protection is automatically to be applied in the country, most prominently Council 
Regulation 3911/92/EEC of 9 December 1992 on the export of cultural goods and 
Commission Regulation 752/93/EEC laying down provisions for the implementation 
of Council Regulation 3711/92/EEC. Notably, Regulation 3911/92/EEC allows each 
Member State to introduce additional national measures to protect its cultural heritage.
In 2004 a special Annex was added to the Law on Monuments of Culture and Mu-
seums (repealing the former Art. 33) to regulate permanent and temporary export 
of movable cultural property. This Annex contains a list of the range of items that 
can be defined as cultural goods in full compliance to Regulation 3911/92/EEC,305
whereas the three types of license already in use that must be attached to the 
customs declaration of exported cultural goods are pertinent to those prescribed 
in Regulation 752/93/EEC.306
302 For further details on the case, see: Watson, P., and C. Todeschini, The Medici Conspiracy. The 
Illicit Journey of Looted Antiquities–From Italy’s Tomb Raiders to the World’s Greatest Museums, New York, 
Public Affairs, 2006.
303 At the same time, the museum’s former curator of antiquities, Marion True, is on trial in Rome 
on charges of illicit antiquities trafficking (PND Philanthropy News Digest, 24 February 2006).
304 Among them are: Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage, CoE European Cultural Convention, Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage in 
Europe, Europe Agreement, establishing an association between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Bulgaria, of the other part.
305 See Mitnicheska Hronika No.5 (2006), p.10.
306 In line with the provisions of the law and the Ordinance on Regular and Temporary Export of Movable 
Cultural Property the customs bodies must ensure that the following documents are attached to 
the export customs declaration:
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Trans-border movement of monuments of culture is made possible by EU leg-
islation which sanctions legal export for antiquities that do not qualify as national 
treasures for which a certificate must be issued. Thus, moveable cultural property 
can be exported (temporarily) if it belongs to a collection legitimized under cur-
rent legislative provisions.
The following three types of export licenses are associated with the transfer of cultural objects from one Member 
State to another:
Standard license
• This license is issued for temporary or permanent export of separate cultural objects or a number of cultural 
objects in a single consignment.
• In order for a single export license to be issued for several cultural goods, the competent authorities must 
assess whether the goods are of the same category, part of the same consignment to the same export 
destination, and when the export is temporary the exporting party must be obliged to return the goods 
to the issuing Member State in the same consignment as exported. If those criteria are not met, separate 
licenses are issued for the individual cultural goods.
• When cultural goods are to be displayed at an exhibition or fair a license for temporary export is issued.
• The period of validity of the license cannot exceed twelve months from the date of issue.
Specific open license
• This license covers repeated temporary export of a specific cultural good (e.g. a musical instrument) which 
is liable to be temporarily exported from the Community on a regular basis for use and/or exhibition in 
a third country. The cultural good must be owned by, or be in the legitimate possession of, the particular 
person or organization that uses and/or exhibits the good.
• The person or organization concerned should offer all the guarantees considered necessary for the good to 
be returned in good condition to the Community.
• A license may not be valid for a period that exceeds 24 months.
General open license
• This license covers repeated temporary export of a cultural good which is liable to be temporarily exported 
from the Community on a regular basis for use and/or exhibition in a third country. 
• The goods must form part of the permanent collection of a museum or other institution.
• In the case of an application for temporary exportation, it must be specified which particular cultural goods 
shall remain outside the Community’s borders in the following 24 months.
• The license may be used to cover any combination of goods in the permanent collection at any one 
occasion of temporary export. It can be used to cover a series of different combinations of goods either 
consecutively or concurrently. 
• A license may only be issued if the authorities are convinced that the institution offers all the guarantees 
considered necessary for the good to be returned in good condition to the Community. 
• The period of validity of the license cannot exceed 24 months from the date of issue. 
Box 9. EU antiquities transfer related legislation
– for the cultural goods listed in the Annex to Art. c33а of LMCM–standard license, specific 
open license or general open license issued by the head of the Museums, Galleries and Fine 
Arts Directorate (MGFID) at the Ministry of Culture;
– for movable cultural objects classified as national treasures–temporary export license endorsed 
by the minister of culture;
– for cultural objects which are not covered in the Annex to Art. 33а of the Law and are not 
classified as national treasures–certificate issued by the Director for Museums, Galleries and 
Fine Arts.
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Legal temporary export makes it possible to share the Bulgarian cultural heritage 
with other European countries and in cooperation with various foreign cultural 
institutes to display it abroad. Such export is also an extra source of funding for 
Bulgarian museums. In 2005–2006 a variety of museum collections were displayed 
in Western Europe and the US or exponents were transported there for resto-
ration and conservation under the conditions for temporary export of movable 
cultural objects which the Bulgarian Ministry of Culture assessed as the most 
valuable. In 2005 alone, 535 temporary export licenses were issued, while in the 
period January through October of 2006 their number was 296 and was expected 
to reach 796 by the end of the year. The figures indicate that this type of export 
has grown 1.5 times compared to earlier periods.307
Local collectors, however, have voiced their criticism of the practice of display-
ing prime national treasures in foreign museums for extended periods as being 
less than worthwhile considering the fairly small revenue such exhibitions bring 
to local museums, especially against the background of general Western rates. 
The much needed promotion of Bulgarian heritage abroad must be balanced off 
by sufficiently long exhibits at home in order to sustain tourist interest and foster 
the tourism industry. 
307 See Mitnicheska Hronika, No.5 (2006), p.11.
In January 2007, ancient Bulgarian artifacts from the private collection of Mr. Vassil Bozhkov were offered for 
display at the European Parliament within an exhibition under the title ”The Grandeur of Bulgaria” to mark 
Bulgaria’s entry into the EU. Many Bulgarian parliamentarians in Brussels boycotted the event and tried to win 
support from other MPs to stop the exhibit as shameful to the institution. The scandal was widely covered in 
the Bulgarian media which criticized it as the first attempt to legalize the private collection of Mr. Bozhkov, 
supposedly the richest Bulgarian, much of whose money comes from the gambling industry. National History 
Museum Director Bozhidar Dimitrov reported that Bozhkov had produced provenance documents for his exhibits 
showing that nearly half of the objects had been bought from foreign owners and the remainder had belonged 
to Bulgarian collectors.
The event brought into focus the intimate ties between the Thracia Foundation, set up by Bozhkov and the 
archaeological community in Bulgaria, especially as certain prominent figures such as art history Professor Ivan 
Marazov, and the world-famous Bulgarian painter Svetlin Rusev were among the organizers. Forty artifacts were 
shown out of the registered 132-item collection which Bozhkov is planning to make the core of a private museum 
he reportedly intends to open in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Prosecution Office has started an inquiry into the legality 
of the exhibited objects, although it had initially authorized its export to Brussels. Some Bulgarian collectors have 
voiced concerns that political squabbles over Bozhkov’s business activities may affect negatively the legalization 
of all private collections suitable for public display. The Ministry of Culture was also reproved for sanctioning the 
collection as a launch emblem of Bulgaria’s EU membership.
Box 10. ”The Grandeur of Bulgaria”: notes on a scandal
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5.5. REGULATING THE PROTECTION AND MOVEMENT OF ANTIQUITIES
Legislation regulating matters of antiquity ownership and trade in Bulgaria is a 
paradoxical mix of the conservative and liberal approaches. The 1969 Law on 
the Monuments of Culture and Museums was inherited from the communist era 
and despite its numerous amendments attempting to modernize it, it is still domi-
nated by the logic of state ownership over cultural property.308 LMCM does not 
explicitly ban private ownership of antiquities, but it does in no way regulate the 
respective market relations, either. There is a well established collector network 
while numismatic clubs can be found in nearly any city in Bulgaria. Coin collec-
tors in particular are supported through invitations to participate in joint exhibits 
with state museums. The legal status of private collectors and their collections, 
however, remains vague and thus vulnerable to improper political influence.
Halfway through this decade, though, the issue most debated in relation to curb-
ing criminal antiquity trading had become that of making allegedly illicit private 
collections legal.309 Affected by mounting public criticism, on 28 January 2005 the 
Ministry of Culture adopted its Ordinance No.1 on the Rating of Registered Mov-
able Monuments of Culture Property of Legal and Natural Persons promulgated 
in the Bulgarian State Gazette on 8 February 2005.310 Its main aim is to set the 
terms for private collection registration which will make privately-owned antiqui-
ties legal and available for public exhibitions. The Ordinance requires any legal 
entity or individual in possession of cultural property to complete and submit a 
registration form at the closest regional or specialized state museum, but defines 
no fixed term for the registration. The registration papers deposited so far show 
that collectors tend to avoid suspicions about the legality of antiquities by declar-
ing that they have bought the items at overseas auction houses or antique stores. 
Only very few private collections have been registered so far, among them the 
notorious lots of Vasil Bozhkov and Dimitar Ivanov.
There are a number of arguments against the feasibility and effectiveness of the 
Ordinance as it is written.311 First, there is little trust among collectors towards law 
308 It defines monuments of culture as belonging to the nation, while legal ownership can be the 
state’s, municipal, or of legal and natural persons. Items, discovered in archaeological excava-
tions, automatically become state-owned (Art.16, Par.1 of LMCM), but legal experts claim it is 
more accurate to define it as so called ”private state property” as excavated monuments of 
culture are liable to appropriation and become property of legal entities or persons. Any other 
monuments of culture that have been buried underground, walled in or concealed in another 
manner, so that their owner could in no way be established, also become private state property 
straight after discovery. These objects are the so called treasures in relation to which there is no 
consistent state policy and treasure finders are in no way encouraged by the state to turn in 
their finds. Krasimir Manev, a legal expert, claims that ”the Law on Property and the Law on 
Monuments of Culture and Museums contain conflicting provisions on this subject, and in reality 
treasure finders are sometimes not even financially compensated. This strongly discourages them 
from turning in or registering with the local museum any such items they might hold ... and in 
this way cultural property crime is encouraged”. See Mitnicheska Hronika, No.5 (2006), p. 15).
309 Estimates about the number of those collections vary–from 1,000 large collections to 30,000 
small-scale owners of several artifacts or coins (See Lazarova, B. and N. Alexandrova, ”Exactly 
how many collectors are there in Bulgaria?”, Darik News, 17 January 2007). The larger part of 
the collector community are members of the Association of Numismatic Societies in Bulgaria in 
which over 120 numismatic clubs are signed up.
310 State Gazette 13/2005.
311 Interviews with prominent coin collectors, December 2006 – January 2007.
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enforcement bodies and museum staff. During the interviews, carried out for the 
purpose of this paper, it was made clear that the prescribed system of registration 
by commissions made up of local museum employees was not found trustworthy, 
as it did not provide safeguards against the theft of valuable coins which could be 
replaced with cheaper lower-grade versions by museum workers.312 Next, cultural 
object owners are required to pay for the photographs that must be appended to 
every single coin/artifact as well as a registration fee and an expert appraisal fee 
(for grading by the commission), which collectors consider a redundant financial 
burden. Last, but not least, collectors argue that legalization is worthwhile only 
for the owners of antiquities other than coins, such as statues and artifacts, but 
it is unfeasible for coin collections given the great turnover of items.313
The pervasive unwillingness of collectors to go legal seems to be rooted in the 
very channels of acquiring their collections (as no amnesty is planned for ob-
jects illicitly acquired in the past314) combined with the rather fuzzy prospects 
of properly regulating such trade in the foreseeable future. Even in the case of 
registration the lack of documents of legal provenance (much more likely when 
the antiquities were acquired in Bulgaria, rather than abroad) and the fact that 
no regulations are in place to provide for the future enrichment of the collections 
would further discourage most collectors already divided between the benefits of 
the legal and the black market.
The interviews with stakeholders–policy makers, collectors, museum employees, 
and archaeologists–have demonstrated that the convergence of their disparate 
interests is highly unlikely due to the lack of dialogue between government, civil 
society and the media. This runs the risk of law makers focusing on drafting 
strict penal measures without seeking any input from the collector commu-
nity. Such an approach would lead to some easily imaginable measures and 
trends–clamping down on currently legal cultural object exchanges as the one in 
Veliko Tarnovo, an increase of contraband between Bulgaria and EU countries as 
border control is being relaxed, and promoting some collectors while using legal 
harassment against others. This would make it easy for each round of incumbents 
in office to try to affect the market of antiquities for their own benefit. 
To encourage registration of private collections which begun rather tentatively in 
2005, stakeholders must be involved in an effective dialogue leading to a con-
sensus on cultural property issues. Prior to voting a new law on cultural monu-
ments, government institutions and civil society should launch a wide debate
on the regulation of cultural objects movement and protection.315 One important 
312 Some collectors have voiced their suspicions that past burglaries of private coin collections have 
been committed with the involvement of corrupt police officers or other enforcement officials.
313 Arguments such as this have been in circulation for a long time in the debate over the liberal-
ization of the coin market in Bulgaria.
314 Illicit ancient artifact collections can still be prosecuted as misdemeanors as the offense of 
”concealing stolen objects” has a statutory limitation of 10 years. In this way the collector could 
avoid harsher sanctions by merely declaring a period of ownership longer than 10 years.
315 On 21 February 2007 the Sofia-based Red House Center for Culture and Debate hosted the 
first major public event devoted to the philosophy and principles of the future law on cultural 
heritage that is currently in preparation. The debate highlighted the disagreements between 
policy-makers, administrators, experts, private collectors, and journalists and the acute need to 
make civil society involved in debating legislation a regular practice.
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issue, carefully evaded so far, is whether an amnesty for all illegal or quasi-legal 
collections acquired in an earlier period should be introduced.
On the other hand, the poor regulatory framework may be a logical consequence 
of the negligible cultural heritage protection efforts of the government itself, at 
least compared to the strong pressure by corrupt officials and culture experts, 
antiquity traffickers, dealers and grassroots looters interested in keeping the cur-
rent chaos and their own impunity.
The government’s indecision in tackling domestic antiquities trade and their 
smuggling abroad is exemplified by poor inter-agency coordination – the Minis-
try of Interior, local authorities, the Ministry of Culture, archaeological institutes 
(one major institute is part of the Bulgarian Academy of Science), and the in-
vestigation and prosecution services. The laxity of measures against illicit antique 
dealing from the late 1990s to the present day contrasts sharply with peaking 
enforcement efforts against other syndicate crime branches. During this period 
the prosecution failed to pursue any charges against encroachments on cultural 
monuments, thus debilitating the efforts of MoI enforcement agencies and other 
institutions dealing with the heritage. Contrary to all logic, in 1999 the anti-traf-
ficking department for cultural property at the then National Service (now Chief 
Directorate) for Combating Organized Crime (NSCOC) was closed down. Pros-
ecution and police officials have called this a major mistake that not only makes 
life easy for criminals, but also gives full scope to corrupt local level MoI officers. 
The above-mentioned department was re-established in 2006 and although a unit 
with similar functions had operated at the national police, it had had to start 
from scratch having received no prior information, experience or methodological 
guidance to fight looters and traffickers. Meanwhile the network of informers, 
whose role in detecting illicit domestic trade and trans-border trafficking is cen-
tral, was irreversibly lost. 
Inertia and neglect are not the only factors to throttle effective enforcement. 
Widespread corruption among local middle-ranking law-enforcement officers who 
earn personal gains on the black cultural property market also has an adverse ef-
fect. Experts have outlined three major forms of corrupt relationships between 
police officers and antique dealers/looters: 1) policemen are bribed to cover 
looters and deter police investigation; 2) officers of higher rank become directly 
involved in illicit antiquities trading, and 3) officers that must prevent and fight 
cultural property violations become collectors.316 In addition, the grading of cul-
tural objects held by looters, dealers or collectors is itself often done by would-be 
experts whose only training is a two-week course delivered by the Privatization 
Agency on a regular basis that can hardly have equipped them with the knowl-
edge they need to possess about cultural goods. Despite their determination to 
get looters or persons in illicit hold of antiquities convicted, law-enforcement and 
investigative bodies are often hampered by either incompetent or intentionally 
falsified expert assessments presented at the trial phase.
316 In 2003, the head of Cultural Property Department at the National Police Col. Georgi Getov 
was discharged. According to media reports he had operated one of the main antiquity smug-
gling channels in Bulgaria in partnership with a number of prosecutors, NSCOC officers, local 
archaeological museum directors and other officials who had served as a supply link between 
looters and the implicated department head. Maritsa Dnes daily, 7 May 2003.
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The complex mixture of relations–criminal, quasi-legal and legal–between the ac-
tors on the cultural property market poses the need for a sophisticated regulatory 
framework that would ensure due protection of the national cultural heritage, 
while lifting some of the unwarranted restraints on private collecting to put it 
in line with the common European practice. Reconciling the wide spectrum of 
public and private interests would highly increase the efficiency of any mecha-
nism targeting the black market of antiquities or their contraband trafficking out 
of the country.
• The new law on the monuments of culture under preparation should be consulted with the equal partici-
pation of an expert group nominated by and representing the Association of Numismatic Societies.
• Cultural objects kept in both public and private collections should be treated equally by law, including a 
great number of items found among the private belongings of individuals inherited from past generations.
• The ownership rights of citizens over cultural objects they possess should be guaranteed by law and a new, 
more precise policy on their grading should be adopted. A balanced policy should also be drawn to facili-
tate the purchase of antiquities held by individual citizens as well as cultural objects exchange or trading 
at specialized legal venues, such as shops and auction houses.
• An official cultural objects classification system should be introduced requiring the mandatory registration on 
a special list of items classified as protected world and national cultural heritage, while all other monuments 
would be regarded as movable cultural property suitable for mass distribution that can be bought and sold 
freely.
• State support to the association of private collectors and the exhibit of private collections within Bulgaria 
should be renewed. This would boost tourism, investment, and the cultural development of regions through-
out Bulgaria.
Box 12. The proposals of collectors317
In 2006, the Bulgarian Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation (SPOC) undertook a sequence of high-profile steps 
to tackle violations on cultural property. The newly elected Prosecutor General, Mr. Boris Velchev, established an 
inter-agency consultation group made up of prosecutors and experts from various ministries that would undertake 
a thorough analysis of the current cultural property violations control system and attempt to formulate an effective 
strategy to counteract such violations in the future. The SPOC has also formed a separate unit to target museum 
thefts and looting offences. So far prosecutor warrants have been issued by virtue of which 480 cultural sites must 
be specially safeguarded. A review of all related cases has been made and 11 prosecutor case termination writs 
have been cancelled. It was found that 14 of all cultural property violation cases tried since 2001 have ended in 
convictions. The number of actions brought against looters and cultural items traffickers in recent years exceeds 
200 cases annually. 
Box 11. The prosecution vs. the mafia
317 These are the core proposals drawn by Mr. Stavri Toplaov, who heads the expert group with 
the Association of Numismatic Societies which were presented and debated at the February 21, 
2007 Red House event together with several other recommendations.
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Public cultural heritage strategies as well as concrete policies must be designed 
while keeping in mind the fact that this market functions like communicating 
vessels. Restrictions or a ban over legal domestic trade in antiquities, for instance, 
would push black market prices down which in turn would fuel outbound smug-
gling. The latter could result in the loss of numerous collections to the Bulgarian 
public. Conversely, generous liberalization unaccompanied by strict prosecution 
of looting would cause clandestine excavations to spawn and would inflict lasting 
damages on archaeological sites. 
Several measures could be recommended to help avoid these risks:
• Modernize the legislation that governs heritage protection and keeps 
the black market of antiquities in check by adopting a new Law on the 
Monuments of Culture and Museums adequate to present-day realities 
and by incorporating relevant texts in the Criminal Code. The Law should 
provide for the currently unregulated issues such as the rights of owner-
ship, use, and inheritance; the purchase, sale and transfer of antiquities; 
concessions of immovable cultural property; subtler differentiation between 
national cultural heritage monuments and utilitarian articles, as the latter 
are in greatest demand by collectors. The new criminal provisions need to 
impose stricter penalties for violations involving cultural items.
• Step up law enforcement and criminal prosecution in cases of clandestine 
excavation and cultural sites vandalism, also by prohibiting the use of metal 
detectors, in order to curb looting. Financial rewards for accidentally found 
articles and a mechanism for public museums to buy cultural items at at-
tractive prices would also rein in looting appetites.
• Improve international coordination to prevent the sale of contraband 
antiquities from Bulgaria at auction houses in Western Europe. This would 
probably deter attempts to traffic local cultural goods across the Bulgar-
ian border.
• Launch a catalog of cultural objects from museum funds as required by 
current international standards and tighten museum security measures to 
reduce museum thefts and illicit coin substitutions and enable the return 
of illegally exported antiquities to Bulgaria.
• Provide options to legalize currently quasi-legal domestic transactions 
with cultural goods not least by delimiting the role of all market actors in 
the law. 
Effective up-to-date regulation will necessarily involve leaving behind the domi-
nant culture of isolation among the institutions whose task it is to tackle looting 
and the illicit dealing and transfer of antiquities. To establish a sound mechanism 
for protecting cultural monuments the competent authorities would have to en-
gage in coordinated efforts at several levels:
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• among the agencies of particular ministries, such as the police and the 
Chief Directorate for Combating Organized Crime which should engage in 
consistent information exchange and coordinated action;
• among the various ministries, e.g. the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of 
Finance (in particular, the Customs Agency) and the Ministry of Interior, 
whose work would gain immensely from a commonly maintained and ac-
cessible data base and the collating of relevant information;
• between central government and local authorities; the Ministry of Culture 
in particular should demonstrate greater commitment to the government 
of regional museums and seek the cooperation of town mayors and the 
management of municipal museums.
• between the MoI and the Prosecutor General’s Office; a series of joint 
actions against monument looting and antiquities trafficking carried out in 
2006 demonstrated the good effects of such coordination;
• public–private partnership involving the relevant institutions, the local au-
thorities, the Bulgarian Orthodox synod and other religious councils, non-
governmental organizations and the media, with the primary aim of in-
creasing civil society participation in the debate on cultural heritage market 
policy and practice.

CONCLUSION
This study is published as part of a series of analyses of the Center for the Study of 
Democracy and attempts to offer a fairly comprehensive view of organized crime 
in its development throughout the transition period. Although law enforcement 
and judiciary institutions have had a certain amount of information on organized 
crime its analysis has not been carried out systematically due to insufficient 
capacity and lack of sustainable efforts. Public attention has been confined to 
short-lived media coverage, while the partisan approach has prevented consensus 
on effective policies. A sensationalist approach coupled with the understandable 
impatience of the European Commission with the lack of progress further make 
prospects of a breakthrough problematic.
In the last decade, the establishment of public-private partnerships as an effective 
model has been a positive step towards tackling organized crime. The non-
governmental sector has provided a platform for a debate free of partisanship and 
inert-institutional strife. Additionally, institutions of the state have the chance to 
open to the community and gradually strengthen democratic transparency. Much 
of the road forward to a new culture of open and accountable administration 
and governance, however, remains to be traveled. The relatively new experience 
of public-private partnership has survived the initial skepticism and revealed the 
availability and potential of sound expertise, particularly in the monitoring and 
assessment of organized crime markets and trends. Partnership thus needs to 
go further and contribute to the acceleration of institutional developments, as 
well as advanced policy-making and practice, in an aspiration to emulate the 
best European models.
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318 Article 33a of LMCM reads as follows: ”Movable monuments of culture belonging to one of the 
categories stipulated in the Annex and movable monuments of culture constituting a national 
asset may be exported from the territory of the country under conditions and following a pro-
cedure defined in an Ordinance adopted by the Council of Ministers on a proposal submitted 
by the Minister of Culture and the Minister of Finance.”
Annex to Article 33a318 of the Bulgarian Law on Monuments of 
Culture and Museums (new, SG No. 55/2004, in force as 
of 1 January 2005)
№ Category Age Value (in levs) 
from 
1 January until 
31 December 
2005
Value (in levs) 
from 1 January 
2006 until full 
membership of 
Bulgaria in the 
European Union
Value (in levs) 
at the time of 
full membership 
of Bulgaria in 
the European 
Union
1.
Archaeological objects which 
are the products of:
– excavations and finds on 
land and under water;
– archaeological sites;
– archaeological collections
dating more than 100 
years back
irrespective of 
the value
irrespective of 
the value
irrespective of 
the value
2.
Elements forming an integral 
part of artistic, historical or 
religious monuments which 
have been dismembered
dating more than 100 
years back
irrespective of 
the value
irrespective of 
the value
irrespective of 
the value
3.
Pictures and paintings other 
than those included in 
categories 4 and 5, executed 
entirely by hand in any 
medium or on any material
above 100,000 above 200,000 above 300,000
4.
Water colours, gouaches and 
pastels executed entirely by 
hand on any material
more than 50 years 
old and not belonging 
to their authors
above 20,000 above 40,000 above 60,000
5.
Mosaics in any material 
executed entirely by hand, 
other than those falling 
in categories 1 or 2, and 
drawings in any medium
executed entirely by hand on 
any material 
above 10,000 above 20,000 above 30,000
6.
Original engravings, prints, 
serigraphs and lithographs 
with their respective plates 
and original posters
more than 50 years 
old and not belonging 
to their authors
above 10,000 above 20,000 above 30,000
7.
Original sculptures or statuary 
and copies
produced by the same 
process as the original (1),
other than those in category 1
more than 50 years 
old and not belonging 
to their authors
above 60,000 above 80,000 above 100,000
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Annex to Article 33a
№ Category Age Value (in levs) 
from 
1 January until 
31 December 
2005
Value (in levs) 
from 1 January 
2006 until full 
membership of 
Bulgaria in the 
European Union
Value (in levs) 
at the time of 
full membership 
of Bulgaria in 
the European 
Union
8.
Photographs, films and 
negatives thereof
more than 50 years 
old and not belonging 
to their authors
above 10,000 above 20,000 above 30,000
9.
Incunabula and manuscripts, 
including maps and musical 
scores, singly or in collections
more than 50 years 
old and not belonging 
to their authors
irrespective of 
the value
irrespective of 
the value
irrespective of 
the value
10. Books, singly or in collections
dating more than 100 
years back
above 60,000 above 80,000 above 100,000
11. Printed maps
dating more than 100 
years back
above 10,000 above 20,000 above 30,000
12.
Archives, and any elements 
thereof, of any kind or any 
medium
dating more than 50 
years back
irrespective of 
the value
irrespective of 
the value
irrespective of 
the value
13.
а) Collections and specimens 
from zoological, botanical, 
mineralogical or 
anatomical collections;
б) Collections of historical, 
palaeontological, 
ethnographic or 
numismatic interest
above 60,000 above 80,000 above 100,000
14.
Means of transport, presented 
independently, their parts and 
units
dating more than 50 
years back
above 60,000 above 80,000 above 100,000
15.
Any other antique items not 
included in categories 1 to 14:
– toys, games;
– glassware;
– jewellery;
– furniture and household 
objects;
– optical, photographic or 
cinematographic apparatus
– geodesic equipment;
– technological objects;
– musical instruments;
– clocks and watches and 
parts thereof;
– articles of wood;
– pottery;
– tapestries;
– carpets;
– wallpaper;
– arms.
dating between 50 and 
100 years back
above 60,000 above 80,000 above 100,000
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Annex to Article 33a
№ Category Age Value (in levs) 
from 
1 January until 
31 December 
2005
Value (in levs) 
from 1 January 
2006 until full 
membership of 
Bulgaria in the 
European Union
Value (in levs) 
at the time of 
full membership 
of Bulgaria in 
the European 
Union
16.
Any other antique items not 
included in categories 1 to 14
above 100 years above 60,000 above 80,000 above 100,000
Notes:
1. Objects for collections under category 13 shall be those objects that possess the qualities necessary for an object to be made part of 
a certain collection, i. e., the objects that are relatively rare, usually not used according to their original purpose, subject to special 
deals outside the trade usual with such utilitarian objects, and having a high value.
2. Postcards shall belong to category 6.
3. The books containing handwritten annotations other than title-page dedications, shall be considered manuscripts and placed under 
category 9.
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